



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

September 2018

Readers are encouraged to reproduce material from ODI publications for their own outputs, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI.



Foreword


Louise Arbour, UN Special Representative for International Migration

Migration is an overwhelmingly positive story. The web of interactions between host communities, migrants and those locations from which they travel is one of great economic, social and cultural richness.

Yet the full potential and nature of this relationship is not sufficiently understood. As migration emerges as a global issue requiring global solutions, there is a risk that development policies are only considered as tools to address the root causes of migration, or that aid is used to deter migration from low-income countries. Instead, it is important to consider how migration can facilitate development and improve opportunities for all.

I am therefore delighted to welcome this series of briefings which explore how migration can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from gender equality to urbanisation, climate change and poverty reduction. These briefings are essential reading for anyone tasked with implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, yet unsure about the how and whether migration can help achieve specific SDGs.

The evidence presented here clearly shows that migration will impact the achievement of all goals, and that development will have an impact on future migration. It is crucial that we understand this interrelationship if we are to achieve our common goals of promoting safe, orderly and regular migration, and holistic sustainable development.



Contents

Foreword	1
Louise Arbour, UN Special Representative for International Migration	
Overview	5
Marta Foresti and Jessica Hagen-Zanker with Helen Dempster	
Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	15
Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Hannah Postel and Elisa Mosler Vidal	
Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	33
Richard Mallett	
Urbanisation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	53
Paula Lucci, Dina Mansour-Ille, Evan Easton-Calabria and Clare Cummings	
Gender equality, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	69
Tam O'Neil, Anjali Fleury and Marta Foresti	
Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	83
Susan Nicolai, Joseph Wales and Erica Aiazzi	
Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	101
Olivia Tulloch, Fortunate Machingura and Claire Melamed	
Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	115
Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Elisa Mosler Vidal and Georgina Sturge	
Water and sanitation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	131
Guy Jobbins, Ian Langdown and Giselle Bernard	
Energy, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	147
Andrew Scott, Leah Worrall and Sam Pickard	
Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	165
Katy Long, Elisa Mosler Vidal, Amelia Kuch and Jessica Hagen-Zanker	
Technology, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	181
Stephen Gelb and Aarti Krishnan	
Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	201
Emily Wilkinson, Lisa Schipper, Catherine Simonet and Zaneta Kubik	

Overview

Marta Foresti and Jessica Hagen-Zanker with Helen Dempster

1 Migration, development and the 2030 Agenda

Migration is one of the defining features of the 21st century. It contributes significantly to all aspects of economic and social development everywhere, and as such will be key to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Although the relationship between migration and development is increasingly recognised, it remains under-explored. We know that a lack of opportunities and investment in origin countries can drive migration. But we also know that migration can improve development and investment in origin countries, fill labour gaps and foster innovation in host countries, and can contribute to development along the journey (or, in ‘transit countries’). It is an effective poverty reduction tool – not just for migrants themselves, but also for their families and their wider communities.

Migration can contribute to positive development outcomes and, ultimately, to realising the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the ‘2030 Agenda’). To do this, we need to understand the impact of migration on the achievement of all SDGs, and – equally – the impact this achievement will have on future migration patterns. As member states and international institutions are starting to discuss how to implement the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), it is more important than ever to understand these links and their implications for policy.

In a series of 12 policy briefings, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has analysed the links between migration¹ and development outcomes in key areas: poverty, decent work, urbanisation, gender, education, health, social protection, water and sanitation, energy, citizenship, technology and climate change. Each briefing explores how migration affects different kinds of development outcomes and, in turn, the achievement of the SDGs. It also offers pragmatic recommendations to ensure that migration is incorporated into the 2030 Agenda and contributes to positive development outcomes.

The 2030 Agenda is well placed to reflect and exploit the links between migration and development for three reasons. First, the 2030 Agenda is the first international development framework to include and recognise migration as a dimension of development. The Agenda includes migration related targets and recognises its important contribution to sustainable development, while acknowledging the specific vulnerabilities migrants may face (UN, 2015).

Second, as we show here, migration interacts with all dimensions of development. The multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of the 2030 Agenda is a useful platform to assess the impact of migration and human mobility on a range of development issues (Lönnback, 2014). This is not just important in terms of problem analysis but also offers opportunities for finding policy solutions.

Finally, and crucially, the 2030 Agenda is supported by the necessary political ‘traction’ in different member states and in the multilateral system. The impacts of migration can be felt at all stages of the journey – notably in both origin and host countries – and as such it interacts with different sectors, requiring coordination between multiple actors and enhanced coherence across policies. This kind of coordination is only possible with high-level buy-in, something the SDGs have already secured. Furthermore, the SDGs’ multi-disciplinary nature increases the potential for multi-stakeholder collaboration (Mosler Vidal, 2017).

1.1 How does migration feature in the 2030 Agenda?

The 2030 Agenda includes a number of targets which recognise the economic value of migrants including SDGs 4, 5, 8, 10, 16 and 17 (Table 1). In particular, target 10.7 – the cornerstone of migration in the 2030 Agenda – calls for the facilitation of ‘safe, regular and responsible migration’ and the implementation of ‘well-managed migration policies’.

Outside these targets, however, the Agenda is silent on the broader contribution of migration to development outcomes. These omitted and ‘indirect’ links between migration and development are the focus of our work.

1 The main focus of the project was on international labour migration, though the briefings also considered internal migration (notably the briefing on urbanisation) and forced displacement (particularly the briefings on climate change and education).

Table 1 The targets that mention migration

4.b	By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries in particular LDCs, SIDS and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and ICT, technical, engineering and scientific programmes in developed countries and other developing countries
5.2	Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation
8.7	Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms
8.8	Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment
10.7	Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
10.c	By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%
16.2	End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
17.18	By 2020, enhance capacity building support to developing countries, including for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts

Source: UN, 2015

If countries are to achieve the SDGs, they need to consider the impact of migration at *all* levels and on *all* outcomes, beyond the targets in Table 1. Our analysis, which has explored the links between migration and 15 of the 17 SDGs, shows that migration is not a development ‘problem’ to be solved (as is the subtext of SDG 10.7), but a mechanism or a strategy that can **contribute to the achievement** of many of the goals. To do this, governments and other actors need to identify the multiple linkages between migration and different goals and targets (Table 2), while at the same time also recognising that migrants can also be vulnerable and should be considered under the general principle of ‘leaving no one behind’.

2 Linking migration, development and the 2030 Agenda

Five main conclusions emerged from our work:

Conclusion 1 Migration is a powerful poverty reduction tool, which can contribute to the achievement of all SDGs

Labour migration can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, their families, and their origin and host countries. Migrants and their families benefit from increased income and knowledge, which allows them to spend more on basic needs, more reliable and modern energy services, access education and health services, and make investments (SDGs 1, 3, 4 and 7). For female migrants, increased economic resources can improve their autonomy and socioeconomic status (SDG 5). In origin countries, migration can lead to increased wages and greater economic growth through higher incomes,

spending, knowledge and technology transfer, and investment of migrant households (SDGs 8 and 9). In host countries, migrants can fill labour gaps, contribute to services and increase government budget through taxes and social security contributions (SDGs 1, 8 and 9).

However, migration does not always achieve its full potential. Our analysis on migration and sustainable cities finds that poor, urban migrants often work in the informal sector where the rewards of migration are lower (Lucci et al., 2016). Likewise, the ability of low- and semi-skilled labour migrants to access decent work is highly constrained (Mallett, 2018). In relation to poverty, our research reveals that the high costs involved in different stages of the migration process reduce financial payoffs, and that restrictions on mobility prevent those who would benefit the most from migrating in a regular and orderly way (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a). More predictable, inclusive and orderly migration processes would allow migrants, their families and host areas better reap the benefits from migration.

Conclusion 2 Migrants can contribute to the provision and delivery of services and to greater development in host countries

Migrants contribute to better service provision and make vital contributions to host countries as workers and consumers. These potential benefits are stifled when access to basic services is denied or limited, undercutting the potential positive benefits of migrant contributions.

By providing them with access to education and training, migrants and their children will be better equipped to help fill labour market needs, increasing their local market contribution, their earning potential, and the remittances they send home. More broadly, access to education helps achieve economic and social

benefits such as improved livelihoods, better health outcomes, reductions in gender inequities and enhanced political participation, helping to achieve a broad range of SDGs (Long et al., 2017; Nicolai et al., 2017).

Likewise, granting access to healthcare and health services is crucial to ensure the health of migrants and their contributions as workers. But it also has important benefits for the general population in host countries. For instance, the entire population benefits from a reduced risk of communicable diseases when migrant children are vaccinated. Importantly, migrants often directly contribute to providing health and care services, which in many countries are increasingly reliable on migrant labour (O’Neil et al., 2016; Tulloch et al., 2016). Concerning social protection, migrants can make important contributions to the fiscal balance of host countries, as the contributions they make in terms of taxes and other payments outweigh the benefits and services they receive (Hagen-Zanker, 2018).

Yet, granting migrants access to services is not without challenges – particularly when migration is unexpected or not accounted for. Large and unexpected migration flows can disrupt education systems, disadvantage migrant and refugee children, and create tensions in host communities (Nicolai et al., 2017). Likewise, for water and sanitation we also see that service providers may struggle to provide services when large (and potentially unexpected) movements of people cause rapid fluctuations in service demand, particularly where competition over water resources is already high, or where host communities already have low levels of service access (Jobbins et al., 2018; Lucci et al., 2016).

Importantly, the challenges to overcome barriers to migrants’ access to basic services are not technical and often not even financial: for instance, the challenge in extending water and sanitation access to migrants is often one of effective governance (ibid.).

Conclusion 3 The specific risks and vulnerabilities of migrants are often overlooked

The risks and vulnerabilities of migrants throughout the migration process are often overlooked in development policies and programmes, the 2030 Agenda included. Migrants experience both migration-specific vulnerabilities – that is, experienced by migrants only – and migration-intensified vulnerabilities – when migration exacerbates a disadvantage that can be experienced by all (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003).

Examples of **migration-specific** vulnerabilities include:

- Female migrants, who tend to work in less regulated and less visible sectors, are at greater risk of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking (O’Neil et al., 2016).
- Migration due to climate change can lead to further risk accumulation in cities (Wilkinson et al., 2016).

Examples of **migration-intensified** vulnerabilities include:

- Migrants are more likely to live in informal settlements, lacking access to health, education, water and sanitation, energy and social protection services (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017b; Jobbins et al., 2018; Nicolai et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2018; Tulloch et al., 2016).
- Migrants are relatively more likely than other workers to work in precarious forms of employment (Mallett, 2018).
- Migrants may experience a worsening in their access to modern energy services, compared to their pre-migration situation (Scott et al., 2018).

Beyond SDGs 5.2, 8.7, 8.8 and 16.2, these risks and vulnerabilities are overlooked in the 2030 Agenda and thus risk being excluded from national policies and programmes.

Conclusion 4 The implementation of existing programmes of support for migrants is often weak

Access to basic services, such as health, education, social protection, water, sanitation and energy, are key for migrants’ livelihoods and development prospects. But while in some cases migrants can access such services through existing or specifically designed interventions, the implementation of such programmes is often weak and levels of uptake low. For example, in principle, three quarters of the world’s migrants are entitled to some form of social protection through a multilateral, bilateral or unilateral agreement but in practice enforcement of these agreements is poor and effective social protection coverage is low (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017b).

A number of factors contribute to low effective coverage, including limited capacity in implementing institutions, funding gaps, a lack of political support and reluctance among migrants to opt in. While often eligible for education, immigrant students tend to face greater difficulties than their host country peers in accessing education and achieving good learning outcomes (Nicolai et al., 2017). And in Thailand, migrants are eligible for the country’s universal health care scheme but uptake is low due to language and cultural barriers, fear of discrimination, fear of losing employment due to absence and poor employer compliance with the scheme (Tulloch et al., 2016).

Conclusion 5 There are major data gaps

Finally, data is often not disaggregated by migrant status or comparable across different groups and countries. As a result, we do not know the share of migrants actually able to participate in social protection programmes, access health, water or energy services or attend school. The poor visibility of migrants in data limits understanding of their needs and reduces the accountability of governments and service providers

(Jobbins et al., 2018). The collection and monitoring of this disaggregated data, accompanied by migrant-specific indicators, is vital to understand the vulnerabilities and needs of migrants. Only then can governments and non-governmental organisations design migrant specific and sensitive support.

Unfortunately, there are no internationally standardised approaches for collecting this data, and coordination of the data that different actors have already collected is limited. Within the 2030 Agenda, there are two targets that could facilitate the implementation of coherent policies and programmes to support better coordination and data. Target 17.18 focuses on data and monitoring, crucially including a call for disaggregation of data by migrant status. Meanwhile, target 16.6 calls for the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions through which migrants could have recourse to hold governments, service providers and individuals to account.

3 Implications for migration and development policy

Development policies and programmes can be part of a comprehensive strategy to better manage migration and make the most of its economic and social benefits. To do this, migration must be better integrated in the delivery of the 2030 Agenda across all its objectives. In order to ‘mainstream’ migration into the 2030 Agenda, the links, opportunities and challenges related to migration under specific goals and targets need to be identified and highlighted (as we do in our briefings) and considered in policy processes.

Here, it is important that the role of migration is considered in Member States’ voluntary national reviews (VNRs). Member States are already making progress on this: in 2017, 29 out of 43 included the terms ‘migration’/‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘human trafficking’/‘traffic in persons’, ‘internally displaced persons (IDPs)’ and/or ‘remittances’ (CDP Subgroup on Voluntary National Reviews, 2018). At the same time, we need to consider that migrants may have specific vulnerabilities and can have specific needs, which should be considered to achieve the principle of leaving no one behind. In 2017, only 25 of 43 VNRs mentioned migrants and refugees as a ‘left-behind’ group, though not always with specific actions or strategies attached (ibid.).

Furthermore, policy-makers need to consider, measure and take account of migration to harness its positive benefits and reduce potential challenges. Migration should be part of regional, national and local level development planning and strategies, from initial context assessments, strategic goal-setting and planning, right through to monitoring and evaluation. A growing number of countries are doing this, for example

Bangladesh’s 7th five-year plan includes ‘migration for development’ within its development strategy (Planning Commission, 2015).

Finally, the multiple facets of the relationship between migration and development offer concrete and sector-specific policy entry points. For instance, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) decent work agenda is highly relevant to migration. Any programming as part of this agenda should consider the specific vulnerabilities of migrants in the workplace (Lucci et al., 2016) and the barriers migrants face in accessing work-place social protection schemes (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017b).

3.1 The Global Compact for Migration: a platform for action

The links between migration and development also have implications for migration policy and practice, particularly for the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM). To date, we have seen little contact and collaboration between the migration and global development policy and practice communities. The GCM – an effort by states to work towards a common approach to address global migration, recognising its impact on development- represents an opportunity to correct this and make real progress (Foresti, 2017).

The text of the GCM states that it:

Is rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and builds upon its recognition that migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the sustainable development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses (UN, 2018).

The text also goes beyond the specific migration targets set out in Table 1, stating that the GCM ‘aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals’. Furthermore, in Objective 23, Member States commit to aligning the implementation of the GCM, the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, recognising that migration and sustainable development are multidimensional and interdependent.

From January 2019, Member States will work on implementing this Compact and here lies the potential for real change. While the framework and aspirations are global, actions need to be *locally led* and rooted in specific contexts, countries, regions and markets where particular development opportunities and challenges exist (Foresti, 2017). These actions must be carried out by a broad range of stakeholders, working together in unique coalitions. In addition to Member States and the UN system, business will need to play a more central role (given their intrinsic interest in labour mobility) as well as city leaders, academics, journalists and others who can help discover and test new ideas. Strategies should

be flexible, and modalities of intervention should adapt to specific needs and opportunities. It will be important to avoid ‘blueprint’ approaches and unrealistic promises if we are to make the most of bringing these two interlinked agendas together for concrete change.

Finally, from an implementation perspective, *how* to do development is as important as *what* to do. There is the risk that viewing migration through a development lens may reinforce or replicate unhelpful dichotomies of donor and recipient or origin and host country. For example, the fact that in some host countries (especially in Europe) development aid is being used as part of a broader strategy to deter migration raises many concerns; not only it is ineffectual (there is no evidence that aid can affect migration patterns) but it also risks misinforming the public about the positive relationship between development and migration. Instead, the SDGs are an opportunity to frame migration and development relationships between countries as reciprocal and mutual, under a global framework.

In all of this we therefore need a new narrative (Foresti, 2017), focusing on the three I’s:

- **Investment.** Beyond aid or remittances alone, focus on investing in future societies for all, in line with the leave no one behind imperative. This includes harnessing the potential of diaspora, civil society innovators and entrepreneurs as private sectors and civil society.
- **Innovation.** Build and expand on the initiatives that already exist especially at local and country levels: diaspora bonds, global skills partnership, extension of rights for citizens on the move, financial inclusion through digital technology/mobile money, training and skills matching/investment, etc.
- **Inclusion.** It is key for development and migration policies to be inclusive and not targeted at specific groups alone. They also need to be aimed explicitly at expanding rights and opportunities. In practice, there is a need to broadening access to services, ensure portability of benefits and expand access to inclusive finance.

Table 2 The impact of migration on different SDGs and targets

Goal	Target	Briefing	Link with migration
	1.a	Poverty	Remittances and other forms of diaspora financing can be mobilised to improve infrastructure, services and development in origin countries.
	1.a	Social protection	Labour migrants present an opportunity to increase the tax base, and a greater number of contributors to social insurance-type schemes leads to better risk pooling and financial sustainability.
	1.b	Poverty	Migration is a key poverty reduction strategy and can be included in policy frameworks.
	1.1, 1.2	Poverty	Migration is a powerful poverty reduction strategy, for migrants themselves and their families in origin countries.
	1.1	Education	If migrants have access to education, it can lead to higher incomes.
	1.1	Urbanisation	Rural to urban migration contributes to economic development in origin countries and poverty reduction for migrants themselves.
	1.3	Citizenship	Migrants lacking permanent residency and/or citizenship status may not be able to access social protection.
	1.3	Social protection	Labour migrants can be a particularly poor and vulnerable group, but often lack eligibility for legal social protection and/or are not effectively covered.
	1.3	Urbanisation	Due to lack of formal registration in the city, many (poor) internal migrants cannot access social protection systems.
	1.4	Poverty	Migration can help families in origin countries improve their wellbeing through increased income, consumption and resilience.
	1.4	Water	Managing water resources sustainably, and providing water, sanitation and hygiene services, can enable successful migration, playing an important role in reducing poverty for migrants.
	1.5	Climate change	The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change, and are also the people who will find it hardest to migrate.
		2.2	Health
	3	Education	Education, particularly female education, has a strong impact on the future health outcomes of migrant students and their families.
	3	Poverty	Migration improves healthcare access and health outcomes for families in origin countries.
	3.1	Health	Migrants are vulnerable to poor health outcomes, yet find it difficult to access health-care services in transit and host countries; the services they can access are often sub-standard.
	3.3	Water	In origin countries, poor water, sanitation and hygiene services can contribute to health shocks that inhibit successful migration.
	3.8	Citizenship	Eligibility for health access is often tied to residency and/or citizenship status, with only some countries opening up (emergency) health care to all.
	3.8	Health	Internal migrants often work in the informal sector and aren't covered by insurance, including universal health coverage.
	3.8	Urbanisation	Internal migrants often end up in a city's informal sector and therefore invisible to universal health coverage programmes.

Goal	Target	Briefing	Link with migration
	4	Poverty	Migration helps improve education access and outcomes for families in origin countries, helping to reduce poverty.
	4.1	Citizenship	Eligibility for education is often tied to residency and/or citizenship status, which means that migrant children can be excluded.
	4.1, 4.3	Decent work	Primary, secondary and higher education is necessary for the attainment of decent work later in life - particularly that which demands highly skilled individuals.
	4.4	Urbanisation	Internal migrants often lack the skills and training required to access decent jobs in the city and as a result end up working in low-productivity jobs in the informal sector.
	4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, 4.7	Education	While migration helps improve both education access and quality for families in origin countries, migrant children in host countries are often excluded from quality education.
		5.2	Decent work
5.2		Gender	Migrant and refugee women and girls can experience violence at all stages of the migration process, especially during transit (e.g. at refugee camps) or in their host country (e.g. by an employer).
5.3		Education	If migrant children are enrolled in education, they are better able to resist child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation, and host-country governments can more easily intervene.
5.3		Gender	Girls facing harmful practices such as female genital mutilation or forced marriage may use migration as a means of escape.
5.4		Social protection	Migrant women often lack regularised status or access to social insurance through their employer.
5.4		Urbanisation	Many migrant domestic workers in cities are female. Actions that increase the value of domestic work would enhance the well-being, dignity and status of migrant workers.
	6.1	Health	Large-scale movements of people can increase stress on fragile water supply systems in origin and host countries. This can lead to adverse health effects such as disease.
	6.2	Water	
	6.1	Water	Migrants can face significant barriers in accessing water, sanitation and hygiene services, particularly when they are in transit or undocumented.
	6.2	Water	
	7	Energy	By moving, migrants can improve their access to affordable, reliable, renewable modern energy services.
	8	Poverty	Migration and remittances can lead to economic growth, a reduction in unemployment and increased wages in origin countries.
	8	Social protection	Migration can be an important contribution to economic development in origin countries through remittances, investment and knowledge exchange.
	8.1	Decent work	Migration can contribute to economic growth across different 'migration spaces' (at host, in transit and at origin).
	8.1	Education	The extent of education access and quality are important drivers of economic growth and differences in growth rates between regions.
	8.2	Technology	High-skilled migrants contribute to innovation and increase productivity by conducting research and development, creating new products and improving existing products.
	8.5	Decent work	In host countries, high-skilled migration can create new jobs for natives through new businesses, but low-skilled migration can have a 'crowding out' effect.
	8.5	Gender	Female refugees and migrants may be prevented from working, experience de-skilling, or be confined to 'feminine' jobs which are often paid or valued less than other work.
	8.7	Gender	Female migrants (particularly irregular migrants and children) are at risk of forced labour, trafficking, and exploitation and abuse.
	8.8	Decent work	Labour migrants are disproportionately affected by violations of employment rights. Efforts must clearly establish whose responsibility it is to protect those rights, and ensure proper enforcement.
8.5	Urbanisation	Low-skilled rural to urban migrants seeking better job opportunities in the city often end up working in precarious occupations in the informal economy.	
8.8	Urbanisation		

Goal	Target	Briefing	Link with migration
 9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE	9	Poverty	Migration can foster innovation in host countries through greater diversity, and in origin countries through social remittances, skills transfers and return migration.
	9.5	Technology	Migration can enhance the technological capabilities of natives in host countries who work directly with high-skilled migrants, and of those in origin countries working with diaspora networks.
 10 REDUCED INEQUALITIES	10	Poverty	Migration can reduce global inequalities, among countries and people, as people migrate from low- to high-income countries, and send remittances back home.
	10.c	Urbanisation	Internal remittances to poor households are often sent through informal channels as poor internal migrants do not have access to bank accounts. Such services can be riskier and more expensive.
	10.1	Education	Access to education can reduce inequality through raising incomes and reducing poverty for migrants, and boosting growth rates and government revenues in host countries.
	10.2	Education	Education can improve the social, economic and political inclusion of migrant children, particularly if they are able to speak the majority language.
	10.4	Social protection	Labour migrants are often not eligible for social protection, nor do they take it up. If vulnerable groups are unable to participate in social protection, inequalities widen.
	10.7	Energy	To ensure safe and responsible migration, especially in transit, migrants need access to modern energy services.
	10.7	Technology	Digital apps and mobile technologies can facilitate migration and integration into host countries.
	10.7	Urbanisation	Some countries discourage internal migration for work, having a direct impact on migrants' well-being and on the host city and country economies.
 11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES	11.1	Water	Providing water, sanitation and hygiene services to slums and informal areas can help reduce inequalities and strengthen social cohesion.
	11.1, 11.2	Education	Improving housing and infrastructure would assist refugee and migrant children in accessing education services and achieve strong learning outcomes.
	11.3	Urbanisation	If host countries are to maximise the benefits of migration, they must take into account the needs of poor internal migrants and enhance their well-being.
 13 CLIMATE ACTION	13	Climate change	Migration is an adaptation strategy to climate change – both extreme and slow-onset changes. Policies and financial planning need to take these patterns into account.
 16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS	16	Citizenship	Lack of citizenship/permanent residency can prevent migrants from being full members of society and can lead to tensions and conflict.
	16	Gender	Irregular and young migrants, particularly girls, are at greater risk of violence, trafficking and sexual exploitation.
	16.1, 16.9	Health	Many migrants lack legal identity, yet such an identity is important to effectively plan and establish health support systems.
	16.2	Education	Providing financial support to families in an attempt to eliminate child labour, exploitation and trafficking will most likely boost education for migrant children.
	16.3	Citizenship	When migrants cannot obtain residency and/or citizenship status, they may struggle to get equal treatment within the justice system or access legal aid.
 17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS	17	Education	Data pertaining to migration background and education level is not collected together. This information should be used to support vulnerable groups, and not for reporting to security-related institutions.
	17	Health	There are no international standardised approaches for monitoring the health of migrants. Such data would help understand migrant health needs.
	17.6	Technology	Enhancing technological sharing, transfer, dissemination and education between host and origin countries would ensure migration contributes to economic transformation.
	17.8	Urbanisation	There is only limited data on internal migration. Improving the evidence base would enable us to better understand the scale and impact of internal migration, and design better policies.

References

- Carling, J. (2017) 'Thirty-six migration nexuses, and counting'. Blog, 31 July (<https://jorgencarling.org/2017/07/31/thirty-six-migration-nexuses-and-counting>)
- Foresti, M. (2017) 'Summary remarks'. Fourth Thematic Consultation on Global Compact for Migration (https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/ts4_marta_foresti.pdf)
- Gelb S. and Krishnan, A. (2018) 'Technology, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Hagen-Zanker, J. (2018) 'Four steps to ensure the mobility of social security for migrants'. IOM Blog, 12 April (<https://migrationdataportal.org/blog/four-steps-ensure-mobility-social-security-migrants>)
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Postel, H. and Mosler Vidal, E. (2017a) 'Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Mosler Vidal, E., and Sturge, G. (2017b) 'Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- IOM – International Organization for Migration (2016) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. New York: United Nations (<https://unofficeny.iom.int/2030-agenda-sustainable-development>)
- Jobbins, G., Langdown, I. and Bernard, G. (2018) 'Water and sanitation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- Lönback, L. (2014) *Integrating migration into the post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda*. Bangkok and Washington DC: International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute
- Lucci, P., Mansour-Ille, D., Easton-Calabria, E. and Cummings, C. (2016) 'Sustainable cities: internal migration, jobs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- Mallett, R. (2018) 'Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- Mosler Vidal, E. (2017) 'The Sustainable Development Goals and labour mobility: a case study of Armenia' in G. Appave and N. Sinha (eds.) *Migration in the 2030 Agenda*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration
- Nicolai, S., Wales, J. and Aiazzi, E. (2017) 'Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- O'Neil, T., Fleury, A. and Foresti, M. (2016) 'Women on the move: migration, gender equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- Planning Commission (2015) Seventh five-year plan FY2016 – FY2020: accelerating growth, empowering citizens. General Economics Division, Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (www.plancomm.gov.bd/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/7FYP_after-NEC_11_11_2015.pdf)
- Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Waite, M. (2003) *Migration and social protection: a concept paper*. University of Sussex, UK
- Scott, A., Worrall, L. and Pickard, S. (2018) 'Energy, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- Tulloch, O., Machingura, F. and Melamed, C. (2016) 'Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI
- UN – United Nations (2015) *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York: UN (<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>)
- UN (2018) *Global Compact for Migration*. New York: UN (www.iom.int/global-compact-migration)
- Wilkinson, E., Schipper, L., Simonet, C. and Kubik, Z. (2016) 'Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing Note. London: ODI



Charleson, an Haitian migrant, outside his store stocked by his US earnings, Kenscoff, Ouest Department, Haiti, May 2016 © Hannah Postel

SDGs covered

- 1:** No poverty
- 8:** Decent work and economic growth
- 10:** Reduced inequalities

Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Hannah Postel and Elisa Mosler Vidal

Key messages

- International labour migration can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and origin countries. It is therefore crucial to achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1.
- Yet, migration does not always achieve its poverty reduction potential. This is due to the high costs involved, poor conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility.
- To reap the benefits, states should increase and diversify safe, regular and orderly migration pathways in line with demand for migrant labour, and make these easier to access.
- Remittances are a powerful poverty reduction instrument. They should be encouraged by origin countries and the private sector. Transfer costs should be lowered. States should also lower the costs and bureaucratic requirements for those wishing to migrate.
- Evidence is needed on the mechanisms through which migration impacts on poverty. Better longitudinal data would help understand these pathways and target policies effectively.

1 Introduction

This briefing considers the extent to which international labour migration can reduce poverty, and the implications this has for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda). Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 calls for ‘ending poverty in all its forms everywhere’. Labour migration can help achieve this goal, having been described as ‘the most effective contribution we can make to improving the lives of the world’s working poor’ (Rodrik, 2007). In this briefing, we show that international labour migration is a powerful tool to reduce poverty, for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and origin countries.

In 2015, over 243 million people (3% of the global population) lived outside their country of origin. The growth of financial transfers made by these migrants (‘remittances’) has rapidly accelerated. Remittance flows to developing countries are now four times larger than official development assistance (ODA) (Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), 2017) and are estimated to touch the lives of over one billion people. In certain settings, migration has been shown to be more effective at reducing poverty than other development programmes (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014).

Tackling the different facets of poverty is one of the key aims of the 2030 Agenda. Poverty is multidimensional; encompassing both monetary measures and other dimensions such as living standards, health, and education access and quality (Alkire and Santos, 2010). Labour migration¹ can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and origin countries. Migrants and their families benefit from increased income and knowledge, which allows them to spend more on basic needs, access services, and make investments. In host countries, immigration can have positive economic effects through increased production and labour-market specialisation. In origin countries, migration can lead to higher economic growth through increased incomes and spending, investment by migrant households, and knowledge transfers. However, migration does not always achieve this potential, nor are the outcomes always beneficial, due to a number of barriers. These include

the financial costs of migration itself, conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility.

The beginning of this briefing presents evidence demonstrating the potential of migration to reduce poverty. Section 3 links this evidence to the 2030 Agenda, arguing that migration should be considered a means to meet the SDGs, especially Goals 1, 8 and 10, and their Targets, especially 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.a and 1.b. Section 4 considers why migration’s poverty reduction potential is not always met, and what to do about it. Section 5 concludes, and offers recommendations to boost this potential.

2 How can migration reduce poverty?

Migration can result in positive economic and social benefits, for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and origin countries. In particular, migration is a powerful poverty reduction tool, with the potential to substantially increase incomes for migrants and their families.²

2.1 Impacts on migrants and their families

Migration can reduce poverty of both migrants themselves and their families in countries of origin. It can do this through remittances, as well as other mechanisms, including knowledge and norm transfers, in-kind transfers (e.g. assets) and changing household dynamics.³ While most studies focus on South-North migration, similar mechanisms hold for South-South movements; effects will of course vary based on context, but likely not enormously.

Labour migration can have a direct, immediate and substantial effect on the poverty of migrants themselves due to increases in income. A typical worker from an average developing country would earn 2.5-3 times their income if they moved to the United States (US) (Clemens et al., 2009). Migration resulted in a 263% income gain for Tongans in New Zealand (McKenzie et al., 2010; Box 4); and 1,400% for Haitians migrating temporarily to the US (Clemens and Postel, 2017; Box 1). Migration within the global South can also result in income gains of up to 60% (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). The families of the migrant can also experience gains in income, mainly through remittance receipts.

1 This briefing focuses on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for the purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example internal migrants, this will be stated explicitly. Most of the evidence focuses on migration to the global North, although we do also include examples of South-South migration.

2 In this briefing we include studies considering the income and welfare gains from migration, which are an indicator of its *potential* to reduce poverty. However, it should be kept in mind that they may not always translate into a reduction of poverty at the national level.

3 The impacts of migration are difficult to measure as migrants are not randomly selected but self-select into migration. Therefore migrant-sending households can have underlying differences to non-migrant-sending households (e.g. they may be wealthier or more willing to take risks), which means comparing them may capture differences in these underlying differences instead of migration effects (Démurger, 2015). This section only cites studies that account for selection bias; where this is not the case this will be stated.

Box 1 A pilot programme using labour mobility as a tool to reduce poverty

After an earthquake devastated Haiti in 2010, the Center for Global Development (CGD) proposed a novel way to help Haitians rebuild their livelihoods: help them migrate. This required opening new legal migration pathways between the US and Haiti, a process that culminated five years later when the US Department of State made Haitians eligible for temporary work visas. A pilot programme matching Haitian workers to US farms in need of agricultural labour soon followed: between 2015 and 2016, 68 workers arrived to work in the US.

The results of a small-sample survey assessing the programme's impact showed the project differed from traditional development aid in three major ways: the size of the income gains; the direct benefit to poor families; and the mutual economic benefit to both countries. On average, one month of seasonal agricultural work by a male Haitian in the US raised his current wage by approximately 1,400% (Clemens and Postel, 2017). This led to a doubling of annual household income in Haiti, with 2-3 months of overseas work by one household member. Furthermore, all migrant households reported being able to invest in durable goods and livelihoods, including in farming tools and home construction. These gains are much larger than for other poverty-reduction policies, which at the high end have been measured at 20-30%.¹² And in comparison to aid, where only a portion of total project funding reaches the poor, income earned by Haitian seasonal workers in the US went directly to Haitian households.

The programme had effects beyond the household level: for every month of overseas work, approximately US\$1,700 will eventually be spent in Haiti. These expenditures ripple through the Haitian economy, adding an estimated US\$3,300 to Haiti's GDP. Haitian agricultural work also adds value to the US economy by filling seasonal workforce needs. By supporting the productivity of US farms, one worker-month of Haitian agricultural labour adds approximately \$4,000 to US GDP.

These results suggest unexplored potential for temporary labour mobility as a tool for development and poverty reduction. The programme described here faced substantial informational and bureaucratic barriers, but was able to operate without any changes to existing legislation in either country. If successfully scaled, 10,000 Haitians working in the US for three months a year would add approximately US\$100 million annually to the Haitian economy.

These income gains can lead to poverty reduction. For example, international migration reduced the level of poverty among migrant households in Ecuador by between 17% and 21% (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014).⁴ This is a substantial decrease, especially when compared to other development programmes – a rigorous review of cash transfers showed that impacts on poverty reduction range from four to nine percentage points (Bastagli et al., 2016). Remittances can also be seen as an informal insurance mechanism, helping households cope with economic shocks (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Yang, 2008) and preventing them from falling deeper into poverty. In addition, migrants and their families can become wealthier through the accumulation of assets and the ability to make more investments (Yang, 2008; de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Mansuri, 2007).

Migration can influence whether family members in origin countries work, and the type of work they do. The

evidence is mixed and context-specific. In some cases, family members work less.⁵ This effect is often gendered; labour-force participation tends to fall more for women in households that receive remittances (as Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006 show for Mexico). Whether this results in an increase or decrease in poverty depends on how far remittances compensate for work-related income loss. Crucially, migration and remittances can reduce child labour, especially among poorer and low-skilled households (de Paoli and Mendola, 2017)⁶, which has important implications for long-term poverty reduction.

Access to education and health are also aspects of multidimensional poverty; moreover, they are important determinants of long-term poverty. Migration leads to improved health, education access and outcomes,⁷ particularly for children.⁸ Migration can also result in 'social remittances' or norm transfers (Levitt, 1998) that can have positive effects on individual and family

4 See also Jimenez-Soto and Brown, 2012 for Tonga.

5 See Adams, 2011 for a review of evidence on this in various countries; Grigorian and Melkonyan, 2011 for Armenia; and Abdulloev et al., 2014 for Tajikistan.

6 See also Acosta, 2011 for El Salvador; Yang, 2008 for the Philippines; and Mansuri, 2006 for Pakistan.

7 For more information, see two other briefings in ODI's *Migration and the 2030 Agenda* series: on health (Tulloch et al., 2016) and education (Nicolai et al., 2017).

8 However, there is also some evidence that the migration of parents or caregivers can have negative impacts on education and health of children and the elderly (e.g. Giannelli and Mangiacchi, 2010 for Albania).

wellbeing. For instance, Mexican women whose partners migrated internationally had lower smoking rates and healthier pregnancies than average through norm transfers (Frank, 2005). Having household members working in urban areas and abroad was associated with improved knowledge of sexual health in rural Guatemalan women (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2005). Again, this has important implications for long-term poverty and the 2030 Agenda more broadly, with migration enabling households to become healthier and better educated.⁹

2.2 Impacts on origin countries

The previous section discussed how migration has the potential to reduce poverty for individuals and households. These effects ripple through national economies in origin countries: raising incomes, protecting against exogenous shocks, and enabling increased economic activity (see also Boxes 1 and 4 for effects on national-level gross domestic product (GDP)). In fact, most of the benefits to national economies accrue through the aggregate effect of migration on individual households. Increases in income through remittances can result in reductions of poverty at the macro-level if poorer households become relatively better off: in other words, by changing national inequality distributions. This is not a given, however. It depends on how income is originally distributed and where migrants fall on this spectrum (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007).

Most macro-level analyses investigating cross-country national-level poverty rates find that migration (often proxied by remittances) does cause a reduction in poverty. However, the size of this effect varies considerably by study and may be overstated in some cases due to methodological concerns. In one study of 10 Latin American countries, for every 10% increase in the ratio of remittances to GDP, poverty fell between 0.04% to 0.5% (Acosta et al., 2008).¹⁰

Other studies sum the benefits accrued by individual households to estimate the effects on national-level poverty.¹¹ This approach reflects the logic explained above, that individual- and household-level poverty

reduction from migration has national impacts in aggregate. For instance, a 10 percentage-point increase in international remittances in the Philippines caused a 2.8 percentage-point decline in the likelihood that a migrant household will be in poverty (Yang and Martinez, 2006). This benefit also spills over to non-migrant households in high-migration regions, where aggregate poverty rates fell by 0.7 percentage points. In Ecuador, one study found that migration reduced poverty incidence among migrant households by between 17.4% and 20.8% (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014). Along similar lines, studies on internal migration in Vietnam and China have found a small yet significant effect on poverty rates (De Brauw and Harigaya, 2007 for Vietnam; Yang et al., 2005 for China).

Emigration can lead to increased wages for non-emigrants in origin countries, particularly in the short-term, which can affect national poverty levels. However, this is mainly experienced by those with similar skills to emigrants; non-emigrants with complementary skills can experience a wage decline (Elsner, 2015).

2.3 Impacts on host countries

Migration can also reduce poverty and increase growth in host countries; through increased productivity, new demand for and supply of goods and services, and more labour-intensive production. As described in Box 1, a programme of temporary agricultural work for Haitians added value to the US economy of around US\$4,000 per worker-month. Under New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employment programme, employers reported increased production through access to a more productive, stable workforce. Immigrants also add value to host countries through their skills and innovation, fostered by diversity; for example, the number of patents applied for by immigrants in the US is far greater than their share in the population (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010). The literature agrees that immigration may encourage natives to take up more highly skilled jobs to take advantage of skills complementarity; native workers in Denmark originally displaced by new refugee arrivals eventually earned 3% more through increased specialisation in more complex tasks (Foged and Peri, 2015).

9 For examples of positive effects of migration on investment in education and access for families in countries of origin, see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2017 and Ambler et al., 2015.

10 See also Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010; Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007; and Gupta et al., 2007. The most cited study in this research space is Adams and Page (2005), but it does not correct for migrant selection bias.

11 Interestingly, the most cited statistics in this area (five percentage points of poverty reduction in Ghana, six percentage points in Bangladesh, and 11 percentage points in Uganda) are untraceable to the original source or methodologically less rigorous (e.g. Lokshin et al, 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013), implying that the magnitude of poverty reduction effects may be overstated).

12 38% to 41% for grants to start-up businesses (Blattman and Niehaus, 2014); 20% to 25% for anti-sweatshop activism in Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse, 2010); 10% to 30% for productive asset transfers for the ultra-poor (Banerjee et al., 2015).

3 Why migration matters for the 2030 Agenda

As shown, international labour migration is a powerful poverty reduction tool, for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and origin countries. Therefore, migration can be a vital weapon in the arsenal to fight poverty, affecting the implementation of **SDG 1**, as well as several other Targets and Goals (see Table 1). These Targets cannot be met successfully unless their links to migration are considered.

Targets 1.1 and 1.2 call for an end to poverty around the world. As we have seen, migration can be an effective instrument in reducing poverty. This is especially the case regarding income, where the potential gains are very large for migrants and their families, leading to wider positive spillover effects. However, labour migrants themselves can be highly vulnerable and may need specific support.

Target 1.4 calls for greater access to economic resources, financial services and basic services. Labour migration can help families in origin countries invest in assets and access financial services. Migration can be a form of self-insurance; protecting migrant families experiencing shocks and stresses. This is relevant for **Target 1.5** which calls for greater resilience and insurance for individuals and families.

Target 1a calls for better and smarter mobilisation of resources for development. We have seen that remittances dwarf aid. Remittances, and other forms of diaspora financing and investment, can be mobilised to improve infrastructure, services and development more generally at a community level (see Gelb, forthcoming). Migration should be included as a poverty reduction strategy in non-migration policy frameworks, as called for in **Target 1b**.

Migration also affects multidimensional poverty (SDGs 1, 3 and 4), economic growth and employment (SDG 8), and innovation (SDG 9), which can have indirect effects on poverty. Finally, it can lead to increases or decreases in inequality, relevant to **SDG 10**.

4 Why migration's poverty reduction potential is not always met, and what to do about it

The financial costs¹³ associated with the migration process can reduce migration's impact on poverty reduction. Further barriers include conditions in host countries, which can entrench poverty amongst migrants, and barriers to mobility, which often prevent those who would benefit the most from migrating from doing so.

Table 1 Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
Goal 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere	
1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.	Migration is a powerful poverty reduction strategy for migrants themselves and their families in origin countries. The benefits of migration are greater for those travelling through regular migration channels, with costs and risks higher for those migrants with irregular status (see Section 4). Furthermore, the poorest are often unable to benefit from migration, owing to the high costs involved.
1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.	Labour migrants in host countries may need specific support as they often face unique poverty challenges, for instance because of discrimination and poor working and living conditions (see Lucci et al., 2016). Migrants often send a high share of their disposable income as remittances which can make them impoverished. Increased immigration does not lead to higher poverty rates in host countries; in fact, migrants often add value to domestic economies.
1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance.	Migration can help families in origin countries improve their wellbeing through increased income and consumption. Indirect effects include higher savings, investment and protection from shocks and stresses. Migration can lead to family members accessing and using financial services for the first time (Anzoategui et al., 2014). It can also improve their ability to invest in assets, including land ownership, and increase access to basic services like education and healthcare.

13 There may also be psychosocial costs of migration, however these are not discussed here. For an overview of migrant happiness and wellbeing, see IOM (2013) and Hendriks (2015).

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.	Migration strengthens households' resilience. It helps families in times of crisis by strengthening their ability to cope with economic risks and shocks, through informal insurance strategies. Remittances have also been shown to increase at times of national shocks and stresses (for instance in the Philippines after natural disasters).
1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.	Remittances and other forms of diaspora financing can be mobilised to improve infrastructure, services and development more generally at community level (see Gelb, forthcoming). These have been shown to lead to poverty reduction on a national level as well. At the same time, remittances, as private funding, do not replace aid. This is recognised in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (June 2015), which states the 'positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries of origin' (United Nations (UN), 2015).
1.b Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions.	Migration tends to be overlooked as a poverty reduction strategy in policy frameworks, with some policies in origin and host countries limiting mobility. Conditions in host countries can also reduce the poverty-reduction potential of migration. Sound policy frameworks should consider migration's role in reducing poverty and strive for policy coherence across different sectors.
Other goals	
Goal 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages.	Migration improves healthcare access and health outcomes for families in origin countries. However, migrants in host countries often lack access to health services (see Tulloch et al., 2016).
Goal 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.	Migration helps improve education access and educational outcomes for families in origin countries. However, migrant children in host countries often suffer disadvantages in accessing quality education (see Nicolai et al., 2017).
Goal 8 Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.	Migration, as proxied by remittances, can lead to economic growth in origin countries. It can also lead to a reduction in unemployment and higher wages in origin countries (Mishra, 2014). Labour migrants often face difficult working conditions (see Lucci et al., 2016), with stronger regulations and monitoring needed around working conditions and recruitment processes (see also Box 3) to achieve decent work for all migrants.
Goal 9 Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.	Migration leads to greater diversity in host countries and this can foster innovation. In origin countries, migration can also foster innovation through social remittances, skills transfers and return migration (Debnath, 2016). This has implications for long-term poverty reduction in these countries. In some contexts, outflows of the highly skilled could have negative impacts for origin countries in certain sectors (for example, shortages of healthcare workers, Mills et al., 2008). However, evidence that a so-called 'brain drain' harms development in origin countries is mixed once the net effects are considered. High-skilled migration often generates positive externalities such as increased investment in education, a more educated domestic workforce, and returnees bringing back skills acquired abroad (Adzei and Sakyi, 2014; Docquier and Rapoport, 2011).
Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries.	With people migrating from low- to high-income countries and sending remittances back home, migration can reduce global inequalities among countries, and among people (Milanovic, 2016). Whether migration reduces inequality within origin countries depends on where migrants sit on the income distribution. In some contexts, migration can lead to higher inequality as the poorest are often unable to migrate. When the costs of migration are reduced, the potential to reduce inequality is also greater.

4.1 The financial cost of migration can be high

Migration can incur high costs, even prior to departure. This includes the costs of procuring passports¹⁴, a visa, work permit and/or the recruitment process more generally. Migrants may secure the services of a travel agent, migrant broker or smuggler, and the costs of the journey itself can be high, especially if protracted and/or irregular. These costs can be excessive – low-skilled migrants often pay more than a year’s worth of future income (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2017; KNOMAD, 2017), reducing their ability to send remittances. Migration costs tend to be higher for the low-skilled (ILO, 2017; KNOMAD, 2017) and are more likely to prevent the poor from migrating. Migration costs also tend to be higher for migrants from more remote areas, who are also more likely to be poorer (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). This relationship holds at the national level as well: countries with low GDP per capita have lower emigration rates (OECD, 2016), to some extent due to aspiring migrants being unable to finance migration.

Loans can facilitate the payment of pre-departure and recruitment costs. However, with imperfect credit markets in poorer areas, this can result in aspiring migrants borrowing high sums of money¹⁵ from informal lenders, often at exorbitant interest rates. This places poor households in a risky situation, and raises the stakes for the migrant: an ‘unsuccessful’ migration, which produces low returns (and hence low remittances), makes it difficult for the household to meet loan repayments and eventually free itself from debt. The most vulnerable can get caught in debt-bondage when they are trapped in exploitative work situations after taking a loan to pay for recruitment costs and/or an advance (e.g. Zeitlyn et al., 2014 on India).

Studies have shown that migration becomes more pro-poor when costs decrease, e.g. through strengthened migration networks (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). The policy discussions in this area have mostly focused on fair recruitment (see Box 3), but have also considered how to improve access to pre-departure migration loans. For instance, at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2009, bank-non-governmental organisation (NGO) partnerships were discussed, where banks would provide loans at reasonable interest rates, as well as transparent information about the migration process (Martin, 2009). In Bangladesh, the NGO BRAC has funded close to

Box 2 Mobile remittances to reduce costs

One innovative way to reduce the cost of remittances is to use mobile money-transfer options. A recent study on using mobile transfers found that it drastically reduces costs: using mobile transfers is on average more than 50% cheaper than using money-transfer operators (MTOs); in 45 country corridors surveyed, the average cost of sending US\$200 using mobile money was 2.7%, compared to 6% with MTOs (GSMA, 2016).

Mobile remittances have the potential to be more inclusive than other transfer methods, as they allow smaller remittance values to be sent more cheaply, which is important for poorer migrants. The same study showed the average value of mobile money transfers was US\$82, while across other channels this was approximately US\$500 (ibid.). Moreover, mobile money can foster greater financial inclusion, by tapping into migrants’ ownership and usage of mobile phones to include them in digital financial services. Finally, the increasing use of mobile money fosters competition in the market, leading to greater transparency and further driving down transfer costs. This includes traditional MTOs, which tend to lower their fees when forced to compete against mobile-money competitors.

200,000 migration loans, also providing additional pre-departure services such as contract reviews (BRAC, 2016). The policy recommendations of former UN Special Representative for Migration Peter Sutherland (the ‘Sutherland Report’) call for migrant welfare funds to issue such loans.

Finally, the cost of sending remittances back home can lower their potential for reducing poverty. Studies have shown that fees for migrants remitting to sub-Saharan Africa average 12% of the amount transmitted (Watkins and Quattri, 2014). These excess fees cost the African continent US\$1.8 billion a year, which would cover the primary-school education of 14 million children in the region (ibid.). The need to reduce remittance fees is now firmly rooted in policy discussions, being an explicit target in the 2030 Agenda (see Target 10.C) as well as more specifically in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the ‘Sutherland Report’. Mobile remittances are seen as one way forward to reduce costs (Box 2).

14 Passport costs vary widely, costing as much as US\$300; in at least 14 countries a passport costs more than 10% of average annual per-capita income (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011a).

15 For instance, one study shows that the average migration loan of migrants in Rolpa, Nepal, is 97% of average annual household expenditure (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2014).

4.2 Poor conditions in host countries can undercut expected benefits from migration

Migration doesn't always offer the rewards anticipated. Conditions in host countries can entrench poverty of migrants, including poor living conditions and limited access to services,¹⁶ low wages, and poor working conditions.

Sometimes, wages paid by employers are lower than promised, or not paid at all (see Donini et al., 2013; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2014; Maher, 2009). Wages can be irregular, particularly for those in the informal economy, making it difficult for migrants to sustain themselves in the host community and send remittances back home. Female migrant workers are especially over-represented in lower-paid, irregular work (ILO, 2017; O'Neil et al., 2016). Furthermore, migrants may not be able to make full use of their education and skills as access to skills-recognition processes tend to be lacking, especially for low- and medium-skilled workers (ILO, 2017). This can

lead to deskilling or 'brain waste' and migrant workers earning less than anticipated. Compared to natives, migrants face wage gaps that cannot be explained fully by differences in education, work experience and language skills (ILO, 2015).

Second, migrants often experience poor working conditions, which can lead to lower earnings and adverse health outcomes. Migrant workers are more likely to hold jobs that are 'dirty, dangerous and difficult' (ILO, 2017). Migrant workers are much less likely to have 'decent-work benefits' such as a contract, occupational health and safety, and fundamental labour rights (Aleksynska et al., 2017).¹⁷ Migrant workers are at greater risk of being victims of forced labour (ILO, 2017). They are also more likely to experience work-related accidents and diseases (Belin et al., 2011; ILO, 2017). This is especially relevant for those who are undocumented and/or working in the informal

Box 3 Policy measures on fair recruitment

International labour standards apply to the recruitment of migrant workers. Effective implementation of fair recruitment measures involves extensive policy coordination amongst governments, labour recruiters and employers alike. The following are some emerging practices:

1. Some host countries state costs are to be paid by the employer, while origin countries may cap recruiter fees (ILO, 2017). Nepalese practice combines this; the 'free visa, free ticket' policy ensures migrants pay no more than NPR20,000 (US\$184) to private employment agencies, and the employer pays for tickets and visas (von Rohland and Crozet, 2017).
2. To ensure workers are given clear, transparent contracts, **standardised employment contracts** can be attached to labour agreements between countries, as in the 2008 Sri Lanka-Qatar agreement (Wickramasekara, 2015), and registered with authorities in the host country, as in some Gulf countries (ILO, 2017).
3. Some countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia have **joint liability provisions** to ensure recruiters and employers can be held liable for workers' rights violations during recruitment (ILO, 2017).
4. **Private-sector initiatives** play a growing role. The Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) recently introduced its Three Priority Industry Principles and guidance to tackle forced labour and abusive recruitment. More global companies are joining the Leadership Group, launched in 2016 under the Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB), to promote responsible recruitment and ethical supply chains (CGF, 2017; IHRB, 2016).
5. More companies are following **due-diligence procedures in supply chains**, for example, US government agencies (United States Office of the Federal Register, 2012) and Colgate-Palmolive and Marks & Spencer's (CGF, 2017).
6. Once migrants are abroad, some **cities** have taken the initiative to protect their employment rights. Barcelona's authorities help migrants with employment through its immigrant reception service, SAIER (Saier Servicio de Atención a Inmigrantes, Extranjeros y Refugiados), which supports migrants with job-seeking, training and education, and offers legal advice (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2017). In the US, 'sanctuary cities' can help protect irregular labour migrants (Ridgley, 2008).

16 More information on these can be found in other briefings in this series, including on living conditions of urban migrants (Lucci et al., 2016) and those displaced by climate change (Wilkinson et al., 2016), access to health services (Tulloch et al., 2016), and access to social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).

17 See also a review of working conditions for internal migrants in Lucci et al., 2016.

economy, who are also less likely to be protected through social-insurance schemes.¹⁸ As such, migrants may lose extended periods of time to illness, can end up with disabilities that limit future earning potential or, in extreme cases, lose their lives. Box 3 gives examples of emerging best practices on how to combat poor working conditions using fair recruitment.

4.3 Barriers to mobility

So far, we have focused on the factors that limit the poverty reduction potential for those who are already on the move. What about those who would like to move, but are unable to do so? This ‘involuntary immobility’ (as coined by Carling, 2002) characterises many poor areas and origin countries. In a global survey, 14% of the world’s adults said they would like to move to another country.¹⁹ Of those surveyed, 33% were in sub-Saharan Africa, 21% in the Middle East and North Africa, and 20% in Latin America (Esipova et al., 2011). However less than half of these respondents had already started making preparations (ibid.). The evidence suggests that those who would benefit the most from migration are often unable to do so. Part of this can be explained by the debilitating costs of migration discussed above. However, there are also policy barriers that prevent people from migrating legally, which diminish the potential of migration to reduce poverty.

Barriers set by origin countries

Some of these barriers are set, perhaps surprisingly, by origin countries. Some have extensive bureaucratic requirements, including procuring documents and participation in pre-migration trainings and health checks, that act as indirect barriers to exit.²⁰ Poorer and less-educated individuals can find it challenging to navigate the complex bureaucratic requirements. This in turn reduces their ability to migrate and increases their dependency on brokers, which drives up the cost of migration.

Furthermore, some origin countries place legal restrictions on their citizens that prevent them from leaving. Some countries enact exit-visa schemes, others prohibit citizens from leaving if their intention is to migrate. Some countries place travel restrictions on women or on citizens of national-service age (see

Figure 1²¹), and others temporarily ban migrant workers from travelling to certain countries, allegedly for safety reasons or to protect their rights.²²

Preventing individuals from migrating can deny them the potential for poverty reduction and negatively affect their households. For example, a study in Indonesia showed that banning female domestic workers from emigrating to Saudi Arabia led to an increase in poverty of between 2% and 3% in households in migration origin communities, as well as a decline in female employment and labour-force participation (Makovec et al., 2016). Furthermore, the bans that are intended to protect potential migrant workers from rights violations can backfire; in some cases, they have been associated with an increase in irregular labour migration and trafficking.

Barriers set by host countries

Then there are barriers set by host countries limiting legal pathways for migration. Host countries employ different legislative and policy instruments to manage the overall number of immigrants and nature of migration. Many of these instruments prevent and restrict migration, which means that the demand far outstrips places available, particularly in the most desirable host countries. For instance, the US temporary visa for skilled migrants has a cap of 65,000 annually, which was reached within the first week in each of the past five years (Trautwein, 2017). Likewise, only about 0.5% of applicants for a diversity visa received it (State Department, 2017). In the UK, skilled Tier 2 visas are capped at 20,700 per year; in 2015 the monthly cap of 1,650 was reached within 11 days (West and Ali, 2015).

Some evidence suggests that national migration policy regimes have become less restrictive over the past 50 years, at all skill levels (de Haas et al., 2016). Other analysis suggests that work-related entry channels in four European countries (France, Italy, Spain, the UK) have become more restrictive, especially with respect to low-skilled migration (Consterdine et al., 2017). While overall policy trends are disputed, country-level analysis shows that over the past two decades, more restrictive policies have started to dominate in traditional host countries, e.g. Australia and the US (de Haas et al., 2016).

18 See Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017 for a review of social-protection coverage of migrants.


19 In total this represented approximately 630 million people who would like to migrate internationally, dwarfing the current estimated international-migrant stock of 244 million (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2015).

20 For example, limited administrative capacity in the Congo means not enough passports are produced year on year to meet demand (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).

21 This figure lists legal restrictions; other countries also restrict mobility for certain ethnic or political sub-groups due to political reasons.

22 Ethiopia bans unskilled workers travelling to the Middle East, and the Philippines restricts or bans labour migration to more than 10 Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan countries. Travel bans for migrant domestic workers are common; for example, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka have had temporary bans on domestic workers migrating to several Middle Eastern countries.

Figure 1 Legal restrictions in origin countries on the international mobility of citizens



Source: Country reports in US Department of State (2016)

The nature of migration policies has changed too, becoming increasingly selective based on skills, with fewer opportunities for poor and less-skilled aspiring migrants (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Selective immigration policies facilitate the entry of skilled workers, but are also used to justify the discrimination and/or denial of rights to low-skilled workers (de Haas et al., 2016). This has direct implications for the potential of migration to reduce poverty as it prevents the low-skilled who are more likely to be poor from accessing regular migration pathways. It also potentially causes ‘brain waste’ amongst those who are slightly better off and can afford to finance migration and who can access regular migration pathways, but then often end up working in low-skilled jobs in host countries (ibid.).

Restrictive policy regimes reduce the opportunities for regular migration in the first place, but they can also deflect migrants towards irregular migration channels.

For instance, a study looking at Eritrean migrants in Ethiopia showed that as people lose hope in the formal processes and channels, the risks involved in irregular transit become tolerable (Mallett et al., 2017). Likewise, a study in 29 European countries showed that more restrictive temporary visa schemes push migrants towards irregularity: a 10% increase in short-stay visa rejections leads to a 5% increase in irregular migration (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014).²³ As irregular migration is more costly and risky, it has a lower potential to reduce poverty, and makes the original point of barriers moot.

Restrictive migration policies are likely to remain on the policy agenda of many desirable host countries, but there are policy entry points. Circular and seasonal migration schemes have been put forward as a ‘realistic’ policy solution (Foresti, 2017), opening up more opportunities for regular and safe migration, particularly for those with lower skills levels (see Boxes 1 and 4).

23 See also Medam (2017) for more examples.

Box 4 New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer programme

The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme began in 2007, aiming to ease labour shortages in New Zealand's horticulture and viticulture industries by admitting up to 5,000 seasonal workers (in the first instance), giving preference to those from Pacific countries. Promoting development in the Pacific Islands is an explicit goal of RSE. It is considered a success; a rigorous multi-year evaluation showed it had a significant and multidimensional impact on poverty reduction for participating migrants and their households in Tonga and Vanuatu.

In both countries, per-capita income of households with an RSE migrant rose by over 30% relative to non-migrant households, and in Tonga, households doubled their savings (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014). Over two years, households in Vanuatu who reported having a bank account rose from 55% to 74% (ibid.), which is thought to reflect more formal savings practices. Subjective economic welfare increased significantly for households in both countries. Participating households in both countries purchased more durable assets, and in Tonga they were almost twice as likely as non-RSE households to make a home improvement. Moreover, school-attendance rates increased by 20% for 16- to 18-year-olds in Tonga.

5 Conclusions and policy recommendations

The potential benefits of international labour migration have been described as the equivalent to 'finding trillion-dollar bills on the side-walk' (Clemens, 2011). The very essence of labour migration lies in the huge income-differentials that exist globally: a worker from a low-income country can earn significantly more in a high-income country, thus being able to improve standards of living for their families, with multiplier effects in both host and origin countries. In other words, migration is a hugely powerful poverty-reduction instrument and is key to meeting SDG 1 and other Goals.

Keeping in mind the 2030 Agenda principle of 'leaving no-one behind', the evidence makes a powerful argument for creating opportunities for mobility for citizens of poor countries, particularly the poorest, who often cannot afford the high costs of migration. Schemes that foster labour mobility should be seen as complementary to other development programmes and considered an important item in the toolbox for reducing poverty.

Yet the role that mobility can play is mostly absent from the discussions on poverty reduction. This is because migration is a 'difficult' policy instrument. The effects of migration are not always immediate and public attitudes to migration are often negative (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017), which makes it tough for policy-makers to propose new policy instruments within short-term political cycles. Migration often fails to achieve its full poverty reduction potential due to the high costs of migration, poor conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility. Furthermore, when regular migration channels are not in place, aspiring migrants make use of irregular ones, with lower benefits for both host countries and migrants themselves.

It is therefore in everyone's interest for migration to happen safely and legally, in a regulated rather than a clandestine way (UN, 2017). To achieve this, the 2030 Agenda can provide the policy framework, as well as the necessary political 'traction', in different member states and in the multilateral system.

The recommendations below set out key actions for national governments in host and origin countries, international institutions and civil-society organisations to maximise the poverty reduction potential of migration. This is key for achieving the SDG targets on poverty reduction and, leaving no-one behind.

Conclusion 1 Migration is one of the most successful ways to reduce poverty, and is therefore crucial to achieving SDG 1 and other Goals.

Recommendation: Allow poor families and households to benefit from migration.

- The benefits of migration are greater for migrants and host countries when it takes place through safe, regular and orderly pathways: expand and diversify them (see Conclusion 3). Origin countries should provide information about regular migration pathways, and run pre-departure training to facilitate migration and maximise its benefits.
- Safeguard the rights of migrant workers, including those working informally, particularly when they are not protected by national labour laws. Work proactively to eliminate abusive recruitment, and encourage greater scrutiny of global supply chains (see Box 3). These efforts should take a multi-stakeholder approach and involve governments of origin and host countries, as well as other actors including the private sector and local authorities.
- Female migrant workers also contribute to sustainable development, but owing to gender-based barriers they are less likely than men to make the most of the economic and social opportunities of mobility. Policy measures should focus on regulating and improving working conditions for all female migrant workers (O'Neil et al., 2016).
- Establish supportive institutions that can help families who stay behind adapt to the loss of an economically active member or caregiver through migration.

Interventions should be tailored to the length and type of migration in question; options could include putting in place safety nets to improve health and education outcomes for children in the community, including those of migrant children, and introducing accessible banking, credit, investment and insurance systems (Démurger, 2015).

- Foster and encourage remittances and other forms of diaspora finance. Remittances can be a key resource for poverty reduction, while diaspora investment can contribute to broader economic growth in origin countries (see Gelb, forthcoming). Bilateral and multilateral organisations have a role to play too, for instance in matchmaking investors/lenders in the diaspora with borrowers in the home country (including the government, businesses or individual households) as well as leveraging and complementing diaspora investment.
- Policy-makers in donor countries should view development aid and migration as complementary. It is possible to achieve aid objectives (such as poverty reduction) through mobility, while at the same time benefitting host countries (Clemens and Postel, 2017). At a more granular level, aid can be used to facilitate skills-training programmes specifically linked to mobility opportunities (see Clemens, 2014), provide information to aspiring migrants (e.g. on regular migration pathways), improve conditions for migrants in so-called transit countries, and more.
- The relationship between migration and poverty reduction is complex: while the evidence shows that migration tends to reduce poverty, the mechanisms are often difficult to disentangle (Antman, 2012). Therefore, more rigorous research is needed to isolate these mechanisms, so that policies can be targeted more effectively. Better longitudinal data could also help to

clarify the range of impacts migration has on migrants and their families, at different stages of the process.

Relevant SDG targets

1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.

1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.

1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance.

1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.

8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries.

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment.

Conclusion 2 The high cost of migration makes it harder for the poorest to migrate.

Recommendation: Reduce the pre-departure, recruitment and travel cost of migration, improve access to loans, and lower the transaction costs of migrant remittances.

- Origin countries should take action to reduce the pre-departure costs of migration, as they burden the poorest the most. For instance, passports should be made available more easily and at a lower cost. Pre-departure loans, at reasonable interest rates from a regulated provider, can help, alongside information about the migration process. Such loans must be fully transparent and legal, and the migrant must have sufficient financial knowledge to assess adequately the implications of taking a loan.
- Governments should better regulate and monitor recruitment agencies, encouraging professionalisation and transparency in the industry, for example holding agencies accountable by publishing their performance and ratings. Additional efforts could include cooperation and agreements with large employers dependent on migrant labour, and bilateral coordination between origin and host countries on enacting the principles of ‘fair recruitment’.
- Lowering the transaction costs of remittances has been on the policy agenda for years. The focus now has to move from rhetoric to action, ensuring more partnerships between MTOs, policy-makers, regulators and other stakeholders, and to set up enforceable agreements, such as the African Postal Financial Services Initiative (APFSI, 2016).

Relevant SDG targets

1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.

10.c Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances.

Conclusion 3 There are insufficient safe, regular and orderly migration pathways diminishing the potential of migration to reduce poverty.

Recommendation: Increase and diversify safe, regular and orderly migration pathways to achieve greater poverty reduction benefits for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and origin countries.

- Origin countries must remove barriers to migration. They should support their citizens who want to migrate by providing information on the migration process and consular support to those in host countries. They should also help those who return, for instance by providing attractive investment opportunities.
- Temporary/seasonal migration has a high poverty reduction potential and can have more political traction in host countries than permanent schemes. These schemes should be expanded, learning lessons from existing pilots (for instance between Haiti and the US, and Tonga and New Zealand).
- Many high-income countries have a strong demand for labour at different levels of skill. To ensure a reliable supply of appropriately trained individuals, host countries could set up training institutions in origin countries. Initiatives such as a Global Skills Partnership could combine skills and job training with embedded mobility schemes (Clemens, 2014). They would also help to maximise the benefits of migration for migrants and origin countries.
- Citizens from the poorest countries have the most to gain from migration, yet are often less able to access regular migration pathways. Countries with a points-based immigration system could give extra points for migrants from low-income countries, to increase their likelihood of obtaining a visa. Additional measures could focus on skills matching and skills recognition.

Relevant SDG targets

1.b Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions.

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

References

- Abdulloev I., Gang I. and Yun M-S. (2014) 'Migration, education and the gender gap in labour force participation', *European Journal of Development Research* 26: 509–526.
- Acosta, P., Calderón, C., Fajnzylber, P. and López, H. (2008) 'What is the impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality in Latin America?', *World Development* 36(1): 89–114.
- Acosta, P. (2011) 'Female migration and child occupation in rural El Salvador', *Population Research and Policy Review* 30(4): 569–589.
- Adams, R. (2011) 'Evaluating the economic impact of international remittances on developing countries using household surveys: a literature review', *Journal of Development Studies* 47(6): 809–828.
- Adams, R. H. Jr. and Page J. (2005) 'Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries?', *World Development* 33(10): 1645–1669.
- Adams, R. H. Jr. and Cuecuecha, A. (2013) 'The impact of remittances on investment and poverty in Ghana', *World Development* 50(C): 24–40.
- Adzei, F. A. and Sakyi, E. K. (2014) 'Drivers of return migration of Ghanaian health professionals: perspectives from doctors and nurses in urban Ghana', *International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care* 10(2), 102–120.
- The African Postal Financial Services Initiative (APFSI) (2016) *Improve partnerships between post and money transfer operators for better remittance services to rural Africa*. World Bank, IFAD, the World Savings and Retail Banking Institute (WSBI), the European Savings and Retail Banking Group (ESBG) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF): Washington DC: World Bank.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona (2017) SAIER (Service Centre For Immigrants, Emigrants And Refugees). Accessed at: www.bcn.cat/novaciutadania/arees/en/saier/saier.html
- Alkire, S. and Santos, M.E. (2010) *Acute multidimensional poverty: a new index for developing countries*. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) Working Papers No. 38. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Aleksynska, M., Kazi Aoul, S. and Petrencu, V. (2017) *Deficiencies in conditions of work as a cost to labour migration: concepts, extent and implications*. KNOMAD Working Paper No. 28.
- Ambler, K., Aycinena, D. and Yang, D. (2015) 'Channeling remittances to education: a field experiment among migrants from El Salvador', *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7(2): 207–232.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Pozo, S. (2006) 'Migration, remittances, and male and female employment patterns', *American Economic Review* 96(2): 222–226.
- Antman, F. (2012) *The impact of migration on family left behind*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6374. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Anyanwu, J. C. and Erhijakpor, E. O. (2010) 'Do remittances affect poverty in Africa?' *African Development Review* 22(1): 51–91.
- Anzoategui, D., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Soledad Martínez Pería, M. (2014) 'Remittances and financial inclusion: evidence from El Salvador', *World Development* 54: 338–349.
- Banerjee, A., Dean K. and Zinman, J. (2015) 'Six randomized evaluations of microcredit: introduction and further steps', *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7(1): 1–21.
- Bastagli, F.; Hagen-Zanker, J.; Harman, L.; Barca, V.; Sturge, G. and Schmidt, T. (2016) *Cash transfers: what does the evidence say? A rigorous review of programme impact and the role of design and implementation features*. London: ODI.
- Belin A., Zamparutti, T., Tull, K., Hernandez, G. and Graveling, R (2011) *Occupational health and safety risks for the most vulnerable workers*. Milieu Ltd., Brussels, Belgium on behalf of the European Parliament.
- Bertoli, S. and Marchetta, F. (2014) 'Migration, remittances and poverty in Ecuador', *The Journal of Development Studies* 50(8): 1067–1089.
- Blattman, C. and Niehaus, P. (2014) 'Show them the money: why giving cash helps alleviate poverty', *Foreign Affairs* 93(3): 117–126.
- BRAC (2016) *Migration loans*. Accessed at: www.brac.net/microfinance-programme/item/858-migration-loans
- Carling, J. (2002) 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility: theoretical reflections and Cape Verdean experiences', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28(2): 5–42.
- Clemens, M. (2014) *Global skill partnerships: a proposal for technical training in a mobile world*. CGD Policy Paper 40. Washington DC: CGD.
- Clemens, M. (2011) 'Economics and emigration: trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25(3): 83–106.

- Clemens, M., Montenegro, C. and Pritchett, L. (2009) *The place premium: wage differences for identical workers across the US Border*. Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Clemens, M. and Postel, H. (2017) *Temporary work visas as US-Haiti development cooperation: a preliminary impact evaluation*. CGD Policy Paper. Washington DC: CGD.
- Consterdine, E., Gonzalez-Ferrer, A., Hampshire, J. and Molinero, Y. (2017) 'Immigration policy: a new tool for policy analysis'. Presentation at the European Parliament, May 2017.
- Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) (2017) *Business actions against forced labour*. CGF.
- Czaika, M. and Hobolth, M. (2014) *Deflection into irregularity? The (Un)intended Effects of restrictive asylum and visa policies*. International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper No. 84. Oxford: IML.
- de Brauw, A. and Harigaya, T. (2007) 'Seasonal migration and improving living standards in Vietnam', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 89(2): 430–447.
- de Brauw, A. and Rozelle, S. (2008) 'Migration and household investment in rural China', *China Economic Review* 19(2): 320–335.
- de Haas, H., Natter, K. and Vezzoli, S. (2016) 'Growing restrictiveness or changing selection? The nature and evolution of migration policies', *International Migration Review*, July 2016.
- de Paoli, A. S. and Mendola, M. (2017) 'International migration and child labour in developing countries', *The World Economy* 40(4): 678–702.
- Debnath, P. (2016) *Leveraging return migration for development: the role of countries of origin: a literature review*. KNOMAD Working Paper No. 17. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Dempster, H. and Hargrave, K. (2017) *Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and migrants*. London: ODI.
- Démurger, S. (2015) *Migration and families left behind*. IZA World of Labor 144. Bonn: IZA.
- Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (2011) 'Globalization, brain drain and development'. IZA World of Labor 5590. Bonn: IZA.
- Donini, A., Sharma, J.R. and Aryal, S. (2013) *Structural violence and social suffering among marginal Nepali migrants*. Somerville: MA: Feinstein International Centre.
- Elsner, B. (2015) *Does emigration increase the wages of non-emigrants in sending countries?* IZA World of Labor 208. Bonn: IZA.
- Esipova, N., Ray, J. and Pugliese, A. (2011) *Gallup World Poll: the many faces of global migration*. IOM Migration Research Series No. 43, Geneva: IOM.
- Fajnzylber, P. and Lopez, H. (2007) *Close to home: the development impact of remittances in Latin America*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Foged, M. and Peri, G. (2015) *Immigrants' effect on native workers: new analysis on longitudinal data*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8961. Bonn: IZA.
- Foresti, M. (2017) *Summary remarks. Fourth Thematic Consultation on Global Compact for Migration*. Accessed at: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/ts4_marta_foresti.pdf
- Frank, R. (2005) 'International migration and infant health in Mexico', *Journal of Immigrant Health* 7(1): 11–22.
- Gelb, S. (forthcoming) *Diaspora investment: making diaspora finance more productive*. ODI working paper. London: ODI.
- Giannelli, G. C. and Mangiavacchi, L. (2010) *Children's schooling and parental migration: empirical evidence on the 'left behind' generation in Albania*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4888. Bonn: IZA.
- Gibson, J. and McKenzie, D. (2011) 'How can developing country governments facilitate international migration for poverty reduction?'. In Murrugarra E., Larrison J., Sasin M. (eds.), *Migration and poverty: toward better opportunities for the poor*, pp. 125–145. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Gibson, J. and McKenzie, D. (2014) 'The development impact of a best practice seasonal worker policy', *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 96(2): 229–243.
- Grigorian, D. A. and Melkonyan, T. A. (2011) 'Destined to receive: the impact of remittances on household decisions in Armenia', *Review of Development Economics* 15(1): 139–153.
- GSMA (2016) *Driving a price revolution: mobile money in international remittances*. GSMA.
- Gupta, S., Pattillo, C. and Wagh, S. (2007) *Impact of remittances on poverty and financial development in sub-Saharan Africa*. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper WP-07-38. Washington DC: IMF.
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Mallet, R., Ghimire, A., Ali Shah Q., Upreti, B. and Abbas, H. (2014) *Migration from the margins: mobility, vulnerability and inevitability in mid-western Nepal and north-western Pakistan*. London: ODI.
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Mosler Vidal, E. and Sturge, G. (2017) *Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- Harrison, A. and Scorse, J. (2010) 'Multinationals and anti-sweatshop activism', *American Economic Review* 100(1): 247–273.
- Hendriks, M. (2015) 'The happiness of international migrants: a review of research findings', *Migration Studies* 3(3): 343–369. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Hunt, J. and Gauthier-Loiselle, M. (2010) 'How much does immigration boost innovation?', *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 2(2): 31–56.
- IHRB (2016) *Driving positive change*. Leadership Group for Responsible Recruitment, IHRB.
- ILO (2015) *Global Wage Report 2014/15: wages and income inequality*. Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2017) *Addressing governance challenges in a changing labour migration landscape*. Geneva: ILO.
- IOM (2011) *Glossary on migration*. International Migration Law Series No. 25. Geneva: IOM.
- IOM (2013) *World Migration Report 2013: migrant well-being and development*. Geneva: IOM.
- Jimenez-Soto, E. V. and Brown, R. P. C. (2012) 'Assessing the poverty impacts of migrants' remittances using propensity score matching: the case of Tonga', *Economic Record* 88: 425–439.
- KNOMAD (2017) *Trends in migration and remittances 2017*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Levitt, P. (1998) 'Social remittances: migration-driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion', *International Migration Review* 32(4): 926–48.
- Lindstrom D.P. and Muñoz-Franco, E. (2005) 'Migration and the diffusion of modern contraceptive knowledge and use in rural Guatemala', *Studies in Family Planning* 36(4): 277–288.
- Lokshin, M., Bontch-Osmolovski, M. and Glinskaya, E. (2010) 'Work-related migration and poverty reduction in Nepal', *Review of Development Economics* 14(2): 323–332.
- Lucci, P., Mansour-Ille, D., Easton-Calabria, E. and Cummings, C. (2016) *Sustainable cities: internal migration, jobs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- Makovec, M., Purnamasari, R. Sandi, M. and Savitri, A. (2016) *Intended vs. unintended consequences of migration restriction policies: evidence from a natural experiment in Indonesia*. Institute for Social & Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 2016-13. University of Essex.
- Maher, S. (2009) *False promises: migrant workers in the global garment industry*. Discussion paper. Amsterdam: Clean Clothes Campaign.
- Mallett, R., Hagen-Zancker, J., Majidi, N. and Cummings, C. (2017) *Journeys on hold: how policy influences the migration decisions of Eritreans in Ethiopia*. London: ODI.
- Mansuri, G. (2006) *Migration, school attainment and child labor: Evidence from rural Pakistan*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3945. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Mansuri, G. (2007) 'Does work migration spur investment in origin communities? Entrepreneurship, schooling, and child health in rural Pakistan' in Özden C. and Schiff, M. (ed.) *International Migration, Economic Development & Policy*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Martin, P. (2009) *Reducing the cost burden for migrant workers: a market-based approach*. Final Report of GFMD 2009. Accessed at: www.gfmd.org
- McKenzie, D., Gibson, J. and Stillman, S. (2010) 'How important is selection? Experimental vs. non-experimental measures of the income gains from migration', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8: 913–945.
- Mckenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2007) 'Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: theory and evidence from Mexico', *Journal of Development Economics* 84(1): 1–24.
- Medam (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration) (2017) *Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe*. Kiel: Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Milanovic, B. (2016) *Global inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Mills, E. J., Schabas, W. A., Volmink, J., Walker, R., Ford, N., Katabira, E., Anema, A., Joffres, M., Cahn, P. and Montaner, J. (2008) 'Should active recruitment of health workers from sub-Saharan Africa be viewed as a crime?', *Lancet* 371: 685–688.
- Mishra, P. (2014) 'Emigration and wages in source countries: a survey of the empirical literature' in Robert E. B. Lucas (ed.) *International handbook on migration and economic development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Nicolai, S., Wales, J. and Aiazzi, E. (2017) *Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- OECD (2016) *Perspectives on global development 2017*. International migration in a shifting world. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- OECD (2017) *Interrelations between public policies, migration and development*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- O'Neil, T., Fleury, A. and Foresti, M. (2016) *Women on the move: migration, gender equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- Ratha, D. and Shaw, W. (2007) *South-South migration and remittances*. World Bank Working Paper No. 102. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Ridgley, J. (2008) 'Cities of refuge: immigration enforcement, police, and the insurgent genealogies of citizenship in US sanctuary cities', *Urban Geography* 29(1), 53–77.
- Rodrik, D. (2007) 'Be our guests', *The New York Times*, 1 June 2007.
- von Rohland, H. and Crozet, M. (2017) *World of work: migration should be a choice*. Geneva: ILO.

-
- Stark, O. and Lucas, R. (1988) 'Migration, remittances, and the family', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 36(3): 465–481.
- Trautwein, C. 'H-1B visa applications just hit their limit for the year in less than a week', *Time*, 7 April 2017.
- Tulloch, O., Machingura, F. and Melamed, C. (2016) *Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- UN (2015) *Countries reach historic agreement to generate financing for new sustainable development agenda*. UN. Accessed at: www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd3/press-release/countries-reach-historic-agreement.html
- UN (2017) *Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration (A/71/728)*. UN. 3 February 2017.
- UN DESA (2015) *International Migration Report 2015 Highlights*. Geneva: UN DESA.
- US Department of State (2016) *Country reports on human rights practices for 2016*. US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
- US Department of State (2017) *Diversity Visa Program Statistics*. Accessed at: <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/diversity-visa-program-entry/diversity-visa-program-statistics.html>
- Watkins, K. and Quattri, M. (2014) *Lost In intermediation: how excessive charges undermine the benefits of remittances for Africa*. London: ODI.
- West, G. and Ali, S. (2015) 'UK Tier 2 visa limit reached for first time', *Work Permit*, 20 June 2015. Accessed at: www.workpermit.com/news/uk-tier-2-visa-limit-reached-first-time-20150620
- Wickramasekara, P. (2015) *Bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding on migration of low skilled workers: a review*. Geneva: ILO.
- Wilkinson, E., Schipper, L., Simonet, C. and Kubik, Z. (2016) *Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- Winters, A., L. (2016) *New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme: an object lesson in policy making – but for whom? 'Migrating Out of Poverty' (MOOP) Working Paper No. 34*. University of Sussex.
- Yang, D. (2008) 'International migration, remittances and household investment: evidence from Philippine migrants' exchange rate shocks', *The Economic Journal* 118: 591–630.
- Yang, D. and Martinez, C. A. (2006) 'Remittances and poverty in migrants' home areas: evidence from the Philippines' in Ozden C. and Schiff M. (ed.) *International migration. Remittances and the brain drain*, 81–122. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Yang, D., Park, A. F. and Wang, S (2005) 'Migration and rural poverty in China', *Journal of Comparative Economics* 33(4): 688–709.
- Zeitlyn, B., Deshingkar, P., and Holtom, B. (2014) *Internal and regional migration for construction work: a research agenda*. MOOP RPC Working Paper No. 14. University of Sussex.



Fish is transported to markets in Binh Thuan Province, Vietnam. © ILO/Nguyen Viet Thanh

SDGs covered

- 4:** Quality education
- 5:** Gender equality
- 8:** Decent work and economic growth
- 16:** Peace, justice and strong institutions

Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Richard Mallett

Key messages

- Low- and semi-skilled labour migrants face significant difficulties accessing 'decent work' in host countries.
- Globally, 40% of workers are in vulnerable or precarious forms of work – migrants are disproportionately represented in this share.
- Low quality work at destination limits the potential economic returns of migration and can impede migrants' integration into host communities.
- Providing employment alone in areas of origin is unlikely to stop migration. Many people move abroad even when opportunities 'at home' are available

1 Introduction

International labour migrants are disproportionately concentrated in vulnerable forms of employment. Migrants in search of better work and wages often find themselves battling for jobs on the lowest rungs of the labour market. The work is often insecure, arbitrarily remunerated and thinly regulated (if at all), representing a continuation of the conditions many faced ‘back home’. As has recently been argued, ‘with local employment in countries of origin often characterised by informal employment, poor working conditions and unsustainable livelihoods, migrant workers are caught within a protracted precarity that spans life at home *and* abroad’ (Piper et al., 2017: 1089).

This briefing explores the causes and consequences of this phenomenon against the backdrop of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It uses a ‘decent work’ lens to look at international labour migration, exploring how employment (in relation to its quality, terms and regulation) relates to migration (including the decision to migrate, integration, return and remittance-sending).

The briefing addresses two key questions. The first (Section 3) asks to what extent aspects of the migration experience are driven or affected by the nature and quality of work that people are able to access. It also provides an overview of why precarious labour is so pronounced among migrants.

The second question (Section 4) explores how migration shapes the nature and quality of work that people are able to access. We consider the way in which this plays out for migrants themselves, native-born workers and ‘stayers’ (i.e. household and community members who have remained in their country of origin).

The final two sections relate the preceding analysis to the 2030 Agenda, drawing on the literature’s key findings to offer practical and policy-relevant ways of approaching the intersections between decent work and migration – an area that has received relatively little attention to date.

2 Precarious labour and the ‘decent work’ agenda

Unemployment is presented as one of the key development challenges, but this perspective risks obscuring the difficulties faced by those locked into precarious labour (where labour rights violations are more likely to occur), underemployment and ‘working poverty’ – a disproportionate share of whom are migrants (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2014; 2016).¹


Latest figures from the ILO show that, globally, the number of unemployed individuals is dwarfed by the number of those working in what it terms ‘vulnerable employment’ (ILO, 2018a). This category includes people who are subject to high levels of precariousness, more likely to be employed on informal terms and less likely to benefit from job security, regular incomes and access to social protection than their waged and salaried counterparts (ILO, 2017).

Last year 1.4 billion people fell into this category – 40% of the global labour supply – and that number is expected to grow by another 17 million in 2018. A staggering 300 million of that 1.4 billion, who live within emerging and developing countries, are classed as ‘extreme working poor’. They work, yet live in households with per capita incomes of less than US\$1.90 per day. By contrast, the global number of unemployed people is expected to remain stable this year at around 190 million – equivalent to just under 6% of the global labour supply (see Figure 1).

The challenges around labour cannot be solved just by getting people into work. As the numbers – and this ILO (2018a) report – demonstrate, even those in employment can face poverty, precarity and vulnerability.

Policy debates within the international development community have circled around job creation for some time, but it is no longer enough to talk about increasing the number of jobs. The concept of ‘decent work’ has been gaining considerable traction in recent years. While

Figure 1 Share of the global labour supply in paid employment, vulnerable employment and unemployment



Source: ILO, 2018a.

1 One recently adopted marker for precarity in the labour market is migrant status (Piper et al., 2017).

a variety of definitions now exist, the term generally refers to work that provides (ILO, 2018b):

- a fair income,
- security in the workplace,
- good prospects for personal development and social integration,
- freedom for people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that affect their lives,
- and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

In other words, it's not just the quantity of work that we need to be thinking about. Its quality matters too.

Within the 2030 Agenda, Goal 8 calls for 'sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and *decent work for all*'. Goals 4 (on educational and learning opportunities), 5 (on gender equality and women's empowerment) and 16 (on peaceful and inclusive societies) also feature relevant aspects. We return to these goals in Section 5, where we examine the links between migration and targets related to decent work.

3 How the 'decency' of work shapes migration

This section explores how different dimensions of migration are affected by the labour market.

3.1 Emigration

Most migration research on this theme has focused on the role of wage differences and un/employment levels in a person's decision to migrate, yet evidence suggests that the *terms* of employment in countries-of-origin can also contribute.

One such example concerns the emigration of nurses from developing countries. In a recent systematic review, Moyce et al. (2015: 3) find 'Many push factors...centred on working conditions or lack of job opportunities in nurses' home countries', with burn-out, emotional exhaustion and general dissatisfaction with conditions commonly cited.

But negative conditions at origin are only one element in deciding to emigrate: the perception of more positive, supportive environments abroad also appears important – in particular the 'pull' of greater educational opportunities (for both the migrant and their children), increased autonomy in the workplace, and more flexible working hours. Issues relating to stress, leisure, independence and personal development, which can be affected by the nature of employment and drive people to search for new opportunities, are therefore relevant to the debate.

The body of studies on nursing illustrates how the stigmatisation of certain types of work can also

contribute to the decision to emigrate (see Box 1). Image and status are important dimensions in what people gain from work, and can be key to both an individual's wellbeing and the way they are treated by others in the wider community. When these dimensions are negatively affected by the context in which that work is taking place, emigration may seem a better option than staying 'at home' and switching sectors.

This resonates with findings on economic crises and austerity in more 'developed' countries such as Greece. Following the onset of Greece's financial crisis in the late 2000s, there was a growth in emigration: some estimates suggest that as many as 350,000 Greeks may have left between 2010 and 2015, and in 2014 it was reported that one in three citizens claimed to be willing to move overseas in search of work (this share was most pronounced among educated young adults) (Labrianidis and Pratsinakis, 2016).

In examining these migration patterns, analysis points to the changes in the types and conditions of employment available in the Greek labour market, and an overriding sense of disillusionment regarding the country's political and economic future (ibid.; see also Themelis, 2017) driving decisions to leave. This is not so much about a lack of jobs per se – around half of all respondents in the Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) study were in employment at the time of their emigration – as it is about shifts in the quality, status and nature of the work available. Where people are highly educated and have prior experience of 'decent work', as many of the Greek post-2010 migrants would have had, a decline in the quality of labour opportunities can prompt emigration in search of work that (hopefully) meets expectations better.

Box 1 The role of stigma in the emigration of Indian nurses to Italy

Recent research with Indian nurses in Italy demonstrates how their decision to emigrate was driven not only by 'unsatisfactory working conditions at home' and 'low salaries', but also by the 'poor image of nursing [in India], linked to a masculine and patriarchal society' (Stievano et al., 2017: 7). Female nurses experience this stigma most acutely. It has also been suggested that the perception of nursing in India as an occupation of comparatively low worth 'plays out in the issues of salaries, rights and working conditions' (World Health Organization (WHO), 2017: 34). For these women, moving to Italy was at least partly about escaping occupational stigma (and the occupational injustices that can accompany this) and finding opportunities to build a more positive self-identity.

3.2 Return migration

The Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) study also shows how poorly perceived labour markets ‘back home’ keep emigrants in work overseas, even when that work may not be ‘decent’. As the authors explain, many people in this study chose low-skilled jobs abroad over Greek employment that doesn’t meet expectations. A key element in this decision is the perception that

employment abroad offers opportunities such as the development of language skills and the construction of wider social networks – pathways that they perceive will ‘help them to eventually find better jobs’, whenever and wherever that might be (ibid.: 25).

Other recent studies lend support to this ‘aversion’ effect. For example, research with Polish and Spanish migrants living in Norway shows how concerns about

Box 2 What explains the disproportionate concentration of migrants in precarious labour?

Migrants are disproportionately concentrated in vulnerable or precarious forms of employment. Recent estimates suggest that 16% of employed migrants in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are in low-skilled jobs, compared with 7% of nationals – something which cannot be explained by lower levels of education and training as evidence also shows high levels of overqualification among migrant workers (ILO, 2014). So what is the explanation?

Market flexibility and ‘unfree labour’

Although the deregulation of labour markets has created new kinds of job opportunities for mobile workers, it has also resulted in an erosion of employment standards (Mosley and Singer, 2015) and an increase in labour casualisation, as formal enterprises outsource production to informal workers (Chen et al., 2006; Chant and Pedwell, 2008). Research shows how greater labour market flexibility has helped create conditions that maximise the potential for the exploitation of migrants, predominantly in the most disadvantaged segments of the market (LeBaron and Phillips, 2018). There is also a growing body of work revealing ‘unfree labour’, where some migrants (for example day labourers and domestic workers) get trapped in exploitative labour relations. Methods of control include disciplining by employers, debt bondage and the use/threat of violence (Anderson, 2010; LeBaron and Phillips, 2018; Yea, 2017).

National legislation and regulatory frameworks

Government legislation tends to be structured around fixed populations, so migrants can be invisible in terms of national regulation (Mosse et al., 2005). Where more targeted frameworks do exist, they often prove ineffective in practice. This is partly due to the complexity and incoherence of the overarching regulatory regime, which makes it difficult to establish which authorities or organisations are responsible for securing migrants’ rights. This problem is particularly pronounced where migrants are sub-contracted through cross-border arrangements (Axelsson and Hedberg, 2018). National legislation and policies determining migrant status play an active role in producing precarity for migrant workers, regulating not just the flow of migrants into a country but also the types of migrant labour available to employers (i.e. that which can be paid minimal amounts and offered on highly flexible, insecure terms) (Anderson, 2010; Lewis et al., 2015).

The creation of ‘hostile environments’

Migrants often respond to national migration policies designed to aggravate the experience of irregular/illegal migrants by working in further under-the-radar clandestine labour. Recent analysis by Lewis et al. (2017) demonstrates that the UK government’s ‘hostile environment’ policy, pursued through the implementation of major immigration acts in 2014 and 2016, has helped generate a ‘super-exploitable’ and ‘hyper-precarious’ (Lewis et al., 2015) workforce. The authors show that by excluding irregular migrants (and in particular asylum-seekers) from formal banking and housing, and restricting their access to public services, this policy regime’s primary outcome has been a deterioration in wellbeing for people either unable or unwilling to return home. This is consistent with research from other contexts showing that tighter migration controls at destination often simply disrupt ‘natural’ patterns of return and circular migration (Czaika and de Haas, 2014)

Individual-level pressures of the migration experience

On arrival at their destination, labour migrants often have to lower the threshold of what they consider ‘decent work’ in order to start remitting. As a result, people can ‘opt into’ low- or under-skilled forms of work, competing against others (including natives) for precarious opportunities on the lowest rungs of the labour market – in some cases with an awareness *prior to departure* that this is likely to happen (Malla and Rosenbaum, 2017; McDowell et al., 2009). Choosing to take up ‘indecent work’ can also be understood as an individual-level response to the constraints that visas often place on people’s employment, as has recently been observed in Australia (Li and Whitworth, 2016).

working conditions and the deregulation of labour markets in countries of origin are often experienced as reasons not to return (Bygnes and Erdal, 2017). Other analysis of return aspirations among young, educated Turkish emigrants highlights the role of gender discrimination within the domestic labour market, showing how the existing and evolving nature of economic and public life in Turkey proves a greater ‘push’ for women relative to men (Elveren and Toksoz, 2017).

Even when workers experience badly paid, precarious forms of work abroad – see Box 2 for an overview of why this happens – return is not inevitable (Castles, 2011). Looking at the experiences of Bolivian migrants in Spain, Bastia (2011) points to the restrictive nature of migration policy in many host countries, which can cause labour migrants to ‘hang on’ in times of adversity or crisis. Box 3 examines this case in more detail.

3.3 Integration

The extensive literature on precarious migrant labour highlights how the nature of work taken up at destination can have a profound impact on people’s

Box 3 Why Bolivian migrants in Spain stayed put during times of crisis

When recession hit Spain in 2008, economic opportunities began drying up quickly. Migrants were among those hardest hit, with work becoming substantially less secure and conditions going into decline. Around this time, the Spanish government introduced a scheme designed to encourage the voluntary return of non-EU immigrants, essentially promising individuals a financial reward if they agreed to leave Spain and not return for three years. Uptake was extremely low.

Through interviews with Bolivian migrants, Bastia (2011) found that the reluctance of migrants to return during the recession was for the most part a product of Spanish migration policy, with increasing restrictiveness, including the introduction of visas, a key factor. This reluctance was based on the rational assumption among migrants that getting back into Spain in the future would be all but impossible, meaning that many (Bolivian) migrants chose to endure worse forms of work and deteriorating conditions rather than leave Spain. This applied even to those with work permits.

This one case illustrates a broader point: that restrictive immigration policy can disrupt natural processes of cyclical or circular migration. The rational response during times of crisis would be to return ‘home’, wait it out, and then possibly migrate back once circumstances improve. Immigration restrictions can interrupt this cycle, keeping people locked in place when the environment turns hostile (see Box 2 for more studies on this).

capacity to integrate into their new settings. Exploring the lives of ‘working poor’ immigrants in Israel, Sigad et al.’s (2018) analysis establishes the world of work as both a ‘primary route of integration into the new culture as well as a means of coping with...the uprootedness caused by immigration’. Their findings speak to the role that work can play in helping people achieve a sense of belonging, even when faced with difficult financial situations.

The authors also argue that the fundamental and far-reaching importance of work to the immigrant experience leaves individuals particularly vulnerable to discriminatory workplace practices (see Box 1). Newly arrived migrants are under pressure to find work quickly, especially when the journey has been financed by others back home, and to start providing remittances.

When decent work opportunities are scarce, integration into host societies can be challenging. We see this in research with refugee communities in sub-Saharan Africa, where difficulties in accessing employment (Danso, 2002; Kamwimbi et al., 2010) or establishing financial security through regular income generation (Smit and Rugunanan, 2014) give way to difficulties in settling in. Some have argued that this is because successful integration is perceived to be related to refugees’ and other migrants’ ability to establish an adequate personal income in their new environment (Pittaway et al., 2009, in Smit and Rugunanan, 2014).

Having to pursue self-employed informal work or insecure, low-wage jobs creates obstacles to successful integration (see Long et al., 2017 in this series). Studies of migrant experiences in the service sectors of European and northern American countries endorse this finding. Zuberi and Ptashnick (2012), for example, interviewed migrants in Vancouver doing hotel and hospital work; they found that the conditions migrants face after arrival – such as low pay or long hours – limit the time available for participation in community life.

3.4 Remittance-sending

Drawing on data from more than 2,500 regular migrants along seven major migration corridors – including Nepal-Qatar, Viet Nam-Malaysia and Ethiopia-Saudi Arabia – Aleksynka et al. (2017) look at the extent to which ‘deficiencies in conditions of work’ overseas constitute a ‘cost to labour migration’: an area that has received extremely limited attention to date. They find that losses due to ‘decent work deficits’ are equivalent to 27% of migrants’ total wages, and are double the recruitment and travel costs of the migration itself. In many destination countries, the bulk of these losses come from excessively long working hours, which are often unfairly remunerated and associated with higher levels of stress, fatigue, work-related injury and poor work-life balance (Figure 2).

Such losses vary from group to group: some of the worst affected include female domestic workers (whose

comparatively higher costs stem from ‘prohibitively excessive hours’) and male construction workers (who are often subject to unexpected wage deductions, long hours and work-related physical injury).

‘Decent work deficits’ have a direct monetary impact on migrants, including on remittance flows: the authors report a significant correlation between higher losses incurred through bad working conditions and the amount of remittances sent back.

4 How migration shapes ‘decent work’ outcomes

In this section we look at how migration shapes both the nature of work for individuals – including migrants themselves, native-born workers and ‘stayers’ – and the functioning of labour markets more broadly.

4.1 At destination

A recent study by OECD/ILO (2018a) asks how international labour migration shapes the nature of destination economies, looking not only at the impact on native employment and wage levels but also at how migration impacts the types of jobs held by native-born workers. It finds that immigration has a ‘negligible’ impact on their labour market outcomes, which is ‘in line with


the majority of research on OECD countries’ (ibid.: 15). When we move below the aggregate or national level, however, a more mixed and complicated picture emerges.

Gender is one element in how migration impacts the labour market. Native-born women appear to be most negatively affected by the presence of female labour migrants (there are exceptions in Costa Rica, Nepal and South Africa). The report suggests this is probably due to women’s over-representation in temporary and vulnerable forms of employment, which are particularly sensitive to increases in competition from new workers (see Box 4).

Geography and scale also have an impact: some countries with insignificant effects at the aggregate level contain several sub-national regions where the effects are much more positive (Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Thailand), while others with an overall positive effect are also home to regions where that impact runs in the opposite direction (South Africa). The reasons for such variations are diverse and complex, but include regional differences in the rate of native out-migration.

There is some evidence that immigration can shape the structures of destination labour markets, to the extent that it can lead to changes in the type of work that native-born workers subsequently take up. One example of how this happens is the creation of new jobs. Recent research in the United States (US) finds that while immigrants constitute 15% of the labour

Figure 2 Excessive working hours are responsible for substantial losses in migrant incomes across countries



Source: Aleksynka et al., 2017.

Box 4 The labour market impacts of immigration are gendered – and vary between countries

Although the OECD/ILO (2018a) synthesis report suggests that native-born women risk losing the most from immigration, the case studies show how this can vary from country to country.

In Ghana, for example, immigration appears to have a negative impact on the paid employment rate of native-born women, even though the aggregate impact at the national level (women and men combined) is negligible. While there is no detectable impact on women’s wages, the report suggests that the reduction in paid employment is likely to be associated with increased informality and a decline in the quality of work for native-born women. It proposes that ‘immigrant women are strong substitutes for native-born women, and that the latter might [therefore] be pushed into vulnerable employment’ (OECD/ILO, 2018b: 102).

By contrast, the evidence from Argentina suggests that immigration may have allowed native-born women with relatively low levels of education to enter the labour market in greater numbers (OECD/ILO, 2018c). The study suggests that women in this category were able to hire migrants to perform domestic duties, freeing themselves up for other work.

force, they account for around a quarter of the country's entrepreneurs (Kerr and Kerr, 2016). What's more, new firms established by immigrants employ an average of 4.4 workers – a powerful counter-narrative to the misplaced idea that economies have a fixed number of jobs to go around (sometimes referred to as the 'lump of labour fallacy').²

Returning to the OECD/ILO report, we also see that in certain contexts 'immigrants provide native-born workers the opportunity of finding better employment' (ibid.: 29). In Thailand, for example, immigration has helped to reduce the share of native-born workers in vulnerable employment and increase their presence in paid employment. The idea that migrant workers, particularly low-skilled ones, can free up natives to specialise and upgrade their occupations is supported by evidence from a number of European countries (Constant, 2014).

This is not the case everywhere of course. The impact of migration depends on the skill structure of immigrants relative to the skill structure of native-born workers (Dustmann et al., 2008), so it matters which parts of the labour market we look at. If, for example, we take what some call the 'secondary sector' – where there is a concentration of low-skilled, low-waged jobs and *underemployment* is the norm (Wachter, 1974, in Fields, 2010: 6) – we find that immigration can generate comparatively worse effects for native-born workers relative to those in higher segments of the market. This can apply both to wages – as research by the Bank of England demonstrates in relation to the UK's semi- and unskilled service sectors (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015) – and occupational status/change. Studies suggest that natives working in jobs with the worst conditions and/or those with some of the lowest levels of educational attainment are most likely to be affected negatively (or potentially even displaced) by new immigration flows (Edo, 2015; Ozden and Wagner, 2014).³

This 'crowding out' effect arises because many migrants find work in the secondary sector (see Box 2), which can subsequently increase competition for jobs in that sector – even those that are badly paid and without protection. Prominent examples include increasingly deregulated sectors such as construction, agriculture and the service industry (particularly in relation to janitorial work, catering and hospitality) (Benach et al., 2011; Bloch, 2006; Castles, 2011; McDowell et al.,

2009; Pajnik, 2016). Part of what drives this dynamic is the combination of pressure and vulnerability that often surrounds migrants as they enter new economic environments. This is most likely to happen when people arrive through irregular means, including asylum channels – research shows that those arriving without documentation tend to find themselves in some of the most exploitable situations within the destination labour market (ILO, 2014; Khatri, 2007; Waite, 2017).

As a result, alongside increased competition and possible displacement within the secondary sector, we sometimes see skills/status downgrading among migrant workers. Bloch (2006) has observed such an effect among highly educated and experienced Zimbabwean immigrants to the UK, describing a 'pattern of under-employment and downward occupational mobility' that is linked to a subsequent process of 'de-skilling' (Bloch, 2006: 83; see also Marsden, 2014 for similar evidence from Canada).⁴ The incorporation of migrants into these precarious sectors of the labour market can thus prove problematic for both native workers and migrants themselves.

The impact of migration on more skilled sectors of the labour market is often very different. There is some evidence, for example, that the insertion of new workers can increase the quality of the labour supply within some sectors. Looking at the impact of the distribution of foreign nurses across US states, Cortes and Pan (2015) find that while fewer native nurses sit the licensing exams, an increase in foreign nurses also increases the pass rate of natives who do sit the exams (the authors' proxy for nursing quality).

So, while an increase in competition as a result of labour immigration can certainly undermine the nature and quality of labour market outcomes for both natives and migrants, this is sector-specific – and must be considered alongside the generally neutral national-level impacts. Moreover, in certain scenarios we see the opposite effect: under certain conditions, migration can help enhance employment outcomes for all, both in terms of quantity and quality. In this regard labour migration constitutes both an opportunity for, and barrier to, meeting SDG 8, and must be managed accordingly.

4.2 In transit

Although there is very little literature looking directly at how migration shapes the nature of labour markets in transit, the recent political prioritisation of Europe's

2 When new firms are co-founded by immigrants and natives, they employ on average nearly 17 workers.

3 It should be noted that, while there is evidence of wage-lowering and 'crowding out' among unskilled native-worker populations, the magnitude of these effects is said to be far lower than popular opinion would suggest (ILO, 2014). One recent review of the effects of low-skilled migration into 'advanced' countries found that 'fears of an adverse impact on the wages, unemployment and living standards of native low-skilled workers are largely misplaced' (Dadush, 2014).

4 The briefing on gender, migration and the 2030 Agenda highlights how de-skilling can be particularly pronounced among female migrants (O'Neil et al., 2016).

'migration crisis' has prompted interest in certain hotspots along key migration corridors.

The case of Agadez, a city in central Niger, illustrates what substantial migration flows can do to the economies of major transit sites. In their 2015 report for the *Wall Street Journal*, Hinshaw and Parkinson describe how recent increases in the number of African migrants passing through the city – many heading to north Africa (and beyond) – have helped revitalise the local economy, primarily through the creation of new migration-related jobs (in the transportation and smuggling industries, for example) but also through increases in local demand and consumption.⁵ This new commercial activity has helped inhabitants to start up or expand self-run enterprises, with the potential of further job creation down the line.

The case of Agadez also highlights the role that international migration/development policy can play in shaping the labour markets and economies of transit spaces. 2016 saw the implementation, funded by the European Union (EU), of a law designed to prevent the 'illicit smuggling of migrants'. This crushed migration-related livelihood opportunities (for members of the host community) and generated a huge shock to the Agadez economy. In assessing the economic fallout of this policy, Hoffmann et al. (2017) observe multiple impacts, including the loss of 6,000 migration-related jobs, adverse economic effects among businesses

previously benefiting from increases in consumption, and a reduction in regional imports.

Yet, at the same time as trying to flatten the migration industries of places like Agadez, international policy is also attempting to create alternative jobs (partly based on a logic of migration deterrence). As part of the Valletta Action Plan to address the root causes of irregular migration, Agadez is the target of a €30-million initiative to 'improve the production conditions and economic value of agricultural products in the region' (European Commission (EC), 2016), while other key transit countries such as Jordan and Ethiopia – both resident to significant numbers of regional refugees and other migrants – have become the testing grounds for a new kind of idea: compacts (see Box 5).

4.3 Back 'home'

Beyond their positive if negligible effect on GDP growth (Mitra et al., 2015; OECD/ILO, 2018a), remittances can drive more localised processes of economic change, including creating jobs at origin by stimulating demand for labour.

In Zimbabwe, research shows that although remittances have been responsible for creating a significant number of jobs locally (within the specific study sites), these are predominantly insecure and low-waged (Ncube and Gomez, 2011), primarily involving domestic and agricultural activities. They were created largely in response

Box 5 Compacts: a new way of creating jobs in transit countries

Refugee compacts are agreements between host government and donors that combine grants, concessional loans and other 'beyond aid' incentives, with the aim to create new labour opportunities and economic development in migration hotspots. They often include industrial parks, with a split allocation of jobs between refugee and host communities. Compacts constitute an important and forward-looking step in international migration policy. But while the focus tends to be on the *number* of jobs created by these initiatives, evidence shows that the *type* and *quality* of the work are equally important.

Looking at the Jordan Compact, research by Barbelet et al. (2018) highlights how work permits provided through the scheme 'are restricted to sectors that do not align with the typical skills profile of Syrian refugees'; neither do they reflect the fact that many refugees rely on 'a portfolio of jobs to make a decent living', designed as they are to tie permit-holders to a single employer (Barbelet et al., 2018: 5; see also International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2017). The geographical dimension of work has also been identified as an important mediating factor, with low take-up of industrial jobs by Syrians ascribed in part to the location of factories and people's reluctance to take on long journey times for family reasons (Lenner, 2016).

One key lesson from Jordan is that, for refugee compacts to work, there must be wide and inclusive consultation during the initial design phase. It is crucial that the skillsets, experiences and aspirations of both refugee and host populations are taken into account and balanced against the limits and structures of the economy. Inputs from a range of actors are needed to get this right, building partnerships across the economic, political, humanitarian, diplomatic and trade sectors.

⁵ One recent analysis suggests that the impacts of transit migration are negligible and potentially negative, stating that 'migrants in transit' generally lack the means to remit home and may end up competing for jobs in transit countries (World Bank Group, 2018). However, the evidence from Agadez counteracts the point regarding competition for jobs in transit. Research by Samuel Hall (2016) suggests that the 'crowding out' effect outlined earlier is unlikely to be a problem for the inhabitants of Agadez: of the 400-plus migrants interviewed, 70% planned on staying in town for less than one month.

to a new demand for labour following the emigration of household members (which freed up positions within the local market) and the financial accumulation of recipient households (which gave them the capital to employ workers). Elsewhere in Zimbabwe, remittances have encouraged entrepreneurial activity among non-recipient households by increasing consumption levels within the local economy (Nzima et al., 2017). And in India, there have been increases in the demand for local construction and service industries (Kapur, 2010).

Remittances can also help improve labour-market outcomes through indirect means – education, for example, which increases human capital and impacts the quality of a country's (future) labour supply. Evidence shows that remittance receipt is often associated with positive outcomes in this respect, not just in relation to better secondary-level attainment, but also at the university level (Gorlich et al., 2007; Kugler, 2006; Ngoma and Ismail, 2013; Mansour et al., 2011). Recent analysis additionally demonstrates that remittances tend to remain relatively stable during times of economic slump or crisis, suggesting they can keep recipients in education even when times are tough (De et al., 2016).

Remittances can fund collectively the provision of local goods, from roads and electricity to health services and hygiene infrastructure (Adida and Girod, 2011; Chaudhry, 1989; Chauvet et al., 2015; Kapur, 2010). Theoretically, both the formation of human capital and functioning public services are important preconditions for 'decent work' creation and attainment.

Another way in which emigration shapes labour markets 'back home' is through changes to the domestic labour supply. Evidence from Nepal suggests that the combination of out-migration and remittance receipt has contributed to a shift in labour relations between 'employees' and 'employers' (Adhikari and Hopley, 2015). Households that are historically marginalised as a result of their caste have achieved greater economic dependence, moving from wage labour into more independent forms of income generation; and land tenants have gained (relatively) greater control over landlords, taking advantage of labour shortages within the community to secure more favourable tenancy terms. At the same time, however, 'left behind' women find themselves having to take on additional work on top of reproductive duties.

While out-migration is sometimes associated with shifts in the employment trajectories of 'stayers', the literature on this question is highly mixed (Bossavie and Denisova, 2018). In some cases 'stayers' move into different *types* of work (for example, from formal paid employment into informal work), resulting in a re-allocation, rather than

reduction, of the labour supply (see Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006 on Mexico); in other cases, the impacts are either insignificant or non-existent.

Finally, there is the question of how migration – or rather the *prospect* of migration – can cause a 'brain gain' for countries of origin.⁶ Analysis shows that prior to the physical act of crossing borders, individuals go through a process of 'cognitive migration' whereby they imagine their future abroad (Koikkalainen and Kyle, 2016). As part of this process, people's behaviour *prior to* departure is geared towards enhancing their chances of a 'successful migration' – for example, by investing in more education – which benefits the country of origin.

The prospect of future migration can generate significant improvements in the quality of the domestic labour supply, with research from Cape Verde showing that an increase in the 'probability of own [future] migration' by 1 percentage point increases the 'probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling' by 1.9 percentage points (Batista et al., 2007: 24). And in contrast to the 'brain drain' narrative, most people do not leave as soon as they finish their course. Studies show that African medical graduates wait on average several years – often more than five – before emigrating (Clemens, 2009; Dovlo and Nyonator, 2001; Tankwanchi et al., 2013).

5 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda

The concept of 'decent work' has a prominent position within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This is an important and positive move forward, steering policy debates beyond their focus on the quantitative aspects of job creation towards a consideration of how the quality of new and existing work opportunities might also be enhanced.

It features most centrally in Goal 8, which encourages action to 'promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all'. Within Goal 8 are five more specific targets (8.1, 8.2, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.8), which draw attention to the nature, quality and regulation of available economic opportunity. Goals 4 ('Ensure inclusive and equitable education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all'), 5 ('Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls') and 16 ('Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies') also include ideas about 'decent work'.

Migration plays into these goals and targets in a number of ways. Table 1 highlights the relevant points policy-makers should consider, and underlines migration's potential contribution towards 'decent work' for all.

6 This is an important counterpoint to the 'brain drain' narrative, which although having received substantial attention within the economic literature, remains a contested and perhaps over-hyped phenomenon (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).

Table 1 Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
Goal 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	
8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries	Migration can contribute to economic growth across different migration spaces. At destination – and, to a lesser extent, in transit – it can do so by supporting the transition of native workers into comparatively higher-skilled jobs, and by creating work opportunities through enterprise. In many countries of origin, remittances form a substantial element of the economy. However, evidence suggests that in both instances their role is limited and likely incapable of sustaining 7% annual growth rates (OECD/ ILO, 2018).
8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors	At destination, migration has been shown to support diversifications in export portfolios (although this is a gradual process), and its association with economic innovation is generally positive. Migration also impacts the country of origin economy positively, as new ideas and knowledge are remitted and individuals invest in their own human capital prior to the act of migration. These effects tend to be linked more to processes of high-skilled migration than other categories.
8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value	<p>Migration can help create new employment opportunities for ‘stayers’ through remittances, which recipient households can use to hire labour, and alterations in the domestic labour supply. However, such work tends to be informal, low-skilled and insecure. Remittances can also support the economic mobility of recipient households, encouraging internal migration to places promising greater labour opportunity (especially non-farm-related).</p> <p>At destination, high-skilled migration can create new jobs for natives through enterprise and business start-up. At the lower-skilled end of the labour market, immigration sometimes brings a ‘crowding out’ effect. This can either result in ‘job upgrading’ or push those who depend on insecure and hyper-flexible work out of the labour market altogether.</p> <p>The current treatment of many low- and semi-skilled labour migrants overseas (e.g. in domestic, service or construction work) means the attainment of ‘full and productive... decent work for all’ remains some way off. In some of the worst-case scenarios, underemployed migrants can be de-skilled through mismatched, low-skilled employment.</p>
Goal 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all	
4.1 Ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes	Generally speaking, a pre-condition for accessing ‘decent work’ is a good standard of human capital, attained through (among other things) quality education. Primary and secondary attainment, rather than attendance alone, is central to this. Additionally, labour migration can help children back home complete primary and secondary education through remittances, which are often used for this purpose.
4.3 Ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university	Higher education is also important for the attainment of ‘decent work’ later in life, particularly that which demands highly skilled individuals. As per Target 4.1, remittances secured through labour migration can be used to put family members back home through higher education.
4.4 Increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship	Technical and vocational skills are often pre-conditions for the attainment of ‘decent work’. Labour migration can contribute to the acquisition of new skills, as jobs overseas may provide better opportunities for further learning and skills development relative to those in countries with weaker economies.
Goal 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	
5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation	Foreign domestic work is a key area of employment for female labour migrants, but it also one of the least protected in terms of exploitation and violation of rights. National legislation, if appropriately designed and properly administered, has a role to play in addressing this; around 30% of the world’s domestic workers are currently excluded from national labour laws (ILO, 2013).
5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate	Emigration can potentially empower ‘left behind’ women by facilitating their entrance into previously restricted spaces of the labour market. In many cases, however, it places additional work burdens on female household members while leaving reproductive labour relations and responsibilities unchanged.
Goal 16 Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies	
16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	For many migrants, the world of work is the primary determinant of their migration experience. Low- and semi-skilled migrants often find themselves in precarious labour positions where they are exposed to violence and rights violations. By contrast, quality jobs that offer security and protection can help migrants integrate into their new surroundings, thus contributing to more inclusive societies at the local level (see also the ODI briefing on citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda (Long et al., 2017)).

6 Conclusions and policy recommendations

SDG 8 calls for ‘full and productive employment and decent work for all’ by 2030. Unfortunately, there is still some way to go to meet this target. While the number of unemployed people has been falling in recent years (190 million or 6% of the global labour force in 2017), the number of people in vulnerable or precarious forms of work remains substantial (1.4 billion or 40% in the same year) – and it looks set to rise. Labour migrants are disproportionately represented in this latter category and, as this briefing has shown, face overwhelming challenges in the pursuit of ‘decent work’.

In the policy context, the relationship between migration and employment tends to be discussed in terms of how job availability influences migration movements, and vice versa. Recent mass displacements have lent further weight to this focus on the numbers. In countries such as Jordan and Ethiopia, new jobs are being created in order to counter the pressures that can

accompany large influxes of refugees and other migrants, helping to support people’s livelihoods and – it is hoped – discourage onward migration.

We need to move beyond this one-dimensional approach. The evidence discussed in this brief clearly demonstrates the fact that badly conditioned, poorly protected or paid work can influence the initial decision to migrate. We have also seen how the experiences of migrants can be vastly undermined by exploitative practices and regulatory black holes in overseas labour markets. In short, having a job is no guarantee that wellbeing, stability and security will follow: the substance or quality of the work involved is just as important.

The evidence has several implications for progress towards the 2030 Agenda, with particular reference to Goals 4, 5, 8 and 16. The following recommendations set out actions for governments, donors and international agencies aiming to maximise ‘decent work’ outcomes in a migration context.

Conclusion 1 The ‘decency’ of work affects the decision to migrate, migrants’ experiences of overseas labour markets, and the economic returns of migration

While it may not always be the single most important determinant of migration processes and outcomes, the *nature* of work plays a significant role. Evidence suggests that ‘indecent’ or precarious work can shape emigration flows, stifle the ability of migrants to integrate into their host communities, and limit the potential returns of labour migration. Policy-makers should take ‘decent work’ issues into consideration in order to address the root causes of migration effectively and maximise its potential benefits.

Recommendation: use a ‘decent work’ lens to better understand, and respond to, the policy challenges of international migration

Policy-makers should:

- **think less in terms of numbers, more in terms of wellbeing.** Go beyond job numbers and wages to consider the regulation and treatment of workers. Consider broader wellbeing factors,

such as autonomy in the workplace, opportunities for learning and self-development, voice and accountability, and personal safety.

Donors and international agencies should:

- **incorporate ideas about decent work and wellbeing into the design of new employment initiatives.** Refugee compacts need to go beyond the initial creation and allocation of work permits. They should include labour inspections on a regular basis and more active attempts to link permit holders to social-security systems. Donors and agencies can draw on lessons learnt from existing compacts (see examples from the Jordan experience: Barbelet et al., 2018; Kattaa and Byrne, 2018; Lenner, 2016).
- **generate and use data that captures ‘decent work’ outcomes.** Data collection methods and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches concerned with employment numbers and productivity levels alone are not sufficient. Consider alternative metrics. Kim et al. (2017), for example, suggest that the ‘inclusiveness’ of processes of economic change can be evaluated by focusing on shifts in the availability and distribution of ‘decent work’ opportunities.

Relevant SDG targets

4.3 Ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university

4.4 Increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship

5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate

8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries

8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors

8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value

8.6 By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

Conclusion 2 Low- and semi-skilled labour migrants face significant difficulties accessing ‘decent work’ in host countries

Given that international labour migrants shoulder a disproportionate share of ‘indecent’ work, we will not achieve Goal 8 without relevant action in host countries. Hostile policy environments and increasingly restrictive immigration laws intensify competition for precarious jobs, affecting the livelihoods of both migrants and natives (who can be ‘crowded out’ of low- and semi-skilled jobs). Transaction fees and ‘decent work’ deficiencies also reduce the size of remittances, which undermines the potential economic ‘success’ of migration.

Recommendation: protect migrants’ labour rights through innovative and politically pragmatic solutions

Donors and international agencies should:

- **support local initiatives and movements that are facilitating migrants’ integration and promoting labour rights.** Such support may need to be at arm’s length in order to minimise political sensitivities. Lend backing and finance to campaigns designed to secure decent pay and conditions for labour migrants in certain sectors, such as domestic work and the service industries, rather than the labour market as a whole. Take advantage of opportunities for wholesale reform, such as that offered by the recent Windrush scandal in the UK (see Foresti, 2018).
- **go sub-national.** The best opportunities for reform are often at municipal or regional level. Consider providing support to sub-national authorities who are willing to protect migrants’ employment rights, offer legal advice and provide support into the labour market – as has been observed in Barcelona (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).

Civil-society organisations should:

- **challenge the ‘hostile environment’.** Policies designed to create an unwelcome situation for migrants are often counter-productive. Advocate for reform on this basis. Rights-based campaigns should draw on the evidence demonstrating that exclusionary practices help create ‘super-exploitable’ migrant workforces and act as a deterrent to return migration.
- **be aware of trade-offs and unintended consequences.** Better rights and protections can result in a reduction in the demand for migrant labour, meaning fewer people get the opportunity to migrate through formal pathways (Naidu et al., 2016; Ruhs and Martin, 2008; Weyl, 2018). Promote the creation of alternative migration pathways and/or make the case that greater rights and higher numbers of jobs are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals.

Relevant SDG targets

5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate

8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value

8.6 By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

Conclusion 3 It’s not just the lack of work in origin countries that drives migration, but the nature of their labour markets too

People’s experiences with labour markets at home can drive the decision to migrate. Even those in employment aspire for and actively pursue opportunities abroad. Thinking about how domestic labour markets work (e.g. in relation to terms of employment or opportunities for legal redress and accountability) opens up new options for reform beyond the mantra of job creation alone.

Recommendation: improve the quality of labour opportunities before migration occurs

Policy-makers in origin countries should:

- **implement policies that lead to higher wages where possible.** Evidence from the health sector suggests that wage-increase programmes can help to reduce emigration levels (Antwi and Phillips, 2013; Okeke, 2014). Expanding this kind of programming to other sectors could help governments retain skilled workers.
- **test new ways to enhance the quality of the labour market,** beyond wage increases alone and in partnership with donors. Michael Clemens (2015: 21) has pointed out that the ‘creative design and evaluation of incentives for skilled workers to remain in poor countries has received extremely little attention’. Experiment with new kinds of reforms and

interventions designed to target workers' conditions, rights and representation; and examine how these could reshape people's plans for the future.

Policy-makers, donors and international agencies should:

- **safeguard the experience of labour migration before it happens.** People will continue to migrate, even in the presence of a 'better' domestic labour market. For those attempting to do so through legal pathways, the quality of recruitment systems is key to a successful migration. As Hagen-Zanker et al. (2017) highlight

in their ODI briefing on poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda, there are several steps that can be taken to ensure exploitative agencies and employers are more accountable. In addition, donors should continue to support and expand existing initiatives such as the ILO-managed Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR) and Regional Fair Migration Project in the Middle East (FAIRWAY), as well as the International Organization for Migration's International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) – all of which are designed to promote fair and ethical recruitment practices.

Relevant SDG targets

5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate

8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries

8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors

8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment

16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere

For very helpful and constructive feedback on an earlier version of this paper, thanks go to Emma Samman, Manolo Abella, and several staff at the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). For continued support, advice and feedback throughout the whole process, many thanks also go to Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Helen Dempster and Sarah Cahoon. Finally, during the editing and production processes, thanks go to Chris Little, Caelin Robinson and Sophy Kershaw.

References

- Adida, C. L. and Girod, D. M. (2011) 'Do migrants improve their hometowns? Remittances and access to public services in Mexico, 1995-2000', *Comparative Political Studies* 44: 3–27.
- Adhikari, J. and Hobley, M. (2015) "“Everyone is leaving. Who will sow our fields?” The livelihood effects on women of male migration from Khotang and Udaypur districts, Nepal, to the Gulf countries and Malaysia', *Himalaya: The Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies* 35(1): 7
- Alberti, G. (2014) 'Mobility strategies, “mobility differentials” and “transnational exit”: the experiences of precarious migrants in London’s hospitality jobs', *Work, Employment and Society* 28(6): 865–881.
- Alberti, G., Holgate, J. and Tapia, M. (2013) 'Organising migrants as workers or as migrant workers? Intersectionality, trade unions and precarious work', *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 24(22): 4132–4148.
- Aleksynka, M., Aoul, S. K. and Petrencu, V. (2017) 'Deficiencies in conditions of work as a cost to labor migration: concepts, extent and implications'. Working paper 28. Washington, D.C.: KNOMAD.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Pozo, S. (2006) 'Migration, remittances, and male and female employment patterns', *American Economic Review* 96(2): 222–226.
- Anderson, B. (2010) 'Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers', *Work, Employment and Society* 24(2): 300–317.
- Antwi, J. and Phillips, D. C. (2013) 'Wages and health worker retention: evidence from public sector wage reforms in Ghana', *Journal of Development Economics* 102: 101–115.
- Barbelet, V., Hagen-Zanker, J. and Mansour-Ille, D. (2018) 'The Jordan Compact: lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts'. Policy briefing. London: ODI.
- Bastia, T. (2011) 'Should I stay or should I go? Return migration in times of crises', *Journal of International Development* 23: 583-595.
- Batista, C., Lacuesta, A. and Vicente, P. C. (2007) 'Brain drain or brain gain? Micro evidence from an African success story'. Discussion paper 3035. Bonn: IZA.
- Benach, J., Muntaner, C., Delclos, C., Menendez, M. and Ronquillo, C. (2011) 'Migration and “low-skilled” workers in destination countries', *PLoS Med* 8(6): 1–4.
- Bloch, A. (2006) 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: migrant perspectives', *Social Policy Administration* 40(1): 67–87.
- Bossavie, L. and Denisova, A. (2018) 'Youth labor migration in Nepal'. Jobs working paper issue 13. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Bygnes, S. and Erdal, M. B. (2017) 'Liquid migration, grounded lives: considerations about future mobility and settlement among Polish and Spanish migrants in Norway', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43(1): 102-118.
- Castles, S. (2011) 'Migration, crisis, and the global labour market', *Globalizations* 8(3): 311–324.
- Chant, S. and Pedwell, C. (2008) *Women, gender and the informal economy: an assessment of ILO research and suggested ways forward*. Geneva: ILO.
- Chaudhry, K. A. (1989) 'The price of wealth: business and state in labor remittance and oil economies', *International Organization* 43: 101-145.
- Chen, M., Vanek, J. and Heintz, J. (2006) 'Informality, gender and poverty: a global picture', *Economic and Political Weekly* 41(121): 2131-2139.
- Clemens, M. A. (2011) 'The financial consequences of high-skill emigration: lessons from African doctors abroad', in S. Plaza and D. Ratha (eds.), *Diaspora for development in Africa*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Clemens, M. A. (2015) 'Losing our minds? New research directions on skilled migration and development'. Discussion paper 9218. Bonn: IZA.
- Chauvet, L., Gubert, F., Mercier, M. and Mesple-Soms, S. (2015) 'Migrants’ home town associations and local development in Mali', *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 117(2): 686-722.
- Constant, A. F. (2014) 'Do migrants take the jobs of native workers?'. 2014: 10. Bonn: IZA World of Labor.
- Cortes, P. and Pan, J. (2015) 'Immigration and occupational choice of natives: the case of nurses in the United States', *CEifo Economic Studies* 61(3-4): 797–823.
- Czaika, M. and de Haas, H. (2014) 'The effect of visa policies on international migration dynamics'. Working paper 89. Oxford: International Migration Institute.
- Dadush, U. (2014) 'The effect of low-skilled labor migration on the host economy'. Working paper 1. Washington, D.C.: KNOMAD.
- De, S., Islamaj, E., Ayhan Kose, M. and Reza Yousefi, S. (2016) 'Remittances over the business cycle: theory and evidence'. Working paper 11. Washington, D.C.: KNOMAD.

- Dovlo, D. and Nyonator, F. (2001) 'Migration by graduates of the University of Ghana medical school: a preliminary rapid appraisal'. Accessed June 2018: www.who.int/hrh/en/HRDJ_3_1_03.pdf
- Dustmann, C., Glitz, A. and Frattini, T. (2008) 'The labour market impact of immigration', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24(3): 477–494.
- EC (2016) 'Presentation of actions to the operational committee: creating jobs in the transit areas of Tahoua and Agadez in Niger'. Accessed June 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/t05-eutf-sah-ne-03_en.pdf
- Edo, A. (2015) 'The impact of immigration on native wages and employment', *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy* 15(3): 1151–1196.
- Elveren, A. Y. and Toksoz, G. (2017) 'Why don't highly skilled women want to return? Turkey's brain drain from a gender perspective'. Munich Personal RePEc Archive paper 80290. Accessed May 2018: https://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80290/2/MPRA_paper_80290.pdf
- Fields, G. (2010) 'Labor market analysis for developing countries'. Cornell ILR working paper 2010-8. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University.
- Foresti, M. (2018) 'Windrush: could this be the end of the "hostile environment" for immigrants?'. ODI Insight. Accessed August 2018: www.odi.org/comment/10641-windrush-could-be-end-hostile-environment-immigrants
- Fudge, J. (2011) 'The precarious migrant status and precarious employment: the paradox of international rights for migrant workers'. Working paper 11–15. Metropolis British Columbia: Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Diversity.
- Gibson, J. and McKenzie, D. (2011) 'Eight questions about brain drain', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25(3): 107–128.
- Gorlich, D., Omar Mahmoud, T. and Trebesch, C. (2007) 'Explaining labour market inactivity in migrant-sending families: housework, hammock or higher education?'. Working paper 1391. Kiel: Institute for the World Economy.
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Postel, H. and Vidal, E. M. (2017) 'Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. Briefing. London: ODI.
- Hinshaw, D. and Parkinson, J. (2015) 'Agadez traffickers profit from movement through Niger to Libya', *Wall Street Journal*, 19 July. Accessed June 2018: www.wsj.com/articles/agadez-traffickers-profit-from-movement-through-niger-to-libya-1437002559
- Hoffmann, A., Meester, J. and Nabara, H. M. (2017) 'Migration and markets in Agadez: economic alternatives to the migration industry'. Conflict Research Unit report. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- ILO (2013) *Domestic workers across the world: global and regional statistics and the extent of legal protection*. Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2014) 'Fair migration: setting an ILO agenda'. International Labour Conference, 103rd session report. Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2016) *Decent work for migrants and refugees*. Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2018a) *World employment and social outlook: trends 2018*. Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2018b) 'Decent work'. Accessed June 2018: www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm
- Kapoor, D. (2010) *Diaspora, development and democracy: the domestic impact of international migration from India*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University.
- Kattaa, M. and Bryne, M. (2018) 'Quality of work for Syrian refugees in Jordan', *Forced Migration Review* 58: 45–46.
- Kerr, S. P. and Kerr, W. R. (2016) 'Immigrant entrepreneurship'. Working paper 17-011. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard Business School.
- Khatri, S. K. (2007) 'Labour migration, employment and poverty alleviation in South Asia', in S. Ahmed, S. Kelegama and E. Ghani (eds.), *Promoting economic cooperation in South Asia: beyond SAFTA*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Kim, K., Sumner, A. and Yusuf, A. A. (2017) 'A job-centred view of inclusive structural transformation'. Briefing paper 7. London: ESRC Global Poverty and Inequality Dynamics Research Network.
- Koikkalainen, S. and Kyle, D. (2016) 'Imagining mobility: the prospective cognition question in migration research', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(5).
- Kugler, M. (2005) 'Migrant remittances, human capital formation and job creation externalities in Colombia'. Accessed June 2018: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7093401.pdf>
- Labrianidis, L. and Pratsinakis, M. (2016) 'Greece's new emigration at times of crisis'. GreeSE paper 99. London: Hellenic Observatory/London School of Economics.
- LeBaron, G. and Phillips, N. (2018) 'States and the political economy of unfree labour', *New Political Economy* Latest Article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1420642>
- Lenner, K. (2016) 'The politics of pledging: reflections on the London donors conference for Syria'. Policy brief 2016/03. Florence: Migration Policy Centre.
- Lewis, H., Dwyer, P., Hodgkinson, S. and Waite, L. (2015) 'Hyper-precarious lives: migrants, work and forced labour in the Global North', *Progress in Human Geography* 39(5): 580–600.

- Lewis, H., Waite, L. and Hodkinson, S. (2017) ‘“Hostile” UK immigration policy and asylum seekers’ susceptibility to forced labour’, in F. Vecchio and A. Gerard (eds.), *Entrapping asylum seekers: social, legal and economic precariousness*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Li, Y-T. and Whitworth, K. (2016) ‘When the state becomes part of the exploitation: migrants’ agency within the institutional constraints in Australia’, *International Migration* 54(6): 138-50.
- Long, K., Vidal, E. M., Kuch, A. and Hagen-Zanker, J. (2017) ‘Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. Briefing. London: ODI.
- Malla, B. and Rosenbaum, M. S. (2017) ‘Understanding Nepalese labor migration to Gulf countries’, *Journal of Poverty* 21(5): 411–433.
- Mansour, W., Chaaban, J. and Litchfield, J. (2011) ‘The impact of migrant remittances on school attendance and education attainment: evidence from Jordan’, *International Migration Review* 45(4): 812–851.
- Marsden, S. (2014) ‘“Silence means yes here in Canada”: precarious migrants, work and the law’, *Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal* 18(1): 1–38.
- McDowell, L., Batnitzky, A. and Dyer, S. (2009) ‘Precarious work and economic migration: emerging immigrant divisions of labour in Greater London’s service sector’, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33(1): 3–25.
- Meyer, D. and Shera, A. (2017) ‘The impact of remittances on economic growth: an econometric model’, *Economia* 18(2): 147–155.
- Mitra, P., Hosny, A., Abajyan, G. and Fischer, M. (2015) ‘Estimating potential growth in the Middle East and Central Asia’. International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper 15/62. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
- Mosley, L. and Singer, D. A. (2015) ‘Migration, labor, and the international political economy’, *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 282–301.
- Mosse, D., Gupta, S. and Shah, V. (2005) ‘On the margins in the city: Adivasi seasonal labour migration in western India’, *Economic and Political Weekly* 40(28): 3025–3038.
- Moyce, S., Lash, R. and de Leon Siantz, M. L. (2015) ‘Migration experiences of foreign educated nurses: a systematic review of the literature’, *Journal of Transcultural Nursing* 1–8.
- Naidu, S., Nyarko, Y. and Wang, S-Y. (2016) ‘Monopsony power in migrant labor markets: evidence from the United Arab Emirates’, *Journal of Political Economy* 124(6): 1735–1792.
- Ncube, G. and Gomez, G. M. (2011) ‘Local economic development and remittances in rural Zimbabwe: building on sand or solid ground?’. Working paper 523. The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies.
- Ngoma, A. L. and Ismail, N. W. (2013) ‘Do migrant remittances promote human capital formation? Evidence from 89 developing countries’, *Migration and Development* 2(1): 106–116.
- Nickell, S. and Saleheen, J. (2015) ‘The impact of immigration on occupational wages: evidence from Britain’. Staff working paper 574. London: Bank of England.
- Nzima, D., Duma, V. and Moyo, P. (2017) ‘Migration and local development: the multiplier effect of migrant remittances on non-recipient households in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe’, *Migration and Ethnic Themes* 33(2): 143–164.
- OECD/ILO (2018a) *How immigrants contribute to developing countries’ economies*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD/ILO (2018b) *How immigrants contribute to Ghana’s economy*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD/ILO (2018c) *How immigrants contribute to Argentina’s economy*. Paris: OECD.
- Okeke, E. N. (2013) ‘Do higher salaries lower physician migration?’, *Health Policy and Planning* 29(5): 603–614.
- O’Neil, Fleury, A. and Foresti, M. (2016) ‘Women on the move: migration, gender equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. Briefing. London: ODI.
- Ozden, C. and Wagner, M. (2014) ‘Immigrant versus natives? Displacement and job creation’. Policy research working paper 6900. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Pajnik, M. (2016) ‘Wasted precariat: migrant work in European societies’. *Progress in Development Studies* 16(2): 159–172.
- Piper, N., Rosewarne, S. and Withers, M. (2017) ‘Migrant precarity in Asia: “networks of labour activism” for a rights-based governance of migration’, *Development and Change* 48(5): 1089–1110.
- Refslund, B. (2018) ‘When strong unions meet precarious migrants: building trustful relations to unionise labour migrants in a high union-density setting’, *Economic and Industrial Democracy* OnlineFirst: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X18760989>
- Ruhs, M. and Martin, P. (2008) ‘Numbers vs. rights: trade-offs and guest worker programs’, *International Migration Review* 42(1): 249–265.
- Samuel Hall (2016) *Selling sand in the desert: the economic impact of migration in Agadez*. Nairobi: Samuel Hall.

-
- Sigad, L. I., Eisikovits, Z., Strier, R. and Buchbinder, E. (2018) 'The meaning of work among immigrants living in poverty in Israel: replanting roots of belonging', *International Journal of Social Welfare* 27: 197–206.
- Smit, R. and Rugunanan, P. (2014) 'From precarious lives to precarious work: the dilemma facing refugees in Gauteng, South Africa', *South African Review of Sociology* 45(2): 4–26.
- Stievano, A., Olsen, D., Diaz, Y. T., Sabatino, L. and Rocco, G. (2017) 'Indian nurses in Italy: a qualitative study of their professional and social integration', *Journal of Clinical Nursing* 26(23–24): 4234–4245.
- Tankwanchi, A. B. S., Ozden, C. and Vermund, S. H. (2013) 'Physician emigration from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States: analysis of the 2011 AMA Physician Masterfile', *PLOS Medicine* 10(12).
- Themelis, S. (2017) 'Degrees of precariousness: the problematic transition into the labour market of Greek higher education graduates', *Forum Sociologico* 31: 53–62.
- Waite, L. (2017) 'Asylum seekers and the labour market: spaces of discomfort and hostility', *Social Policy and Society* 16(4): 669–679.
- Weyl, E. G. (2018) 'The openness-equality trade-off in global redistribution', *The Economic Journal* 128(612): F1–F36.
- WHO (2017) *From brain drain to brain gain: migration of nursing and midwifery workforce in the state of Kerala*. New Delhi: WHO.
- Yea, S. (2017) 'The art of not being caught: temporal strategies for disciplining unfree labour in Singapore's contract migration', *Geoforum* 78: 179–188.
- Zuberi, D. and Ptashnick, M. (2012) 'In search of a better life: the experiences of working immigrants in Vancouver, Canada', *International Migration* 50(s1): e60–e93.



Street side electronic repairs, Accra, Ghana, 2014. Photo: Fairphone

SDGs covered

- 1:** No poverty
- 3:** Good health and well-being
- 4:** Quality education
- 5:** Gender equality
- 8:** Decent work and economic growth
- 10:** Reduced inequalities
- 11:** Sustainable cities and communities
- 17:** Partnerships for the goals

Urbanisation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Paula Lucci, Dina Mansour-Ille, Evan Easton-Calabria and Clare Cummings

Key messages

- Internal migration and population growth drive urbanisation in many countries. How urbanisation is managed, and the types of jobs and services that migrants can access, are crucial to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
- Rural to urban migration can open up job opportunities, improve livelihoods and contribute to poverty reduction. Those who remain behind also benefit through remittances and non-financial transfers, such as improved knowledge and skills.
- Despite their potential, internal migrants are often neglected in government policies and lack access to adequate social protection or basic services.
- Poor, urban migrants often work in the informal sector which is badly regulated in many cities.
- More and better jobs, entrepreneurial opportunities, improved work standards and protection in cases of abuse would increase the opportunities available to migrants.

1 Introduction

Rapid urbanisation in developing countries is a defining feature of the 21st century, driven by internal migration and population growth. How urbanisation processes are managed and the types of jobs that internal migrants can access will have a great bearing on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

This policy briefing focuses on the economic integration of internal migrants arriving to cities in rapidly urbanising countries. It highlights two important SDGs, from migrants' perspectives: the promotion of full, productive employment and decent work for all (Goal 8), and making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (Goal 11). This briefing synthesises the evidence on the impact of internal migration on migrants' livelihoods, host cities' development and overall poverty reduction. We assess how both migrants and 'host' cities can benefit from migration. We then put forward the policy instruments at city and national level that could help in achieving the SDGs.

Our main focus is on internal, rural to urban migration – one of the key pathways of urbanisation. People often move from poor rural areas to cities in the hope of escaping poverty. It is conventional economic wisdom that cities – because they concentrate economic activity and labour markets – are places of economic opportunity that hold the keys to further economic development and poverty reduction (Asfaw et al., 2010; Beegle et al., 2011; Tacoli et al., 2015). Indeed, in many Latin American and East Asian countries, urbanisation happened concurrently with industrialisation and access to higher productivity jobs. However, in some developing countries, particularly in Africa, urbanisation is happening without industrialisation and alongside an expansion of the informal economy. Despite this, people


still prefer to move and stay in cities, which suggests that even in cases where poor rural migrants move from agricultural activities to precarious informal jobs in the city, they may still be better off. This briefing analyses the existing evidence to consider why this is.

After reviewing the main trends of internal rural to urban migration, Section 2 highlights the SDGs on which we focus. Section 3 provides an overview of the available evidence on the impact of internal rural to urban migration on migrants' livelihoods, on the cities that they migrate to, and on overall poverty reduction. Section 4 goes on to illustrate these impacts with two case studies across different regions (Dhaka in Bangladesh, and Accra and Kumasi in Ghana). Section 6 concludes with policy recommendations targeted at maximising the benefits of rural to urban migration and that go towards achieving the SDGs on decent jobs and inclusive, integrated urbanisation.

2 Internal migration trends

While international migration receives a lot of attention, internal migration is larger in terms of scale. In 2013 there were an estimated 763 million internal migrants worldwide (Bell and Charles-Edwards, 2013), three times the number of international migrants. Given that the costs of moving internally are much lower than those of crossing borders, internal migration and remittances are more likely to involve poorer people (Deshingkar, 2006; Migration DRC, 2006). As such, internal migration also has the greater potential to reduce poverty. Even if internal remittances are likely to be smaller, these individual transfers can reach a much larger number of poor households. For example, Castaldo et al. (2012) found that internal remittances in Ghana and India appear to be greater in magnitude than international ones.

Figure 1 Percentage of people living in urban areas



Source: UN DESA, 2014.

Urbanisation is defined as the increasing share of population living in urban areas, and it is primarily the result of internal migration (Tacoli et al., 2015).¹ Currently, Asia and Africa have 48% and 40% of their population, respectively, living in urban areas. They remain among the least urbanised regions and are expected to experience the fastest urban growth in coming decades (UN DESA, 2014; Figure 1). Asian countries, such as China, Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh and Indonesia, have experienced a large increase in the share of their population living in urban areas over the last 15 years, and are expected to continue doing so between now and 2030. In Africa, countries including Namibia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Rwanda, Mali and Ghana have also experienced a similar increase (UN DESA, 2014).

There are limitations to using the existing data on urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa, which often rely on out-of-date censuses. As a result, claims of recent rapid urbanisation in the region have been overestimated, with the reality being much more nuanced. Only some countries, such as Ghana, Cameroon and Burkina Faso fit this trend (Potts, 2013). Furthermore, census data can hide circular or temporary migration, people moving back from urban centres to rural areas as a result of seasonal work or extreme urban informality (ibid.).

Urbanisation materialises as growth in various types of settlements. Mega-cities – in particular, cities of 10 million plus residents – have received a lot of attention, in part because they are a relatively new phenomenon. There are 28 mega-cities today, up from just two in 1970, with 41 projected by 2030 (UN DESA, 2014). Many of the fastest growing mega-cities are in China and India; some are also located in fragile states, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt. Despite the attention on mega-cities, the fastest-growing agglomerations are medium-sized cities and those with fewer than 1 million inhabitants located in Asia and Africa (UN DESA, 2014). Even though they receive significant numbers of migrants, these secondary cities often receive less political attention, have fewer resources and poorer quality basic services (Ghosh, 2012). This dimension of urbanisation adds to the complexity in considering internal migration and how to better support it.

3 Internal economic migration and the SDGs

How urbanisation is managed by both city and national policy-makers, and the types of livelihoods that internal migrants can access in the city, will have a great impact on sustainable development. Goals 8 and 11 speak

directly to the issues of jobs and inclusive cities. We consider them from a migrant perspective.

Goal 8 seeks to promote decent work and protect labour rights for all workers, including migrants. Target 8.8 states, ‘Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers’. Poor, internal migrants tend to work in the informal economy, often in risky environments and with no access to social protection. Policies that support decent job creation and entrepreneurship in such settings are critical to strengthening the opportunities available to new arrivals, as are those interventions seeking to improve work standards and provide protection and assistance in cases of abuse.

Goal 11 aims to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable for migrants and others. In particular, target 11.3 seeks to promote inclusive city planning and management, while target 11.a sets out ways of implementing this goal by supporting positive economic and social links between rural and urban areas through regional and national planning. The aim is for city and national policy-makers to include new arrivals in economic and spatial planning, and in the delivery of services. Goals 8 and 11 are inherently interrelated.

Other SDGs also relevant to the economic integration of internal migrants are included in Table 1.

4 Evidence on the impact of internal migration on livelihoods and poverty reduction

4.1 How does internal migration impact migrants’ livelihoods?

The economic benefits for migrants

Broadly speaking, evidence suggests that rural to urban migrants (hereafter, urban migrants) benefit economically from moving to cities (Deshingkar, 2006). A study of internal migrants in Cambodia found that almost all were able to save money, and many also developed skills in areas such as tailoring or construction, allowing them to earn an income in both cities and rural areas (Godfrey et al., 2001). This study, like many others, suggests that, in general, urban migrants are ‘winning’ through migration. Wages and the ability to earn an income are also generally higher in urban areas than in rural ones (World Bank/IMF, 2013). Further still, using a wider measure of well-being, UNDP has found that internal migrants have a higher quality of life than non-migrants (UNDP, 2009).

1 Note that there is often confusion between urbanisation (increasing the share of the urban population) and urban population growth (the result of natural increase in populations).

Table 1 Urbanisation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDGs and targets	Link to migration
Goal 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	
8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalisation and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services.	Policies that support job creation and entrepreneurship are fundamental to guarantee decent work and better work conditions for migrants, and the urban poor more generally. There are debates about the extent to which formalisation is feasible in the short to medium term in cities with a large informal economy. Therefore, there is a need to also consider policies that can support better conditions in the informal economy in the short term.
8.5 Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value.	Low-skilled rural to urban migrants seeking better job opportunities in the city in fast urbanising developing countries often end up working in precarious occupations in the informal economy.
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment.	
Goal 11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	
11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.	Actions that take into account the needs of poor internal migrants, and the urban poor more generally, enhance their well-being and are more likely to maximise benefits for the host city economy.
11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban ¹ and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning.	Effective management of the challenges posed by urbanisation and internal migration require an understanding of the links between urban, peri-urban and rural economies. However, an understanding of these links is often missing in rapidly urbanising countries.
Goal 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere	
1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.	The evidence suggests that rural to urban migration contributes to economic development and to overall poverty reduction (Ravallion et al., 2007).
1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.	Due to their lack of formal registration in the city, many (poor) internal migrants cannot access social protection systems.
1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.	
Goal 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	
3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, and access to quality essential health-care services	As internal migrants are often in the informal sector they risk exclusion from coverage of insurance-based schemes and in many cases are invisible to universal health coverage programmes (Tulloch et al., 2016)
Goal 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all	
4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship	Internal migrants often lack the skills and training required to access decent jobs and as a result end up working in low-productivity jobs in the informal sector.
Goal 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	
5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate.	Many migrant domestic workers are female. Actions that increase the value of domestic work, including changes in underlying gender norms, would reduce women's burden of unpaid work and enhance the well-being, dignity and status of paid and unpaid care and domestic workers, including migrants (O'Neil et al., 2016).
Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries	
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	Some countries explicitly discourage internal migration for work. The policies put in place to manage migration have a direct impact on migrants' well-being and on the host city and country economies.
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%.	Internal remittances to poor households are often sent through informal channels as poor internal migrants do not have access to bank accounts. Such services can be riskier and more expensive.

Goal 17 Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

17.8 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing states. This will significantly increase the availability of high quality, timely and reliable data, disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

Data on migration, particularly on internal migration, is very limited. Improving the evidence base is fundamental in order to better understand the scale and impact of internal migration, and design better policies.

Peri-urban areas are largely defined as the areas that surround our metropolitan areas and cities – neither urban nor rural in the conventional sense.

The informality of work

Migrants from poor rural areas may find prospects in the city more financially rewarding than in the rural areas they migrated from. However, most gain employment in precarious conditions within the informal sector, often as self-employed workers,² home-based workers, street vendors (Deshingkar and Grimm, 2004), or domestic and construction workers (de Haas, 2006; Mitra, 2010; Pattanaik, 2009; Picherit, 2012).

Incomes in the informal sector can be unstable. In Tianjin, China, only 7.3% of urban migrants have permanent jobs versus 31.8% of non-migrants, while over 50% of migrant workers have no work contract compared to 14.4% of urban workers (Lu and Song, 2006). The common practice of sending remittances to family in rural areas can contribute to a loss of income that could otherwise be used to increase a migrant's standard of living (Tacoli et al., 2015). Income instability can also be exacerbated by a number of issues, including illness or injury, discrimination in labour markets, debt bondage, bonded labour, and long-term indebtedness (for the latter, see examples on India in Breman, 1996 and Mosse et al., 2005).

Given the informal arrangements, migrant workers can be subject to exploitative or dangerous working conditions. For example, construction workers in Kathmandu, Nepal face harsh working conditions that put them at high risk of injury and sickness (Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015); while female domestic workers in Asia have few rights in the workplace and are one of the least protected urban migrant groups (Siddiqui, 2012). Moreover, migrant workers are often not eligible for social or employment protection. Even when they are, they may not be able to obtain it because of complex and costly registration requirements, portability constraints (rather than being able to move with the worker, many social protection programmes require permanent residency) and lack of enforcement of existing laws (Hopkins et al., 2016; Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015).

Government policy on the informal sector, particularly at city level, can have significant consequences on the livelihoods of urban migrants. Few cities have coherent

regulations and policies. Instead, police and other authorities 'deal with' informal workers in haphazard ways (Bhowmik, 2004; Mitullah, 2004). In Kampala, Uganda, a 2011 law enforced by the Kampala City Council Authority prohibits the selling of goods in public spaces without a business license or permit. Yet many urban migrants cannot afford business licenses, and some migrants end up paying even more than urban residents due to their migrant status. Such laws restrict the livelihoods of locals and migrants, and increase insecurity. For example, women who now sell wares at night and are therefore more at risk of rape and theft (Easton-Calabria, 2016).

The informality of residence

On top of vulnerabilities in the workplace, many urban migrants also live in fear of eviction, as the majority live in informal settlements. Many governments still perceive evictions as the main way to address inappropriate living conditions in slum areas, instead of seeing a result of the failure of planning and service provision. For example, in Zimbabwe, poor slum dwellers, many of them migrants, have been evicted from slums in Harare (UNDP, 2009). Similarly, in Ghana, migrants living in the slum area of Old Fadama in Accra are vulnerable to evictions, which are sometimes violent (Awumbila et al., 2014).

Informal settlements in the poorest areas of cities often lack access to basic services, such as water and sanitation. This can affect both migrants' livelihoods and incomes, as they often have worse health than non-migrants (Afsar, 2003) and must pay in order to obtain (typically, poor quality) basic services. For example, about 92% of urban migrants in a neighbourhood in Ghana lack access to water within their residences, meaning they have to pay to buy water and bathe (Awumbila et al., 2014). In Nairobi, Kenya, urban migrants often experience a lack of sanitation, high crime rates and malnutrition (Oucho et al., 2014). However, in Accra, Ghana, although migrants live in slums with little formal social protection, they still overwhelmingly believe their overall well-being in addition to their livelihoods, has been improved through migration (Awumbila et al., 2014).

2 Entrepreneurship in the informal sector is highly gendered, with women often working as petty traders, food vendors, and hair dressers. Men often create work as artisans, construction workers, and motorbike drivers (Awumbila et al., 2014).

4.2 What is the impact of internal migration on the host city?

The economic benefits for the city

There is an increasing recognition of the benefits of urban migrants, including their ability to fill labour gaps as a cheap labour force, and their resulting contributions to economies (IOM, 2015). Many industries are reliant on migrant labour, such as garment manufacturing or construction – in India, almost 90% of construction work is estimated to be carried out with migrant labour (Deshingkar and Grimm, 2004). The informal sector, where most migrants work, can also be a major area of entrepreneurship. Again, in the case of India, it accounts for over 99% of establishments in the manufacturing sector (Ghani and Kanbur, 2012).

Despite this, it is important to note that the positive outcomes of urban migration are contextual – they depend on individual countries' economic prospects, characteristics of employment sectors and migrants' skill levels. While some research suggests that migrants may struggle more than non-migrants to find work in cities (Oucho et al., 2014), research from Bangladesh found that three out of every five migrants in Dhaka found work within one week of arrival (Afsar, 1999). A study on Dhaka estimated that the unemployment rate for working-age members of migrants' households was only 4% – half that of non-migrants in the same age range (Hossain et al., 1999). This low unemployment rate stems from a variety of factors, including Dhaka's economic and political climate and migrants' high drive to find work, which sometimes leads them to accept lower-paid jobs than locals will. Urban migrants also have high employment rates in particular cities and suburbs of Vietnam, in part due to direct recruitment from rural areas. For example, in Binh Chieu, an industrial zone ringing Ho Chi Minh City, an estimated 65% of workers are migrant labourers (Taylor, 2011).

To further increase the positive economic impact from the informal sector, some municipal and national governments have adopted policies targeting professional training to upskill micro-entrepreneurs and regulate apprenticeships, which include both the formal and informal sector. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the local government in China's Yanbian district developed policies to harness the productive capacity of both international and internal migrants, including through pre-migration skills training, encouraging capital transfer, and supporting return migrant entrepreneurship (Luova, 2014). The high remittances and other capital transfers received in Yanbian is attributed in part to these programmes, and is impressive given the low-education level of most labour migrants from the region (ibid.).

Increasing pressures on services

If local governments do not have the capacity to plan for services to meet increasing demands (or apply restrictive policies based on negative views of internal migration), this can lead to the rise of informal settlements with poor access to water, sanitation and basic amenities. Pressures on city finances compound the situation; the informal economy is rarely taxed, and there is often little redistribution from national government to the city level to deal with the backlog in the provision of amenities. In addition, poor service provision for urban migrants can affect not only new arrivals but local residents as well, and can exacerbate existing inequalities (Tacoli et al., 2015; Awumbila, et al., 2014).

For instance, in the case of Brazilian urbanisation, internal migrants and other low-income urban residents were left to live in informal settlements (*favelas*) with very limited access to services. Now that the country's urban transition has been completed, the country has introduced policies, such as urban rights in its Statute of the City (Rolnik, 2013; Santos Carvalho and Rossbach, 2010), to reduce urban inequalities. However, these inequalities ultimately stem from how low-income migrants were treated during past urbanisation (Tacoli et al., 2015).

4.3 The wider picture: how does internal migration affect poverty reduction?

Urbanisation is, generally, a positive factor in overall poverty reduction (Ravallion et al., 2007). Rural to urban migration opens up new job opportunities to migrants (in urban areas and in rural areas), and through the role of remittances also increases the living standards of those who remain behind (Ravallion et al., 2007). Increasing evidence demonstrates the role of the informal sector in contributing to national GDP in many developing countries (Chen, 2012; WIEGO, 2013). In the case of Mexico, the informal economy is understood to have contributed about 25% to its GDP for the years 2003-2012, demonstrating its relevance to national economic growth (WIEGO, 2013).

There is also some evidence of the positive effects of entrepreneurialism on the communities that urban migrants originate from. Entrepreneurship among returning migrants has been found to be small, but the businesses they do create post-migration can have a large impact on their community through the creation of jobs, the buying and selling of local supplies, and increased trade networks to rural regions (Murphy, 2002). Similarly, many Igbo entrepreneurs – an ethnic group widely cited as the most entrepreneurial in Nigeria – purposively invest in rural areas (Osuji, 1983). Rural poverty in Igboland has declined due to the high level of entrepreneurial activities, investment, and community

development in rural areas (Chukwuezi, 2001). A further positive effect of male out-migration is that left-behind women also become entrepreneurs, creating their own independent incomes (Moldova, 1997; Georgia, 1997).

Internal remittances too, play an important role in poverty reduction. Despite internal remittances being smaller in comparison than international remittances (de Haan, 1999), internal remittances can potentially play a greater role in reducing poverty (Castaldo et al., 2012). Internal migration is more common than international migration among poor households as they often lack the resources to send a family member abroad (Deshingkar, 2006). In India and Bangladesh, poverty rates in households with an internal migrant have fallen by about 50% (UNDP, 2009). Even in cases where remittances do not directly reduce poverty, they are likely to help sustain rural livelihoods and prevent people from further impoverishment (Deshingkar, 2006).

In addition to material benefits through remittances, there are further positive outcomes in other dimensions of well-being. For example, rural to urban migration can improve migrant-sending households' living standards, and can positively impact health and sanitation in the areas of origin through migrants' increased knowledge about hygiene practices (Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015). Families of migrants are also more likely to send their children to school, using remittances to pay fees and other costs. In Guatemala, internal migration increases educational expenditures by 45%, particularly on higher levels of schooling. Mexican children in households with an internal migrant were 30–45% more likely to be in an appropriate school grade for their age (UNDP, 2009).

National and local policies that seek to curb rural to urban migration on the basis that it increases urban poverty are problematic, and are largely based on a crude measure of poverty that fails to capture the dynamics – many of them positive – behind the movement of poor people to urban areas, such as access to more remunerative opportunities and the beneficial impact that this has on their families. A more balanced and nuanced understanding of the inter-linkages between causes and impacts of rural to urban migration and its role in poverty reduction is required (Awumbila et al., 2014).

5 Case studies

How do the positive and negative dynamics of rural to urban migration play out on the ground? Case studies from Dhaka in Bangladesh, and Accra and Kumasi in Ghana provide an illustration of the impacts of internal migration on migrants' livelihoods, the host city and wider poverty reduction discussed above. Bangladesh and Ghana are two of the fastest urbanising countries in Asia and Africa, and a number of studies have been carried out on these two countries, which provide readily

available evidence on the impact of internal migration at micro and macro levels.

5.1 Dhaka, Bangladesh: migration into an unsupported, unregulated hive of activity

Dhaka is the world's fastest growing megacity and the 11th largest in the world. With an estimated 15 million inhabitants, the city's population has increased fourfold in the last 25 years. Approximately 300,000 to 400,000 migrants arrive in Dhaka each year, most of whom are poor and from rural areas (Sanderson, 2012). As agricultural production has declined, landless rural inhabitants fleeing floods, climate and food disasters have also sought livelihoods in the urban areas.

Upon arriving in Dhaka, most urban migrants become part of the urban poor. Overwhelmingly, they live in slums (*bastees*) and work in the informal sector (70% of employment in Dhaka is informal: IOM, 2010). Common jobs include street vending, rickshaw driving, petty trade, daily construction labour, hairdressing, and carpentry. Migrants who find work in the formal sector mostly work in the rapidly growing ready-made garment industry – most of Bangladesh's garment industry is in Dhaka and the flow of economic migrants is considered a key factor in the sector's success. Other migrants find work in the construction sector, or as private domestic help (BPB, 2015).

Government policy towards rural to urban migration at both national and local levels is ambivalent. While there are no restrictions on movement to cities, national government policies and programmes do not specifically support migrants. For example, national targeted poverty reduction programmes, as well as those led by NGOs, tend to only register people living at their place of official residence. Once people become migrants, they are largely unable to access these forms of support due to both legal requirements and a need for good contact with the officials distributing entitlements. Urban migrants are thus often excluded from development and social programmes that could help lift them out of poverty (Afsar, 2005).

Furthermore, street-trading is illegal and urban authorities often harass and evict street traders, many of whom are migrants. Urban migrants are also vulnerable to eviction as most can only afford to live in informal settlements (BBS, 2014).

Due to the rapid increase of migrants. Dhaka faces a shortage of housing, an increased cost of living, overall lack of access to social services, and environmental strains such as a decreasing amount of potable water (Islam, 2015). The worsening socioeconomic conditions that have resulted from an increasing urban population are even perceived by some municipal officials as a means to deter potential urban migrants, due to the low quality of life in informal settlements (UNDP, 2011).

In sum, people migrating from declining opportunities in rural areas to Dhaka face a number of difficult

challenges in establishing a life in the city, yet the overall impact on their livelihoods is positive. Despite negative attitudes towards the informal sector – threats of eviction and a lack of social protection – most migrants who arrive in Dhaka are able to survive in the informal urban economy. Moreover, internal remittances sent to family members (up to 60% of migrants’ income: Deshingkar, 2006) have a significant impact on rural economic growth and play a role in reducing poverty both directly and indirectly. Institutionalising internal remittances, such as incorporating them into the country’s Deposit Pension Scheme, could further increase both rural development and the savings of the rural poor (Afsar, 2003).

5.2 Accra and Kumasi, Ghana: economic policies driving labour migration to urban areas

Accra and Kumasi are the two largest cities in Ghana. Accra, the capital, has an estimated population of 2.27 million (CIA, 2012) and is the country’s economic hub. Accra is the most popular destination for migrants in Ghana, who make up an estimated 55% of the city’s population (Pescina and Ubaldo, 2010). Kumasi, known as the ‘hinterland capital’, also attracts many migrants from northern Ghana (Litchfield and Waddington, 2003).

Ghana’s economic policies have played a role in incentivising the migration flow from rural to urban areas. National government liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes removed fertiliser and social service subsidies, which made engaging in agriculture less economically viable (Awumbila and Momsen, 1995; Awumbila, 1997). In addition to this, national policies favouring urban development through industrial protection meant that income levels and social conditions were better in urban than rural areas (Anarfi et al., 2003). Consequently, rural inhabitants facing declining incomes in agriculture have become a large labour supply for urban industries, mainly in and around Accra and Kumasi (Awumbila and Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2008).

The majority (71.2%) of migrants arriving in Accra work in the informal sector (Awumbila et al., 2014). Common jobs include ice water and ice cream sellers, second-hand clothes hawkers and wholesalers, electronic waste pickers, hairdressers, maize retailers and wholesalers, construction workers, and domestic services (Overa, 2007; Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011).

While migrants may be able to create a livelihood in their host city, they experience many vulnerabilities. It is common for migrants to face frequent harassment by city authorities due to the illegal status of their work and homes (Awumbila et al., 2014). The upgrading of markets, such as the Agboghloshie and Nima, located in migrant-dense areas of Accra, would allow many more migrants to earn a living without risk of harassment on the street (Awumbila et al., 2014). Furthermore, at least half of the migrants in Ghana live in temporary shelters in informal settlements (Awumbila et al., 2014) and can

face discrimination in accessing housing due to their migrant status (UNESCO, 2013). Female migrants and unaccompanied child migrants are especially vulnerable. Female migrants may resort to sex work as a means to support themselves or in exchange for housing (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011), while child migrants commonly end up living on the streets (Awumbila and Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2008; Molini et al., 2016; GSS, 2003).

Until recently, the Ghanaian national government did not have any policies explicitly targeting migration and there have often been contradictory policy responses at national and city levels. For example, while national level policies call for urban renewal and upgrading, city authorities in Accra continue to harass street vendors and pursue slum clearance (Awumbila et al., 2014). But in 2014, a National Migration Policy was introduced which sought to address these challenges through promoting ‘fair settlement planning’ in urban areas. This included the provision of adequate infrastructure, and managing the causes and consequences of migration flows (GoG, 2014). Similarly, the recent National Policy on Migration (2016) and implementation plan aim to increase the benefits of both internal and international migration, in part through policy coherence (GoG, 2016).

The impact too of internal migration on migrants’ households appears to be positive. It appears that, on average, households receiving remittances have a 77% higher consumption level than non-migrant households (Molini et al., 2016). A recent survey of migrants in Ghana suggests they overwhelmingly believe their overall well-being, in addition to their livelihoods, have been improved by migrating (Awumbila et al., 2014).

6 Conclusions and policy recommendations

The movement of people within and across borders in search of better living and working conditions has been an integral part of human history. During the Industrial Revolution, rural to urban migration helped turn cities into constantly growing and transforming industrial hubs, and created opportunities for future generations.

As with international migration, internal migration occurs for a variety of reasons. In most developing countries, the search for employment and the drive to escape poverty remain the primary factors of voluntary movement. Facilitating the movement of people within borders has the potential to improve the livelihood of individual migrants and their families through remittances and non-financial transfers, such as improved knowledge and skills. Yet despite their potential, internal migrants are often neglected in formal government policies at local and national levels. Urban migrants often end up working in the informal sector, lacking

Box 1 Access to work for refugees

While the focus of this briefing is on internal migration for economic reasons, it is useful to establish parallels with access to work for refugees. It is particularly relevant given the current large numbers of refugees and the policies that governments and cities are actively pursuing to integrate refugees into their labour markets.

In Europe, cities have demonstrated greater flexibility and creativity than national governments in responding to the influx of refugees, introducing a number of job-matching and integration projects (Eurocities, 2016). Milan created reception hubs overseen by municipal employees, volunteers and NGOs to receive asylum seekers and provide them with shelter, support and information. Barcelona declared itself a 'City of Refuge' last September, with mayor Ada Colau, stating that 'It may be that states grant asylum, but it is cities that provide shelter' (Pescinski, 2016; Eurocities, 2016). In March 2016, Barcelona negotiated an innovative city-to-city agreement with three cities: Athens, Lesbos and Lampedusa. This pilot initiative aims to alleviate the pressures on these major receiving hubs by welcoming more asylum-seekers into Barcelona. London provides an example where socially-responsible businesses can address the struggles of the forcibly displaced trying to find work. The social enterprise 'Transitions' is providing refugees with job-matching services and information while the ethical underwear business 'Who Made Your Pants' is providing refugees with sewing and English classes, among other services (Forrest, 2015).

Cities and towns in the Middle East, in countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, have to cope with far larger numbers of refugees than in Europe. In these countries, there are also examples of endeavours by governments in cooperation with other partners, to provide humanitarian assistance and to promote self-reliance and inclusion. Indeed, earlier this year, Jordan granted Syrian refugees the right to apply for work permits. This is part of a wider programme among the Jordanian government, donor countries and development actors to improve the investment climate (World Bank, 2016). Yet, after a three-month grace period ending in July 2016, fewer than 13,000 Syrians had obtained work permits out of an expected 50-100,000 (Patchett, 2016).

In other cases, there are examples of how refugees themselves can drive urban development and build parallel informal economies. For instance, Dadaab in Kenya hosts close to 300,000 refugees (Laing, 2016; UNHCR, 2016) making it the world's largest refugee camp. The difficulties of leaving the camp led to the development of an informal camp economy as Dadaab's residents opened their own businesses and started to provide services to residents and those in the host community (McKenzie and Swails, 2015). Today, Dadaab is not only considered to be Kenya's third largest 'city', but also a commercial hub with refugees running successful businesses from bakeries to boutiques providing services, products and a ready market for locals as well as a substantial tax return to the Kenyan government (Hujale, 2016). There are also a number of organisations providing livelihoods support. For instance, the Norwegian Refugee Council provides vocational training courses and recorded that 58% of its graduates are currently running successful businesses.

access to social protection and basic services. Host cities, in turn, experience a range of rural to urban migration effects, from potentially strengthened economies, as a result of an influx of workers, to the potential strains on infrastructure from increasing demand.

Many of the benefits of internal migration remain unrealised due to policy barriers affecting population movement, inadequate legislation enforcement to protect the rights of the poor, and social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, caste, tribe and gender as well as an incomplete understanding of migration patterns (Deshingkar, 2006). More inclusive policies are needed to

advance the economic potential of urban migration, and address migrants' insecurity of work and residence.

The recommendations below set out key actions for local and national government agencies, civil society organisations, the private sector – particularly in fast growing urban centres of the South, and those agencies in charge of monitoring the SDGs. Ultimately, how cities and government policies respond to urbanisation is crucial to unlocking and maximising the positive impacts that urban migration can have on both migrants and 'host' cities, and to achieving the SDGs, particularly those linked to access to decent jobs and inclusive urbanisation.

Conclusion 1 Internal migration is more common than international migration and has a larger poverty reduction potential.

Recommendation: create policies at local and national levels to enable a more balanced and fact-based understanding of the causes and impacts of rural to urban migration, and its role in poverty reduction.

- Improve the data on internal migration and remittances to challenge assumptions linking rural to urban migration with increasing urban poverty. A better understanding of complex migratory patterns, including circular migration, is needed to inform better policies. Work with existing global networks (e.g. the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data)

to improve the capacity of national statistics offices and local governments to collect this data.

- Advocate for policies that support well-managed, internal migration. Government, local bodies and civil society organisations should support advocacy efforts at all levels – for example, in the implementation of the SDGs and at the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III). This will enable more balanced debates around internal migration.
- Governments should include analysis of urbanisation and its consequences at all levels of policy planning and implementation, and ensure coherence between them. This would allow for a better understanding of factors that drive migration in different areas, and how to better support them.

Relevant SDG targets

1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.

1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and development planning.

17.8 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing states, to increase significantly the availability of high quality, timely and reliable data, disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

Conclusion 2 The economic potential of internal migrants is underutilised.

Recommendation: improve livelihood support to internal migrants to maximise their economic potential.

- Local governments should include the needs and vulnerabilities of informal workers in policy planning. For instance, cities' urban planning often excludes the issue of supporting infrastructure and services for informal workers, which frequently results in the informal sector clashing with city authorities. Supporting measures by city authorities could include the upgrading of markets, which serve the job and income needs of migrants (Awumbila et al., 2014).
- The informal sector should be decriminalised in both municipal and national policies. This should also include implementing or increasing labour rights and protection for internal migrants. Examples include free legal advice and rights awareness training, particularly in sectors common for migrants such as construction work and domestic help. Where state protection is lacking, civil society organisations have a role to play.
- Internal migrants/temporary residents and returning migrants should be supported through local and national government channels, with help ranging from job searches to pre-migration training. Increase access to education and training for both rural and urban workers in line with the needs of the economy, as this has a positive influence on the wider economy and the job opportunities they can access.
- Government should work with the private sector to create banking services for the poor. This includes formalising remittance services (i.e. sending remittances through banks) and reducing their cost, especially because remittances are likely to be sent by poor

internal migrants currently using informal channels that are expensive and risky. Consider institutionalising internal remittances, such as by incorporating them into the country's pension scheme (Afsar, 2003).

Relevant SDG targets

8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services.

8.5 Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men.

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment.

10.c Reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%.

4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship.

11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and development planning.

11.3 Enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

Conclusion 3 Internal migrants are often neglected in local and national policies. They end up living in informal settlements without adequate social protection and basic service provision.

Recommendation: create and improve protective legislation and social security for migrants, including access to basic services.

- Extend state protections to the informal sector, where most migrants from poor rural areas work (e.g. pensions, access to healthcare for informal workers, including female domestic workers). Help informal workers access programmes they are already eligible for (e.g. by simplifying bureaucratic requirements and removing requirements to have resident status). Internal migrants are, by definition, a highly mobile population so they need to be able to access social benefits that are portable.
- Focus on enforcing existing legislation, improving knowledge on social protection among migrants and making registration requirements easier to meet (e.g. not needing formal rental contracts).
- End informal settlement evictions. Many rural to urban migrants live in informal settlements and face intense disruptions to both their home life and livelihoods through the threat of eviction. Increase the capacity of local governments and programmes to upgrade informal settlements and orientate urban planning that supports access to basic services and affordable housing. Neglecting informal urban communities will not deter urban migrants from settling in these areas, as the existing conditions give them no other choice but to settle there.
- Redistribute tax revenues so that poorer localities housing more internal migrants have the capacity to provide adequate local public services.

Relevant SDG targets

1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.

3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, and access to quality essential health-care services.

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family.

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

References

- Adhikari, J. and Deshingkar, P. (2015) *How Migration into Urban Construction Work Impacts on Rural Households in Nepal*. Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper Series No. 27. Falmer: University of Sussex.
- Afsar, R. (1999) 'Is migration transferring rural poverty to urban areas? An analysis of longitudinal survey data of Dhaka city'. Presented at the workshop 'Changes and Determinants of Urban Poverty'. Dhaka: Grameen Trust, Grameen Bank.
- Afsar, R. (2003) 'Internal migration and the development nexus: the case of Bangladesh'. DFID Conference Paper: Regional Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia, Dhaka Bangladesh.
- Afsar, R. (2005) 'Internal Migration and Pro-Poor Policy'. In: IOM (International Organization for Migration) (2005) *Migration, Development and Poverty Reduction in Asia*. Geneva: IOM. Pgs. 85–98.
- Anarfi, J.K.; Kwankye, S.; Ofuso-Mensah, A. and Tiemoko, R. (2003) Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper. Country Background Paper No. 4, Migration DRC. Brighton: University of Sussex.
- Asfaw, W., Tolossa, D. and Zeleke, G. (2010) Causes and impacts of seasonal migration on rural livelihoods: Case studies from Amhara Region in Ethiopia. *Norwegian Journal of Geography*, 64: 58–70.
- Awumbila, M. (1997) 'Gender and structural adjustment in Ghana: A case study in Northeast Ghana'. In: Awotoma, A. and Teymur, N. (eds.) *Tradition, Location and Community: Place-making and Development*. Brookfield: Avebury. Pgs. 161–172.
- Awumbila, M. and Ardayfio-Schandorf, E. (2008) Gendered poverty, migration and livelihood strategies of female porters in Accra, Ghana. *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift. Norwegian Journal of Geography* 62(3): 171–179.
- Awumbila, M.; and Momsen, J. H. (1995) Gender and the environment: Women's time use as a measure of environmental change. *Global Environmental Change* 5(4): 337–346.
- Awumbila, M; Owusu, G.; and Tyeye, J. (2014) Can rural-urban migration into slums reduce poverty? Evidence from Ghana. Migrating Out of Poverty Working Paper Series No. 13. Falmer: University of Sussex.
- BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) (2014) Preliminary report on the census of slum areas and floating population 2014. Dhaka: BBS.
- Beegle, K., De Weerd, J. and Dercon, S. (2011) Migration and Economic Mobility in Tanzania: Evidence from a Tracking Survey. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 93, 1010–1033.
- Bell, M. and Charles-Edwards, E. (2013) Cross-national comparisons of internal migration: an update on global patterns and trends. Population Division Technical Paper No. 2013/1. New York: UN DESA. (www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/technical/TP2013-1.pdf)
- Bhowmik, S. (2004) Survey of Research on Street Vendors in Asia. Cambridge: WIEGO.
- BPB (Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung) (2015) Urbanization, Migration Systems within Bangladesh and Translocal Social Spaces. 30 November. (www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/216108/urbanization-migration-systems-within-bangladesh-and-translocal-social-spaces)
- Breman, J. (1996) *Footloose Labour*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Castaldo, A., Deshingkar, P. and McKay, A. (2012) *Internal migration, remittances and poverty: evidence from Ghana and India*. Migrating Out of Poverty Working Paper Series No. 7. Falmer: University of Sussex.
- Chen, M. (2012) The informal economy: Definitions, theories and policies. Women in informal economy globalizing and organizing, WIEGO Working Paper No. 1. Cambridge: WIEGO.
- Chukwuezi, B. (2001) Through Thick and Thin: Igbo Rural-Urban Circularity, Identity and Investment. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19(1): 55–66.
- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) (2012) Ghana – The World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: CIA. (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html>)
- de Haan, A. (1999) Livelihoods and poverty: The role of migration: a critical review of the migration literature. *The Journal of Development Studies* 36: 1–47.
- de Haas, H. (2006) Migration, remittances and regional development in Southern Morocco. *Geoforum*, 37: 565–580.
- Deshingkar, P. (2006) Internal Migration, Poverty and Development in Asia: Including the Excluded through Partnerships and Improved Governance. Presented at the Promoting Growth, Ending Poverty – Asia 2015 Conference.
- Deshingkar, P. and Grimm, S. (2004) Voluntary Internal Migration: An Update. September. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- DeSoto, Hermine G. and Dudwick, N. "Poverty in Moldova: 'The Social Dimensions of Transition, June 1996 – May 1997.'" Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

- Easton-Calabria, E. (2016) 'Refugees asked to fish for themselves': The Role of Livelihoods Trainings for Kampala's Urban Refugees. UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper, No. 277. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Eurocities (2016) Eurocities: Social Affairs, Refugee Reception and Integration in Cities. (<http://urbanagendaforthe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Eurocities-Refugees-Report.pdf>)
- Forrest, A. (2015) 'Refugees Will Have the Right to Work – Why Not Employ Them?' *The Guardian*. (www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/sep/11/business-refugee-crisis-employment-work-asylum-seekers)
- Ghani, E. and Kanbur, R. (2012) *Urbanization and (In)formalization*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Ghosh, J. (2012) 'The challenges of urbanisation may be even greater in small towns'. Global Development Poverty Matters Blog, 2 October. (www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/oct/02/challenges-urbanisation-greater-small-towns)
- Godfrey, M., Sovannarith, S., Saravy, T., Dorina, P., Katz, C., Acharya, S., Chanto, D. and Thoraxy, H. (2001) 'A study of the Cambodian labour market: reference to poverty reduction, growth and adjustment to crisis.' Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Research Institute (CDRI).
- GoG (Government of Ghana) (2014) National Migration Policy for Ghana. Accra: GoG.
- GoG (2016) National Policy on Migration. Accra: GoG. (<http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/files/file.php?name=national-migration-policy-for-ghana.pdf&site=354>)
- GSS (Ghana Statistical Service) (2003) Ghana Child Labour Survey. Accra: GSS.
- Hopkins, E., Bastagli, F., and Hagen-Zanker, J. (2016) *Internal migrants and social protection: A review of eligibility and take-up*. ODI Working Paper No. 436. London: ODI.
- Hossain, S. (2013) 'The informal practice of appropriation and social control—experience from a bosti in Dhaka'. *Environment and Urbanization* 25(1): 209–224.
- Hujale, M. (2016) "The Refugee Camp that became a City" IRIN. (www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/01/20/refugee-camp-became-city)
- IOM (International Organization for Migration) (2010) *Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: IOM.
- IOM (2015) *IOM World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility*.
- Islam, M. (2015) 'Causes and consequences of rural-urban migration: A study of migrant street vendors in Dhaka city'. Doctoral dissertation, University of Dhaka.
- Laing, A. (2016) Kenya Says Years of Hosting Refugees 'Have Come to an End. *The Telegraph*. (www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/09/kenya-says-years-of-hosting-refugees-have-come-to-an-end/)
- Litchfield, J.; and Waddington, H. (2003) *Migration and Poverty in Ghana: Evidence from the Ghana Living Standards Survey*. Sussex Migration Working Paper. Sussex: University of Sussex.
- Lu, Z. and Song, S. (2006) Rural–urban migration and wage determination: The case of Tianjin, China. *China Economic Review* 17: 337–345.
- Luova, O. (2014) *International migration and economic development in Northeast China – the Acquisition and transfer of new migrant capital*. In Zhang, J. and Duncan, H. (2014) *Migration in China and Asia. Experience and Policy*. Springer Netherlands.
- McKenzie, D. and Swails, B. (2015) 'Sanctuary without End: The Refugees the World Forgot'. CNN. (<http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2015/10/world/dadaab-refugees/>)
- Migration DRC (Migration Development Research Centre) (2006) *Place, Social Protection and Migration in Bangladesh: A Londoni Village in Biswanath*. Migration DRC Working Paper 18. Sussex: University of Sussex.
- Mitra, A. (2009) Migration, Livelihood and Well-Being: Evidence from Indian City Slums. *Urban Studies* 47: 1371–90.
- Mitullah, W. (2004) *A Review of Street Trade in Africa*. Cambridge: WIEGO.
- Molini, V., Pavelesku, D. and Ranzani, M. (2016) *Should I Stay or Should I Go? Internal Migration and Household Welfare in Ghana*. World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 7752. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Mosse, D., Gupta, S. and Shah, V. (2005) 'On the margins in the city: Adivasi seasonal labour migration in Western India'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 40(28): 3025–3038.
- Murphy, R. (2002) *How Migrant Labour is Changing Rural China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Neil, Tam, et. al. (2016) *Women on the Move Migration, Gender Equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Overseas Development Institute. (www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10731.pdf)
- Osei-Boateng, C.; and Ampratwum, E. (2011) *The informal sector in Ghana*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Ghana Office. Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Osuji, E. E. (1983) Rural Development by Self-Help Efforts in Abiriba, Imo State Nigeria. *Nigeria Magazine Lagos* 147: 55–64.

- Oucho, J., Oucho, L. and Ochieng, V. (2014) *Rural-Urban Migration Experiences of Migrants from Western Kenya to Kisumu and Nairobi*. Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper Series No 21. Falmer: University of Sussex.
- Overa, J. (2007) When men do women's work: structural adjustment, unemployment and changing gender relations in the informal economy of Accra, Ghana. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45(4): 539–563.
- Patchett, H. (2016) 'Why Jordan's Plan to Integrate Syrian Refugees into Workforce Has Faltered'. Al-Monitor, 2016. (www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/jordan-free-work-permits-syrian-refugees.html)
- Pattanaik, B. K. (2009) Young migrant construction workers in the unorganised urban sector. *South Asia Research* 29(1): 19–40.
- Pescina, J. and Ubaldo, C. (2010) *The Economic Base of Accra, Ghana. Advanced Issue in Development Planning*. Millennium Cities Initiative, Earth Institute. New York: Columbia University.
- Pescinski, J. (2016) Cities of Migration. Open Democracy. (www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/janina-pescinski/cities-of-migration)
- Picherit, D. (2012) 'Migrant labourers' struggles between village and urban migration sites: labour standards, rural development and politics in South India'. *Global Labour Journal* 3(1): 143–162.
- Potts, D. (2013) *Rural–urban and urban–rural migration flows as indicators of economic opportunity in Sub-Saharan Africa: What do the data tell us?* Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper Series No. 9. Falmer: University of Sussex.
- Ravallion, M., Chen, S. and Sangraula, P. (2007) 'New Evidence on the Urbanization of Global Poverty'. *Population and Development Review* 33(4): 667–701.
- Rolnik, R. (2013) 'Ten years of the city statute in Brazil: From the struggle for urban reform to the World Cup cities'. *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development* 5(1) 54–64.
- Sanderson, D. (2012) 'Building livelihoods to reduce risk among the most marginalized in urban areas: strategic approaches from Dhaka'. *Environ Hazards* 11(2): 112–122.
- Santos Carvalho, C. and Roszbach, A. (2010) *The city statute of Brazil: A commentary*. Brazilia and Washington D.C.: Brazil Ministry of Cities and Cities Alliance.
- Siddiqui, T. (2012) *Impact of Migration on Poverty and Development*. Migrating Out of Poverty Working Paper Series No. 2. Falmer: University of Sussex.
- Tacoli, C., McGranahan, G. and Satterthwaite, D. (2015) *Urbanisation, rural–urban migration and urban poverty*. International Institute for Environment and Development (iied) and IOM Working Paper. London: iied.
- Taylor, W. (2011) *Vietnam's Migrant Workers: Greatest Advantage, Greatest Challenge*. The Asia Foundation, September 28. (<http://asiafoundation.org/2011/09/28/vietnams-26-million-migrant-workers-greatest-advantage-greatest-challenge/>)
- Tulloch, O. et. al. (2016) *Health, Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: Overseas Development Institute. (www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10759.pdf)
- UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) (2014) *World Urbanization Prospects*. Geneva: United Nations.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2009) *Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*. Geneva: UNDP.
- UNDP (2011) *Internal Migration in Bangladesh: Character, Drivers and Policy Issues*. Bangladesh: UNDP.
- UNHCR (2016) *Refugees in the Horn of Africa: Somali Displacement Crisis – Dadaab Refugee Camp*. UNHCR.
- WIEGO (2013) *GDP and National Accounts in Mexico*. Cambridge: WIEGO. (<http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/INEGI-Measuring-Informal-Economy-Mexico.pdf>)
- World Bank (2016) '\$300 million to Improve Employment Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees'. (www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/09/27/300-million-to-improve-employment-opportunities-for-jordanians-and-syrian-refugees)
- World Bank/IMF (2013) *Global Monitoring Report 2013: Rural-Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Development Goals*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Yaro, J.A. et. al. (2011) *Migration and Population Dynamics: Changing Community Formations in Ghana*. Migration Studies Technical Paper Series 2, Centre for Migration Studies: Legon.



"Take care". Photo: Francois Lepage, France, 2016

SDGs covered

- 5:** Gender equality
- 8:** Decent work and economic growth
- 10:** Reduced inequalities
- 16:** Peace, justice and strong institutions
- 17:** Partnerships for the goals

Gender equality, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Tam O'Neil, Anjali Fleury and Marta Foresti

Key messages

- Women migrate as much as men. Migration data must be disaggregated by sex and age, and migration policies must take account of how gender shapes different migrants' needs.
- Migration can increase women's access to education and economic resources, and can improve their autonomy and status.
- Female migrants and refugees are at greater risk of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking.
- Highly skilled women have high rates of migration but many are employed in low-skilled jobs.
- Unskilled female migrants work in less-regulated and less-visible sectors than male migrants. Most migrant domestic workers are women and adolescent girls.
- Migration creates empowerment trade-offs for individual women and girls, and between different groups of women and girls. These trade-offs matter for gender equality and for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

1 Introduction

This policy brief gives an overview of the opportunities, risks and vulnerabilities female migrants and refugees¹ face and the implications for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It describes the realities of migration for women and adolescent girls, focusing on the experiences of those working in a range of ‘care’ professions, from domestic workers to nurses and doctors. Mobility and employment create opportunities for female migrants, but gender norms – shared ideas about the different capabilities and ‘natural’ roles of women and men, girls and boys – also create vulnerabilities, as do institutional failures to address discrimination. Gender norms, prevalent in all countries, are a root cause of the gendered division of labour (whether paid or unpaid work), violence against women and girls, and women’s lack of decision-making power – all of which have particular consequences for female migrants. While gender stereotypes and expectations also shape the migration experience of men and boys, this brief focuses on female migrants because they are most likely to be ‘left behind’ in progress towards the 2030 Agenda.

After briefly exploring current migration trends, Section 2 describes how gender norms and relations shape decisions about why and when women and girls migrate, and their experiences of migration. We highlight how the socioeconomic characteristics of individual female migrants and the countries they migrate from and to influence whether migration is likely to increase their capabilities and/or vulnerabilities, and how. In Sections 3 and 4 we use the concept of the global care chain to expand this discussion. We examine the experiences of skilled and unskilled female migrants and explore how the feminisation of labour leads to empowerment trade-offs for individual migrants, as well as between groups of women and girls.

In Section 5 we make recommendations about how the international community can ensure that female migrants and refugees are not excluded from the benefits of economic and social progress and the 2030 Agenda. We argue that migration can contribute to women and girls’ capabilities and freedoms, but can also expose them to new or increased risks. Migration policies must reflect the different needs and risks women and girls face, and actively manage these trade-offs.

1.1 Migration trends


People have always moved across borders. In 2015, the global number of international migrants reached

224 million, up from 173 million in 2000. However, as a proportion of the world’s population, the number of migrants has remained relatively stable over the past 40 years at around 3%. Europe and Asia host the most international migrants (76 million and 75 million respectively), while southern Europe and Gulf States are the regions with the highest growth in labour migrants (UN DESA, 2016a).

In general, women migrate as much as men: in 2015, almost half (48%) of all international migrants were female (see Figure 1). From 2000 to 2015, women and girls’ migration to developing countries (15.8%) increased more rapidly than to developed regions (6.4%) (UN DESA, 2016b). The proportion of female migrants to Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania increased, but the proportion going to Africa and Asia decreased (UN DESA, 2016a).

Regarding forced displacement, in 2015 the number of refugees worldwide rose to 21.3 million – the highest level since the Second World War. Refugees comprise approximately 8% of the total number of international migrants, and 47% of refugees were girls and women in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016).

Figure 1 Total number of international migrants by sex



Source: UN DESA (2016b).

1 The term ‘migrant’ can refer to two different categories of people that should not be conflated: labour migrants who move for the purposes of employment, and refugees who – owing to fear of persecution, war or natural disaster – are outside their country of origin and are unable to avail themselves of protection from that country, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951). Given that this briefing focuses on women employed in care professions, we primarily use the term ‘migrant’ as we are mostly referring to women and girls moving for employment purposes (unless we are referring to refugees and asylum seekers, in which case we do so explicitly). Internal migrants are not included in this analysis.

2 Migration and the SDGs

The challenges addressed by the SDGs contain many important gender dimensions. Gender-specific actions and solutions are needed to reduce women and girls' poverty and insecurity and to promote their access to economic and sustainable growth, as well as to health, education, and justice. Policy-makers and practitioners must understand how gender inequalities influence progress on each goal and target. They should support measures that target harmful gender-related practices, reduce gender discrimination, and increase women and girls' choices and decision-making power.

A handful of the SDGs have targets that relate directly to migration. These include:

- Goal 5 on gender equality and women and girls' empowerment;
- Goal 8 on growth and decent work;
- Goal 10 on reducing inequalities;

- Goal 16 on peaceful, inclusive societies and access to justice for all; and
- Goal 17 on global partnership on sustainable development, which includes improving data.

Target 10.7, for example, is to 'facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies' (UN DESA, 2016c). However, this target is gender-blind; effective implementation requires a gender lens to capture the specific needs of female migrants. Other targets are not related directly to gender and/or migration but are nonetheless relevant. For instance, Target 8.10 seeks to improve access to financial institutions, which is important for women's ability to receive and send remittances.

As Table 1 shows, SDG 5 and SDG 8 are particularly important to the wellbeing of female migrants and refugees in ensuring they are not left behind in progress towards the 2030 Agenda.

Table 1 Gender equality, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
Goal 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	
5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.	Migrant and refugee women and girls may experience violence at all stages of the migration process, whether at home or in the community. Gender-based violence or conflict-related sexual violence may force women and girls to migrate, and they may be subject to violence during transit (e.g. at refugee camps) or at their destination (e.g. by an employer). Irregular migrants and young migrants are at greater risk of violence, trafficking and exploitation. Migrant girls are more likely to be trafficked or experience sexual exploitation than boys (Temin et al., 2013).
5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM).	Girls facing harmful practices such as FGM or forced marriage may use migration as a means of escape (Temin et al., 2013). Migration can expose girls and young women to different social norms and practices (including FGM) in new locations (Goldberg et al., 2016). Migrant communities may use early marriage as a coping strategy in the face of girls' insecurity or economic hardship.
5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate.	11.5 million (17.2%) of the world's 67.1 million domestic workers are international migrants; 8.4 million (73.4%) of migrant domestic workers are women or adolescent girls (ILO, 2015). Actions that increase the value of domestic work, including changes in underlying gender norms, would reduce women's burden of unpaid work and enhance the wellbeing, dignity and status of paid and unpaid care and domestic workers, including migrants.
Goal 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	
8.5 Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men.	Many host countries limit or bar refugees from employment opportunities. Similarly, migrant spouses may be prevented from working. Female migrants and refugees that do work may experience deskilling or be confined to 'feminine' jobs, often paid or valued less than other work. Ensuring full and productive employment and decent work requires access to work that is aligned with refugees' and migrants' skills and qualifications. It also means improving social and economic value afforded to work typically performed by women and girls.
8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking, and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour.	Migrants (particularly irregular migrants and children) are at risk of forced labour, trafficking, and exploitation and abuse. To eradicate these forms of labour requires improving labour standards, increasing the opportunities for decent work, protecting migrants, and prosecuting the perpetrators of such violations.
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular female migrants, and those in precarious employment.	Protection of labour rights is particularly important for migrants, particularly women and children, who are at greater risk of exploitation or abuse. Female migrants in stereotypically feminine roles (such as live-in care and domestic work) are frequently isolated and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation, violence and abuse.

3 Gender norms and women and girls' migration

Men and women migrate for similar reasons – to get an education, to find work, to get married, or to flee persecution or harm. However, migration is very much a gendered phenomenon; gender norms and expectations, power relations, and unequal rights shape the migration choices and experiences of women and girls as they do men and boys.

Gender norms affect when and why people migrate. Women usually have less control over the decision to migrate than men – a decision more likely to be taken by their family (Yeoh et al., 2002). Where women and girls lack autonomy, this challenges the distinction between forced and voluntary migration – and particularly so for adolescent girls. Gendered expectations may also guide family decisions. For instance, families may believe that girls or young women are more likely than male family members to send home remittances regularly, or the eldest daughter may be expected to migrate so that the family has money to send her siblings to school (Kanaiaupuni, 2000).

Not all decisions for girls or women to migrate are taken by families. Indeed, some adolescent girls and women migrate in order to escape family control that can lead to harmful practices such as forced or early marriage or female genital mutilation (FGM) (Temin et al., 2013). At the same time, gender norms may limit women and girls' migration; at the household level,

families may prevent them from migrating for fear of 'moral corruption' or difficulties in marrying (Shaw, 2005). At the national level, rather than addressing the causes of gender discrimination or the risks female migrants face, some governments have banned female migration as a means to protect women and children – a measure that contravenes women's human rights.

Gender also shapes the migration experience, regardless of whether migration is voluntary or forced (see Box 1). Female migrants, particularly girls, have less information, less education, and fewer options for regular migration, which puts them at greater risk of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking (UNFPA, 2015). Farah (2006) reported that 80% of trafficking victims were estimated to be female. Girls migrating alone are particularly vulnerable (Temin et al., 2013). Female migrants tend to be more averse to risk than men, however, and prefer to migrate through regular channels and when social networks are in place (Fleury, 2016). Migrants often establish networks for social support; this enables other women and girls from their community to follow (Temin et al., 2013) and reduces the stigma caused by breaking traditional gender norms (De Haas, 2009).

Gender norms and social norms in migrants' country of origin and destination also influence the outcomes of migration for women and girls. Such norms determine whether migration empowers women and girls and/or exposes them to harm, and in what ways. Women are more likely to migrate to countries with less

Box 1 Refugees and forced displacement

Refugee women and girls are subject to gender inequalities and discrimination. Conflict can exacerbate gender-based violence, and sexual violence is commonly used as a tactic of war. The state's failure to protect women and girls from gender-based violence can spur migration.

When they are displaced from their homes, women and girls are more vulnerable to violence and abuse, particularly if not accompanied by male relatives. The risk of human trafficking may also increase. When displacement results in female-headed households, women may struggle with the additional burdens of fulfilling both traditional male and female roles within the family. Female migrants (especially in cases of forced migration or displacement) may be forced into prostitution or sex work to survive or provide for their families.

Displacement can disrupt social and gender norms and bring added pressures for men and women alike, as well as increasing the vulnerabilities faced by women and girls. Male refugees in temporary camps may no longer be able to provide for their family as the breadwinner. Domestic violence by a spouse or family member can increase as families experience psychosocial trauma and as male refugees struggle with feelings of inadequacy and loss of control within the family.

Women and girls in refugee camps typically continue to be responsible for fetching the family's firewood and water, often going beyond the camp walls where they face increased risk of sexual and gender-based violence. Even within camps, women and girls are exposed to increased risks of violence from other refugees. As is the case among some Syrian and Rohingya refugees, for example, displaced families may choose early or forced marriage for their daughters as a strategy to cope with economic hardship or perceived risks of sexual violence. During times of crises, states may be less able to protect and provide adequate services, further disadvantaging vulnerable refugees, including women and girls.

Sources: Bukachi et al. (2010); UNHCR (2008); Women's Refugee Commission (2016); De Berry and Petrini (2011); UNHCR and World Bank Group (2015).

discriminatory social institutions than their country of origin, which also tend to offer greater economic opportunities (Ferrant et al., 2014; Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015). However, there are also instances of women migrating from countries with very high levels of discrimination to countries with similarly high levels of discrimination, possibly because the decision to migrate may not have been solely theirs (Ferrant et al., 2014) or they were driven by economic hardship.

The act of migration may change social and gender norms, for migrants as well as for their home communities. In addition to improving women's autonomy, self-esteem and social standing, migration can also provide women and girls with new skills and their families with remittances. These new resources can change power dynamics within families and households. Migrants may also influence their home communities to adopt more equitable norms around education, marriage, fertility rates, and gender roles in the household and community. However, while migrant women may return home with new norms and skills, they may also face resistance or stigma and struggle to reintegrate into their families and communities (Sijapati, 2015).

When a woman migrates with her spouse, even to a more liberal country, discriminatory gender norms from the home community (such as restrictions on women's movement outside the home) may still govern household relations, leaving women more isolated and vulnerable. For example, Kabeer (2000) found that employment had greater empowerment effects for Bangladeshi women who migrated to cities to work in factories than for those that migrated to London and performed piecework in the isolation of their own homes.

Migration may also bring changes in gender roles for men. Women's migration may mean that men who stay behind take on more unpaid care responsibilities, though other female family members often take on the additional burden. Remittances from migrant workers also make a vital contribution to source economies and to the household income and wellbeing of migrants' families (Fleury, 2016). However, realising the benefits of remittances depends on who receives and controls them; women are more likely to invest in children's education and health, while men tend to invest in assets such as cars (De and Ratha, 2005).

4 Gender norms, labour market segmentation and the global care chain

Gender is a key factor in the employment opportunities that are open to migrants. Most societies valorise men as natural leaders, decision-makers and breadwinners, placing them at the centre of the public and productive spheres, while women are relegated to the role of natural homemakers and carers, confining them to the domestic

and reproductive spheres. In many countries though, simple productive-reproductive or public-private gender dichotomies have come under stress as women have entered the labour force in greater numbers. While it is now more acceptable that women perform productive roles, norms about reproductive and domestic work are, in some cases, proving very resistant to change and men are not doing their equal share of unpaid domestic and care work (Evans, 2016; Samman et al., 2016; Wojczewski et al., 2015). Time-use surveys show that women *in all countries* spend more time on unpaid care than men, ranging from around 2 weeks more in the Nordic countries to more than 10 weeks more in Iraq, Mexico and Turkey (Samman et al., 2016).

Furthermore, the labour market – including migrant labour – remains highly segmented by gender, as well as by class and ethnicity. Men are perceived as stronger and more capable of manual labour and, as a result, are more likely to work in mining, industry, transport, trade and construction. Men are also overrepresented in management positions. By contrast, women are perceived as nurturing and are concentrated in 'feminine' sectors related to care (e.g. health, teaching, cleaning, cooking, service industries) or entertainment, or in factory positions that prefer workers to be 'nimble' or meticulous (ILO, 2015; de Villard and Dey de Pryck, 2010; Ghosh, 2009; UNFPA, 2006; IOM, 2009, 2011). Gendered labour opportunities then influence where male and female migrants move to. Countries with higher demand for construction workers are more likely to recruit or attract male migrants, whereas countries seeking domestic workers and nurses will attract more female migrants (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003).

The gender segregation of labour and the feminisation of domestic and care work also mean that, even when female migrants have legal rights, they are less likely to be enforced than the rights of male migrants. This is because unskilled female migrants tend to be more isolated and less aware of their rights than unskilled migrant men working in relatively better-regulated, visible and better-paid sectors, such as construction, mining and agriculture (Garcia et al., 2002). In sum, the intersection of gender norms and market economics has three consequences for female migrants:

1. They are concentrated in unskilled, undervalued and low-paid sectors, often employed as domestic workers in hard-to-regulate private homes;
2. Skilled and unskilled migrants often face intersecting gender and racial discrimination and have a triple burden of managing paid employment alongside unpaid domestic and reproductive responsibilities;
3. Female migrants are less able to advance their own interests than male migrants; they have less decision-making power within the home and – whether migrating alone or as a dependent – are less likely to

have the time or capabilities to engage with political decision-making and policy processes (O’Neil and Domingo, 2016).

The expectation that women, not men, are responsible for unpaid domestic and care responsibilities therefore influences labour market segmentation and the economic opportunities open to women, including migrants. The feminisation of labour then intersects with inequality and discrimination based on class and ethnicity within and across countries, creating global care and healthcare chains. Both *societal* factors and the *individual* characteristics of women and girls therefore determine the empowerment effects of migration – particularly migrants’ socioeconomic status, and the sector they work in after migrating, as well as the type of work they do. Changing this situation requires a shift in gender stereotypes and expectations – one that changes harmful masculinities and limiting femininities – as well as addressing class and other forms of discrimination.

4.1 Unskilled female migrants and domestic and care work

Most migrant domestic workers are women and girls – approximately 75% of the 11.5 million estimated in 2013 (ILO, 2015). Indeed, domestic work is the most common employment for girls under the age of 16 (UN OHCHR, 2015). While nearly 80% of domestic workers are in low- and middle-income countries, 79.2% of *migrant* domestic workers are in high-income countries. South-East Asia and the Pacific is the region with the highest levels of female migrant domestic workers (24%), followed by northern Europe, southern Europe, and western Europe (22.1%), then Arab States (19%) (ILO, 2015). Levels of migration and destination vary by country of origin; for instance, 86% of female labour migrants from Sri Lanka are employed as domestic workers in the Middle East (IOM, 2015).

The feminisation of domestic and care labour creates a global care chain, a term coined by Arlie Hochschild to describe ‘a series of links between people across the world based on the paid and unpaid work of caring’ (Wojczewski et al., 2015: 131). As ageing populations and women’s increasing participation in the global labour force create more demand for paid domestic and care work, the women who fill those positions then rely on female relatives to care for their own families, creating a chain effect (UN OHCHR, 2015). Migrants’ families (particularly female relatives such as mothers or eldest daughters) who take over unpaid domestic and care work may find that doing so limits their own ability to take up economic or education opportunities (Azcona, 2009; Wojczewski et al., 2015). Rather than leading men, employers or governments to play a greater role in the provision of domestic and care needs, the effect of women entering the workforce in greater numbers is to pull in even more women as paid carers.

Despite the high demand for and numbers of domestic workers in many countries, domestic and care work is less socially valued than other types of work – something that is reflected in lower pay and fewer labour regulations compared with other sectors (Petrozziello, 2013; Temin et al., 2013). For example, 40% of countries do not offer protection for domestic workers within national labour laws (UN Women, 2012). Some countries, like Mexico, include domestic work in labour laws but afford such workers fewer rights and protections than workers in other occupations (European Union et al., 2014). Other countries may include protections in national labour laws but invest little or no resources in enforcement. Enforcing the rights of domestic workers is particularly difficult given that many live in their employer’s home, hidden from public view.

Since paid domestic work mostly takes place in private homes, it increases the risk of abuse and mistreatment (Fleury, 2016; Oishi, 2002; Piper, 2005; Temin et al., 2013; UN OHCHR, 2015). Domestic workers often receive low pay, work long hours, may suffer from insufficient sleep and (depending on their employer) may have difficulty in receiving time off or pay (Temin et al., 2013; Piper, 2005; UN OHCHR, 2015). For example, in Ethiopia, migrant girls doing domestic work are more likely to experience sexual abuse and rape by employers than other girls, in part due to their social isolation and dependence on their employers (Temin et al., 2013). In Gulf countries, migrant women are often marginalised and experience difficulties claiming their wages and with their legal status (Wojczewski et al., 2015). Yet, despite these risks, women and girls are still driven to migrate, usually pulled by the potential for better economic opportunities and increased income (see Box 2).

4.2 Skilled female migrants and healthcare work

Skilled female migrants also face gender segregation and tend to work in ‘feminine’ professions, such as education, health, social work, and nursing (Piper, 2005). In high-income and upper-middle-income countries, various factors have combined to create a global healthcare chain – demographic changes (ageing populations and declining fertility rates), shifts in gender norms (more women entering the workforce) and gaps in health and social care systems (availability of trained nurses, adequacy of welfare provision). Some countries have active, even ‘aggressive’ recruitment policies (UNFPA and IMP, 2004) and bilateral agreements to plug gaps in their healthcare system (Wojczewski et al., 2015). For instance, in the UK in 2012, 22% of nurses and 35% of medical practitioners were born abroad (Jayaweera, 2015). In addition to push factors in their countries of origin, the prospect of better wages and/or working conditions draws trained nurses, doctors and other healthcare professionals to wealthier countries in the global North (e.g. Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand,

the UK and the USA) and the global South (e.g. Saudi Arabia and South Africa).

Conversely, this migration of skilled workers can weaken healthcare systems in developing countries, sometimes referred to as ‘brain drain’. Since women from developing countries have less access to tertiary education and high-skilled positions, when they migrate there are higher relative losses of human capital than when skilled males migrate (Docquier et al., 2009), though the picture is mixed depending on the countries involved. The chain of displacement and replacement is not just in one direction, from developing to developed countries. For example, the demand for migrant workers in the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) is fuelled by a shortage of UK-trained

nurses but also by their migration to the USA and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

Today, rather than accompanying or joining spouses, women are more likely to be the ‘lead migrant’. In fact, highly skilled migrant women not only have higher rates of migration than low-skilled women, they are also more likely to migrate than highly skilled men. The demand for skilled migrants can also incentivise people in developing countries to gain further education and professional qualifications, a phenomenon known as ‘brain gain’. However, as Arends-Kuenning et al. (2015) found in the Philippines, these societal gains have costs for individual families. Often it is a family decision to invest in private education and the

Box 2 The global care chain and the experiences of unskilled female migrants

Many unskilled women and girls migrate for domestic work to improve their and their families’ economic wellbeing, but they also often face new or increased risks. These trade offs from migration vary in types and scale, however, and are informed both by individual and country characteristics.

Recently, there have been growing numbers of Ethiopian adolescent girls migrating to Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia to do domestic work. The main driver is increased income, particularly given the pressures on sustainable livelihoods in Ethiopia – one of the world’s poorest countries – due to worsening agricultural cycles, shortage of land, limited job opportunities and increasing unemployment. However, poverty is not the only driver. For adolescent girls, migration offers an escape from early marriage, oppressive social norms, and the lack of control over their lives. Now, the established culture of migration, a growing reliance on remittances and peer pressure also motivate young Ethiopians to migrate.

Though migration brings many benefits, the costs can be high. Young migrant domestic workers risk serious violations of their human rights, including exploitation, physical and sexual violence, trafficking, abuse, isolation, incomplete wages or even non-payment, long work hours, racial and religious discrimination, and psychological and mental trauma. For Ethiopian girls in Saudi Arabia, these experiences are far too common, both in transit and when they reach their employer’s home. One returnee girl said: ‘I was beaten by the daughters in the house and the daughter next door. They would use their hands or whatever object they asked me to fetch – spoons, cans, whatever. The beating was daily – even if one daughter wasn’t beating me, the other was’. Young Ethiopian girls encounter the difficult trade-offs between economic gains and empowerment, and exploitation and abuse. With few options for a fulfilled life at home, many adolescent girls leave feeling optimistic that their experience will be a positive one.

Ecuadorian women migrating to Spain as domestic workers also face a trade-off – in their case, between increased economic opportunity and family income, and separation from their family and discrimination in the destination country. Domestic work in Spain provides a far superior income for Ecuadorian women than most job opportunities available to them at home, where they face age and gender discrimination when seeking employment. Women also have better, more stable opportunities in Spain than Ecuadorian men, so families often decide that it is best for women to migrate. Ecuadorian women are highly marketable in Spain given that they are native Spanish speakers and their general categorisation as nurturing carers and housekeepers. Migration also enhances Ecuadorian women’s autonomy, agency, and worth. By contributing financially to their families, women often gain greater decision-making power in the household. For single Ecuadorian women, migration also provides an alternative to marriage.

Many Ecuadorian women who migrate to Spain are themselves mothers who are forced to leave their own children behind as they care for other children abroad. This separation is one major cost of migration. In many cases, Ecuadorian women prefer other female relatives (a grandmother or aunt) to care for their children, rather than their spouse. Ecuadorian migrants also face discrimination as foreigners in Spain; like many migrant women, they experience deskilling and occupy lower-level positions, primarily employed as domestic workers regardless of their education or experience.

While Ethiopia and Ecuador both provide examples of female migration for domestic work, they illustrate how individual factors as well as the broader political and institutional context of the destination country influence women’s experiences of migration. Ethiopian adolescents in Saudi Arabia, for example, are especially vulnerable not just because of their age and lack of voice but also because of the lack of legal protection for women in the Middle East and the lack of recourse to justice when their human rights are violated.

Sources: Jones et al. (2014); Dudley (2013).

pay-off on the investment is only realised if the individual family member is able to complete their training, migrate, and secure a high-skilled and well-paid job.

Migration to a wealthier country can provide improved career opportunities and skills acquisition for women, as well as a better quality of life and increased security (employment or otherwise) for themselves and their families. If they do return home, migration can also transfer skills to less-developed countries (UNFPA and IMP, 2004; Lorenzo et al., 2005). At the same time, many highly skilled migrant women are employed in

low-skilled jobs, indicating a gap between expectations and opportunities in destination countries. Migrant nurses and, in particular, doctors can face an extended process to get visas, have their qualifications validated and register with the relevant bodies, during which time they may need to take up less-skilled work (see Box 3). Employers may not recognise migrants' qualifications or experience and re-training may be necessary, or migrants may need to improve their language skills.

Deskilling and perceived devaluing of female migrants is common (Piper, 2005). Differences in national

Box 3 The global healthcare chain and the experiences of skilled female migrants

Despite skilled female migrants being the fastest-growing category of migrants, little attention has been paid to their experiences. There are few qualitative studies documenting the growing number of foreign-trained female doctors and the experiences of migrants working in the health sector, particularly those working outside Anglo-Saxon countries.

To fill this gap, Wojczewski and colleagues (2015) interviewed 34 migrants in Austria, Belgium, South Africa and the UK who trained as nurses or doctors in sub-Saharan Africa. Temporary 'deskilling' was a common experience, with validation of qualifications, retraining, and certification meaning that migrants were unable to practice as nurses or doctors for between two and 10 years. Doctors in particular reported having to do other jobs such as care work while they repeated lengthy training. Some reported permanent inability to work in their profession and 're-domestication' when financial, reproductive, or care responsibilities meant retraining was not an option.

Formal regulations and bureaucratic capacity in destination countries have a significant impact on migrants' experiences. For instance, interviewees complained that in South Africa, the validation of foreign certificates and registration with the nursing council could take two years. The recognition of qualifications was reported to take two to three times longer in Austria and Belgium than in the UK. Social attitudes and employment rights (and their enforcement) are also important. Many of the black (but not white) African doctors and nurses in the study reported experiencing racial discrimination from co-workers and patients.

In Greece, Lazaridis (2006) also found informal barriers (cultural, attitudinal, organisational and practical) as well as formal barriers to women's occupational mobility in her study of 'quasi-nurses' – people (often migrants and usually women) employed to care for families' elderly or sick relatives either in their own home or in hospital. Before the economic crisis, the demand for quasi-nurses was driven by three main factors: Greek women entering the labour market out of economic necessity; inadequate social welfare provision by the state; and social norms that frown upon families who do not care for their elderly relatives at home. Families were also driven to hire quasi-nurses to care for their sick relatives during their hospital stays because of the shortage of nurses (doctors outnumbered nurses in Greek hospitals), and the overlap between the informal and formal care sectors in Greece, similar to other southern European countries.

A 'hierarchy of labour' in Greece based on intersecting forms of discrimination means that women from marginalised ethnic groups and without legal status experience the worst employment conditions. Many women (including skilled women) who migrate to Greece, particularly those without documents, have little choice but to work in the informal sector. Only one out of the 18 interviewed migrants working as quasi-nurses had nursing qualifications. All had higher education or professional experience but were unable to pursue their chosen career (e.g. accountancy, engineering, teaching).

The women reported experiencing discrimination and insecurity. According to a Bulgarian migrant, 'I came to Greece because I heard that whoever comes here makes money... It wasn't an easy decision to take as I left behind my husband and children... The job was to look after a family with three children; the money was very little, only 40,000 drachmas in the late 1990s, when other women were paid for similar job 120,000 drachmas, but I took it... When we fell out, they refused to let me have my passport back. I got it back only after I complained to the agency about it. The job was hard. I was not allowed to have a day off or to go out, because they were afraid that I would not return'.

The lack of solidarity among quasi-nurses and hostility between Greek and migrant workers undermined collective action to improve conditions. However, in some cases, interviewees reported that working in a private home sometimes led to a bond with the employer, based on the elderly person's dependence on the migrant employee, which enabled her to negotiate better wages and conditions.

Sources: Wojczewski et al. (2015); Lazaridis (2006).

regulations may mean that migrant nurses are unable to continue to undertake routine duties in the destination country. Racial discrimination on the part of recruiters and co-workers may mean that they are forced to accept positions they are overqualified for, or do not have the same opportunities for career progression as co-workers (Ghosh, 2009; Wojczewski et al., 2015). Nursing and healthcare positions typically do not offer the same benefits (e.g. housing, relocation expenses) as male-dominated, white-collar positions (Piper, 2005). Female migrant workers therefore face a double penalty in terms of labour market segregation and discrimination; they are more likely to work in less well-paid and rewarded sectors because of their sex, and are more likely to work in lower-skilled positions in that sector because of their ethnicity and migrant status (European Commission and OECD, 2005).

Point-based immigration systems influence these dynamics. For example, when Canada awarded no or negative points to health qualifications in the 1990s, many trained Filipinos entered the country through domestic labour programmes instead (Kofman, 2004). When women migrate as dependents, the labour market or social norms may mean they are unable to continue to do a job they have been trained for (Ghosh, 2009). Governments also control the labour market through the issuing of professional licences and certificates: ‘In Canada, certification requirements are often described as a form of systemic discrimination, in that criteria are created which are applied to the Canadian-born and foreign-born alike, but which disproportionately restrict the access of the foreign-born to trades or professions’ (Piper, 2005: 9).

5 Conclusions and policy recommendations

Migration implies trade-offs for women and girls, in that it can offer new opportunities but can also expose female migrants and refugees to new or increased risks. For women and girls to benefit from mobility, policies must support the empowerment and economic benefits of migration *and also* increase protection of female migrants. This is especially important for the most vulnerable migrants and refugees, such as adolescent girls and low-skilled female workers in highly unregulated markets. Female migrants are also not a homogenous group; they have different socioeconomic characteristics. Policy will only amplify the empowerment effects of migration and mitigate increased vulnerabilities if the specific needs of different women and girls, as well as men and boys, in different countries are understood, and policy and programmes are tailored accordingly.

Migration is most likely to empower women and girls when it occurs through regular channels, when they can

make informed choices, and when they have access to legal protection, services and social networks in countries of origin and destination. Achieving this requires actions at different levels – from the community to the international – and cooperation within and across sectors (international organisations, government agencies, the private sector and civil society). The recommendations below set out key actions for the SDG monitoring agencies, specialist United Nations (UN) agencies (e.g. the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), relevant national government agencies (home offices, labour departments, national statistics agencies), and civil society organisations, but they are not exhaustive. In addition, countries vary greatly in their political context and leadership on gender and migration issues. Further work is therefore needed to analyse the political and social barriers to progress in different countries of origin and destination and to tailor strategies accordingly.

Conclusion 1 Women migrate as much as men, so migration policies must be gender-sensitive and data must be disaggregated.

Recommendation: get the basics right – data, policies and advocacy.

- Ensure that all key national, regional and global processes and mechanisms on migration (e.g. the Colombo Process and the Global Forum on Migration and Development) as well as advocacy organisations and agencies (e.g. IOM and UNHCR and key non-government organisations (NGOs) such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC)) focus on female migrants and recognise how gender affects migration experiences and outcomes. SDGs 5, 8, and 10 are important advocacy tools.
- Include specific objectives, targets and milestones on female migrants and refugees in key migration and asylum policies, programmes and monitoring systems, and specifically SDG 10 on inequality, and target 10.7 promoting orderly and safe migration.
- Work with international networks such as the Global Partnership for Sustainable Data Development and invest in the capacity of national agencies to collect and use sex- and age-disaggregated data on international migrants in countries with high levels of female migrants or where they are most exposed to risks.
- Target specific initiatives such as the recently established High-Level Panel on Women’s Economic Empowerment to address female migration issues as part of decent work agendas and efforts to promote women’s economic empowerment.
- Provide financial support and political backing to national campaigns and initiatives focusing on community education, awareness raising, networking

and training to combat xenophobia and increase awareness of migrant and refugee contributions to society (paid and unpaid).

Relevant SDG targets

10.7 Orderly, safe and responsible migration

17.8 Increase significantly the availability of high-quality and reliable data

Conclusion 2 Female migrants and refugees are less visible than male migrants but they are more vulnerable and exposed to greater risk.

Recommendation: prioritise and enhance protection policies and mechanisms.

- Ensure that opportunities to promote safe and regular migration consider gender factors and do not reinforce gender discrimination and disadvantage through a focus on traditionally male employment sectors.
- Introduce mandatory gender training for agencies that have most contact with female migrants, including immigration authorities, the police and health service providers.
- Support national and sub-national resource centres for migrants that provide advice, information and support services (e.g. legal advice, information on sexual and reproductive health services) for women and girls, regardless of their legal status.
- Increase access to basic services such as health, education, social protection and psychosocial support for all female migrants and refugees, including dedicated resources for returnees.

Relevant SDG targets

5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres

5.6 Universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights

8.7 Eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration, implement planned and well-managed migration policies

16.1 Reduce all forms of violence and death everywhere

16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all violence and torture against children

16.3 Promote the law to ensure equal access to justice for all

Conclusion 3 Female migrant workers are less likely than men to make the most of the economic and social opportunities of mobility.

Recommendation: regulate and improve working conditions for all female migrant workers.

- Improve monitoring and enforcement of labour standards, policies and legal frameworks for female migrant workers to support decent work, eliminate abusive and illegal employment, and reduce discriminatory practices in the workplace. The OECD and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are well-positioned to lead these improvements in high-income countries where most migrant domestic workers are found.
- Strengthen domestic and regional regulations to speed up access to and integration in the labour market for migrant women in destination countries, including regional collaboration for better recognition of qualifications.
- Support a global initiative and campaign to increase awareness and recognise the social and economic value of care and domestic work and to promote the equal sharing of unpaid work by men and women.
- Increase temporary and permanent work permits for migrants and refugees and their families (e.g. spouses of migrants, or refugees awaiting resettlement in camps or urban settings).
- Improve migrants' access to financial institutions for general financial inclusion and for sending/receiving remittances.

Relevant SDG targets

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work

8.5 Achieve full and productive employment for all

8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe working environments

8.10 Improve access to financial institutions, including remittance flows

10.c Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances

The authors thank Nicola Jones, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Pietro Mona and colleagues for their helpful comments and suggestions.

References

- Arends-Kuening, M., Calar, A. and Go, S. (2015) 'International Migration Opportunities and Occupational Choice: A Case Study of Philippine Nurses 2002 to 2014'. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8881. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour.
- Azcona, G. (2009) 'Migration in Participatory Poverty Assessments: A Review'. Human Development Research Paper 56. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- Bukachi, S., Juma, F. and Passion Africa (2010) *Baseline Survey on Gender & Long-Term Forced Migration*. Kampala: Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA).
- De Berry, J. and Petrini, B. (2011) *Forced Displacement in Europe and Central Asia*. Washington: The World Bank.
- De Haas, H. (2009) 'Mobility and Human Development'. Human Development Research Paper 01. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- de Villard, S. and Dey de Pryck, J. (2010) 'Making Migration Work for Women and Men in Rural Labour Markets'. Gender and Rural Employment Policy Brief #6. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Office (ILO) (www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2008e/i2008e06.pdf).
- De, P. and Ratha, D. (2005) 'Remittance Income and Household Welfare: Evidence from Sri Lanka Integrated Household Survey'. Unpublished study by the World Bank.
- Dimmitt Gnam, A.L. (2013) 'Mexico's Missed Opportunities to Protect Irregular Women Transmigrants: Applying A Gender Lens to Migration Law Reform'. *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal* 22(3): 713–749 (<https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1282>).
- Docquier, F., Lowell, B. and Marfouk, A. (2009) 'A Gendered Assessment of Highly Skilled Emigration'. *Population and Development Review* 35(2): 297–321 (www.jstor.org/stable/25487664).
- Dudley, L. (2013) 'To Spain and Back: Changing Roles and Identities of Ecuadorian Female Migrants'. Master of Arts. University of Kansas (https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/11689/Dudley_ku_0099M_12721_DATA_1.pdf?sequence=1).
- European Commission and OECD (2005) *Migrant Women and the Labour Market: Diversity and Challenges*. Papers and presentations from seminar jointly organised by the European Commission and the OECD. Brussels: European Commission and OECD.
- European Union (EU), UN Women and Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI) (2014) 'Legislación mexicana y derechos de las trabajadoras migrantes. Un análisis del cumplimiento de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación Contra la Mujer (CEDAW) y su Recomendación General no. 26 en la legislación'. Mexico City: UN Women (www.unwomen.org/es/digital-library/publications/2015/01/legislacion-mexicana-y-derechos-de-trabajadoras-migrantes).
- Evans, A. (2016) 'The Decline of the Male Breadwinner and the Persistence of the Female Carer: Exposure, Interests and Micro-Macro Interactions'. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, June.
- Farah, F. (2006) *An Expert Group Meeting on Female Migrants: What is So Special About It?* Female Migrants: Bridging the Gaps Throughout the Life Cycle. Selected Paper of the UNFPA-IOM Expert Group Meeting. New York: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and International Organization for Migration (IOM).
- Ferrant, G. and Tuccio, M. (2015) *How Do Female Migration and Gender Discrimination in Social Institutions Mutually Influence Each Other?* Working Paper 326. Paris: OECD Development Centre.
- Ferrant, G., Loiseau, E. and Nowacka, K. (2014) 'The Role of Discriminatory Social Institutions in Female South-South Migration'. Paris: OECD Development Centre.
- Fleury, A. (2016). *Understanding Women and Migration: A Literature Review*. KNOMAD Working Paper 8. Washington DC: The World Bank/ Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD).
- García, A.I., Barahona, M., Castro, C. and Gomariz, E. (2002) *Costa Rica: Female Labour Migrants and Trafficking in Women and Children*. GENPROM Working Paper No. 2. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Ghosh, J. (2009) 'Migration and Gender Empowerment: Recent Trends and Emerging Issues'. Human Development Research Paper 04. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- Goldberg, H., Stupp, P., Okoroh, E., Besera, G., Goodman, D. and Daniel, I. (2016) *Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the United States: Updated Estimates of Women and Girls at Risk, 2012*. Public Health Reports, Volume 131. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (www.publichealthreports.org/documents/fgmutilation.pdf).

- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (ed) (2003) *Gender and US Immigration: Contemporary Trends*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- International Labour Organization (ILO) (2015). *ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers: Results and Methodology - Special Focus on Migrant Domestic Workers*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2015) *World Migration Report 2015. Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011) *Thailand Migration Report 2011. Migration for Development in Thailand: Overview and Tools for Policymakers*. Bangkok: International Organization for Migration (http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/tmr_2011.pdf).
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2009) *Gender and Labour Migration in Asia*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Jayaweera, H. (2015) 'Migrant Workers in the UK Healthcare Sector'. Oxford: Compas, University of Oxford.
- Jones, N., Presler-Marshall, E., Tefera, B., Emirie, G., Gebre, B. and Gezahegne, K. (2014) *Rethinking Girls on the Move: The Intersection of Poverty, Exploitation and Violence Experienced by Ethiopian Adolescents Involved in the Middle East 'Maid Trade'*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Kabeer, N. (2000) *The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market Decisions in London and Dhaka*. London: VERSO.
- Kanaiaupuni, S.M. (2000) 'Reframing the Migration Question: An Analysis of Men, Women, and Gender in Mexico'. *Social Forces* 78(4): 1311–1347.
- Kofman, E. (2004) 'Gendered Global Migrations'. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6(4): 643–665.
- Lazaridis, G. (2006) 'Les infirmières exclusives and migrant quasi-nurses in Greece'. IIS Discussion Paper No. 155. Dublin: Institution for International Integration Studies.
- Lorenzo, F.M., Dela Rosa, J.F., Paraso, G.R., Villegas, S., Isaac, C., Yabes, J., Trinidad, F., Fernando, G. and Atienza, J. (2005) *Migration of Health Workers: Country Case Study Philippines*. Working Paper No. 236. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) (2015) *Behind Closed Doors: Protecting and Promoting the Human Rights of Migrant Domestic Workers in an Irregular Situation*. New York and Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- Oishi, N. (2002) *Gender and Migration: An Integrative Approach*. Working Paper. San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies.
- O'Neil, T. and Domingo, P. (2016) *Women and Power: Overcoming Hurdles to Women's Leadership and Decision-Making*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Petrozziello, A. (2013) *Gender on the Move: Working on the Migration-Development Nexus from a Gender Perspective*. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: UN Women.
- Piper, N. (2005). *Gender and Migration*. Background paper for Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) and appendix to the GCIM Global Report on Migration, Recommendations to the Secretary General, Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the GCIM. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration.
- Samman, E., Presler-Marshall, E. and Jones, N. (2016) *Women's Work: Mothers, Children and the Global Childcare Crisis*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Shaw, J. (2005) 'Overseas Migration in the Household Economies of Microfinance Clients: Evidence from Sri Lanka', in J. Shaw (ed), *Remittances, Microfinance and Development: Building the Link*. Brisbane: The Foundation for Development Cooperation.
- Sijapati, B. (2015) *Women's Labour Migration from Asia and the Pacific: Opportunities and Challenges*. Issue in Brief Issue No. 12. Bangkok and Washington DC: International Organization for Migration/Migration Policy Institute.
- Temin, M., Montgomery, M., Engebretsen, S. and Barker, K. (2013) *Girls on the Move: Adolescent Girls & Migration in the Developing World. A Girls Count Report on Adolescent Girls*. Washington DC: Population Council.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2016a) *International Migration Report 2015: Highlights*. New York: United Nations (www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf).
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2016) *Global trends: Forced Displacement in 2015*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2016b). *International Migrant Stock 2015: By Age and Sex* (www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml).
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2016c). *Sustainable Development Goals*. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform (<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>).

-
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015) *World at War: UNHCR Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2014*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2008) *Evaluation of UNHCR's Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-based Violence in Situations of Forced Displacement*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Bank Group (2015) *Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa*. Geneva and Washington: UNHCR and World Bank Group.
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2015) *Policy Brief: Female Migrants*. Second Mayoral Forum on Mobility, Migration and Development. Quito: United Nations Population Fund.
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2006) *State of World Population: A Passage to Hope. Women and International Migration*. New York: United Nations Population Fund.
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the International Migration Policy Programme (2004) *Meeting the Challenges of Migration: Progress Since the ICPD*. New York/Geneva: United Nations Population Fund/ International Migration Policy Programme.
- UN Women and IMUMI (Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migracion) (2015) *Las Trabajadoras Migrantes Centroamericanas en Chiapas. Recomendaciones de politica publica para garantizar el ejercicio de sus derechos*. Mexico City: UN Women (www.unwomen.org/es/digital-library/publications/2014/7/las-trabajadoras-migrantes-centroamericanas-en-chiapas).
- UN Women (2012) *Factsheet: Domestic Work and Migration in Asia*. UN Women (<http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2012/9/factsheet-domestic-work-and-migration-in-asia>).
- Wojczewski, S., Pentz, S., Blacklock, C. Hoffmann, K., Peersman, W., Nkomazana, O. and Kutalek, R. (2015) 'African Female Physicians and Nurses in the Global Care Chain: Qualitative Explorations from Five Destination Countries', *PLoS ONE* 10(6): e0129464 (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4466329/).
- Women's Refugee Commission (WRC) (2016) *Falling Through the Cracks: Refugee Women and Girls in Germany and Sweden*. New York: Women's Refugee Commission.
- World Bank (2014) *Republic of Niger: Gender, Agency and Economic Development in Niger*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Yeoh, B.S.A., Graham, E. and Boyle, P.J. (2002) 'Migrations and Family Relations in the Asia Pacific Region'. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 11(1): 1-11.



A South Sudanese refugee takes notes in a makeshift classroom in Ethiopia, June 2014 © UNICEF Ethiopia/Ayene

SDGs covered

4: Quality education
10: Reduced inequalities
17: Partnerships for the goals

Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Susan Nicolai, Joseph Wales and Erica Aiazzi

Key messages

- 31 million school-aged children are international migrants, and this number is set to grow. Their education is therefore a long-term strategic priority and investment.
- Educating migrant children is essential to meet SDG 4, and more broadly to achieve economic and social benefits such as improved livelihoods, better health outcomes, reductions in gender inequities and enhanced political participation.
- Large and unexpected migration flows can disrupt education systems, disadvantage migrant and refugee children and create tensions in host communities. To combat this, a combination of forward-planning and contingency funding is needed.
- Education plays an important role in social integration, economic mobility and learning outcomes. Migrant children should not be placed in segregated classes or schools, nor solely taught in their native language.
- There is limited data on the education of migrant and refugee children. Government and international institutions need to collaborate to collect such data, and use it to support vulnerable groups.

1 Introduction

This briefing explores the challenges and opportunities related to primary-school education for migrants – especially in host countries – and the implications for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It focuses mainly on international migrants, but also includes a brief discussion of education for refugees.

In 2015, around 244 million people were international migrants¹ (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2016), including 31 million children below the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2016). This means that roughly one in 70 children worldwide live in a country different to that of their birth. Asia and Africa host the largest numbers of migrant children. Migrant populations in Africa are notably younger – one in three migrants is under the age of 18, a figure twice the global average. While migrant populations tend to be younger in low-income countries and older in high-income countries, it is striking that Europe, North America and Oceania host a disproportionate number of migrant children compared to their share of all children globally (see Figure 1) (UNICEF, 2016). These patterns demonstrate that the challenge of meeting migrant education needs is a matter of importance for both high- and low-income countries.


The right to education for migrant children is protected by several legal instruments, including the 1990

Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants and Members of Their Families, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the extent to which these commitments are implemented in practice varies considerably. Moreover, they are particularly valid for primary education, with the right to secondary and tertiary education less protected by legal instruments.

Overcoming barriers to migrant education is key to achieving not only the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 on education, but also a range of other Goals. There is a strong evidence base showing that education contributes to improved livelihoods, more rapid economic growth, better health outcomes, reductions in gender inequities, strengthened support for democracy, higher levels of tolerance, enhanced political participation and greater concern for the environment. Providing education to migrant children is therefore of utmost importance – increasingly so given the likelihood of future growth in migrant flows (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2016; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2014).

This briefing first highlights why education matters for migrants and their host countries. It then goes on to discuss trends in primary education for migrant groups, as education at this level has important repercussions for educational achievement at upper levels and for joining

Figure 1 Distribution of international migrant children and all children by region, 2015 (%)



Source: UNICEF (2016).

1 International migrants are defined as people living in a country than the one in which they were born. In countries where this precise data was lacking, it was proxied for by the number of people with foreign citizenship. However, different sources of data in the brief might use slightly different definitions of international migrants, for example excluding short-term migrants from the statistics concerning migrants. We have tried to clarify where this is the case.

the workforce. It examines how migrant education contributes to SDG achievement, particularly SDG 4 on education and sub-goals on children in vulnerable situations. It explores some of the major challenges, particularly in terms of integration into education systems and the kind of education provided. The analysis examines how migrant education issues may differ between low-, middle- and high-income countries, and concludes by drawing out detailed recommendations.

1.1 Why does education matter?

Education brings a range of benefits for both individuals and societies. It provides children with skills that enable them to be more productive later in life, which leads to higher incomes and the possibility of breaking out of cycles of chronic poverty. It also shapes the way that citizens understand their society and engage with each other. These benefits are particularly important for migrants. Education creates opportunities to understand and better integrate into their host country, particularly when considering areas such as language, laws and customs. Being able to speak the language of the host country is especially important; across a range of surveys, respondents in host countries see it as a primary concern for effective integration (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017). More educated populations also tend to be more supportive of democracy, more likely to participate in politics, and more tolerant of differences (UNESCO, 2016) – all of which will help the host country to better manage the opportunities and challenges that migration creates.

Research finds that investment in this sector also produces strong returns for countries (Pritchett, 2006 quoted in UNESCO, 2016; Schäferhoff et al., 2016). Estimates suggest that every US\$1 invested in an additional year of schooling for children in low- and middle-income countries generates benefits in earning and health gains of US\$10 in low-income countries, US\$4 in lower-middle-income countries and US\$2 in upper-middle-income countries (International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity (Education Commission), 2016). Education is also likely to generate remittances, which tend to strengthen education in countries of origin.

1.2 Trends in migrant education provision

Globally, there have been significant gains in education – particularly primary – since the early 2000s. However, these have largely been in terms of access, which has become compulsory in most countries, with more limited progress made on quality and equity (Education Commission, 2016). A major challenge in mapping education trends for migrant children is the absence of internationally comparable data, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, partly due to the diversity of

Box 1 Data challenges in migrant education

In countries where official data collection is limited, only key variables such as age and gender are captured, and migration status is rarely recorded. Even if migration status is added to existing surveys, the ‘rareness’ of migrants may restrict a Ministries’ ability to collect meaningful data (Bilsborrow, 2016). While international organisations might collect information concerning the education of refugees residing in camps, little is known about those residing in urban areas due to the challenges in reaching them.

Politics can also play a role in preventing the collection of migration data, for example if governments wish to downplay the figures of immigrants and asylum-seekers. Moreover, even countries with well-functioning data-collection systems may be unable to produce precise estimates of children of irregular migrants. Schools themselves might face difficulties in collecting information on their students, even if they can persuade parents in legally vulnerable situations that such data is aimed at supporting their children, rather than reporting them to security authorities (Bartlett et al., 2015).

migration flows (see Box 1). Where data is available, it suggests that immigrant students face greater difficulties than their host-country peers in accessing education and achieving good learning outcomes (OECD, 2015).

Large immigration flows can also have an impact on education systems, particularly if the host country does not have the infrastructure and resources to include a significant number of new students quickly. Demographic changes and rising demand for education caused by migration flows may lead to overcrowding in schools and falling education quality, larger class sizes and the emergence of a more complex mix of student language, existing skills and social norms. For example, the rapid increase in the number of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon led to the introduction of second shifts in the afternoon for Syrian students, with negative effects on both students and teachers (Dryden-Peterson and Adelman, 2016; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2016; see Box 4).

However, if managed well, migrant influxes can have a positive impact, for example by revitalising depopulated schools or, as in London, being linked to improvements in school and student performance (Burgess, 2014). Important strategies to facilitate the rapid integration of new students include prompt availability of funding for language classes (Hickmann et al., 2008), as well as the availability of extra funds for local authorities to match a rise in local migrant numbers (IPPR, 2014).

1.3 Trends in migrant education outcomes

Evidence from selected low- and middle-income countries also highlights challenges for migrant education (see Box 2). Immigrants and children in immigrant households in Côte d'Ivoire and the Dominican Republic are less likely to attend school than their host-country peers; this is also the case for children in Costa Rica who were born abroad. However, migrants are not always at a disadvantage: in Burkina Faso no significant differences in attendance were found (OECD, 2017).

Evidence from six OECD countries² found that immigrant students³ tend to perform worse in standard

Box 2 Education and migration to low- and middle-income countries

The examples of South Africa and Thailand, middle-income countries with significant immigration, show that migrant inclusion in the primary-education system is an urgent issue and one that generates a variety of challenges and coping strategies.

In South Africa, research shows that children of Zimbabwean migrants face discrimination when trying to access school, which results in migrant children having lower enrolment rates than South African children. This is partly a function of schools being requested to undertake policing functions and report undocumented migrants to the Department of Home Affairs, which makes them an unwelcoming environment for migrant children (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014). Moreover, the country experiences a high number of unaccompanied children who migrate for work, for whom no education is provided outside of their working hours (Save the Children UK, 2007).

In Thailand, despite the legal right of all children to access education irrespective of their status, access to school for migrant children – particularly Burmese migrants – is very difficult due to fear of the authorities, the cost of books and uniforms, a lack of accreditation, and language barriers. In some areas, these challenges are overcome through co-operation between schools and civil society. For example, the Foundation for Rural Youth operates in a southern Bangkok district with a high number of migrant families and has successfully collected data on the whereabouts and profiles of many out-of-school children. This data allowed them to engage in awareness-raising activities with families about the right to education in Thailand (Save the Children, 2015).

assessments of reading, science and mathematics than their host-country counterparts and, in some countries, are more likely to repeat a grade, attend vocational schools or drop out of secondary education (see Box 3). They are more likely to attend schools in major urban centres with student populations who are from less advantaged socio-economic backgrounds and, in some countries, are less likely to have attended early-childhood education (OECD, 2010; OECD, 2015).

This performance gap is largely explained by parents' occupations and educational background, and the language spoken at home. Other factors include better educational resources at home, early reading at home, early-childhood education activities, a more advantaged socio-economic composition of schools and communities, more hours for learning language at school, and school accountability measures (i.e. informing parents of student performance and the use of performance data) (ibid.).

Migrant children are also likely to face linguistic barriers that impact on their achievement. Many

Box 3 Education and migration to high-income countries


With access to primary school less of an issue in high-income countries, the main debates about inclusion of migrant children relate to the balance between their native language and culture and that of the host country. The OECD describes countries as using three different models: the ethnic-identity model, which values mother language and culture; the language-assimilation model, which focuses on the acquisition of the host country's language; and the language-integration model, which values both languages equally (Taguma et al., 2010).

Choices about integration stem from the countries' histories of immigration. Different integration models, such as fostering multiculturalism or assimilation, also influence the way in which the education system has responded to the challenge of migrant students. For example, Sweden belongs to the language-integration model, having policies that promote supporting migrant children in their learning through their native language. On the contrary, in France it is illegal to collect information about the migration background of students, which shows the importance that the country gives to the assimilation of children in the French culture through French language (Escafré-Dublet, 2014).

2 Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

3 The definition of immigrant children varies based on different countries' definitions. These could be both foreign-born children or children who are born in the host country, but who are considered foreign nationals per host-country law.

Figure 2 Percentage of immigrant students who do not speak the language of assessment at home



Note: data sourced from high-income countries; comparable data is not available for low- or middle-income countries.
Source: OECD (2015a).

first- and second-generation migrants do not speak the testing language at home (see Figure 2) and Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) data suggests that this has a strong influence on their reading-comprehension scores – in part explaining the performance deficit with host-country students (OECD, 2015a).

The characteristics of education systems and schools also play an important role in migrant children’s school results. Migrant students from the same countries of origin and similar socio-economic backgrounds have been found to perform very differently depending on the schools that they attend. For example, the performance of Arabic-speaking migrants in the Netherlands is higher than the achievement of students from the same countries who emigrated to Qatar, after accounting for socio-economic status (OECD, 2015).

2 Education, migration and the SDGs

Overall, improving education provision for migrants will impact the achievement of a range of SDGs. SDG 4 calls for inclusive and equitable education and lifelong learning for all. It specifically references an aspiration to meet the needs of children in ‘vulnerable situations’ – a group that includes migrant children,

refugees and other displaced populations. Migrant children are often excluded from education due to language or socio-economic barriers (SDGs 4.1 and 4.5). Moreover, SDG 4.2 calls for their inclusion in quality early-childhood education, essential to prepare migrant children for primary school. Content focusing on socio-emotional learning, human rights and citizenship education in school curricula (SDG 4.7) can foster the inclusion of migrant children and enhance intercultural understanding among host-country children.

Other SDGs address migrant children’s inclusion in the education system; foster gender equality (SDG 5.1); and target the wider integration of migrant children and their families within host communities (SDG 10.2). Inclusive and high-quality education can protect children from harmful practices such as early marriage, child labour and human trafficking (SDGs 5.3, 8.7 and 16.2) and has a positive effect on the health of migrants (SDG 3). These Targets are not specific to migrants, but as migrant populations are subject to socio-economic and legal vulnerabilities, they are at risk of harmful practices and lack of access to healthcare. Finally, greater education is linked to a lower incidence of poverty and boosts income growth (SDG 1.1 and 10.1). These dynamics and other links are outlined below in Table 1.

Table 1 Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
<p>4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.</p> <p>4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes.</p> <p>4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education so that they are ready for primary education.</p> <p>4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.</p> <p>4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.</p>	<p>Reducing the barriers to migrant children accessing education is vital to meeting this Goal, as is improving the quality of the education they receive. This holds true for SDG 4 sub-goals of ensuring free access to education, improving education equity, raising levels of access to quality early-education programmes, and increasing the proportion that achieve certain benchmarks in literacy and numeracy – all areas of challenge for migrant children.</p> <p>It is important to develop more inclusive, intercultural school curricula, with a focus on socio-emotional learning, and to train teachers in these skills. It is also important to enhance the social and intercultural skills of host-country children.</p> <p>Achieving quality education for all (including in source countries) may lead to increases in migration, as there is a positive link between education levels and propensity to migrate. However, this varies across contexts, depending on opportunities available. In contexts where overall education levels are low, the link between migration and education levels is weaker, possibly due to a preponderance of low-skilled migration (OECD, 2017).</p>
<p>1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.</p> <p>8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries.</p> <p>10.1 By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average.</p>	<p>Improving the education of migrant populations both in the developed and developing world is pertinent to these economic-related targets, as education can lead to rising incomes and reduced poverty for migrants, and boost growth rates and government revenues in their host countries.</p> <p>Migrant education may also indirectly contribute to these goals if their rising incomes translate into higher levels of remittances, and if remittances are partially invested in better education for family members at home. This impact is likely to be increased if SDG 10.C – on reducing the costs of sending remittances – is achieved.</p>
<p>3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.</p>	<p>Education has a strong impact on the future health outcomes of the student and their families, particularly in the case of female education. There may also be indirect impacts if migrant children can access and navigate the health services of their host country better because of improved knowledge of the country and its majority language.</p>
<p>10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.</p>	<p>The integration of migrant children into education systems is closely linked to their broader integration into their host country and community, as well as that of their parents and immediate family. Education can improve their social, economic and political inclusion, particularly if they are better educated regarding their host country and able to speak the majority language.</p>
<p>5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation.</p> <p>8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.</p> <p>16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.</p>	<p>The enrolment of migrant children in education systems provides them with more protection and access to resources to resist these practices, and allows host-country governments to monitor and intervene more easily where needed.</p> <p>Attempts to eliminate child labour, exploitation and trafficking through financial support to families are all likely to boost education for migrant children by freeing them to receive an education that they would not otherwise be able to have.</p>

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.	Achieving these housing and infrastructure targets would improve the basic ability of migrant children and refugees to access education services and to ensure that their home life was more conducive to achieving strong learning outcomes successfully.
11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons.	
10.3 Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard.	Removing legal barriers to accessing education – particularly for the children of irregular migrants and refugee children – would boost enrolment rates, as would ensuring that all people have a legal identity and the necessary paperwork to allow them to enrol in school.
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.	

3 Integration of migrant children in education systems

This section explores a range of efforts to support the full integration of migrant children into education systems, and the barriers to achieving integration, specifically legal, socio-economic and technical aspects.

3.1 Educational integration of migrants

The integration of children in schools plays an important role in the social integration of their families within the host community, which in turn has a positive bearing on educational experiences (Moskal, 2010; Sacramento, 2015). This is challenging in practice, however, particularly for irregular migrants who may be wary of interacting with staff at their child's school due to concerns about revealing their legal status (Bartlett et al., 2015).

Educational integration of migrants can also have powerful generational effects. For example, a comparative study of Turkish migrants in several European countries showed social systems that support migrants are associated with greater economic mobility for second-generation migrants (Schnell, 2014). PISA data on the performance of second-generation migrant students finds that their scores correlate strongly to their parents' educational background. This suggests that integrating first-generation migrants into the education system successfully can lead to a virtuous circle of integration in the host society across generations (Dustmann et al., 2011).

3.2 Barriers to access

Legal barriers

While many countries grant access to basic education for children of irregular migrants (UNESCO, 2017), the type

of migration strongly influences the legal barriers migrant students might face; irregular migrants, unaccompanied children, stateless children, children without identity documents, and seasonal migrants face more barriers (see Box 2). Countries take different approaches to this. In some countries, such as Malaysia, irregular migrants are legally barred from government schools, while in other contexts the children of undocumented migrants may find themselves unable to enrol, despite having a legal entitlement (Lumayag, 2016; Insan Association, 2015).

Within Europe, irregular migrant children attend school in 23 out of 28 countries. In 10 of these⁴, the legislative framework has a specific reference to the entitlement of children with irregular status to attend schools (Spencer and Hughes, 2015). When law prevents access, civil society can step in to provide non-formal education to excluded children, as in the case of Malaysia (Lumayag, 2016). However, accreditation of non-formal education remains a problem and can prevent children from proceeding to the next education level.

Meeting enrolment requirements can also be an issue for unaccompanied and stateless children. In the US, unaccompanied children face challenges with proof of residency or guardianship, as they live with other families who are not their legal guardians (American Immigration Council, 2016). In addition, changes in citizenship laws in the Dominican Republic denationalised many citizens of Haitian descent, which prevented their children from enrolling in primary education (Georgetown Law Human Rights Institute Fact-finding Project, 2014).

Strict rules on age limits for enrolment can also prove a challenge for migrant children who lack formal education and the knowledge necessary to enter the level of schooling appropriate for their age, but are too old to enrol in the level of schooling appropriate for their existing knowledge (American Immigration Council, 2016).

4 Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia for primary education.

Box 4 Education for refugees

In 2015, there were 11 million children under 18 who were refugees or asylum seekers⁶, representing just over half the total global refugee population (The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 2015). Estimates suggest that 1.75 million primary-school aged refugee children – or half of that population – are out of school. The proportion of those out of school varies from 80% in Egypt and Yemen to 40% at refugee sites in Pakistan⁶ (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2016). This has a compounding effect on secondary education, contributing to the 80% of refugee adolescents (1.95 million) not enrolled in secondary education (UNESCO, 2016b; UNESCO, 2016). These percentages contrast with a secondary-school enrolment rate of around 75% worldwide and 40% in low-income countries (UIS, 2016).

Countries have adopted a range of strategies to integrate refugee children into their education system, shaped by the local context and type of emergency. The main differences are whether they integrate refugees into the national school system, and what curriculum they use.

Some countries integrate refugees in schools with native children, others set up separate schools in refugee camps. While integrating refugees avoids segregation, refugee children might face bullying and teaching might not be tailored to their language or psycho-social needs (Shuayb et al., 2014). If there are no schools within refugee camps, or refugees are in remote locations, transportation to school can be a major barrier to enrolment. When schools are set up in refugee camps, they often suffer from a scarcity of qualified teachers and the resources to pay for teachers' salaries. Many teachers therefore work on a voluntary basis, which could have negative consequences for the quality of the education provided (UNHCR, 2016).

The choice of whether to use the host-country curriculum or that of the refugees' country of origin is an issue in refugee settings. While the curriculum of the country of origin helps to maintain ties with the home culture and facilitates later repatriation, it isolates refugees from the host community and makes it difficult for them to access higher levels of education or employment due to a lack of accreditation. Examples include Congolese refugees in Tanzania and students at two refugee camps in Djibouti, who have faced problems with accreditation of school certificates in the host countries and so been unable to continue their education (UNHCR, 2016). Conversely, the host country's curriculum facilitates integration, but can present knowledge barriers and the challenge of translating the curriculum into another language. Overall, UNHCR favours use of the host country's curriculum in the context of protracted emergencies and displacement (UNHCR, 2015a).

Innovative and flexible financing mechanisms are being developed to respond better to the needs of refugee children. These are often based on cooperation between multiple donors, as in the case of the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis and the Jordan Compact, a partnership between the Jordanian government and the international community (European Commission (EC), 2016; Reliefweb, 2016).

Socio-economic barriers

Socio-economic barriers can impact upon migrant inclusion in education systems in two main ways. The first is that the children in question may be engaged in labour of some type – either to meet their own needs or those of their family, or due to trafficking or forced labour. Under these circumstances, migrant children are unlikely to attend school (Child Protection Working Group (CPWG), 2015). Children engaged in seasonal migration for work or in nomadic and pastoralist movements may be migrating to work during the school term. Seasonally sensitive education policies have been introduced in countries such as Brazil, Colombia and the Gambia to reduce the impact of this phenomenon (Hadley, 2010).

The second way is the de facto segregation of migrant and host-country children that may occur because of socio-economic differences. First-generation immigrants

tend to be poorer and are likely to be concentrated in urban areas. Thus, they are more likely to attend schools in cities with student populations who are, on average, from less-advantaged socio-economic backgrounds and more likely to be first- or second-generation migrants. This can reinforce disadvantage for both groups.

Evidence from some high-income countries shows that the enrolment of a significant number of migrant children in schools can cause host-country children to move to other – often private – schools (Bloem and Diaz, 2007; Fairlie and Resch, 2002). To reduce this tendency towards segregation, the Danish municipality of Aarhus created a quota approach that sets a cap of 20% of students eligible for linguistic support for each school. If the number of students in need for linguistic support is higher, some of these students are moved to another school (Jørgensen, 2014).

5 Per UNHCR, a refugee is 'someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence' while asylum seekers are those who 'apply for asylum – the right to be recognized as a refugee and receive legal protection and material assistance' (UNHCR, 2017)

6 This is in contrast to gross enrolment rates of native populations in host countries at above 97% in Egypt and Yemen and above 92% in Pakistan.

Linguistic and technical barriers

The language of instruction can act as a major barrier to migrant students' integration, even if they are enrolled and attending school. In the US, there are concerns at the number of English-language learners amongst second-generation migrant students with at least one parent born in the US. It suggests that their parents, despite having been born and educated in the US, have not learnt English fully nor passed on the language – a potentially significant barrier to the broader integration of both parents and children (Fix and McHugh, 2009).

Early-childhood education plays a particularly important role in primary school readiness for children who do not speak the majority language at home, as their interaction with majority-language staff and students allows them to reach primary school with better language skills. Training pre-school staff to interact better with families of different backgrounds can help foster bilingualism amongst students by encouraging the family to use the majority language with the children alongside their native language (UNICEF, 2009).

However, migrant families tend to have less physical access to high-quality early-childhood education (Leseman, 2007). Programmes such as the Migrant and Seasonal Head Start Program (MSHS) in the US can help by providing transportation to early-childhood education centres, mitigating the difficulties faced by migrant workers due to their working hours and limited access to transport.

Another aspect of education systems that affects their level of inclusivity is how selective they are and how early the selection is made. Evidence from some high-income countries shows that migrant children are often streamed into educational paths that lead to vocational training instead of higher education. This has been observed in Germany which has a highly selective education system where only 23% of foreign-born students attend a grammar school (gymnasium) compared to 46% of German-origin students, and 1.8% German-origin students leave school before graduation compared to 14.2% of foreign-born students (Bendel, 2014).

4 Quality education and life skills

This section looks at the challenges of ensuring quality education and securing life skills for migrant students. It will examine some of the major barriers affecting provision and the strategies that have been adopted to overcome them.

Despite the challenges that migrant children face compared to host-country students, migrant students and their families often show higher educational aspirations than their counterparts (UNICEF, 2009; UNESCO, 2017). They therefore have the potential to thrive if education systems offer the necessary support.

Box 5 Education and the role of remittances

Remittances that migrants send home to their families are widely acknowledged to have a positive impact on education (Gindling and Poggio, 2012). Remittances lead to improved financial security – this means migrant families can spend more on education, and free children from income-earning opportunities (Amakom and Iheoma, 2014). This impact may be particularly important for girls (Elbadawi and Roushdy, 2010). Potential earning power abroad may also lead families to prioritise improving the human capital of their children (Gyimah-Brempong, 2014).

There is considerable evidence that the remittances migrants send back to their families are used to increase investments in education. Studies show that children whose families receive remittances are more likely to attend school, to reach higher levels of education and to attend private schools, when these are perceived to be of better quality (OECD, 2017; Elbadawi and Roushdy, 2010). A randomised experiment in El Salvador found that for every US\$1 received by beneficiaries, education expenditures rose to US\$3.72 (Ambler et al., 2015).

Still, the positive influence of remittances on education cannot be assumed. Firstly, the gender of the household head can have a bearing on how remittances are allocated; a study in Ghana found that remittances to female-headed households increase education investments more than those to male-headed households (Gyimah-Brempong, 2014). Secondly, remittances might have no effect, or even a negative effect, on education. For example, when there are low-skilled jobs that can help sustain migrants' families at home without additional investments in education, remittances may discourage reaching higher levels of education. For example, the availability of low-skilled jobs in the US may act as a disincentive to further education for Mexican citizens who plan to migrate (Latapí and Martin, 2008).

To improve educational opportunities, systems should focus on the presence of institutional and teacher discrimination, choice of languages of instruction, content of the curriculum, and teacher training, including attention to social and emotional learning, and teaching of the majority language.

Discrimination

Feeling discriminated against affects the psychological wellbeing of children, as well as their social relations and academic outcomes (Spears Brown, 2015). Discrimination of migrant students has been observed across very diverse school contexts. For example, it has been reported by Haitian students in the Dominican

Republic and by Colombian students in Ecuador, in both cases with detrimental effects for the students (Bartlett et al., 2015). The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) also found that lower expectations from teachers towards migrant students have a negative impact on students' education. Moreover, discrimination based on cultural practices, such as the prohibition of wearing a headscarf in France, might also lead to exclusion or segregation in schools allowing such practices (EUMC, 2004).

Learning support in native language

It is estimated that around 40% of the global population does not have access to education in a language that they speak or understand, an issue that mainly concerns countries with a high diversity of languages, which often also deal with many migrant children. Some of these countries are taking steps to recognise the importance of instruction in children's native language, and their best practices could be used as examples for the primary education of migrant children as well (UNESCO, 2016a). For example, in 1977 Sweden introduced programmes of teaching in the native language of migrant children, encouraged by diversity policies already in place towards the Sami and Finnish minority groups (Jacobs, 2013).

The choice of language in education affects the ability of children to acquire better learning skills. Indeed, some examples show that the use of migrant students' native languages in support of their learning can boost their self-esteem and increase their school achievements (Taguma et al., 2010). Countries differ in the way they approach heritage-language teaching, with some of them centralising it through national directives and others leaving it to private initiatives (EC, 2009).

Curriculum and teacher training

Including elements related to the child's native culture in the school curriculum is helpful for development, as it allows migrant children to feel valued (Heckmann, 2008). Diaspora schools, and collaborations between countries of origin and destination of migrants, can play an important role in fostering teaching of native languages and culture. For example, many European countries have bilateral agreements with migrants' countries of origin that sponsor teaching on specific subjects through embassies, consulates and cultural associations (Jacobs, 2013). A downside of this approach is the risk that they highlight differences that can hinder integration of the students within the host community.

Stressing diversity and social and emotional learning within the curriculum can also help, especially when the migration process has been traumatic (International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2014). Similarly, including peacebuilding activities in the curriculum, and ensuring teachers have the skills to carry out such activities, not only fosters learning related to peace and sustainable

development in situations of conflict, but also promotes social cohesion in non-conflict contexts (UNICEF, 2014).

Teachers therefore play a central role. The ability of school staff to manage diversity touches different levels.

- At the individual student level, teachers should be trained and able to adapt their style to individual learning needs;
- At the classroom level, teachers should be able to deal with the interaction between different cultural backgrounds, showing students the strengths that derive from multicultural contexts; and
- At the 'school life' level, teachers should include parents and communities, which requires sensitivity to different cultural practices and intercultural communication skills. This also enhances the role of schools in effective integration (OECD, 2010a).

Inclusion in mainstream classes

Research broadly agrees that migrant children are better facilitated by support-oriented education systems than by those focused on selectivity. However, there is a strong debate as to whether migrant children should be included in mainstream classes immediately, or separated initially in special classes. In 2015, the OECD concluded that migrant students who are immediately immersed in normal classes tend to score higher in PISA data at 15 years old (OECD, 2015). However, other evidence points to benefits arising from migrant students attending accelerated language-learning classes before being streamed into normal classes. One caveat with this approach is the need to distinguish between language-support classes and classes for students with learning disabilities. Migrant children are often included in the latter by default, even when they do not present any learning difficulty, thus fostering their exclusion from the mainstream education system (UNICEF, 2009; Waslin, 2016).

5 Conclusions and policy recommendations

Globally, there are tens of millions of school-age children that migrate each year. Their experience varies tremendously, depending partly on where they are coming from and where they move to, but also on other socio-economic factors such as the employment and educational background of their parents. Regardless, education is a crucial determinant shaping their and their families' lives.

There is limited data on the extent to which migrant children can access education, the teaching-learning experiences available to them, and their learning outcomes. It is clear, though, that certain challenges cut across contexts and complicate education opportunities. This includes legal, socio-economic and linguistic barriers to access, alongside poor learning outcomes and limited

focus on life skills as part of the curriculum. These issues are present in low-, middle- and high-income countries. Moreover, the challenges for refugee children are often acute, whether education provision is through host communities or in separate camp schools.

Conclusion 1 Educating migrant children is essential to meet SDG 4 and plays an important role in achieving other Goals.

Recommendations:

- Children should be able to access school irrespective of their migration status. Eliminate legal barriers that prevent the children of irregular migrants from enrolling in schools. Adopt a flexible approach to documentation requirements for unaccompanied minors to maximise enrolment levels (Lumayag, 2016). Flexible education programmes should be in place for working children, and for children belonging to pastoralists and nomadic groups (Save the Children UK, 2007).
- Introduce a combination of forward-planning and contingency funding to account for surges in migration rates, both at national level and through multi-donor funds. These are essential to minimise disruption to the education system, maximise the extent of access and achievement amongst migrant students, and prevent the emergence of tensions between host and migrant communities (Hickmann et al., 2008). This should involve early investment in developing suitable curricula and teacher-training modules for engaging with new arrivals, and the flexibility to channel resources to schools that see a rapid rise in the number of migrant students.
- Do not view migrant education in isolation, but pursue a range of coordinated strategies to maximise its overall impact (Schäferhoff et al., 2016) and impact across other areas of the in the 2030 Agenda. These should include a focus on employment, health, family and social-protection policies and programmes so that gains in education are translated into the labour market; close links between schools and other social services to ensure protection; and lowering the costs associated with transferring remittances back to migrants' home countries to allow investment into the education of children staying behind.

Relevant SDG targets

4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and Goal-4 effective learning outcomes.

4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education so that they are ready for primary education.

4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.

4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.

4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all.

10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.

Conclusion 2 Education is strengthened by policies that prioritise integration.

Recommendations:

- School segregation hinders both social cohesion and migrants' rapid improvement in the majority language. Put in place measures to avoid segregation, for example by attracting native students to schools with migrants through the offer of special programmes. Include local communities as beneficiaries when additional resources are spent in schools with a high number of migrants to avoid making native residents feel neglected.
- Improve access to quality early-childhood care and education for migrant groups and foster bilingualism amongst children that do not speak the majority language of the host country at home. This will enable children from migrant families to integrate more easily (UNICEF, 2009).
- Develop and invest in remedial education programmes for migrant students, focusing as quickly as possible on majority-language skills, as well as gaps between their skills and knowledge and those anticipated in the national curriculum for their age group. This should be paired with ongoing learning support in their native language (Taguma et al., 2010). Children should not stay in special classes with accelerated learning programmes for longer than needed, to avoid segregation.
- Teachers should be trained and supported in managing diversity, both before they start to teach and through in-service training. Develop resources and networks giving teachers and schools access to learning materials and modules that will allow them to integrate references to migrants' national home culture into lessons (Heckmann, 2008).
- Both the curriculum and school staff should provide psychosocial support to foster children's wellbeing (IRC, 2014). This may involve a specific curriculum on intercultural issues or peace education. School staff should emphasise children's potential, for example by not lowering expectations towards migrant children.

Relevant SDG targets

4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and Goal-4 effective learning outcomes.

4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education so that they are ready for primary education.

4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.

4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.

4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all.

4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing states.

10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.

Conclusion 3 There is limited data available on the education of refugee and migrant children, making it more difficult to design policies and programmes to support this group.

Recommendations:

- Data pertaining to migration background and education level should be collected together, as further analysis on the link between education and migration status is necessary to improve service provision. To do this, more coordination is needed among the institutions collecting the data, including Ministries of Education, central statistics offices and international

organisations collecting data in refugee camps and elsewhere.

- The international community should provide more data-collection resources, especially where national governments are having to deal with other urgent priorities.
- Data collection on the migration backgrounds of students should be used to support vulnerable groups, and not for reporting to security-related institutions. A lack of trust in how personal information will be used can jeopardise not only the collection of valuable data, but also families' trust in schools, which can negatively impact their children's enrolment and learning (Bartlett et al., 2015).

Relevant SDG targets

17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

17.19 By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries.

The authors would like to thank Manos Antoninis and Anna Cristina D'Addio (UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report), Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Helen Dempster (ODI), and Pietro Mona (Swiss Development Corporation) for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks go to Sophy Kershaw for editing.

References

- Amakom, U. and Iheoma, C.G. (2014) 'Impact of migrant remittances on health and education outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa', *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)* 19 (8), pp. 33–44. Retrieved from: www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol19-issue8/Version-1/G019813344.pdf
- Ambler, K., Aycinena, D. and Yang, D. (2015) 'Channeling remittances to education: a field experiment among migrants from El Salvador', *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7 (2), pp. 207–232. Retrieved from: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4437739/#
- American Immigration Council (2016) 'Undocumented children face these challenges in accessing public education'. Retrieved from: <http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/04/14/undocumented-children-public-education/>
- Bartlett, L., Rodriguez, D. and Oliveira, G. (2015) *Migration and education: socio-cultural perspectives*. Retrieved from: www.scielo.br/pdf/ep/v41nspe/en_1517-9702-ep-41-spe-1153.pdf
- Bendel, P. (2014) *Coordinating immigrant integration in Germany: mainstreaming at the federal and local levels*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.migrationpolicy.org/research/coordinating-immigrant-integration-germany-mainstreaming-federal-and-local-levels
- Bilsborrow, R.E. (2016) *The global need for better data on international migration and the special potential of household surveys*. Background paper for the conference 'Improving data on international migration', Berlin, 2–3 December 2016. Retrieved from: https://gm dac.iom.int/sites/default/files/Bilsborrow_background%20paper.pdf
- Bloem, N. and Diaz, R. (2007) 'White flight: integration through segregation in Danish metropolitan public schools'. Retrieved from: www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/142-white-flight-integration-through-segregation-in-danish-metropolitan-public-schools
- Bruckauf, Z. (2016) *Falling behind: socio-demographic profiles of educationally disadvantaged youth*. Evidence from PISA 2000-2012. UNICEF Innocenti Office for Research. Retrieved from: www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/IWP_2016_11.pdf
- Burgess, S. (2014) *Understanding the success of London's schools*. Centre for Market and Public Organisation Working Paper, Series No. 14/333. Retrieved from: www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/cmpo/migrated/documents/wp333.pdf
- CPWG with The Education Cluster and ILO (2015) NO to child labour YES to safe and quality education in emergencies. Retrieved from: https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/9156/pdf/cl_and_education_in_emergencies_final_web.pdf
- Crush, J. and Tawodzera, G. (2013) 'Exclusion and discrimination: Zimbabwean migrant children and South African schools', *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 15 (4), pp. 677–693. Retrieved from: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-013-0283-7>
- Dempster, H. and Hargrave, K. (2017) *Understanding public attitudes towards refugees, migrants and migration*. London: ODI. Retrieved from: www.odi.org/publications/10826-understanding-public-attitudes-towards-refugees-and-migrants
- Dryden-Peterson, S. and Adelman, E. (2016) 'Inside Syrian refugee schools: making room for refugees in second shifts'. Brookings blog, 17 February. Retrieved from: www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2016/02/17/inside-syrian-refugee-schools-making-room-for-refugees-in-second-shifts/
- Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. and Lanzara, G. (2011) *Educational achievement of second generation immigrants: an international comparison*. Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration. Retrieved from: www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/Cpapers/CDP_16_11.pdf
- EC (2009) *Integrating immigrant children into schools in Europe*. Eurydice Network. Retrieved from: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_reports/101EN.pdf
- EC (2016) 'EU regional trust fund in response to the Syrian crisis. European neighbourhood policy and enlargement negotiations'. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria/madad_en
- Education Commission (2016) *The learning generation: investing in education for a changing world*. Retrieved from: http://report.educationcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Learning_Generation_Full_Report.pdf
- Elbadawi, A. and Roushdy, R. (2010) *Impact of international migration and remittances on child schooling and child work: the case of Egypt*. Economic Research Forum Working Paper 545. Retrieved from: <https://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/545.pdf>
- Escafré-Dublet, A. (2014) *Mainstreaming immigrant integration policy in France: education, employment, and social cohesion initiatives*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.migrationpolicy.org/research/mainstreaming-immigrant-integration-policy-france-education-employment-and-social-cohesion

- EUMC (2004) *Migrants, minorities and education*. Retrieved from: <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2004/migrants-minorities-and-education>
- Fairlie, R.W. and Resch, A.M. (2002) 'Is there "white flight" into private schools? Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey', *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 84 (1), pp. 21–33. Retrieved from: www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/003465302317331892
- Fix, M. and McHugh, M. (2009) *Education, diversity, and the second generation: a discussion guide*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.migrationpolicy.org/research/education-diversity-and-second-generation-discussion-guide
- Georgetown Law Human Rights Institute Fact-finding Project (2014) *Left behind*. Retrieved from: www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/human-rights-institute/fact-finding/upload/Left-Behind_HRI_Report-2014_English_Final.pdf
- Gindling, T.H. and Poggio, S. (2012) 'Family separation and reunification as a factor in the educational success of immigrant children', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (7), pp. 1155–1173. Retrieved from: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2012.681458
- Gyimah-Brempong, K. and Asiedu, E. (2014) 'Remittances and investment in education: evidence from Ghana', *The Journal Of International Trade & Economic Development* 24 (2), pp. 173–200. Retrieved from: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09638199.2014.881907?scroll=top&needAccess=true
- Hadley, S. (2010) *Seasonality and access to education: the case of primary education in sub-Saharan Africa*. Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity. Retrieved from: <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/2418/1/PTA31.pdf>
- Heckmann, F. (2008) *Education and the integration of migrants*. European Forum for Migration Studies. Retrieved from: www.efms.uni-bamberg.de/pdf/NESEducationIntegrationMigrants.pdf
- Hickmann, M., Crowley, H. and Mai, N. (2008) *Immigration and social cohesion in the UK*. Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Retrieved from: www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/2230-deprivation-cohesion-immigration.pdf
- HRW (2016) 'We're afraid for their future'. *Barriers to education for Syrian refugee children in Jordan*. Retrieved from: www.hrw.org/report/2016/08/16/were-afraid-their-future/barriers-education-syrian-refugee-children-jordan
- Insan Association (2015) *Shattered dreams*. Retrieved from: www.insanassociation.org/en/images/Shattered%20Dreams-%20children%20of%20migrants%20in%20Lebanon.pdf
- IOM (2016) *Global migration trends factsheet 2015*. Retrieved from: <http://publications.iom.int/books/global-migration-trends-factsheet-2015>
- IPPR (2014) *A fair deal on migration for the UK*. Retrieved from: www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2014/03/Fair-deal-on-migration_Mar2013_11970.pdf?noredirect=1
- IRC (2014) *Healing classrooms, healing families, healing communities. Social and emotional learning at the IRC*. Retrieved from: <http://doc.iiep.unesco.org/wwwis/repdoc/peic/2960.pdf>
- Jacobs, D. (2013) *The educational integration of migrants. What is the role of sending society actors and is there a transnational educational field?* INTERACT Research Report 2013/03. Retrieved from: www.interact-project.eu/docs/publications/Research%20Report/INTERACT-RR-2013-03.pdf
- Jørgensen, M.B. (2014) *Decentralising immigrant integration: Denmark's mainstreaming initiatives in employment, education, and social affairs*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.migrationpolicy.org/research/decentralising-immigrant-integration-denmarks-mainstreaming-initiatives-employment
- Latapí, A.E. and Martin, S. (2008) *Mexico-US migration management: a binational approach*. Executive summary. Retrieved from: https://isim.georgetown.edu/sites/isim/files/files/upload/Martin%20US_Mexico_Report.pdf
- Leseman, P. (2007) *Early education for immigrant children*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.migrationpolicy.org/research/early-education-immigrant-children
- Lumayag, L.A. (2016) 'A question of access: education needs of undocumented children in Malaysia', *Asian Studies Review* 40 (2), pp. 192–210. Retrieved from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357823.2016.1158238?src=recsys>
- Moskal, M. (2010) *Polish migrant children's experiences of schooling and home-school relations in Scotland*. Retrieved from: www.ces.ed.ac.uk/old_site/PDF%20Files/Brief054.pdf
- Norad (2017) 'Innovation competition: EduApp4Syria'. Retrieved from: www.norad.no/eduapp4syria
- OECD (2010) *Closing the gap for immigrant students: policies, practice and performance*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from: www.oecd.org/edu/school/oecdreviewsofmigranteducation-closingthegapforimmigrantstudentspoliciespracticeandperformance.htm
- OECD (2010a) *Educating teachers for diversity*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/educating-teachers-for-diversity_9789264079731-en
- OECD (2015) *Helping immigrant students to succeed at school – and beyond*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from: www.oecd.org/education/Helping-immigrant-students-to-succeed-at-school-and-beyond.pdf
- OECD (2015a) *Immigrant students at school: easing the journey towards integration*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264249509-en>

-
- OECD (2017) *Interrelations between public policies, migration and development*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264265615-en>
- OECD (2016) *Perspectives on global development 2017: international migration in a shifting world*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/dev/perspectives-on-global-development-2224475.htm>
- Reliefweb (2016) *The Jordan Compact: a new holistic approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the international community to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis*. Retrieved from: <http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>
- Sacramento Berger, R. (2015) *Migrant education and community inclusion*. Sirius Network Policy Brief Series Issue no. 5. Retrieved from: www.sirius-migrationeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SIRIUS-CommunityInclusion-FINAL.pdf
- Save the Children (2015) *Education for all in action in Thailand: a case study of good practice*. Retrieved from: https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/documents/education_for_all_in_action_in_thailand_eng_resized.pdf
- Save the Children UK (2007) *Children on the move*. Retrieved from: www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/children-on-the-move_3.pdf
- Schäferhoff, M. et al. (2016) *Estimating the costs and benefits of education from a health perspective. Background paper for the Oslo summit on Education for Development*. Retrieved from: www.resultsfordevelopment.org/sites/resultsfordevelopment.org/files/resources/SEEK.pdf
- Schnell, P. (2014) *Educational mobility of second-generation Turks*. IMISCOE Research Series. Retrieved from: www.imiscoe.org/publications/library/2-imiscoe-research-series/6-educational-mobility-of-second-generation-turks
- Shuayb, M., Makkouk, N. and Tuttunji, S. (2014) *Widening access to quality education for Syrian refugees: the role of private and NGO sectors in Lebanon*. Centre for Lebanese Studies. Retrieved from: <http://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Widening-Access-to-Quality-Education-for-Syrian-Refugees-FINAL.pdf>
- Spears Brown, C. (2015) *The educational, psychological, and social impact of discrimination on the migrant child*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: www.migrationpolicy.org/research/educational-psychological-and-social-impact-discrimination-immigrant-child
- Spencer, S. and Hughes, V. (2015) *Outside and in: legal entitlements to health care and education for migrants with irregular status in Europe*. Compas, University of Oxford. Retrieved from: www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/PR-2015-Outside_In_Mapping.pdf
- Taguma, M., Kim, M., Brink, S. and Teltemann, J. (2010) *Sweden*. OECD Reviews of Migrant Education. Retrieved from: www.oecd.org/sweden/44862803.pdf
- UIS (2016) 'Education: gross enrollment ratio by level of education'. Retrieved from: <http://data.uis.unesco.org/?queryid=142>
- UNESCO (2014) *EFA Global Monitoring Report. Teaching and learning: achieving quality for all*. Retrieved from: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002256/225660e.pdf>
- UNESCO (2016) *Global Education Monitoring Report. Education for people and planet: creating sustainable futures for all*. Retrieved from: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002457/245752e.pdf>
- UNESCO (2016a) *If you don't understand, how can you learn? Global Education Monitoring Report Policy Paper 24*. Retrieved from: <http://allinschool.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/243713E.pdf>
- UNESCO (2017) *Concept note for the 2019 Global Education Monitoring Report on education and migration*. Retrieved from: <https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/sites/gem-report/files/Concept%20Note%205%20April%20Final.pdf>
- UNHCR (2015) 'Figures at a glance'. Retrieved from: www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html
- UNHCR (2015a) *Curriculum choices in refugee settings*. Education: issue brief 3. Retrieved from: www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/education/560be1209/education-brief-3-curriculum-choices-refugee-settings.html
- UNHCR (2016) *Education for refugees*. Retrieved from: <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Education%2020160810.pdf>
- UNHCR (2017) 'What is a refugee'. Retrieved from: www.unrefugees.org/what-is-a-refugee/
- UNICEF (2009) *Children in immigrant families in eight affluent countries*. Innocenti Research Centre. Retrieved from: www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/ii_immig_families.pdf
- UNICEF (2014) *Peacebuilding, education and advocacy programme*. Retrieved from: www.unicef.org/education/files/F_UNICEF1006_LFP_R3-online_single.pdf
- UNICEF (2016) *Uprooted*. Retrieved from: www.unicef.org/videoaudio/PDFs/Uprooted.pdf
- Waslin, M. (2016) 'Undocumented children face these challenges in accessing public education'. Retrieved from: <http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/04/14/undocumented-children-public-education/>





Red Cross paramedic measures migrant's blood level. John Engedal/Danish Red Cross, 2015

SDGs covered

- 1:** No poverty
- 3:** Good health and well-being
- 10:** Reduced inequalities
- 17:** Partnerships for the goals

Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Olivia Tulloch, Fortunate Machingura and Claire Melamed

Key messages

- There are fundamental policy gaps in addressing the health needs of migrants. Global, regional and national institutional arrangements could be improved to facilitate dialogue and collaborative problem solving.
- Migration is a determinant of health: it does not have a systemic association with public health security threats to host communities but migrants do face distinctive vulnerabilities to poor health. These are exacerbated by 'migrant-unfriendly or migrant-indifferent' legal frameworks and health systems. Resolving these will require intersectoral approaches.
- There are no international standardised approaches for monitoring variables relating to the health of migrants. Development of data collection, monitoring and surveillance mechanisms is needed to understand migrant health needs.
- Migration can have a positive effect on the development of health systems if the International Code of Practice is adhered to and if there is strong coordination between home and diaspora systems and professionals.

1 Introduction

This briefing presents an overview of health-related challenges faced by international migrants. Implicitly, the SDGs recognise the importance and interrelation between health and migration. SDG 3 aims to ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’, including that of migrants, while a number of other SDGs incorporate elements relating to health outcomes and migration. In this brief, we primarily focus on three distinct aspects of the interrelation. Firstly, migrants can be more vulnerable than other populations to exclusion from health services. Secondly, countries with high numbers of migrants with complex or hidden health needs may be hindering individual countries’ own efforts in reaching their SDG targets. These first two risks demand a critical reassessment of the capacities of both transit and destination health systems to manage the needs of migrants, as well as the policy frameworks that should be promoting the health of migrants. The third element is the impact of migration on health outcomes in sending countries, through remittances, technology transfer and behaviour change. The conclusion offers recommendations for better migration and health global governance, at both national and regional policy levels.

Migrants make a considerable net economic contribution in many countries. The good health of migrants has obvious intrinsic benefits, but is also essential if migrants are to fulfil the considerable potential economic and social benefits and contributions to their home and destination countries. Migrants should be able to live and work in safe and healthy conditions, enjoy access to health services and expect health outcomes similar to that of the rest of the population of their destination country. Yet when migration levels rise or health systems are stretched, decisions about who is responsible for the welfare of migrants becomes contentious in national and global policy debates. Migrants, by virtue of their mobility and status, are therefore at great risk of being invisible, deprioritised or even excluded from national health strategies. They are subjected to neglect, discrimination, ostracism and exploitation, the effects of which can curtail migrants’ life expectancies, increase mortality and directly affect social, physical and mental well-being. These effects are further compounded by legal and socio-economic barriers that impede migrant access to health care.

Two types of migrants are considered in this briefing: international economic migrants who move for the purposes of employment, and refugees who move because of fear of persecution, war or natural disaster. Internal migrants are not included in the analysis.

1.1 Migration trends


In 2015, the global number of international migrants reached 224 million, up from 173 million in 2000. However, as a proportion of the world’s population, the number of migrants has remained relatively stable over the past four decades at around 3% (UNDESA, 2016). Europe and Asia host the most international migrants (76 million and 75 million respectively), while southern Europe and Gulf states are the regions with the highest growth in labour migrants. Since 1995, the top sender countries have been consistent: India (15 million), Mexico (12 million) and Russia (11 million); with the most significant increase in Syria (0.6 to 5 million and continuing to rise).

Regarding forced migration, in 2014 the number of refugees worldwide rose to 19.5 million – the highest level since World War II. Refugees comprise approximately 8% of the total number of international migrants (UNDESA, 2016). Using 2014 data, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found 30.4 million persons of concern, including both refugees and migrants. (See UNDESA, 2015; UNFPA, 2016; and UNHCR, 2016 for these statistics.)

2 Health and migration in the 2030 Agenda

Health is central to the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable development,

Figure 1 Origins of largest migrant populations worldwide between 1995–2015



Source: UNDESA (2015).

both as a beneficiary and a contributor. In addition, health is considered an indicator of ‘people-centered, rights-based, inclusive, and equitable development’ (UN, 2015); a key aspiration of the 2030 Agenda is to ‘leave no one behind’, reflected in the Goals, nearly all of which state, ‘for all’. Achieving these Goals will require an inclusive approach that should include migrants by default. Although migrants are given special attention in some of the SDG targets, none relate specifically to their health status. Yet migration functions as a social determinant of health and will, crucially, affect the achievement of numerous targets across several Goals.

2.1 SDG 3: health and well-being

The health-related SDG 3 is underpinned by 13 targets that cover a wide spectrum of health and well-being for all populations. Migration flows intersect with this Goal through a number of different channels.

1. **Individual migrants.** One of the strongest features of the 2030 Agenda is universality. Leaving no one behind means including migrants in efforts to tackle poor access and inequity in health care. Migrants can be at higher risk of poor health from infectious diseases, non-communicable diseases and mental health problems due to a range of factors at different points before, during and after migration.
2. **National outcomes.** Migrants are less likely than other populations to access or fully benefit from their host country’s health care system, which can result in poorer health outcomes when measured at the national level. For countries with large migrant populations and limited capacity in the health system, this will impede their ability to reach the targets in SDG 3.
3. **Health systems.** Migrant remittances are a critical source of household incomes and foreign exchange in several countries, and this income feeds into household and government level health spending. Returning migrants and those in diaspora communities can influence policy and practice in domestic health systems, help with crisis response during epidemics and influence health seeking behaviour at the individual level, often with a positive effect on health outcomes.

The vulnerabilities faced by migrants, and how they intersect with selected SDG 3 targets relating to health and well-being are summarised in Table 1.

One of the channels through which migration can affect health and the achievement of SDG 3 is through the impact on the health systems of the source country. As with the impact on individuals, there are many ways that this can play out in practice. However, three factors are key: the impact on resource flows, the impact on human capital and response to disasters.

1. **Resources.** Where migrant remittances are a large percentage of GDP, they boost government revenues through higher taxes, and will increase the resources available for public spending (e.g. remittances are more than 15% of GDP in Haiti and Honduras, nearly 30% of GDP in Nepal, and over 20% of GDP in Liberia and the Gambia (World Bank, 2014). Increased household income from remittances increases the funds available for out of pocket spending on health services, and several studies have found that receiving households spend more on health services than non-receiving households (e.g. UNESCAP, n.d.).
2. **Human capital.** A great deal of attention has been paid to the question of the ‘brain drain’ and the extent to which migration can undermine health systems. Migration related shortages of human resources for health can hamper progress in health care delivery and improving population health (Mills et al., 2008). But, while every effort should be made to retain skilled people, the evidence that the ‘brain drain’ harms developmental outcomes is contested (Clemens, 2014). In addition, there are benefits to returning migrants who can bring skills acquired abroad to strengthen the domestic health system. A study in Ghana, for example, found that returning doctors, nurses and midwives brought with them skills in a range of medical techniques and systems management that were used either in the public health system or through setting up new private facilities, often with new investments from diaspora communities or other new sources (Adzei and Sakyi, 2014).
3. **Disaster relief.** Migrants and diaspora communities often respond strongly when a disaster strikes their home country. During the Ebola crisis in West Africa, for example, diaspora communities raised money for affected communities and donated equipment. However, the overall impact of these efforts was reduced by weak links to the public health system and to the donor-led relief effort (Chikezie, 2015).

Table 1 illustrates the multiple vulnerabilities migrants face and the SDG 3 targets which seek to alleviate them. It is important to recognise that the type and level of vulnerabilities change over time. Those who have settled long-term tend to have similar health needs to the wider population in host countries. Contrary to popular opinion in the west, there is a healthy migrant bias where first generation (non-refugee) migrants can have a lower crude mortality rate than the host population because the healthiest tend to migrate (Thomas and Thomas, 2004). However, refugees have a specific set of health needs which also evolve depending on the time elapsed since they took flight. These are described in Box 1.

Table 1 Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
Goal 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	
3.1 Reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to <70 per 100,000 live births	<p>Migrants, particularly those without legal residence permits, tend to experience higher maternal mortality and morbidity relative to the host populations. They tend to be more vulnerable to high blood pressure, poor nutrition, pre-eclampsia, premature or complicated delivery, fatigue and maternal suicide.</p> <p>Substandard or lack of services, patient delays, poor health worker-migrant communication, lack of knowledge about the transit or destination country health system can put expecting migrant mothers at risk. (See Esscher, et al., 2014; van den Akker and van Roosmalen, 2015; Fellmeth et al., 2016.)</p>
3.2 End preventable deaths of new-borns and children under 5 years of age.	<p>Migrants have greater difficulty accessing obstetric, antenatal and maternal health-care services.</p> <p>Poor health outcomes and higher mortality for migrant new-borns and children under 5 are related to overcrowding in low-quality housing, poor sanitation (both in communities and refugee camps), substandard health care, inadequate diets, the mother's educational attainment, and the migration process.</p> <p>Additional risk factors for poor migrant child health outcomes or life expectancy are poor mental health of migrant mothers, and residence in refugee camps (Racape et al., 2010, Rechel et al., 2013).</p>
3.3 End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) and combat hepatitis, waterborne diseases and other communicable diseases	<p>Migrants constitute nearly 40% of people living with HIV in the European Economic Area. The UNAIDS programme recognises migrants as one of the most vulnerable groups to HIV infection. They are also at increased risk of TB-related morbidity and mortality (IOM, 2012; Tomás, 2013).</p> <p>Although the global burden of malaria has substantially decreased, the cases among migrant populations within and between countries represent a high percentage of the total number of cases. E.g. In the Lao PDR, a surge in new cases between 2011–2015 was associated with economic migrant mobility.</p> <p>Limited access to health care services and preventative measures means migrants are less likely to receive treatment making fatalities from NTDs more likely.</p> <p>Although low in non-endemic countries, cases of NTDs are also common among migrants and often overlooked. Non-specific symptoms and inadequate knowledge among health care workers in non-endemic countries complicates diagnosis. (See ECDC, 2010; IOM, 2013; UNAIDS, 2014; Cairns, 2015; SASPEN, 2015; WHO, 2015b.)</p>
3.4 Reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases	<p>Social and environmental factors interact with migration to form a complex pattern of determinants of non-communicable diseases (NCDs).</p> <p>Migrants in transit are at particular risk of not receiving continuous care for pre-existing chronic diseases. (See WHO, 2016).</p>
3.5 Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol	<p>Stressful conditions can heighten tobacco use, alcohol and substance abuse as a form of coping mechanism. This can be further exacerbated by long-term separation from families and stress over lack of legal status, causing many migrants to develop mental health problems, depression and anxiety disorders.</p> <p>Seeking treatment for these disorders comes with individual-level barriers, including limited local language proficiency, work demands, and internalised stigma around substance abuse.</p> <p>Migrants often do not have access to psychosocial services, resulting in increased mental health disorders (See Negi, 2011; UNGA, 2013; Pagano, 2014).</p>
3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, and access to quality essential health-care services	<p>Universal health coverage (UHC) is an important means of achieving cross-cutting health SDGs. Although countries adopt different mechanisms for UHC progress, a common trend emerges: migrants are often neglected and/or excluded.</p> <p>Migrants risk exclusion from coverage of insurance-based schemes and those in the informal sector are often invisible to UHC programmes.</p> <p>Where UHC policies favour service provision free of charge in public health facilities, undocumented migrants often fail to access these free services because of registration barriers.</p> <p>Where government spending on health fails to match the increased demand for health services, migrants can struggle to raise the household out-of-pocket payments to access health care.</p>

2.2 Links to health across the SDGs

Health is implicit in almost all of the other 16 Goals, not just in SDG 3. Progress on many of the Goals will affect health and the achievement of the Goal can be used to incentivise progress on migrant health, in some of the ways detailed below. Improving the health of migrants and all vulnerable people will be dependent on equity, as countries work towards achieving all SDGs, particularly those relating to poverty, inequality, hunger and food insecurity, employment and peace (see Table 2).

The range of SDG targets should incentivise the development of intersectoral approaches that may help improve migrant health, alongside the health of other vulnerable groups. Different groups of migrants have specific vulnerabilities and needs according to the sector in which they work or live. The SDG targets can be used to advocate for change in a number of these areas. Two targets in particular, relating to inequality (10.4) and employment (8.8), are relevant to tackling known problems for migrants. Migrant groups are more likely to experience work-related accidents (e.g. the

construction sector) or violence (e.g. domestic workers); or to be abused at the hands of unscrupulous employers, or immigration services (NNIRR, 2008; Long and Crisp, 2011). A focus on inequality can also be used to address the legal, discriminatory, cultural and linguistic barriers that many migrants face when accessing services. If a serious commitment is made to 'leave no one behind', then progress on many of the other Goals and targets will have a positive impact on migrant health, as well as the overall achievement of SDG 3.

3 Responding to migrants' health needs and meeting the SDGs

It is clear from the discussion above that there are several channels through which migration will impact on health and the achievement of the SDGs. This section describes three major strategies essential to aid countries' efforts to achieving the SDGs that have particular resonance for migrants.

Box 1 Refugees and forced displacement

Newly arrived refugees and displaced persons from communities affected by crisis have complex needs and a heightened risk of health problems related to their flight journeys. They are susceptible to a number of problems due to the likely exposure to physical and environmental threats, violence and trauma. As a result, they may face any and many of the following: loss of social networks and assets, poor language skills, knowledge and information in the new environment, decreased food security, and inadequate shelter, sanitation and access to safe water (FMO, 2016). Those who arrive in detention centres may also face abuse and ostracism (IFHR, 2008). As with other migrants, the varied experiences before, during and after displacement cause difficulties in creating mechanisms for gathering reliable health data, and particular difficulties in continuity of health care and record keeping. Many refugees lack access to any health records or continuity of service or provision for chronic conditions.

There is no evidence of systemic association with migration and public health security threats to host communities (WHO, 2016; European Parliament, 2016). However, the risks of infectious disease faced by refugees are exacerbated by poverty, poor sanitation and living conditions after arrival and there is potential for these risks to affect host populations in lower income countries if the public health and welfare systems are weak. The public health risks for refugees are difficult to address particularly when there are high inflows of people in a short space of time. Displaced people do tend to have a higher crude mortality rate (Thomas and Thomas, 2004). Child health is a major problem, as children tend to make up a large proportion of refugee numbers. Refugees' babies have lower birth weights and their children face increased risks of malnutrition, diarrheal conditions, infectious disease, anaemia, intestinal parasites, gastroenteritis, skin infections, wasting, stunting, delayed development and undiagnosed congenital anomalies (Tangcharoensathien, 2015).

A case study of refugees in Turkey, an upper middle-income country, provides a clear illustration of the difficulties in managing health care for refugees. Turkey is now guardian of the largest single refugee population in the world. Most of these refugees live outside camps, are unaccounted for and live in extremely challenging circumstances. Increasingly, they are considered 'permanent refugees'. Registered refugees have the right to free primary health care, but the protracted refugee situation means that many refugees are in a new state of flux as their long term status is unclear – they are far from receiving the benefits covered by a universal health care system.

Following the influx of migrants, the Turkish health system became overwhelmed by the increase in caseloads, resulting in overworked staff and a shortage of supplies. Consequently, the World Health Organization (WHO) took over functions of health coordination, management and core services, with 200 partners contributing to a Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) that includes health care services. Coordination and financial support remain persistent problems, with a significant proportion of pledged funds not arriving when planned.

The vast majority of migrants in Turkey are at risk of being invisible to the public health system. Among those outside of camps, female refugees are the most vulnerable, 40% of whom are estimated to lack access to services (UNFPA, 2015).

Table 2 Examples of major SDG targets that have an impact on health outcomes for migrants

Target	Goal and target (summary)
1.3	Poverty: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all. Key factor for migration: portability of social protection coverage across borders, or inclusion into national systems.
2.2	Hunger: End all forms of malnutrition, and address nutritional needs of key populations. Key factor for migration: ensuring migrants are reached by assistance programmes aimed at improving nutrition.
5.2 5.3 5.6	Gender: Eliminate all forms of violence and harmful practices against women and girls, including trafficking and sexual exploitation, and ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights. Key factor for migration: addressing the specific vulnerabilities of female migrants (see ODI briefing on Gender and Migration).
6.1 6.2	Water: Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking-water, sanitation and hygiene. Key factor for migration: ensure that large-scale movements of people do not increase stress on fragile water supply systems, and address water and sanitation provision in migrant communities and refugee camps.
8.8	Employment: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all, including migrants.
10.4 10.7	Inequality: Adopt fiscal, wage and social protection policies; facilitate safe, and responsible migration including through migration policies.
16.1 16.9	Peace: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates. Provide legal identity for all. Key factor for migration: conflict is a major driver of migration. Legal identity for migrants is an important factor in the effective planning of response and establishment of effective support systems.
17.18	Implementation: Increase availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, <i>migratory status</i> , disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

3.1 Universal health coverage

Target 3.7 is ‘Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to essential health care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all’. Not only is this a target in itself, but it will be a contributory factor in the achievement of all the other targets in SDG 3. UHC is intrinsically inclusive of the entirety of a population, including migrants. It is expected to cover all the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services people need, with affordable services being understood as not exposing the user to financial hardship. Providing UHC is a major financial undertaking, it can be politically contentious and technically complex, particularly in developing countries that may already struggle to provide basic health services for the wider host population. However, it is essential to tackling the question of migration and health outcomes, at both individual and national level.

3.2 Health systems, health workforce and migration

There is a global shortage and poor distribution of the health workforce. Lower-income countries, many of whom host significant numbers of migrants have a wide gap between the need for health workers and supply.

As these countries attempt to fulfil the SDG target for UHC, this gap is likely to widen. Upper middle-income countries are likely to face a similar widening as demands for health care from aging populations increase. This demand stimulates international migration from low- to high-income countries (WHO, 2015a). This is exacerbated by ‘push factors’ in source countries, such as low pay, lack of career paths and poor working conditions. The WHO Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment of Health Personnel ‘promotes a fair balance of the interests of the health workforce, so sending and receiving countries can help to address the challenges in the widening gaps in the health workforce’. But implementation of the code is suboptimal. Where the numbers are large enough, health worker migration can have an impact on the economy of the whole country, for example, in the Philippines, the remittances from migrants, of which health professionals make up a significant part, contribute more than 8% to the gross national income (Guinto, 2015). Win-win situations may be possible if countries attracting migrant health workers adhere to the code, and the countries from where migrants come from organise their health profession education systems and labour markets so that local populations’ access to health care does not suffer.

3.3 Barriers to effective implementation: coordination and data

One of the first difficulties in being responsive to migrants' health needs as countries implement the SDGs is the lack of data available. Health characteristics differ according to a multitude of variables including type of migrant, sex, age, host and destination country, epidemiological conditions, employment status and poverty. Migrants are heterogeneous, their experiences and the reasons they leave or flee their home countries are multifaceted and there are inadequate data that give a digestible and accurate picture of their health needs (Thomas and Thomas, 2004; FMO, 2016). There is a great deal of anecdotal and case study evidence suggesting migrants have specific health needs that could limit achievement of the SDGs if they are not tackled. However, there is currently no international standardised approach for monitoring data variables and indicators related to the health of migrants, and many countries do not include migrant status variables in their health statistics, which makes tracking outcomes very difficult. This is not a problem confined to poorer countries. In the UK, a report from the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford remarked, 'it is currently difficult to gain a comprehensive account of the health of migrants because much existing evidence on health includes ethnic group but not migration variables' (Jayaweera, 2014). Without targeted evidence, the policies, strategies and institutional arrangements to support migrant health are likely to remain inadequate at the national, regional and global levels.

A second challenge for implementation is the need for inter-agency and intersectoral coordination and cooperation, both within and between countries and regions. The action required to include a health lens in the number of areas influencing migrant health is complex. For example, in South Africa, achieving the SDG target relating to communicable diseases will be a major challenge. South Africa attracts the largest migrant population in Africa, mostly from countries in southern and eastern Africa where the burden of communicable diseases is already high and HIV incidence is the highest in the world. Migration has been a key feature of the economy of the country and the region as a whole, with migrants making up about 6% of the population of South Africa. TB incidence and the HIV burden are particularly high in sectors in which migrants work (mining and agricultural labour), among migrants and non-migrants alike. Migration also had an impact on malaria incidence: the International Organization for Migration (2013) reports that in South Africa, almost half (48%) of all confirmed Malaria cases recorded between 2001-2009 in one border province were found in migrants from Mozambique. Tackling the communicable disease burden in South Africa will require a multifaceted approach that takes into account

Box 2 Migrants and universal health coverage

Thailand is a UHC pioneer for middle-income countries. There is a tradition of progressive health policies in Thailand and it was the first country in the world to integrate the needs of all migrants (including irregular and undocumented migrants) into its health system through a compulsory migrant health insurance scheme. UHC policy for Thais was introduced in 2002, and not long after, migrants too became entitled to the same health care rights. There is an immigrant population of nearly 4 million (constituting 6% of population) and migrants from three neighboring countries make up 5% of the Thai labor force. The government recognised the migrant contribution to the economy, considering health care a human right and concerned that without health services, migrants would exacerbate control efforts against communicable diseases.

This system *should* mean that Thailand is in a good position to achieve the SDG 3 targets for the whole population, including migrants. Yet uptake of the scheme remains quite low. The reasons appear to be language and cultural barriers, fear of discrimination, fear of losing employment due to absence and poor employer compliance with the scheme. Though the original UHC policy may provide a useful model, there is a need for greater understanding on how to improve its implementation with regard to migrants.

Countries considering UHC packages that integrate migrants would need to take action beyond simply extending the existing service coverage to migrants. This should involve consideration of advocacy with migrants and health promotion, feasibility of an annual fee, monitoring of implementation, transferability of health insurance between health facilities and quality of services for migrants (including non-discrimination). This also requires a good understanding of the social and cultural influences, language barriers on health outcomes and health seeking behaviour for the specific migrant groups.

migrants. It can only be addressed through sustained, multi-sectoral collaboration across the region between ministries of labour, mining and health, and private industry (Mberu et al., 2016).

There are two SDG targets which may facilitate implementation of coherent policies and programmes to support better coordination and data. Target 17.18 focuses on data and monitoring, crucially including a call for disaggregation of data by migratory status. Reaching this target is essential in order to collect meaningful data to monitor outcomes informing health financing, human

resources for health and health care coverage of migrants, and monitoring of the means of implementation. While target 16.6 works towards the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions through which migrants could have recourse to hold governments, service providers and individuals to account on matters relating to their health and well-being.

4 Conclusions and policy recommendations

As people migrate, the socio-economic and political drivers of migration intersect. This intersect is increasingly complex, blurring the separation between voluntary and forced forms of migration. This briefing highlights that within this complex landscape, there is a clear and urgent need to reassess the capacities of both transit and destination health systems to manage the needs of migrants. Migrants frequently experience inadequate access to health care, and though there are pockets of progress, such as Thailand's Compulsory Migrant Health Insurance Scheme, many other countries are yet to consider migrants or refugees in their health care systems. In doing so, these countries are hindering their own efforts to achieve their SDGs, as well as preventing migrants from fulfilling their considerable potential in contributing to the net economy and the health systems of host and home countries. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies migrants, refugees and internally displaced people as vulnerable populations that 'must be empowered' (UNGA, 2015). For health, as for other sectors, migrants face specific challenges that must be addressed if the world is to meet the aspiration to 'leave no one behind'.

The evidence reviewed suggests a number of issues which need to be tackled to ensure that migration contributes to, and does not undermine, the achievement of the SDGs. We make the following policy recommendations to achieve these aims.

Conclusion 1 There are fundamental policy gaps in addressing the health needs of migrants. Global, regional and national institutional arrangements could be improved to facilitate dialogue and collaborative problem solving.

Recommendation: establish a formal, well-defined role within UN-based multilateral institutional arrangements that specifically monitors the implementation of migration and health policies.

- Formal multilateralism must be pursued in areas where migration specifically intersects with identified health issues, including maternal and neonatal mortality, HIV/AIDS, UHC, vaccination and other targets under SDG 3.

- This will involve reaffirming the stewardship role of WHO on health and IOM on migration, but will also require new ways of collaborating to ensure that the two institutions, and others such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNHCR, can effectively lead a joint global response to the health needs of migrants.

Recommendation: support networks and organisations working on migration globally and regionally.

- Support and promote non-binding and flexible regional consultative processes within and between regions. Policy-makers, representatives from planning ministries, health ministries and other relevant sectors need a forum to discuss common challenges relating to migrants, and share important context-relevant best practice and inevitable trade-offs.
- Recognising that many countries still ignore migrant health, encourage training, peer exchange programmes and sensitisation of government and non-governmental organisations involved in the delivery of health care and migration-friendly policies.
- Establish networks that can respond quickly in the event of sudden population movements such as a new influx of migrants caused by conflict or environmental disaster.
- Other institutions involved in advocacy and delivery of health intervention (such as the Global Fund or Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance) should be encouraged to ensure that migrants' needs are recognised in their global and regional planning processes.

Relevant SDG targets

- 3.1 Reduce maternal mortality.
- 3.2 End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age.
- 3.3 End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases.
- 3.4 Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
- 3.7 Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services.
- 3.8 Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.
- 10.7 Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility.

Conclusion 2 Migration is a determinant of health: it does not have a systemic association with public health security threats to host communities but migrants do face distinctive vulnerabilities to poor health. These are exacerbated by ‘migrant-unfriendly or migrant-indifferent’ legal frameworks and health systems. Resolving these will require intersectoral approaches.

Recommendation: domesticate international migration law standard and practices into national health strategies and other development and poverty reduction plans.

- Integrate migration relevant aspects when designing national health strategies and plans.
- Promote ‘Health in All’ policies, an approach to cross-sector public policies that takes into account the health implications of policy decisions, forges synergies and avoids harmful health impacts to improve population health and health equity, and addresses the wider social determinants of health.
- Ensure that health policies are consistent with country obligations under international laws relating to migration.

Recommendation: harmonise social protection legislation for better inclusion of migrants in state-provided health services.

Through regional (economic) communities (e.g. East African Community or ASEAN) or coordination by bilateral and multilateral agencies (e.g. WHO, IOM, ILO, or World Bank), countries should agree to harmonise legislation and policies related to social protection or UHC. This may result in better inclusion of migrants into state-provided health services. To achieve this, we recommend a three-tiered process:

- Conduct a mapping exercise to identify national legislation on access to state-provided health services and social protection
- Review practical challenges for implementation, and barriers to access by migrants in different contexts
- Make recommendations for harmonisation between countries, and improvements for local implementation to increase inclusion of migrants into national systems.

Recommendation: Ensure that countries with large migrant populations following conflict or environmental disaster get adequate support from the international community to address the health needs of migrants without compromising services to the local population.

Relevant SDG targets

- 1.5 Build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations.
- 3.1 Reduce maternal mortality.
- 3.2 End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age.
- 3.3 End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases.
- 3.4 Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
- 3.7 Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services.
- 3.8 Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.
- 10.7 Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility.

Conclusion 3 There are no international standardised approaches for monitoring variables relating to the health of migrants. Development of data collection, monitoring and surveillance mechanisms is needed to understand migrant health needs.

Recommendation: collect, track and review disaggregated data of all migrants to evaluate and support their health needs.

- National health information management systems, and monitoring and surveillance systems must collect disaggregated data by age, gender and location of all migrants. Only then can we begin understanding migrant health needs in detail to inform migrant-friendly policies and action.
- Such disaggregated data needs to be protected by adequate data protection, privacy and confidentiality measures.

Recommendation: integrate and dedicate resources for infectious diseases surveillance and monitoring migrants within national and regional programmes.

- Transit and destination countries to support the integration of infectious diseases surveillance and monitoring (e.g. for HIV/TB, malaria).

- With committed resources, transit and destination countries to support access to diagnostics, treatment and care for migrants within national disease control programmes.
- Migrants must have access to TB and HIV treatment, as well as support and care regardless of legal migration status. This will involve improvements in the portability of health information to facilitate the continuation of treatment, and clinical testing efficiency.

Recommendation: support local accountability mechanisms and build grassroots capacity to track and monitor the protection of migrant health rights and safety.

- Local faith-based, charity and volunteer groups, NGOs, and other local-level entities in sending countries should take the responsibility of educating and equipping migrants with relevant health information.
- In transit and destination countries, similar groups including the diaspora community must also document abuses and campaign with and on behalf of migrants for their health rights.
- Local groups can equip leading government ministries, employers and health service providers with knowledge, and support the means for increased intervention.

Relevant SDG Targets

- 3.1 Reduce maternal mortality.
- 3.2 End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age.
- 3.3 End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases.
- 3.4 Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
- 3.7 Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services.
- 3.8 Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.
- 10.7 Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility.
- 17.18 Increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics.

Conclusion 4 Migration can have a positive effect on the development of health systems if coordination is improved between home and diaspora systems and professionals

Recommendation: support and enforce policies that help to retain, incentivise and remunerate the health workforce.

- Addressing poor wages and improving career opportunities can help to alleviate the ‘push factors’ of migration in the health workforce.
- Implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel can help to address the challenges of the widening gap in the health workforce.

Recommendation: support engagement between health professionals in diaspora communities and local health systems

- During epidemics, encourage systematic collaborations between diaspora communities and government, NGOs and donors to ensure that resources and expertise can be mobilised and used effectively in a way that is aligned with national strategies.
- Encourage twinning and other arrangements to increase collaboration and knowledge sharing between diaspora and home medical professionals.


Relevant SDG Targets

- 3.1 Reduce maternal mortality.
- 3.2 End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age.
- 3.3 End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases.
- 3.4 Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
- 3.7 Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services.
- 3.8 Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.
- 3.c Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries.

References

- Adzei, F. and Sakyi, E. (2014) 'Drivers of return migration of Ghanaian health professionals: perspectives from doctors and nurses in urban Ghana', *International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care*, Vol 19, No. 2, pp.102–120 (www.academia.edu/9190243/Drivers_of_return_migration_of_Ghanaian_health_professionals_perspectives_from_doctors_and_nurses_in_urban_Ghana).
- Cairns, G. (2015) 'Four in ten people diagnosed with HIV in Europe are migrants', AIDSmap (24 June), available www.aidsmap.com/Four-in-ten-people-diagnosed-with-HIV-in-Europe-are-migrants/page/2978799/ [accessed 4 June 2016].
- Chikezie, C-E. (2015) 'The Ebola Crisis and the Sierra Leone Diaspora', *Humanitarian Exchange*, Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI, London, No.64, June 2015 (http://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/he_64.pdf).
- Clemens, M. (2014) 'A case against taxes and quotas on high-skill emigration', Working Paper 363, Centre for Global Development, Washington DC, May (www.cgdev.org/publication/case-against-taxes-and-quotas-high-skill-emigration-working-paper-363).
- Darshan, S. and Brown. M. (2015) 'Human African trypanosomiasis in non-endemic countries', *Clinical Medicine* 15(1): 70–73.
- ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) (2010) *Migrant health: Epidemiology of HIV and AIDS in migrant communities and ethnic minorities in EU/EEA countries: Revised edition*, [online] available http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/publications/0907_ter_migrant_health_hiv_epidemiology_review.pdf [accessed 6 June 2016].
- Esscher, A., Binder-Finnema, P., Bødker, B., Högberg, U., Mulic-Lutvica, A. and Essén, B. (2014) 'Suboptimal care and maternal mortality among foreign-born women in Sweden: maternal death audit with application of the 'migration three delays' model' *BMC pregnancy and childbirth* 14(1): 1.
- European Parliament (2016) 'The public health dimension of the European migrant crisis', European Parliament Briefing [online] available [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573908/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)573908_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573908/EPRS_BRI(2016)573908_EN.pdf).
- Fellmeth, G., Paw, M. K., Wiladphaingern, J., Charunwatthana, P., Nosten, F. H. and McGready, R. (2016) 'Maternal suicide risk among refugees and migrants', *International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics*.
- FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights) (2008) 'Undocumented migrants in Malaysia: Raids, Detention and Discrimination', No. 489/2, March.
- FMO (Forced Migration Online) (2016) 'Impact of forced migration upon health', [online] available www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/forced-migration-and-public-health/impact-of-forced-migration-upon-health [accessed 9 July 2016].
- Guinto R., Curran U., Supanchaimat R. and Pocock N. (2015) Universal health coverage in 'One ASEAN': are migrants included? *Global Health Action* 2015. 8: 25749
- HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2005) *Ukraine: On the Margins: Rights Violations against Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union*, [online] available www.hrw.org/report/2005/11/29/ukraine-margins/rights-violations-against-migrants-and-asylum-seekers-new-eastern.
- IOM (International Organization for Migration) (2012) 'Migration and Tuberculosis: A Pressing Issue', International Organisation for Migration, [online] available www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/Migration-Tuberculosis-A-Pressing-Issue.pdf [accessed 9 May 2016].
- IOM (International Organization of Migration) (2013) *Global report on population mobility and Malaria, moving towards elimination with migration in mind*, IOM: Geneva.
- Jayaweera, H. (2014) *Health of Migrants in the: What Do We Know: Briefing*, Migration Observatory, University of Oxford: Oxford.
- Long, K. and Crisp, J. (2011) *New Issues in Refugee Research: In harm's way: the irregular movement of migrants to Southern Africa from the Horn and Great Lakes regions*, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Switzerland.
- Mills, E., Schabas, W., Volmink, J., Walker, R., Ford, N. et al. (2008) 'Should active recruitment of health workers from sub-Saharan Africa be viewed as a crime', *The Lancet* 371(9613): 685–688.
- Negi, N.J. (2011) 'Identifying psychosocial stressors of well-being and factors related to substance use among Latino day laborers', *Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health*. 2011;13(4): 748–775.

- NNIRR (National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights) (2008) 'Over-Raided, Under Siege: U.S. Immigration Laws and Enforcement Destroy the Rights of Immigrants, National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights' [online] available www.datacenter.org/reports/UnderSiege_web.pdf [accessed 9 May 2016].
- Pagano, A. (2014) 'Barriers to Drug Abuse Treatment for Latino Migrants: Treatment Providers' Perspectives', *Journal of Ethnicity in Substance Abuse* 13(3): 273–287.
- Racape, J., De Spiegelaere, M., Alexander, S., Dramaix, M., Buekens, P. and Haelterman, E. (2010) 'High perinatal mortality rate among immigrants in Brussels', *Europe Journal of Public Health*. 20(5): 536–542.
- Rechel, B., Mladovsky, P., Ingleby, D., Mackenbach, J. P. and McKee, M. (2013) 'Migration and health in an increasingly diverse Europe', *The Lancet* 381(9873): 1235–1245.
- SASPEN (Southern African Social Protection Experts Network) (2015) 'Migration and health care: The case of HIV and AIDS in Botswana, SASPEN brief 6/2015' [online] available www.saspen.org/brief/SASPEN-brief_2015-6_Reflwe-Sinkamba_Migration-and-Healthcare-HIV-Botswana.pdf [accessed 10 June 2016].
- Tangcharoensathien, V., Mills, A. and Palu, T. (2015) 'Accelerating health equity: the key role of universal health coverage in the Sustainable Development Goals', *Biomed Central Medicine* 13:101.
- Thomas, S. L. and Thomas, S. D. (2004) 'Displacement and health', *British Medical Bulletin* 69 (1): 115–127.
- Tomás, B. A., Pell, C., Cavanillas, A. B. et al. (2013) 'Tuberculosis in Migrant Populations. A Systematic Review of the Qualitative Literature'. *PLOS* [online] available <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0082440>.
- UNAIDS (The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS) (2014) 'The Gap Report 2014' [online] available www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/04_Migrants.pdf [accessed 6 June 2016].
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2015) 'Technical Support Team issues brief: Health and Sustainable Development' [online] available <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/18300406tstissueshealth.pdf> [accessed 11 July 2016].
- UNDESA (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs) (2015) 'Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 revision'. United Nations Database [online]: POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015.
- UNDESA (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs) (2016) *International Migration Report 2015: Highlights*. United Nations: New York [online] available www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf.
- UNESCAP, (n.d.) 'The Development Impact of Remittances' [online] available <http://sitreport.unescapsdd.org/remittances/development-impact-remittances>.
- UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) (2016) 'Migration' [online] available www.unfpa.org/migration [accessed 9 June 2016].
- UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) (2013) 'Human Rights Council Twenty-third session, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development'. United Nations General Assembly: Switzerland.
- UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) (2015) 'Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. United Nations General Assembly: Switzerland.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (2016) 'Population Statistics Database' [online] available http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series [accessed 9 June 2016].
- van den Akker, T. and van Roosmalen, J. (2015) 'Maternal mortality and severe morbidity in a migration perspective', *Best Practice and Research Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology*.
- Webber, G., Spitzer, D., Somrongthong, R. et al. (2012) 'Facilitators and barriers to accessing reproductive health care for migrant beer promoters in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam: A mixed methods study', *Globalization and Health* 8(21) doi: 10.1186/1744-8603-8-21.
- WHO (World Health Organization) (2015a) 'Health in 2015: from MDGs, Millennium Development Goals to SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals'. WHO: Geneva.
- WHO (World Health Organization) (2015b) 'World Malaria report'. WHO: Geneva.
- WHO (World Health Organization) (2016) 'Migration and Health: Key Issues', [online] available www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/migration-and-health/migrant-health-in-the-european-region/migration-and-health-key-issues.
- World Bank (2014) *Migration and Development Brief 26*. World Bank: Washington DC, April 2016 [online] available <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/661301460400427908/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief26.pdf>.





Construction workers at work, Tianjin, China, 2012. Photo: Yang Aijun/World Bank

SDGs covered

- 1:** No poverty
- 5:** Gender equality
- 10:** Reduced inequalities
- 16:** Peace, justice and strong institutions
- 17:** Partnerships for the goals

Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Elisa Mosler Vidal and Georgina Sturge

Key messages

- Expanding social protection coverage of migrants is integral to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, specifically Goals 1 and 10.
- Yet coverage for labour migrants remains low. 22% of migrants are not covered, including less than 1% migrants moving between low-income countries.
- Globally, 55% of migrants are entitled to access social protection benefits, but cannot take these benefits home, or to another country (the 'portability' of benefits).
- States should therefore ensure labour migrants are eligible for, and participate in, social protection, and that they can transfer benefits they have contributed towards.
- To be able to create, implement and enforce effective social protection for migrants, national bodies need better data and more support.

1 Introduction

This briefing considers the extent to which international labour migrants¹ are covered by social protection, and the implications this has for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda). More specifically, this brief shows that social protection coverage of international labour migrants varies considerably, and outlines how this has a bearing on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) related to social protection.

Social protection is the set of policies and programmes that aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to enhance the capacity of people to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, disability and old age. It includes **social assistance programmes**, which are not conditional on having previously made contributions (e.g. cash transfers to poor households) – and **social insurance programmes**², which are conditional on past contributions (e.g. contributory old-age pensions). There is a large evidence base showing the positive impact social protection programmes can have on reducing poverty and child labour, and on improving health and education outcomes and investment in productive assets (e.g. agricultural tools) (Babajanian et al., 2014; Bastagli et al., 2016; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2011). As such, social protection is seen as a priority area for achieving the 2030 Agenda, specifically in its contribution to Goal 1 (No Poverty) and Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and their Targets³.

Several international agreements governing social protection systems already make reference to the eligibility of migrants. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has long championed universal eligibility to social protection. Their 1952 Convention No. 102, which required equality of social protection treatment, has been ratified by 55 countries (ILO, 2017). More recently, they passed Recommendation No. 202, known as the *Social Protection Floor*. This sets out four basic social protection guarantees to all residents and children. Furthermore, several blocks of countries have agreed to guarantee social protection access to migrants moving within them, the best-known example being

Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 for European Union (EU) migrant workers. Globally, there are also hundreds of bilateral and multilateral agreements between specific countries. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda of 2015, for example, commits UN member countries to improving ‘access to and portability of earned benefits [social insurance]’ (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), 2015).

In spite of these agreements, both the legal and effective social protection coverage of international labour migrants remains low⁴. Section 2 of this briefing discusses existing agreements and their legal coverage. Section 3 explores the factors that lead to low legal coverage for migrants and exclusion from effective coverage. Section 4 links the analysis to the 2030 Agenda, showing why these issues need to be considered for governments to meet the SDGs, in particular Targets 1.3, 1.a and 10.4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and offers recommendations to improve legal and effective social protection coverage of migrants.

2 Legal coverage varies considerably, but tends to be low

Social protection programmes differ in two main respects: the extent to which migrants can access them in their host country, and whether their benefits can be withdrawn in another country, in other words whether they are *portable* (see Figure 1). Social assistance programmes are often funded through general national taxation (for example, maternity allowances) or through external funding such as official development assistance (ODA). These programmes are usually not portable (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2011).

Labour migrants should have legal access to a host country’s social protection system if there is:

1. A bilateral or multilateral agreement enabling eligibility for, and portability of, social protection between countries.
2. Unilateral programmes, provisions of equality of treatment or access to voluntary insurance in their host country.

1 This briefing will focus on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for the purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example internal migrants, this will be stated explicitly.

2 These types of programmes are also sometimes called ‘social security’.

3 SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage is also often considered a priority target for social protection, but this goal is dealt with in a separate briefing paper on health, migration and the 2030 Agenda (Tulloch et al., 2016). This briefing also does not cover the decent work aspects of social protection (SDG 5.4, SDG 8.5 and SDG 8.B).

4 There is a distinction between *de jure*, or legal, coverage of migrants, meaning official social protection coverage of migrants under relevant agreements and mechanisms, and *de facto*, or effective, coverage, which may differ to this due to issues in ratification or implementation of these agreements, or practical access and take-up issues. As there is limited data on effective coverage, this briefing will mainly focus on legal coverage.

3. More rarely, labour migrants may be covered by unilateral programmes from their origin country, such as a fund for overseas workers.

2.1 Frameworks for labour migrants' access to social protection


This section describes the nature of migrants' legal access to social protection, firstly considering entitlement while residing in a country and, secondly, considering portability of accumulated entitlements upon moving country.

A **bilateral portability agreement** between two countries sets out social protection entitlements to a citizen of one country who is resident in the other. Most bilateral agreements are between high-income countries (such as those concluded between the United States and 27 high- and upper-middle-income countries⁵).

Bilateral agreements covering South-North migrants are sometimes designed around temporary labour migration, such as Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010). Certain EU countries have agreements with Turkey and Morocco allowing labour migrants' contributions into national social insurance schemes to accumulate across countries (Holzmann, 2010). Bilateral agreements also exist between low-income countries, although these are more rare and less extensive in legal coverage. One example is that between Malawi and Zambia, which provides healthcare for temporary mine workers from Malawi through the Zambian Workers Compensation Fund (Avato et al., 2009).

Multilateral agreements provide a framework for coordinating portability at the regional level. For

Figure 1 The portability of social protection benefits



5 www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html

instance, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) allows social security contributions to accumulate across member states, helping labour migrants to meet state-pension contribution thresholds (Taha et al., 2015, van Ginneken et al., 2013). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has a regional legal framework for pension portability and other entitlements for all migrants from member states (van Ginneken, 2013). The Ibero-American multilateral agreement between Spain, Portugal and 20 Latin American countries provides a pension floor for labour migrants (Taha et al., 2015). The East African Community (EAC) gives its nationals and all migrants from member states equal rights to national social security systems; however, its member states have mostly under-developed systems to begin with and migrants lose their accumulated contributions upon returning to their country of origin (ibid).

Social protection can be made accessible to migrants through **unilateral measures of destination countries**. For example, third-country nationals legally resident in the EU for five years become entitled to equal treatment with EU nationals⁶. Canada, Australia and New Zealand also have generous entitlements for permanent resident migrants (and temporary migrants in New Zealand). Such measures are much more rare in low-income countries. For example, labour migrants arriving in member states of the GCC or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are not granted any right to access social protection. One exception is Barbados, where labour migrants can participate in the national social security system even if they lack a work permit (Taha et al., 2015; Morlachetti, 2015). Host countries' laws can also permit portability, for instance Australia and Malaysia refund contributions accrued as a lump sum when a migrant departs the country.

Migrants from the global South may be covered by a **unilateral programme from their origin country**. A notable example is the Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) (see Box 1). Sri Lanka has a similar voluntary, contributions-based fund for overseas workers, with the benefits paid out to family members left in Sri Lanka (Taha et al., 2015), while Mexico has a voluntary national social insurance programme for emigrants to the US (ibid.).

Finally, irregular labour migrants and those working in the informal economy tend not to be covered by national social protection systems. Asylum seekers and refugees outside high-income countries are also rarely covered, but instead may receive humanitarian support

offering short-term or ad-hoc protection (e.g. Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).

2.2 Data showing migrants' legal social protection coverage

While specific data is not available for most countries, Avato et al. (2009) have compiled a database of migrant stocks by destination and origin country, and paired this information with whether a bilateral or multilateral portability agreement covers each migration corridor⁷. Most agreements concern the benefits of contributory systems such as disability, survivors' and old-age pensions. They also estimate the number of migrants who are not covered by portability agreements but are entitled to social protection access in their host country through a unilateral programme. This category could include access to non-contributory social assistance. When it comes to those who are not covered, official

Box 1 Migrant welfare funds

Some countries of origin such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand use migrant welfare funds to protect their labour migrants abroad. These funds are contributory schemes funded usually by employers, recruitment agencies and/or migrants, which provide a range of services to migrants while overseas. They commonly include life and medical insurance, loans and repatriation services (Ruiz and Agunias, 2008). They also provide government with funds to finance other migrant programmes such as pre-departure rights education, and can support migrants' families at home (Jones, 2015).

The OWWA is the most developed of these funds. Managed by a government agency within the Department of Labor and Employment, OWWA is funded by a mandatory membership fee of US\$25 paid prior to migration, either by the employer, recruitment agency or migrant. The fund pools these contributions to offer services to migrants including life and accident insurance, legal assistance and on-site help at embassies (Ruiz and Agunias, 2007). As of 2013, OWWA membership was over 1.6 million and had raised over US\$300 million (OWWA, 2013). These funds allow origin governments to support migrants abroad; as such they offer a potential solution to financing migrant social protection.

6 EU Directive 109/2003.

7 Based on data from 2000/2001.

data sources only tend to capture those with regular status, while the stocks of undocumented migrants must be estimated⁸.


Migrants therefore fall into three categories:

- those that move between countries and are covered by a bilateral or multilateral agreement (23%)
- those that move between countries without an agreement but are still entitled to some social protection (55%)
- those that have no access to social protection (22%).

Firstly, around a quarter of all migrants move between countries with a **bilateral or multilateral agreement** in place, meaning that in principle some migrants are

entitled to social protection and portability of benefits (Avato et al., 2009). However, as Figure 2 shows, while 90% of high-income to high-income movers fall into this category, less than 1% of migrants moving between low-income countries are legally covered. Overall, around 17% of those migrating from low- or middle-income countries to high-income countries are covered by a bilateral or multilateral social protection agreement. Some countries have secured bilateral agreements that result in higher coverage of their emigrants, notably Morocco (89% of emigrants), Algeria (87%) and Turkey (65%); however this is only for documented migrants, as we explore further in the next section. This is compared to a coverage rate of 0.5% among Mexico's 1.1 million emigrants, who migrate largely to the United States.

Figure 2 Most migrants moving between high-income countries are legally covered by social protection, whereas coverage of migrants moving between low-income countries is low



Source: Authors' own calculation based on data compiled by Avato et al. (2009) and hosted by the World Bank <http://go.worldbank.org/NCO9EJABP0>. The figure shows the percentage of migrants (size of 'bubble') who are legally covered by a bilateral or multilateral social protection portability agreement, split by the income classification of their origin and destination country.

⁸ Undocumented migrants are typically excluded from social protection provision by law and are unlikely to take up any that they are entitled to for fear of exposure and the harassment or legal consequences that might ensue (Taha et al., 2015). The figures quoted here include estimates of undocumented migrants included in the data compiled by Avato et al. (2009).

Secondly, in the absence of formal agreements, migrants may still be entitled to some form of social protection in their host country, although these benefits are unlikely to be portable. In fact, most migrants fall into this category (55% globally). While this situation is better than having no access at all, it is still precarious. Some within this category migrate to high-income countries where they are generally entitled to a full range of social protection, even if the benefits are not portable. The majority within this category, however, are migrating between low- and lower-middle-income countries where national social protection systems are generally weak.⁹

Finally, the most vulnerable group are arguably the remaining 22% of migrants who are neither legally covered by a bilateral/multilateral agreement nor entitled to social protection by host-country law. As Holzmann et al. (2015) have noted, these migrants may have access to some short-term provisions but are denied long-term or equal access as citizens. Almost all these migrants originate in the global South and the majority move to another low- or middle-income country. However, a large share (around 42%) of those moving with no access to social protection are moving to high-income countries and this category includes large numbers of undocumented migrants.

3 Why are migrants not covered by social protection?

A range of factors affect legal and effective social protection coverage of labour migrants including non-eligibility, barriers to take-up and portability constraints. Further, these factors often interact with others including gaps between policy design and implementation, practical barriers to participation, and political sensitivity.

3.1 Eligibility

Labour migrants can be ineligible for social protection in two ways. First they may lose eligibility for social protection in their home country if they work in another country. Second, they can be legally ineligible for social protection in host countries. Although many countries have committed to equality of treatment between nationals and migrants¹⁰, this is not always followed in practice¹¹. Some countries limit access by residency and/or nationality requirements (Hirose et al., 2011). For example, many countries in the Gulf only provide pensions to nationals and have no provisions for migrant workers (Avato et al., 2009). In addition, this can affect internal migrants. For instance, rural-urban migrants in China are ineligible for China's biggest social assistance programme – the Minimum Living Standards Guarantee Programme – and must meet stringent requirements to access social insurance programmes (Hopkins et al., 2016).

Some eligibility requirements mean access to social protection is cut off for certain groups of migrant workers, such as the self-employed or those earning too little (Taha et al., 2015; ISSA, 2014). For example, while Canada's SAWP gives labour migrants the same social protection status as other groups, in practice it is difficult for seasonal migrant workers to meet eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits¹² (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010 in Taha et al., 2015). Immigration status and formality of employment also affects access: for example, the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers excludes irregular migrants from its scope (Council of Europe, 2004)¹³. Further, informal economy employers are unlikely to extend social protection to their workers (van Ginneken, 2013). Many migrants are both undocumented and work in the informal economy, which can compound their weak legal and social position in a host country.

9 A more recent study by van Panhuys et al. (2017) found considerable regional variation in whether countries had laws in place granting equality of treatment to non-nationals for contributory social security and healthcare. It finds that Latin America had the highest proportion of countries granting equal legal treatment to non-nationals, although this may not reflect effective coverage.

10 A recent ILO study shows that of 120 countries, more than 70 have made provisions in the law granting equality of treatment between national and non-nationals with regards to contributory social security (Van Panhuys et al., 2017).

11 Countries make distinctions, for example, between the rights of migrants with permanent, temporary or irregular residence status. Further distinctions and restrictions of rights based on the migrant's specific citizenship and purpose of residence (e.g. work vs. family reunion) are common (Ruhs, 2009).

12 To be eligible, workers must show their employer paid employment insurance either for 600 insurable hours in the past 52 weeks or since their last claim, whichever is less. This excludes many seasonal workers, as they only work for part of the year (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).

13 One common exception to this is emergency healthcare; in many European countries hospitals are obliged to treat individuals for free even if they are undocumented. Some countries, such as Bulgaria, provide social benefits to irregular migrants as for natives (though this tends to be the exception rather than the rule), while others do not explicitly link benefits access to regularity of employment (Council of Europe, 2004).

Migrants can also be excluded due to political sensitivities. In host countries, negative public attitudes tend to highlight concerns about migration increasing job competition, placing downward pressure on wages, and adding pressure on public services (ISSA 2014; Ford and Heath, 2014; Ford and Lowles, 2016). This is linked to perceptions that migrant workers ‘take advantage’ of a country’s welfare system, even though the empirical evidence shows that this is mostly not the case (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2013). For example, 37% of European citizens support migrants receiving benefits and services only after they have acquired citizenship of a host country (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013).. This climate can be a constraint in extending social protection to migrant workers, through a lack of political commitment from the host government.

3.2 Legislation implementation and enforcement

Even when there are social protection arrangements in place for labour migrants, the implementation and enforcement of these can be ineffective (van Ginneken, 2013 in Taha et al., 2015; Box 2). There is evidence that some national and multilateral social protection instruments for migrants are not properly enforced. For example, implementation of relevant Indonesian legislation is weak due to lack of coordination between central and regional government. The CARICOM agreement has been applied infrequently, which is thought to be due to design inconsistencies and lack of public awareness (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2010; Pasadilla and Abella, 2012; Fortaleza, 2010 in Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).

Administering social protection to migrants can be difficult. For example, if benefits are means-tested, it may be necessary to obtain information on the financial situation of the migrant worker’s family abroad to assess eligibility. This can be costly or even impossible to secure (ISSA, 2014). Further, documentation to process claims can require knowledge of another country’s system (ibid.), and officials in countries of origins must be aware of the detail of agreements (Holzmann, 2016)¹⁴.

Finally, employers of migrant workers do not always enforce relevant arrangements, knowingly or otherwise. For example, while documented Moroccan migrant workers can accrue portable social protection and retirement benefits in Spain, there is evidence that many of their employers do not provide migrants with relevant documentation for this (Arango and Martin, 2005 in Taha et al., 2015).

3.3 Barriers to take-up

Even if programmes are accessible and implemented effectively, knowledge gaps, language and financial barriers, time constraints and lack of representation can affect migrant take-up (see Box 3 for a case study). Furthermore, time and travel costs associated with the application process may prove a deterrent. For example, one study found that Mexican and Jamaican workers had difficulty accessing available health benefits in Canada due to lack of information on available services, language barriers, and long working hours limiting their access (McLaughlin, 2009 in Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).

Social protection can also incur more direct financial costs such as monthly contributions or ad-hoc payments,

Box 2 Fragmented enforcement of legislation in Southern Africa

Regional efforts to harmonise cross-border social protection, while encouraging, can have a limited impact due to institutional and political factors. The 2014 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Employment and Labour contains provisions on the coordination of social security schemes and portability of benefits, however it has not yet been ratified by member states. The effects of an earlier non-binding Code on Social Security are also limited and social protection systems across SADC remain highly fragmented and tend to exclude migrants (Olivier, 2009; Millard, 2008). The SADC’s institutional weakness and limited resources, as well as the absence of an accompanying policy framework on regional movement of labour, limit its enforcement capability (Dodson and Crush, 2015; Olivier, 2009). Therefore, migrant social protection continues to be decided at the national level in SADC, which can be problematic (Dodson and Crush, 2015).

For example, South Africa, a primary destination for SADC migrants, largely excludes migrant workers from its national social protection system (Fish, 2013; Millard, 2008; Mpedi and Nyenti 2013). Its bilateral agreements with other SADC states do not usually include social protection and where they do, for example with Mozambique, relevant mechanisms can be poorly enforced and employers’ compliance low (Mpedi and Nyenti, 2013; Olivier, 2009). This has been linked to negative anti-immigrant attitudes; 90% of respondents in a 2010 national survey felt there were too many foreigners in South Africa (Crush et al., 2013 in Dodson and Crush, 2015).

14 The ILO has formalised the exchange and provision of administrative assistance through international labour standards with respect to migrants and social protection, namely the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157) and the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167).

Box 3 Bureaucratic requirements affecting take up of social protection in India


Programme registration requirements can prove an additional barrier to take-up. Such requirements may unintentionally make it harder for migrants to participate. This is the case in India where, despite legal access to the Public Distribution System (PDS), which offers access to subsidised food to poor households, internal migrants can be excluded through complicated regulations and administrative requirements (MacAuslan, 2009, 2011). Eligibility for PDS and other Indian social protection programmes is linked to residency and registration status. For example, to access PDS, residency criteria mean migrants must reapply with every move across certain boundaries. Different forms need to be filled out and attested to by government officials, and limited knowledge of local bureaucracies and weaker social networks leads to reluctance amongst migrants to apply.

which can be a barrier for many, particularly those in low-skilled or low-wage labour (Hopkins et al., 2016). This affects labour migrants in the informal economy especially. As their work can involve low and irregular income, their capacity and willingness to contribute to social protection financing programmes can be limited, especially if they do not perceive these to meet their most important needs (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003).

3.4 Portability constraints

As highlighted above, the benefits received from social protection systems can be **portable**, **not portable**, or lie somewhere in between. For instance, some of the world's largest migrant-sending and -receiving countries – Bangladesh, China, Mexico, Russia – have almost no arrangements in place for social protection portability (van Panhuys et al, 2017). Some countries limit the portability of pensions by applying different rates to people from different countries, or by banning pension payments to selected countries. For example, Germany and the UK apply reduction rates to pension payments

Figure 3 The most common portability constraints



for nationals of countries with which they have no social security agreement, and the US bans pension payment to selected countries (Holzmann et al., 2005). The most common issues are summarised in Figure 3.

4 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda

The 2030 Agenda advocates safe and orderly migration and the expansion of legal and effective social protection coverage, though it does not explicitly link the two. However, we argue that migration affects the implementation of the three main Targets on social protection (see Table 1), as well as several other Targets and Goals, and that these cannot be met effectively if these links are not considered.

Target 1.3 calls for the implementation of nationally appropriate social systems, measures, including floors, and for social protection systems to achieve ‘substantial coverage of poor and vulnerable groups’. Labour migrants are often a vulnerable sub-group, particularly those with irregular status or those in informal employment. In some circumstances, migrants are more likely to have physical (Tulloch et al., 2016) and mental health issues (Sabates-Wheeler and Waites, 2007). Migrants can also face discrimination in access

to labour markets and housing (Lucci et al., 2016), as well as stigma or harassment. Therefore migrant workers may have a particularly salient need for social protection. Those working in dangerous working environments have a greater risk of work-related accidents or ill health and hence require sickness, disability or work-injury benefits. Often being in irregular and badly paid employment can mean migrants have a strong need for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, working in a new and foreign environment, often without family support and with weak social networks, migrants can lack information as well as informal support (ISSA, 2014). Failing to include labour migrants in conceptualising and implementing Target 1.3 will negatively affect the Target’s outcome as it will exclude one specific poor and vulnerable group; this undermines the general principle in the 2030 Agenda of ‘leaving no-one behind’.

One particularly vulnerable sub-group of labour migrants is that of domestic workers (see this series’ gender briefing for a detailed discussion (O’Neil et al., 2016)). As this group often lacks regularised status or access to social insurance through their employer, it is likely to have low effective social protection coverage – though data on this is lacking. This directly impacts **Target 5.4**, which calls for the recognition of domestic work through public services, infrastructure and social protection policies.

Table 1 Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDGs and targets	Link to migration
Goal 1 No poverty	
1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.	Labour migrants can be a particularly poor and vulnerable group, especially in terms of work and health-related risks, but often lack eligibility for legal social protection and/or are not effectively covered. Where migrants are legally covered by a social protection mechanism, benefits are often non-portable, further reducing coverage amongst a group that is highly mobile.
1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.	Labour migrants present an opportunity to increase the tax base, and a greater number of contributors to social insurance-type schemes leads to better risk pooling and financial sustainability. However, high immigration can at first lead to increased costs for host countries if immigrants are eligible for tax-funded benefits and take-up is high. Due to political sensitivities around migration, with many countries (especially low-income countries) already having limited resources for social protection, it can be difficult to justify expansion of eligibility to labour migrants.
Goal 10 No poverty	
10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality	Social protection policies often do not guarantee equal access to social protection, particularly for ‘non-natives’, which means that labour migrants have lower eligibility for, and, where eligible, lower take-up of social protection. If vulnerable groups (such as labour migrants) are unable to participate in social protection, inequalities widen. The design of social protection policy can fail to account for mobility of beneficiaries, with portability being a key constraint for labour migrants in accessing benefits they have contributed towards.

Many labour migrants can lose access to social protection when they move to another country or back home. This could reduce return migration and/or decrease payments of social security, as the incentives to stay in the host country and to move into the informal economy and/or into an irregular migration status may be higher. This would make it harder to monitor migration flows and implement evidence-based policy, negatively impacting **Target 10.7** on ‘safe and orderly migration’. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda also emphasises that access to and portability of earned benefits is part of ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration (UN DESA, 2015).

If limited portability disincentivises return migration, this could deprive origin countries – many of them developing countries – of the beneficial development effects of migration. Migration can be an important contribution to economic development in origin countries, for instance through remittances, investment and knowledge exchange (see Clemens, 2011), so this could also impact the success of other SDGs, for instance **Goal 8** on sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

Labour migrants can contribute to the achievement of **Target 1.a**, which calls for ‘significant mobilization of resources’ [...] to implement programmes and policies to end poverty’, including social protection. Besides their direct social security contributions, labour migrants generate additional resources for governments to deliver social protection programmes, for instance through personal income tax and indirect taxes such as consumption taxes. Research has shown that migrants often make net fiscal contributions to host countries (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013), paying more in taxes and social insurance contributions than they take out in benefits. Likewise, a study by OECD (2013) showed that the majority of OECD countries drew a positive balance from migration in their social security systems.

However, high levels of mobility by migrant workers can make their contributions less predictable. Significant labour-market informality in many low-income economies acts as a constraint to increases in tax revenue through social security contributions. Initiatives either to formalise such sectors or to include informal-sector workers (including migrants, who are heavily represented in this group) in contributory social protection can expand the tax base (Bastagli and Hagen-Zanker, 2014). The potential resources to be gained from this are high: the United States Social Security Administration, for example, has acknowledged that mostly non-reimbursable contributions by undocumented workers represented a US\$12 billion annual net gain to the US accounts in 2010 (Goss et al., 2013)¹⁵.

At the same time, if migrants are eligible for and receive tax-funded benefits, this could lead to increased costs for host countries. If needed, additional resources can be mobilised by designing programmes that share the costs of delivering social protection to migrants. For example, social insurance programmes tend to involve contributions from workers, employers and the host state. A greater number of contributors also leads to better risk pooling and financial sustainability of the system. Country-of-origin governments can be involved, for example through Migrant Welfare Funds, which are funded through contributions by employers, recruitment agencies and/or labour migrants (see Box 1).

Finally **Target 10.4** calls for social protection to ‘progressively achieve greater equality’. On the one hand, social protection has been shown to tackle income inequality and unequal access to basic services (UN ESCAP, 2015). For example, one study found that cash transfers alone reduced the Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality) in six Latin-American countries by 1%-9% (Lustig et al., 2013). On the other hand, as discussed in Section 3, social protection policies do not guarantee equal access, with ‘non-natives’ having lower eligibility and lower take-up when eligible. This implies that if vulnerable groups (including labour migrants) are excluded from social protection coverage, inequality remains the same or widens.

Policy design can widen this inequality, in particular with regards to portability. As shown in Section 3, some labour migrants may acquire entitlement to social protection by fulfilling their host country’s national requirements, only to have these reduced or barred if they move back to their origin or another country. As a result, these migrants subsequently experience unequal access to social protection in both origin and host countries.

5 Conclusions and policy recommendations

The 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of social protection in reducing poverty and inequalities. It sets out specific targets for improving coverage amongst vulnerable groups and for mobilising funds to implement social protection programmes. International labour migrants are a vulnerable group, yet they often lack access to social protection, particularly those coming from low-income countries, those with irregular migration status and/or those working in the informal economy.

Improving social protection for labour migrants goes hand in hand with better management of labour migration. Providing legal channels to migrants and

15 Furthermore, expansion of social security coverage is argued to be an effective tool to reduce exploitation and abuse of workers through the formalisation of working practices (ISSA, 2014).

including them in national social protection systems expands the base of potential contributors. At the same time, increasing social protection coverage is tightly linked with bringing migrant workers into the formal economy (ISSA, 2014) and, as such, also increases the ability of states to manage migration. Increased formalisation of workers also leads to higher tax contributions and a more productive workforce (ibid). Finally, guaranteeing portability of benefits removes some of the constraints to the mobility of labour so migration flows can be more closely matched to the supply and demand for labour. Effective coverage and portability are also important to ensure wellbeing and prevent vulnerability through the whole of a migrant's life.

The recommendations below set out key actions for national governments, international institutions and civil-society organisations to improve social protection for international labour migrants. Ultimately, increasing their participation in social protection is not only important to protect migrants, but also plays an important role in maximising the potential benefits of labour migration for migrants, origin and host countries.

Conclusion 1 Legal and effective social protection coverage is important for labour migrants, but is very patchy outside high-income countries.

Most labour migrants moving to high-income countries are covered by a social protection agreement or provision giving some degree of access and portability. However, the proportion of those moving between low-income countries that are legally covered is less than 1%. These countries tend to have under-developed national social protection systems that also leave large shares of their native population uncovered. Furthermore, low legal coverage is especially prevalent among undocumented migrants and those working in the informal economy.

Recommendation: increase eligibility through new agreements and make it more feasible for migrants to participants in social protection.

- Host countries can increase labour migrants' eligibility for social protection by building on existing measures and by concluding new agreements. Particular attention must be paid to improving legal coverage of migrants from low- and middle-income countries.
- Migrants in the informal economy are often in irregular work and unable to make regular social protection contributions. These factors need to be taken into account when designing the scope of benefits, financing mechanisms and administrative procedures for informal workers. In addition, governments, organisations and employers can provide effective informal protection for informal workers, for example by holding preventive health-

education workshops or empowering informal worker alliances in certain industries (Lund, 2009).

- Where labour migrants are not legally or effectively covered through other measures, country-of-origin governments should consider migrant welfare funds for emigrants. These funds provide basic protection through contributions from employers, recruitment agencies and migrants. They can be a good bridging measure, when integration into social protection systems in the host country is not yet feasible.

Relevant SDG targets

1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.

1.a Ensure significant mobilisation of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.

5.4 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate.

10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.

Conclusion 2 Some migrants are legally covered by social protection in the host country, but lose these benefits when they move again.

Even if a labour migrant is legally eligible to contribute to and receive benefits from their host country's social insurance system, their entitlements may not be transferrable when they move back home or to another country. This increases the migrant's vulnerability and reduces their incentives to contribute to social insurance systems. Some benefits that are in principle portable, such as pensions, carry limitations such as high transfer fees or not being transferable to certain countries.

Recommendation: extend and improve social protection portability for migrants.

- Continue to negotiate bilateral and multilateral social security agreements along key migration corridors and within regional groupings of states, extending portability practices of pensions and other benefits to

more countries. Focus on extending these to include low-income countries. Timely ratification of these agreements between states should also be encouraged to ensure they are operational as soon as possible.

- Lift any restrictions on existing portability arrangements by origin countries. This includes enabling the transfer of benefits to all countries and ending the practice of applying reduction rates to entitlement transfers to certain countries.
- Decrease the financial burden of transferring social protection benefits to countries of origin. Countries can do this by introducing fixed transfer fees for certain entitlements to keep these low, requiring transfer operators to disclose fees, tax charges and exchange rates to increase transparency, and/or ending any exclusivity arrangements with banks or agents to encourage operator competition (Watkins and Quattri, 2014).

Relevant SDG targets

10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration, implement planned and well-managed migration policies.

10.c Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances.

Conclusion 3 The implementation and enforcement of social protection arrangements for migrants can be ineffective.

Even with bilateral social protection portability agreements in place, many migrants continue to be left without effective coverage as the implementation and enforcement of these can be inadequate. The administration and financing of well-intentioned portability agreements can be beyond the capacity of under-funded national social protection departments. Further, take-up can be low amongst labour migrants due to burdensome and confusing documentation requirements, language barriers, and financial or time constraints.

Recommendation: strengthen the capacities of national bodies to design and enforce social protection arrangements better.

- Make portability agreements legally binding, ensuring regional and bilateral portability efforts are enacted at the national level. Increase the enforcement capabilities of national social security administrations and other relevant bodies to implement and enforce these agreements. For example, where possible ensure that monitoring mechanisms for social protection

arrangements include both national agencies and non-governmental organisations, to give a fuller picture of compliance.

- Introduce compliance procedures for employers and appropriate oversight mechanisms. For example, governments can introduce mandatory social protection provisions in work contracts which set out entitlements in detail. They can also improve protection of labour migrants against legal reprisals from employers by ensuring that effective and timely complaint, appeal and redress mechanisms are available to migrant workers free of charge. Such mechanisms should also be available in languages spoken by migrants and through channels accessible to them.
- Encourage social protection take-up by labour migrants. Tools for doing this include information campaigns that raise awareness on existing rights and entitlements (in different languages), greater efficiency and clarity in administrative procedures (including through better trained staff), and establishing more flexible rules and procedures to incentivise joining (ILO, 2014). Adopt a more migrant-centric approach by including migrants and migration organisations in the design process (Ratel et al., 2013).
- There is very little data on coverage of labour migrants, which exacerbates the ineffectiveness of social protection arrangements in place. This is partly because irregular migrants are usually missing from official population statistics, but also because even regular migrants are not always clearly identified in either data or legislation. Countries should work towards collecting data to help estimate effective, or de facto, social protection coverage of labour migrants. National data on social protection programmes should disaggregate by citizenship and residence status (a strong proxy for migrant status), so as to manage the financial implications of benefits becoming portable.

Relevant SDG targets

1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.

16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

Conclusion 4 Expanding legal social protection coverage can be politically and financially challenging.

All too often, migrants are perceived as taking advantage of national welfare systems (Ford and Heath, 2014), which makes the expansion of legal coverage to migrants politically challenging. The expansion of a social protection system does carry a cost, especially where benefits are funded from general taxation, yet labour migrants have the potential to be a financial and economic asset for host countries. Indeed, host countries often draw a positive fiscal balance from labour migration, depending on demographic characteristics of migrants and status of national labour markets (OECD, 2013).

Recommendation: recognise the economic and fiscal contributions of migrants and use these to expand social protection eligibility.

- To fund improved legal social protection coverage, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN DESA, 2015) proposes that governments broaden and diversify the tax base. By allowing migrants to work formally and to contribute towards national social insurance

systems, destination countries can grow their tax base and spread risk across a larger pool.

- Strengthen the political will to increase social protection eligibility for migrants, particularly in key destination countries. Policy-makers should be encouraged to use reliable, empirical evidence on the economic and fiscal contribution of migrants to host countries (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013; OECD, 2013) and the consequences of (not) granting migrants access to national social protection systems in order to help them make decisions in a polarised political context.
- Make efforts to shift public attitudes towards favouring migrant access to national social protection systems, by targeting specific groups with information about the economic and fiscal benefits of migration (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).
- Governments need to cooperate to facilitate payments into and out of migrant welfare funds (for example, overseas workers funds) based in a migrant's origin country. Facilitation measures could include lowering transfer fees on remittances into social protection funds and host countries allowing administration offices for such funds to operate there.

Relevant SDG targets

1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.

1.a Ensure significant mobilisation of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions.

10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality.

16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

References

- Arango, J. and Martin, P. (2005) 'Best practices to manage migration: Morocco-Spain', *International Migration Review* 39(1).
- Ashcroft, A. (2013) *Small Island: Public Opinion And The Politics of Immigration*. London: Lord Ashcroft KCMG PC.
- Avato, J., Koettl, J. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2009) *Definitions, Good Practices, And Global Estimates On The Status Of Social Protection For International Migrants*. Social Protection discussion paper; no. SP 0909. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Babajanian, B., Hagen-Zanker, J. and Holmes, R. (2014). 'How do social protection and labour programmes contribute to social inclusion?' Evidence from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal.
- Bastagli, F. and Hagen-Zanker, J. (2014) *Financing The SDGs. Ending Extreme Poverty: The Role Of Social Protection*. London: ODI (unpublished).
- Bastagli, F., Hagen-Zanker, J., Harman, L., Barca, V., Sturge, G. and Schmidt, T. (2016) *Cash Transfers: What Does The Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review Of Programme Impact And The Role Of Design And Implementation Features*. London: ODI.
- Clemens, M.A. (2011) 'Economics and emigration: trillion dollar bills on the sidewalk?' *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22(3): 83-106.
- Council of Europe (2004) Committee of Experts on Standard-Setting Instruments in the Field of Social Security (CS-CO), 6th Meeting, Limassol, 25-26 May 2004, Exploratory Report on the Access to Social Protection for Illegal Labour Migrants, prepared by P. Schoukens and D. Pieters, Doc. CS-CO.
- Dempster and Hargrave (2017) *Understanding Public Attitudes Towards Refugees, Migrants And Migration*. ODI Working Paper 512. London: ODI.
- Dodson, B. and Crush, J. (2015) *Migration Governance And Migrant Rights In The Southern African Development Community (SADC): Attempts At Harmonization In A Disharmonious Region*. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Research Paper. UNRISD.
- Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2013) *The Fiscal Effects Of Immigration To The UK*. Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration Department of Economics, University College London (CREAM).
- Fish, J. (2013) 'Rights across borders: policies, protections and practices for migrant domestic workers in South Africa' in D. du Toit (ed.) *Exploited, Undervalued – And Essential: Domestic Workers And The Realisation Of Their Rights*. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press.
- Ford, R. and Heath, A. (2014) 'Immigration: a nation divided?' in *British Social Attitudes 31*, National Centre for Social Research (NatCen).
- Fortaleza, A. (2010) 'The portability of pension rights: general principles and the Caribbean case', *Development Policy Review* 28(2): 237-255.
- Ginneken, W. van (2013) 'Social protection for migrant workers: national and international policy challenges', *European Journal of Social Security* 15(2): 209-221.
- Goss, S., Wade, A., Skirvin, P., Morris, M., Bye, K. M. and Huston, D. (2013) *Actuarial Note 151: Effects Of Unauthorized Immigration On The Actuarial Status Of The Social Security Trust Funds*. Social Security Administration Office of the Chief Actuary Baltimore, Maryland.
- Hagen-Zanker, J., McCord, A., Holmes, R., Booker, F., and Molinari, E. (2011) *Systematic Review Of The Impact Of Employment Guarantee Schemes And Cash Transfers On The Poor*. London: ODI.
- Hirose, K., Milos, N. and Tamagno, E. (2011) *Social Security For Migrant Workers: A Rights-Based Approach*. Budapest: ILO.
- Holzmann, R. (2016) 'Bilateral social security agreements and pensions portability: a study of four migrant corridors between EU and non-EU countries', *International Social Security Review* 69(3):109-130.
- Holzmann, R., Koettl, J. and Chernetsky, T. (2005) *Portability Regimes Of Pension And Healthcare Benefits For International Migrants: An Analysis Of Issues And Good Practices*. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0519. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Holzmann, R. and Pouget, Y. (2010) 'Social Protection For Temporary Migrant Workers: Conceptual Framework, Country Inventory, Assessment And Guidance'. Study prepared for the Global Forum of Migration and Development, Marseille (27 October).
- Hopkins, E., Bastagli, F. and Hagen-Zanker, J. (2016). *Internal Migrants And Social Protection: A Review Of Eligibility And Take-up*. London: ODI.
- ILO (2017) *Ratifications Of C102 – Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102)*. Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2014) *Transitioning From The Informal To The Formal Economy*. Report V(1). International Labour Conference 103rd Session. Geneva: ILO.
- IOM (2011) *Glossary On Migration*. International Migration Law Series No. 25. Geneva: IOM.

- IOM (2010) *Labor Migration From Indonesia: An Overview Of Indonesian Migration To Selected Destinations In Asia And The Middle East*. Jakarta: IOM.
- ISSA (2014) *Handbook On The Extension Of Social Security Coverage To Migrant Workers*. Geneva: ISSA.
- Jones, K. (2015) *Recruitment Monitoring & Migrant Welfare Assistance: What Works?* Dhaka: IOM.
- Lund, F. (2009) 'Social protection and the informal economy: linkages and good practices for poverty reduction and empowerment' in *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth Social Protection*. OECD.
- Lustig, N., Amábile, F., Bucheli, M., Molina, G.G., Higgins, S., Jaramillo, M., Pozo, Arauco, V.P., Pereira, C., Rossi, M., Scott, J. and Yáñez Aguilar, E. (2013) *The Impact Of Taxes And Social Spending On Inequality And Poverty In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru And Uruguay: An Overview*. Commitment to Equity Working Paper No. 13. New Orleans: Tulane University.
- McLaughlin, J. (2009) 'Trouble in our fields: health and human rights among Mexican and Caribbean migrant farm workers in Canada'. Unpublished dissertation. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada.
- Millard, D. (2008) 'Migration and the portability of social security benefits: the position of non-citizens in the Southern African Development Community', *African Human Rights Law Journal* 28(1)
- Morlachetti, A. (2015) *Current State Of Social Protection Legislation In Barbados And The Organization Of Eastern Caribbean States From A Human Rights Perspective*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
- Mpedi, G. and Nyenti, M. (2013) *Portability Of Social Security Benefits In Mining Sector: Challenges Experienced By Former Mineworkers In Accessing Social Security Benefits In Selected Southern African Countries*. Midrand: Southern Africa Trust.
- OECD (2013) 'The fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries' in *International Migration Outlook 2013*, OECD Publishing
- Olivier, M.P. (2009) *Regional Overview Of Social Protection For Non-Citizens In The South African Development Community (SADC)*. SP Discussion Paper No. 0908, World Bank.
- OWWA (2013) *Annual Report 2013*. Manila: OWWA, Department of Labor and Employment.
- Panhuis, C. van, Kazi-Aoul, S., Binette, G. (2017) *Migrant Access To Social Protection Under Bilateral Labour Agreements: A Review Of 120 Countries And Nine Bilateral Arrangements*. Extension Of Social Security Working Paper 57. Geneva: ILO.
- Pasadilla, G. and Abella, M. (2012) *Social Protection For Migrant Workers In ASEAN*. CESifo Working Paper No. 3914. Paper presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Portability of Social Benefits, Venice (July).
- Ratel M-H., Williams G. and Williams K. (2013) *Inserting Migrants Into The Global Social Protection Floor*. Waterloo: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
- Ruhs, M. (2009) *Migrant Rights, Immigration Policy And Human Development*. New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Research Paper 2009/23.
- Ruiz, N.G. and Agunias, D.R. (2007) *Protecting Overseas Workers: Lessons and Cautions from the Philippines*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Ruiz, N. G. and Agunias, D. R. (2008). *Protecting Temporary Workers: Migrant Welfare Funds From Developing Countries, Migration And Development Brief 7*. 24 October. Migration and Remittances Team Development Prospects Group. World Bank.
- Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2009) 'Social security for migrants: Trends, best practice and ways forward'. Project on examining the existing knowledge of social security coverage, Working Paper No. 12. Geneva: ISSA.
- Sabates-Wheeler, R., Koettl, J., and Avato, J. (2011) 'Social security for migrants: a global overview of portability arrangements' in *Migration And Social Protection. Claiming Social Rights Beyond Border*. Ed. Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Feldman, R. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Waite, M. (2003) *Migration And Social Protection: A Concept Paper*. Brighton: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.
- Social Security Administration (SSA) (2005) *Totalization Agreement With The United Kingdom*. Social Security Administration (SSA) Publication No. 05-10199.
- Taha, N., Siegmann, K. A. and Messkoub, M. (2015), 'How portable is social security for migrant workers? A review of the literature', *International Social Security Review* 68: 95–118.
- Tulloch, O., Machingura, F. and Melamed, C. (2016) *Health, Migration And The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- UN DESA (2015) *Addis Ababa Action Agenda Of The Third International Conference On Financing For Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda)*. New York: UN DESA.
- UN ESCAP (2015) *Time For Equality: The Role Of Social Protection In Reducing Inequalities In Asia And The Pacific*. Bangkok: UN-ESCAP.
- Watkins, K. and Quattri, M. (2014) *Lost In Intermediation: How Excessive Charges Undermine The Benefits Of Remittances For Africa*. London: ODI.



Migrants washing their feet before crossing the border to Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, 2015 © IFRC

SDGs covered

- 1:** No poverty
- 3:** Good health and well-being
- 6:** Clean water and sanitation
- 11:** Sustainable cities and communities

Water and sanitation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Guy Jobbins, Ian Langdown and Giselle Bernard

Key messages

- Migration isn't driven by a lack of water and sanitation services, but providing services can support successful migration.
- The barriers faced by migrants make achieving the SDGs' ambitions of universal access more challenging.
- Challenges stem from failures in governance, not the amount of water available, numbers of migrants or rates of migration.
- The poor visibility of migrants in data limits understanding of their needs and reduces the accountability of governments and service providers.

1 Introduction

This briefing explores the relationships between water, sanitation and migration, and how they may affect the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Specifically, we discuss the fact that while water and sanitation do not appear to drive migration, the process of migration can radically shape access to water and sanitation services – particularly for undocumented migrants¹ and people in transit. We question whether attaining universal access to safely managed water and sanitation services is possible without specific measures to address the needs of refugees and other migrants.

This briefing focuses primarily on refugees and international labour migrants. However, several dominant narratives about the relationships between water and migration have been shaped by experiences of other forms of migration. As such, this briefing does discuss domestic migration, nomadic pastoralism and seasonal labour migration, and people temporarily relocating in response to droughts and floods. When not explicitly differentiated, ‘migration’ and ‘migrants’ should be understood to mean refugees and other international migrants.

We examine how migration relates to several of the SDGs – chiefly SDG 6: to ‘ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for

all’. SDG 6 covers a wide range of issues related to water security, including access to water and sanitation services, and water quality, scarcity, sustainability and management. The ‘water security’ framing of SDG 6 connects the rights of individuals (e.g. access to safe water and sanitation services) with broader environmental and natural resource issues.

While this briefing touches upon most of the issues covered by SDG 6, we focus in particular on access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services (section 2). SDG 6, and the specific water and sanitation targets (6.1 and 6.2), set the ambition of ‘safely managed’ services ‘for all’. This is a step up from previous commitments to provide basic water service levels – which might include, for example, a standpipe or well shared by multiple households. Instead, standards for *safely managed* water services focus on piped water delivery to each household (see also Box 1). This poses obvious problems when applied to transitory populations, but also significant challenges for people with insecure land tenure and immigration status.

WASH – and water services more broadly – fall into the category of basic services. This series on migration and the 2030 Agenda has already covered several other basic services: health (Tulloch et al., 2016); education (Nicolai et al., 2017; and social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017). But several factors make WASH services worthy of separate consideration.

First, like food and shelter, drinking water is an immediate need for human survival, and poor sanitation

Box 1 The challenge of delivering services ‘for all’

SDG 6 aims to ‘ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’. This unambiguous commitment to universal access presents significant practical challenges. In the past, investment in WASH services has tended to focus on the people who are easiest – and most cost-effective – to reach, such as fixed, urban populations. Ensuring that *no one* is left behind requires additional and different types of investments aimed at the hardest-to-reach people and groups. The requirement for services to be *safely managed* introduces further costs and difficulties.

The Joint Monitoring Programme of the World Health Organization and UNICEF (WHO and UNICEF, 2017) defines basic and safely managed services as:

Sanitation

Basic: *use of improved facilities which are not shared with other households.*

Safely managed: *use of improved facilities which are not shared with other households and where excreta are safely disposed in situ or transported and treated off-site.*

Drinking water

Basic: *drinking water from an improved source, provided collection time is not more than 30 minutes for a roundtrip including queuing.*

Safely managed: *from an improved water source which is located on premises, available when needed and free from faecal and priority chemical contamination.*

How these standards might be attained in serving migrant and transitory populations without fixed households or premises is a challenging question.

1 ‘Undocumented migrant’ refers to people without valid travel documents, including those who have entered the country without valid documents, overstayed their visas, or had asylum or refugee requests rejected.

can also have serious public health consequences. Second, water and sanitation systems have more specific and fixed infrastructure at the point of delivery than other basic services: education services can be provided in a variety of ways, places and contexts, but options for delivering safely managed WASH services are more limited and expensive – particularly where connecting to individual residences. Third, compared to other basic services there are stronger links between WASH access and land rights, an issue that strongly affects migrants.

This briefing begins by exploring narratives about the role of water in driving migration. It then considers how migration affects WASH service delivery from the perspective of four groups: migrants, migrants' origin communities, service providers and the policy community. In section 4 we relate these findings to migration's effects on the achievement of WASH-related SDGs, and in section 5, provide recommendations for national governments, donors, international agencies and civil society organisations to improve WASH access for migrants and strengthen the potential of WASH to support successful migration.

2 The relationship between water, sanitation and migration

The relationship between migration and water security is not straightforward (Wilkinson et al., 2016), despite a common framing in which people are 'pushed' away from areas where water is scarce or inaccessible and 'pulled' towards areas offering better access (Jónsson, 2010). Individual migration decisions are complex, and based on a broad range of social, economic, political and institutional factors of which water is just one (Affi, 2011; Miletto et al., 2017). Large-scale movements of people, in particular, have multiple causes, and untangling them may be impossible (Cummings et al., 2015; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016).

Rural livelihoods based on agriculture and livestock production rely on large quantities of water and when supplies are insufficient, people may move to find water or alternative economic opportunities. Many rural households practice seasonal labour migration, with young males in particular moving from agricultural activities to jobs in urban services and construction during the dry season (Affi, 2011; Simonet and Jobbins, 2016). Similarly, pastoral nomads frequently move in search of water and forage for their livestock, usually in traditional seasonal patterns. In these contexts, providing water services has even been an instrument for the sedentarisation of nomads by governments who seek greater political and economic control over them, often with negative environmental and cultural consequences (Gomes, 2006).

Migration can also be an adaptation strategy where long-term water resource scarcity or degradation of water resources undermines the viability of livestock or

agricultural livelihoods. While this can lead to migration that is more permanent than seasonal in character, it does not necessarily mean that whole households or communities are migrating: mostly, migration by some household members is used to generate and diversify household income and support those left behind (Tacoli, 2009). The role of water is also likely to be indirect and/or hard to distinguish from other environmental changes (e.g. land degradation) or non-environmental factors driving migration such as job and economic opportunities (Reuveny, 2007).

Migration is also a common strategy for coping with and recovering from droughts and floods (Bhat et al., 2013; Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2017). For example, large scale movements of people have been seen in response to recent floods in Pakistan (Salik et al., 2017). Migratory responses to water-related disasters are usually temporary, with displaced people returning to their communities and livelihoods as soon as possible (Wilkinson et al., 2016). However, such displacement can be repeated or prolonged, leading to longer-term relocation (IDMC, 2016). Migration in response to droughts and floods is also not usually international, as long-distance migration requires planning and resources, which are scarce in disasters (Jónsson, 2010).

Nor do extreme events necessarily lead to migration. In areas such as the Sahel, where drought and climate variability are the norm, social networks and other assets provide people with a range of coping strategies beyond migrating (Jónsson, 2010). Similarly, though rural–urban migration increased in Syria between 2005 and 2010 during a drought, the same drought didn't produce widespread movements of people in other affected countries, which included Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (Weinthal, Zawahri and Sowers, 2015). In Syria, the wave of rural–urban migration – and the wider crisis – resulted from broad governance failures, not the drought (de Châtel, 2014).

The role of water and sanitation *services* (as opposed to water *resources*) as a push or pull factor in migration is even less clear. While improved access to basic services, including water, is often cited in policy discussions as a factor pulling people to cities, it is rarely mentioned by migrants as a primary reason for their journey (WEF, 2017). WASH is more likely to be a secondary reason for migration than a direct driver – that is, water and sanitation access may shape factors like jobs, food availability and living standards, but people don't move to a city solely to for improved water services or better toilet facilities (Salik et al., 2017). Migrants may also be willing to accept *lower* levels of WASH access at their destination if other, greater benefits – such as higher or more stable income, or education opportunities for their children – are on offer.

Perhaps surprisingly, there is some evidence that development in origin communities – including improved access to WASH services – may accelerate out-migration.

With development comes greater prosperity, which means people are better able to save money and finance their migration, and their aspirations increase (De Haas, 2010). Conversely, unreliable, poor quality or low levels of access to WASH services may prevent people from migrating by contributing to poverty and limiting their ability to form the necessary assets (Dorward et al., 2009; Salik et al., 2017). This might be due to the opportunity costs of the time taken in collecting and managing water, or because water-related health shocks reduce people's assets.

3 How does migration affect WASH services?

The relationships between migration and WASH services are complex; the issues differ depending on your perspective. For migrants, and their origin communities, the issues are largely about how the process of migration affects their *access* to WASH services. For those delivering WASH services – such as public utilities, private companies or charitable actors – the challenges lie in the *sustainable provision* of safe, sustainable and effective services. By contrast, the policy community's concerns focus on *enabling* migrants' access to WASH services. Using case studies from Lebanon and the United States, this section looks at each of these perspectives in turn to illustrate specific challenges.

3.1 Impacts of migration on WASH and water in origin communities

Migration can have mixed effects on the water security of those left behind in origin communities. Remittances can be invested in water management and WASH services, and there is some evidence that visiting and returning migrants can transfer new technologies and practices to communities, including better sanitation behaviours (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2010). On the other hand, migration does not necessarily relieve pressure on water resources, and male out-migration can increase the water management burden for women.

Remittances are an important pathway for migrants to support water security, particularly in rural origin communities with low levels of WASH provision, and where water access is important productive factor (Asian Development Bank, 2009). Remittances can support capital investment in irrigation or domestic equipment (De Haas, 2006), or paying for improved WASH services (Massey, 1990). Remittances can also contribute to cash reserves, and help left-behind families cope with water-related shocks from drought and floods (Miletto et al., 2017; Salik et al., 2017).

Not all these relationships are causal. Richer households are better able to support the cost of migration and to afford WASH equipment, pay for services and cope with shocks. Also, WASH-related benefits don't emerge automatically from remittances. Households may have competing priorities for

remittances and, where they are used for consumption expenditure, it will not have the same long-term impact as investments. Arguably governments can do more to channel remittances from international migrants towards better developmental and WASH outcomes for origin communities (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2010; Salik et al., 2017). In Mexico, for example, the Three-For-One Program matches government funds with collectivised remittances for community public works, and has positively contributed to water and sanitation service provision in some communities (Duquette-Rury, 2014).

However, migration doesn't necessarily affect other water security challenges in origin communities. For example, it is not clear that out-migration reduces competition over water resources or helps degraded ecosystems recover (Jónsson, 2010) – despite arguments to the contrary (e.g. Olsson, Eklundh and Ardö, 2005). In practice, migration is often a strategy used to keep most household members in the rural setting (e.g. Mounkaila, 2002), without significantly reducing demand for water. Remittances can also fund water equipment – particularly for irrigation – that may even increase water demand and contribute to further ecosystem degradation (Zeitoun et al., 2012).

Migration can also have clearly negative impacts for origin communities and households. In particular, male out-migration can shift responsibilities in the home, with women taking additional burdens such as securing water and caring for livestock (Affi, 2011; Salik et al., 2017). Where women are marginalised in local water management systems, the departure of men can cause further stress and problems (Miletto et al., 2017).

3.2 Access of migrants to WASH services

The vulnerability, exclusion, political and documentation status of migrants contribute to a range of challenges they experience in accessing basic and safely-managed WASH services.

Migrants in transit

Accessing even *basic* water and sanitation services can be challenging for migrants on the move. Migrants – particularly those who are undocumented – can face difficult and hazardous journeys, and access to water and sanitation services is just one of many challenges they face. While there is little evidence on how migrants access water and sanitation services during their journeys, we do know that along extreme but widely travelled trajectories such as the Sahara, the lack of water can be fatal (IOM, 2017a).

Even in less extreme environments, migrants can face exclusion and disincentives in accessing basic WASH services. For undocumented migrants, one such disincentive is the possibility of detection by authorities. Near the French-Italian border, for example, undocumented migrants have slept in the forest, using rivers as both drinking sources and toilet facilities,

rather than risk detection by staying in Red Cross camps (Welander, 2017). In populated areas, people on the move often face racism, discrimination and exclusion from services, being moved away from spaces with public toilets and water points, or refused sale of water.

Formal camps and detention centres for migrants and refugees generally offer better access to WASH than life without a roof. However, the services offered do not necessarily meet the ‘safely managed’ standard (i.e. services on premises and not shared with other households). For instance, the ‘formal’ migrant camp at Calais had inadequate WASH services, with overflowing toilets and reports of respiratory disease linked to bacteria-contaminated water (Dhesi et al., 2015). Similar reports of unsanitary conditions and waterborne disease in transit camps are found around the world, including Europe (Van Berlaer et al., 2016). Unsanitary and overcrowded WASH facilities have also been reported in more permanent infrastructure for housing migrants, such as detention centres for people awaiting deportation (e.g. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015).

The reasons for these shortfalls in service standards are diverse and complex, and include – for example – challenges coping with increased numbers of migrants at the onset of the European ‘migration crisis’. However, they also reflect the technical challenges of meeting the standards for basic and especially safely managed services for people on the move, and the limited political incentives and will to do so (Dhesi et al., 2015).

Migrants settled in host countries

Challenges in accessing WASH services can persist long after the initial migration journey. Refugees and low-income and undocumented migrants are more likely to end up living in decaying or informal urban areas with old or absent infrastructure and services that fall below standards for safely managed – or even basic – provision (Jabareen, 2014). Unestablished migrants in new communities often lack the necessary social and political capital to demand better services from authorities; language skills and limited knowledge of their rights can also be barriers (Jabareen, 2014; IOM, 2017b). Undocumented migrants are in a worse position: those without the right to remain are less likely to demand services because of the risk – perceived or actual – of detection and deportation (Jepson et al., 2014; UN-Habitat, 2016) (see Box 2). Financial barriers to access can also be significant, as poor and marginalised people pay a greater proportion of their income for water services (Bakker et al., 2008).

Migrants are also highly vulnerable to homelessness (Pleace, 2010). In the UK, migrants from Central and Eastern Europe make up a large proportion (28%) of the homeless population (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012). UK government policies attempt to create a hostile environment for undocumented migrants and failed asylum seekers by excluding them from support and benefits, driving homelessness (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012;

Box 2 Undocumented migrants and WASH services in the *colonias* of Texas

In Texas, more than 1,800 informal shanty towns – or *colonias* – lie along the border with Mexico. *Colonias* provide limited services, rights and security to their largely undocumented, Latino, migrant population, and have been termed America’s ‘third world’ (Rios and Meyer, 2006). The *colonias* occupy a specific institutional and political niche in the US: politically and socially unwelcome, but providing cheap and disposable sources of labour that is economically useful.

Water and sanitation provision in the *colonias* is highly variable. One study in Hidalgo County found that 46% of residents in 950 *colonias* faced deficiencies in water and/or sanitation provision (Jepson et al., 2014). Sporadic attempts by the state to address WASH needs as a public health measure have yielded some formal service provision. But many *colonia* residents lack water utilities, and instead purchase water privately from trucks or vending machines and store it in drums. This water is often unaffordable to many residents and of poor quality.

Source: Jepson et al., 2014.

Burnett, 2016). As homelessness implies exclusion from basic services, these policies constitute a further risk factor for the access of migrants to WASH services.

Despite these challenges, there is evidence that successful migrants gain improved access to WASH services over the longer term. Urban areas provide better services than rural areas, and not all migrants are relegated to slums (Lu, 2010; Lucci et al., 2016; Salik, 2017). Over time, migrants can also move from low-income neighbourhoods to more established parts of the city with better services (UN-Habitat, 2016).

3.3 Water and sanitation service providers

The sustainable provision of WASH services is the principle challenge for utilities, private suppliers and charitable provider organisations. Though largely a question of mobilising capital for investment and generating the income to sustain WASH services, service provision can also have political dimensions. Migration compounds the challenges faced by WASH service providers in several ways, particularly where meeting the needs of migrants might involve – or be perceived as – lowering the service standards for long-standing residents.

In cities experiencing rapid growth from rural–urban migration, problems with WASH provision are well documented. In fast-growing cities in Africa and Asia, such as Accra and Hyderabad, rapid growth in demand for WASH services has outstripped the ability to invest in, and provide, them (Ramachandraiah and Vedakumar,

2007; Van Rooijen, 2011; WEF, 2017). Haphazard responses to rapid city growth exacerbate the challenges: in India, this has contributed to unequal access to water, over-abstraction of water sources and water pollution (Bhat et al., 2013). A related problem is that rapid growth in low-income areas is often marginalised in flood-prone areas, increasing flood risk (Di Baldassarre et al., 2010).

There is little evidence that international labour migration contributes significantly to such problems in major cities: international migrants are usually a relatively small proportion of urban growth. However, migrants may concentrate in slums or new shanty towns, with shortfalls in service standards (Jabareen, 2014; Jepson et al., 2014). Such situations provide few incentives for service providers to make the necessary investments: replacing decaying infrastructure in old neighbourhoods can be highly expensive, as can reaching new shanty towns outside city limits. Authorities may also reason that shanty towns are temporary and therefore it is difficult to justify the investment, as well as being wary of providing de facto tenure to communities with informal land rights. Such issues can exacerbate spatial inequalities, where communities with political voice and wealth are better able to leverage urban amenities for their own benefit, leaving poorer and marginalised communities behind (UN-Habitat, 2016).

Problems for service providers are accentuated in areas where large movements of people cause rapid fluctuations in service demand. This is particularly the case where competition over water resources is already high, or where host communities already have low levels of service access. This is the case in Amman, one of the most water-scarce cities on Earth. Here, demand for drinking water rose

40% between 2011 and 2015 due to influxes of refugees from Syria (WEF, 2017), and additional pressure has also decreased access to, and the quality of, urban sanitation (Mosello et al., 2016). Again, expansion of supply and network capacity requires substantial capital investment, and uncertainty over migrants' length of stay complicates the business case. Yet reliance on some short-term measures such as water rationing and private supply can also raise costs and lower user satisfaction for permanent residents (see Box 3). Cost-effective, scalable models are needed that can provide services for extended periods, such as the shared water and sanitation facilities provided in Durban's community ablution blocks (Roma et al., 2010).

Refugee camps pose similar problems. The average stay in a camp is 17 years, yet WASH provision is frequently managed in terms of short-term assistance (UNHCR, 2006). This can be as much a political and institutional issue as a financial issue. The Kenyan government forbids the construction of permanent structures at Dadaab refugee camp, for example, meaning that water still comes from temporary taps decades after the camp was first constructed. Inadequate sanitation has contributed to regular outbreaks of waterborne disease such as hepatitis E and cholera (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2014).

Expanding services to meet the additional needs of migrants is not a technical challenge. Rather, it is a challenge of effective governance, needed to overcome financial, political, institutional, social, cultural, political and environmental obstacles (Van Rooijen, 2011). Surges in demand do not explain an inability to deliver services: even in a difficult case such as Amman or migrant camps in France, it is a lack of readiness to meet the challenge (Diep et al., 2017).

Box 3 The impacts of migration on water services and resources in Lebanon

Lebanon, like Jordan, has taken in many Syrians since 2011: around one in four people currently in the country is a Syrian refugee.

But while inflows of refugees have affected Lebanon's WASH services, the country's WASH systems and water resources struggled to meet demand before the current crisis due to weak governance and insufficient infrastructure. The poor quality and reliability of water services in Lebanon means that many households self-supply, usually through private water trucks or wells. The influx of refugees has increased demand and increased competition for private water services, with supply from water trucks becoming both more expensive and less frequent (Baylouny and Klingseis, 2018). The proliferation of private – often illegal – wells has also accelerated, contributing to already serious groundwater deterioration and salinisation (Saadeh and Wakim, 2017). The lack of sanitation provision in informal areas occupied by refugees has also contributed to degraded water quality (Jägerskog and Swain, 2016).

One poll found that 93% of Lebanese people believe that their availability of water and energy is affected by Syrian refugees (Christophersen et al., 2013). Yet the problems of competition over services and degradation of water quality are long-standing; the arrival of refugees has simply exacerbated pre-existing governance problems. For example, years of conflict-related damages and underinvestment in wastewater treatment have long meant that untreated sewage discharges have contaminated water supplies (Assaf and Saadeh, 2008). Localised, additional pressures from refugees in informal areas are significant, but are not transformational.

Source: Baylouny and Klingseis, 2018.

3.4 The policy community

The policy community faces two distinct problems: a lack of evidence/data to inform programming; and political barriers to addressing the marginalisation of migrants and shortfalls in service provision. The marginalisation of refugees and migrants, and their marginalisation in the data record, jeopardises the achievement of universal access.

On the first, data is limited for a number of reasons, one of which is undocumented migrants' attempts to avoid detection (Welander, 2017). Even where migrants join official or unofficial camps, authorities are often uninterested in fully assessing their needs. Several small camps near Calais in 2016 had no WASH facilities: authorities failed to accurately estimate numbers so even when water was provided it was insufficient (Alarcon et al., 2016). More broadly, data on WASH service coverage in most countries is generated by household or census surveys – methods which can exclude migrants living in informal settlements or without shelter. Migration can lead to intense demand for services, but demand that is temporary and localised, leading to further problems with monitoring and understanding the scope and nature of the challenges. To address these methodological issues, inform programming and complement national census results, we need surveys with purposeful – and opportunistic – sampling strategies that focus on the needs of migrants, the homeless and dwellers of temporary housing and informal areas.

The exclusion of migrants in WASH data collection and analysis reflects broader issues with the invisibility and exclusion of migrants, and migrant camps as spaces of exclusion and exception (Agier, 2016). The rules and rights that apply to citizens are not expected to apply to migrants and camp residents. The location of camps, often in border areas, falling in between jurisdictions, compounds the statelessness and exclusion of their inhabitants. These issues of exclusion and marginalisation naturally extend to the provision of services. As described, service providers and governments can face disincentives in serving migrants where there are negative public attitudes about immigration and its perceived impacts on public services (Ford and Lowles, 2016).

There are positive experiences of reducing the access barriers of migrants and the institutional and financial challenges of service providers – at least in cases of domestic migration. In Colombia, where 7 million people have been uprooted by conflict, the government, as part of the process of social reconstruction and peacebuilding, has broken the division between slums and the rest of the city by guaranteeing basic services for all and making progress with land reforms (Econometria, 2016; UN-Habitat, 2016). Similarly, efforts to deliver services to even the poorest of India's urban communities (Bhat et al., 2013) have helped integrate migrant slum dwellers in a broader 'right to the city' (Harvey, 2008; IOM, 2017b), thereby contributing

to greater social cohesion and urban resilience. But such approaches require political will, and it may be more difficult to generate sufficient political will to meet the needs of foreign migrants than those of domestic migrants.

4 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda

The 2030 Agenda advocates safe and orderly migration (SDG 10.7), and the provision of universal access to safely managed water and sanitation services (SDG 6). While the two issues are not explicitly linked in the 2030 Agenda, it is not possible to achieve universal access unless internal and international migrants also have access to WASH services. The linkages between water, sanitation and migration also affect other SDGs – on poverty (SDG 1), human health (SDG 3), and sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11).

Targets 6.1 and 6.2 call for *universal and safely managed* access to water and sanitation services. Yet migrants face significant financial and non-financial barriers in accessing WASH services, particularly when they are in transit, undocumented, or living in informal areas, ghettos, or without a roof. Disabled people, children and menstruating women can have specific water, sanitation and hygiene needs and access constraints that compound their vulnerabilities as migrants. Service providers face technical, governance and financial challenges in meeting the needs of migrants, as the provision of safely-managed services requires significant capital investment, and – usually – delivery to a household. These challenges are compounded by large and abrupt flows of migrants and refugees, and where migrants are living in informal, unincorporated or temporary accommodation.

These issues of exclusion in access to and provision of WASH services relate also to **target 11.1**, which calls for universal access to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and the upgrading of slums. Addressing the rights of people living in slums and informal areas can be politically and institutionally challenging. Yet breaking down the distinction between formal and informal areas by providing safely managed WASH services can reduce spatial inequality and improve social cohesion (UN-Habitat, 2016).

The absence of safely managed sanitation services and wastewater treatment can contribute to the pollution of surface and groundwater with human waste – relevant to **target 6.3**, which calls for an end to water pollution, including from untreated wastewaters. This is a specific challenge in refugee camps and other concentrations of people in areas, such as informal settlements, without adequate services (Mosello et al., 2016). The public health consequences of poor sanitation provision, as seen in refugee camps across Europe (Van Berlaar et al., 2016) can also affect **targets 3.3 and 3.9**, which call for an end to waterborne disease and mortality from water pollution.

Migration may also affect **target 6.4**, which addresses the sustainability of water resources. While there is limited evidence that emigration improves water resource sustainability in places of origin, large and abrupt inflows of migrants can exacerbate sustainability issues where water resources are scarce. While there is only evidence of this being problematic in contexts with pre-existing water governance challenges, the geography of instability means that it is countries with such challenges to which people displaced by conflict often move (Mason et al., 2017).

The issues of water resources (target 6.4) and WASH services (targets 6.1 and 6.2) also intersect with **target 1.4**, which calls for natural resources rights and basic services

as essential components for ending poverty. While water resources and WASH services may not be principal drivers of large-scale migration, they can be indirect multipliers of drivers such as underdevelopment and marginalisation in origin communities and economic opportunities in destinations (Jägerskog and Swain, 2016). The provision of WASH services and improved water resources management in both origin and destination communities can support successful migration – enabling planned migration and reducing the challenges that migrants face in making a success of their new lives. Migration has an important role in reducing poverty, and water resources and WASH services have an important role in migration.

Table 1 Water and sanitation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDGs and targets	Link to migration
Goal 1 No poverty	
1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance	Sustainable water resources management and the provision of WASH services can enable successful migration, which plays an important role in reducing poverty.
Goal 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	
3.3 By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, waterborne diseases and other communicable diseases	In origin communities, poor WASH services can contribute to health shocks that inhibit successful migration. However, remittances from migrants can contribute to WASH provision and health outcomes.
3.9 By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination	Failure to meet the WASH needs of migrants can contribute to public problems, particularly when large numbers of people are concentrated in temporary, informal or dilapidated areas.
Goal 6 Clean water and sanitation	
6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all	While there is evidence that water resources shocks and long term stresses contribute to seasonal, temporary and permanent migration, there is limited evidence that WASH services are a significant driver of migration.
6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations	Achieving universal access for all requires addressing the needs of migrants. Migrants can face significant barriers in accessing WASH services, particularly when they are in transit or undocumented. Large and abrupt flows of migrants, particularly refugees, can pose specific problems to the coping capacity of service providers. Monitoring is a challenge, especially for disaggregation by migratory status. Monitoring methods for WASH targets are likely to exclude undocumented and transitory migrants, and localised and temporary needs.
6.3 By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally	Where refugee and migrant populations are not served with safely managed sanitation, open defecation, untreated wastewater discharge, and unsafe disposal of faecal sludge can contribute to pollution of surface and groundwaters.
6.4 By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity	Large and abrupt flows of migrants can increase competition where water resources are scarce. However, this becomes problematic only in contexts of pre-existing challenges in water governance. There is limited evidence that economic out-migration reduces water competition in origin communities.
Goal 11 Sustainable cities and communities	
11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums	Providing WASH services to slum and informal areas helps reduce spatial inequality and strengthen social cohesion.

5 Conclusions and policy recommendations

The 2030 Agenda sets out ambitious goals for water resources management and access to WASH services. Here refugees and migrants pose specific challenges to service providers and host governments.

Dominant narratives about the relationship between water and migration focus on the role of water in driving migration and the stresses that migrants place on the resources and services in host communities, although the evidence for these narratives is far from conclusive. The 2030 Agenda presents a different set of questions and challenges: how do we ensure access to WASH services is universal, including the hardest-to-reach groups; and how can providing WASH services and improving water resources management help reduce poverty?

The following recommendations set out actions for national governments, donors, international agencies and civil society organisations to improve WASH access for migrants and strengthen the potential of WASH to support successful migration.

Conclusion 1 Migration isn't driven by a lack of water and sanitation services, but providing services can support successful migration

People migrate for many different reasons. The role of water in these decisions can be complex and indirect, and the drivers and challenges of nomadic pastoralists, rural-urban domestic migrants, refugees and international economic migrants all look very different. Before a 'response' can be developed and implemented, we need to understand who migrants are, why they have moved, where they move to, how long they intend to stay, and how these issues relate to their water and WASH needs. The principal challenges for governments lie not in mitigating the impacts of migration on water resources and services, but in ensuring that migrants have access. WASH can be an ingredient supporting successful migration, and most migrants are moving to positions of better access to WASH services over the long term.

Recommendation: governments in origin and host countries should develop policies that support synergies between improved WASH access and successful migration.

- Host countries and communities which ensure migrants have adequate WASH access are more likely to achieve economic co-benefits from migration, reduce risks to public health and the environment, and promote social cohesion and equality.

- Programmes and institutional measures to support people and communities during drought and flood are important, but shouldn't be framed in terms of preventing migration; migration can play a critical role in helping households cope with and recover from shocks (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2017).
- Similarly, investments in WASH services and water resources management in marginalised areas may reduce the barriers to successful migration. This can support those households using migration to diversify their income and get out of poverty.
- Governments in origin countries can improve investments into communal WASH in migrant communities via policies that co-finance collectivised remittances, as in Mexico's 3-for-1 Programme.

Relevant SDG targets

1.4 Ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance

3.3 End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases, and other communicable diseases

3.9 Substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water, and soil pollution and contamination

6.1 Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all

6.2 Achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all, and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations

6.3 Improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimising release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally

6.4 Substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity, and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity

Conclusion 2 The barriers faced by migrants make achieving the SDGs' ambitions of universal access more challenging

Refugees and migrants face significant barriers in accessing water, sanitation and other basic services. These barriers vary across different contexts, at different stages of the migration journey, and with documentation status. In addition to high costs, migrants can face non-financial barriers stemming from limited knowledge of their rights and how to claim them, and underlying political and institutional factors that discriminate against them. Such barriers are compounded when migrants live in conditions that concentrate deprivation and exclusion, such as shanty towns, ghettos and homelessness.

Recommendation: governments, service providers and international agencies must ensure all people have access to water and sanitation services, regardless of their migratory status.

- Governments should guarantee the rights and entitlements of migrants to water and sanitation services. This includes eliminating institutional barriers to WASH access that arise from documentation status. Migrants and refugees need to be able to assert their rights to water and sanitation without fear of arrest and deportation.
- States and service providers should proactively ensure that homeless people, formal holding facilities and informal transit camps have adequate WASH provision, with appropriate needs assessment, working through trusted and competent intermediary organisations where appropriate.
- States and service providers should mitigate the financial barriers to WASH provision, mitigating the relatively high cost of water to migrants.

- States and service providers should ensure that the specific WASH needs of vulnerable migrant subgroups are met, including those of children, disabled people and menstruating women.
- At a national level, targeted interventions and investments should address areas of service deprivation, such as ghettos, shanty towns and camps in unincorporated or marginalised areas.
- International programmes should continue to invest in contexts where high rates of migration overwhelm response capabilities e.g. Lebanon and Jordan.

Relevant SDG targets

1.4 Ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance

6.1 Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all

6.2 Achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all, and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations

6.3 Improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimising release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally

11.1 Ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums

Conclusion 3 Challenges stem from failures in governance, not the amount of water available, numbers of migrants or rates of migration

Droughts alone don't cause mass waves of migration. Similarly, problems with expanding services in rapidly growing cities are as much to do with issues of land tenure, accountability, policies and finance as they are with the rate of growth or constraints on the amount of water available. The two critical factors are (1) the extent to which water management systems are capable of providing water security to all, and (2) the ability of that system to respond different rates of change in demand by expanding and contracting services.

Recommendation: governments and utilities should strengthen water governance and services to cope better with the effects of migration.

- General strengthening of governance and institutions will help cope with the needs of migrants, consequences of migration, and the water security of host communities. Infrastructure is an important element, but monitoring, planning, finance, coordination with other actors, improving accountability and getting the right mix of incentives in place are key.
- More should be done to bridge divides between humanitarian and developmental programmes. Development actors can do more to strengthen resilience through better emergency planning for WASH institutions before crises begin, and humanitarian actors can support longer-term sustainability through better exit-planning and appropriate collaboration with

government agencies, utilities and non-humanitarian agencies during emergencies.

- Governments and donors need to invest in innovation. Technologies and processes for delivering services to transitory people and communities are different to those for fixed populations; rather than focusing on settling people, more efforts are needed to provide agile, flexible, safely-managed services.

Relevant SDG targets

1.4 Ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance

6.1 Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all

6.2 Achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all, and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations

6.4 Substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity, and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity

11.1 Ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums

Conclusion 4 The poor visibility of migrants in data limits understanding of their needs and reduces the accountability of governments and service providers

Monitoring for WASH services is already a significant challenge for the 2030 Agenda. The call in Target 17.18 for indicators ‘to be disaggregated where relevant by ... migratory status’ makes data challenges even more problematic. Monitoring frameworks for the SDG water and sanitation indicators generally use census data and household surveys to assess water and sanitation coverage, and data from administrative and regulatory bodies to determine whether provision is safely managed. These data do not necessarily enable disaggregation by migratory status, and collection methods underlying them may not even sample undocumented or transitory migrants in a representative fashion. Such approaches fail to capture any localised, temporary, but intense effects of migration on WASH coverage. These data constraints make it more difficult to understand the needs of migrants, and to identify, design and deliver services that meet those needs. They also make it difficult to hold governments to account for failing to do so.

Recommendation: international agencies should revise monitoring frameworks for SDG water and sanitation targets, ensuring they disaggregate by migrant status.

- National and international bodies should assess the scale and character of needs in marginalised, unincorporated, and border areas outside the responsibility and mandate of specific service providers or states.
- Targets 6.1 and 6.2 should be revised to include specific mention of migrants and refugees as vulnerable groups who are explicitly included under universal access.
- Service providers, and the agencies that hold them accountable, should adopt appropriate monitoring techniques to identify and report on the scale and character of the needs of unserved or under-served migrant, transitory and refugee populations.

Relevant SDG targets

1.4 Ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance

6.1 Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all

6.2 Achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all, and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations

11.1 Ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums

17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts

We are grateful to the following people for their comments and assistance with this paper: Jessica Hagen-Zanker (ODI), Nat Mason (ODI), Helen Dempster (ODI), Hannah Caddick (ODI), Caelin Robinson (ODI), Eilen Hoffstetter (SDC), Anne Savary Tchoursine (SDC), Michele Leone (IDRC) and Saiful Alam (WARPO).

References

- de Albuquerque, C. (2010) *Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation*. United Nations Human Rights Council A/HRC/15/31/Add.1
- Affi, T. (2011) 'Economic or environmental migration? The push factors in Niger' *International Migration*, 49(S1)
- Agier, M. (2016) 'Afterword: what contemporary camps tell us about the world to come' *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 7(3): 459–468 (<https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2016.0026>)
- Alarcon, C., Sippel, D., Wahle, H. S. and Wisniewska, A. K. (2016) *The unknown knowns: observations from small informal refugee camps in Northern France*. London: Refugee Rights Europe (http://refugeerights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/RRDP_TheUnknownKnowns.pdf)
- Asian Development Bank (2009) *Urban sector and water supply and sanitation in Bangladesh: an exploratory evaluation of the programs of ADB and other aid agencies*. Independent Evaluation Department. Manila: Asian Development Bank
- Assaf, H. and Saadeh, M. (2008) 'Assessing water quality management options in the Upper Litani Basin, Lebanon, using an integrated GIS-based decision support system' *Environmental Modelling & Software* 23(10–11): 1327–1337
- Bakker, K., Kooy, M., Shofiani, N. E. and Martijn, E. J. (2008) 'Governance failure: rethinking the institutional dimensions of urban water supply to poor households' *World Development* 36(10): 1891–1915
- Di Baldassarre, G., Montanari, A., Lins, H., Koutsoyiannis, D., Brandimarte, L. and Blöschl, G. (2010) 'Flood fatalities in Africa: from diagnosis to mitigation' *Geophysical Research Letters* 37(22)
- Baylouny, A. M. and Klingseis, S. J. (2018) 'Water thieves or political catalysts? Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon' *Middle East Policy* 25(1): 104–123
- van Berlaer, G., Bohle Carbonell, F., Manantsoa, S., de Béthune, X., Buyl, R., Debacker, M. and Hubloue, I. (2016) 'A refugee camp in the centre of Europe: clinical characteristics of asylum seekers arriving in Brussels' *BMJ Open* 6(11): e013963
- Bhat, G. K., Raghupathi, U., Rajasekar, U. and Karanth, A. (2013) *Urbanisation, poverty, climate change, India: a synthesis report*. Volume 1. Gurgaon, India: TARU Leading Edge
- Budlender, D. and Hartman-Pickerill, B. (2014) *Migration and employment in South Africa: statistical analysis of the migration module in the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, third quarter 2012*. African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand
- Burnett, J. (2016) 'Entitlement and belonging: social restructuring and multicultural Britain' *Race Relations* 58(2): 37–54 (<https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396816657723>)
- De Châtel, F. (2014) 'The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: untangling the triggers of the revolution' *Middle Eastern Studies* 50(4): 521–535
- Christophersen, M., Liu, J., Thorleifsson, C.M. and Tiltne, A.A. (2013) *Lebanese attitudes towards Syrian refugees and the Syrian crisis: results from a national opinion poll*. Fafo Paper 13. Oslo: Fafo
- Cummings, C., Pacitto, J., Lauro, D. and Foresti, M. (2015) *Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends of migration to Europe*. ODI Report. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Dhesi, S., Isakjee, A. and Davies, T. (2015) *An environmental health assessment of the new migrant camp in Calais*. University of Birmingham, UK
- Diep, L., Hayward, T., Walnycki, A., Husseiki, M. and Karlsson, L. (2017) *Water, crises and conflict in MENA: how can water service providers improve their resilience?* Working Paper. London: International Institute for Environment and Development
- Dorward, A., Anderson, S., Bernal, Y. N., Vera, E. S., Rushton, J., Pattison, J. and Paz, R. (2009) 'Hanging in, stepping up and stepping out: livelihood aspirations and strategies of the poor' *Development in Practice* 19(2): 240–247
- Duquette-Rury, L. (2014) 'Collective remittances and transnational coproduction: the 3x1 program for migrants and household access to public goods in Mexico' *Studies in Comparative International Development* 49(1): 112–139
- De Haas, H. (2006) 'Migration, remittances and regional development in Southern Morocco' *Geoforum* 37(4): 565–580
- De Haas, H. (2010) *Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of international migration*. Working Paper 24. International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, UK
- Econometria (2016) *External evaluation of the UNHCR – UNDP Joint Program 'Transitional Solutions Initiative – TSI'*. Executive Summary (http://tsicolombia.org/sites/acnur/files/descargas/executive_summary_tsi_evaluation_colombia.pdf)

- Fayissa, B. and Nsiah, C. (2010) 'The impact of remittances on economic growth and development in Africa' *The American Economist* 55(2): 92–103
- Fitzpatrick, S., Johnsen, S. and Bramley, G. (2012) 'Multiple exclusion homelessness amongst migrants in the UK' *European Journal of Homelessness* 6(1): 31–58
- Ford, R. and Lowles, N. (2016). *Fear & Hope 2016: Race, Faith and Belonging in Today's England*. London: Hope Not Hate Educational Limited
- Gomes, N. (2006). Access to water, pastoral resource management and pastoralists' livelihoods. *Lessons Learned from Water Development in Selected Areas of Eastern Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia)*. Livelihoods Support Programme Working Paper, 26. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation
- Hagen-Zanker, J. and Mallett, R. (2016). *Journeys to Europe: the role of policy in migrant decision-making*. ODI insights. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Vidal, E. M. and Sturge, G. (2017) 'Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Harvey, D. (2008) 'The right to the city' *The City Reader* 6: 23–40
- HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2015) *Report on an unannounced inspection of Heathrow Immigration Removal Centre (Harmondsworth)*. London: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons
- IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2016) *Global Report on Internal Displacement*. Geneva: IDMC
- IOM – International Organization for Migration (2017a) 'Fatal journeys', in *Volume 3, Part 2: Improving data on missing migrants*. Geneva: IOM
- IOM (2017b) *Migration in the 2030 Agenda*. Geneva: IOM
- Jabareen, Y. (2014) "'The right to the city" revisited: assessing urban rights – the case of Arab cities in Israel' *Habitat International* 41: 135–141
- Jägerskog, A. and Swain, A. (2016) *Water, migration and how they are interlinked*. Working Paper. Stockholm: Stockholm International Water Institute
- Jepson, W. and Brown, H. L. (2014) "'If no gasoline, no water": privatizing drinking water quality in South Texas colonias' *Environment and Planning* 46: 1032–1048
- Jónsson, G. (2010) *The environmental factor in migration dynamics – a review of African case studies*. Working Paper 21. International Migration Institute. University of Oxford, UK
- Jung, Y. T., Lou, W. and Cheng, Y. (2017) 'Exposure–response relationship of neighbourhood sanitation and children's diarrhoea' *Trop. Med. Int. Health* 22: 857–865 (<http://doi:10.1111/tmi.12886>)
- Lu, Y. (2010) 'Rural–urban migration and health: evidence from longitudinal data in Indonesia' *Social Science and Medicine* 70(3): 412–419
- Lucci, P., Mansour-Ille, D., Easton-Calabria, E. and Cummings, C. (2016) 'Sustainable cities: internal migration, jobs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Mason, N., Denis Le Seve, M. and Calow, R. (2017) *Future flows: global trends to watch on water and sanitation*. ODI Working Paper 520. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Médecins Sans Frontières (2014) *Dadaab refugees: an uncertain tomorrow*. Geneva: Médecins Sans Frontières (<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bp-dadaab-march-2014-low.pdf>)
- Miletto, M., Caretta, M. A., Burchi, F. M. and Zanlucchi, G. (2017) *Migration and its interdependencies with water scarcity, gender and youth employment*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing
- Mosello, B., Matoso, M., Cummings, C. and Doczi, J. (2016) *Sanitation under stress. How can urban services respond to acute migration?* ODI Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Mounkaïla, H. (2002) 'De la migration circulaire à l'abandon du territoire local dans le Zarmaganda (Niger)' *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 18(2): 161–187
- Nicolai, S., Wales, J. and Aiazzi, E. (2017) 'Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Olsson, L., Eklundh, L. and Ardö, J. (2005) 'A recent greening of the Sahel – trends, patterns and potential causes' *Journal of Arid Environments* 63(3): 556–566
- Opitz-Stapleton, S., Nadin, R., Watson, C. and Kellet, J. (2017) *Climate change, migration and displacement: the need for a risk-informed and coherent approach*. ODI Report. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Pleace, N. (2010) 'Immigration and homelessness' *New Law Journal* 143(6620): 1436–1437
- Ramachandraiah, C. and Vedakumar, M. (2007) 'Hyderabad's water issues and the Musi River: need for integrated solutions', presented at the International Water Conference, Berlin, 12–14 September 2007
- Reuveny, R. (2007) 'Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict' *Political Geography* 26(6): 656–673
- Rios, J. M. and Meyer, P. S. (2006) 'Community building and public health in a South Texas colonia' *National Civic Review* 95(4): 54–57

-
- Roma, E., Buckley, C., Jefferson, B. and Jeffrey, P. (2010) 'Assessing users' experience of shared sanitation facilities: a case study of community ablution blocks in Durban, South Africa' *Water SA* 36(5): 589–594
- Saadeh, M. and Wakim, E. (2017) 'Deterioration of groundwater in Beirut Due to seawater intrusion' *Journal of Geoscience and Environment Protection* 5(11): 149
- Salik, K. M., Qaisrani, A., Umar, M. A. and Ali, S. M. (2017) *Migration futures in Asia and Africa: economic opportunities and distributional effects – the case of Pakistan*. PRISE Working Paper. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute
- Satterthwaite, D. (2004) *The under-estimation of urban poverty in low- and middle-income nations*. Working Paper on Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas 14. London: International Institute of Environment and Development
- Simonet, C. and Jobbins, G. (2016) *Understanding the patterns of climate resilient development: the case of Senegal*. PRISE Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Tacoli, C. (2009) 'Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility' *Environment and Urbanization* 21(2): 513–525
- Tulloch, O., Machingura, F. and Melamed, C. (2016) 'Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing. London: Overseas Development Institute
- UN-Habitat (2016) *Urbanization and development: emerging futures*. World Cities Report 2016. Nairobi: UN-Habitat (<https://unhabitat.org/books/world-cities-report>)
- UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2006) 'Protracted refugee situations: the search for practical solutions', in *The state of the world's refugees 2006*. New York NY: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Oxford University Press
- UNHCR (2017) WASH, protection and accountability. Geneva: UNHCR
- Van Rooijen, D.J. (2011) 'Implications of Urban development for water demand, wastewater generation and reuse in water-stressed cities: case studies from South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa' (doctoral dissertation, Loughborough University, UK)
- WHO and UNICEF – World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund (2017) *Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene: 2017 update and SDG baselines*. Geneva: WHO and UNICEF
- Wilkinson, E., Schipper, L., Simonet, C. and Kubik, Z. (2016) 'Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. ODI Briefing. London: Overseas Development Institute
- WEF – World Economic Forum (2017) *Migration and its impact on cities*. Davos: WEF
- Weinthal, E., Zawahri, N. and Sowers, J. (2015) 'Securitizing water, climate, and migration in Israel, Jordan, and Syria' *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 15(3): 293–307
- Zeitoun, M., Allan, T., Al Aulqi, N., Jabarin, A. and Laamrani, H. (2012) 'Water demand management in Yemen and Jordan: addressing power and interests' *The Geographical Journal* 178(1): 54–66



Solar powered health post, Danaan-Shinile Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) settlement, Ethiopia, 2016 © UNICEF Ethiopia/Mulugeta Ayene

SDGs covered

- 7:** Affordable and clean energy
- 8:** Decent work and economic growth
- 10:** Reduced inequalities
- 16:** Peace, justice and strong institutions
- 17:** Partnerships for the goals

Energy, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Andrew Scott, Leah Worrall and Sam Pickard

Key messages

- Migration can contribute to improving access to reliable, affordable modern energy services (SDG target 7.1) through higher incomes for migrants and the sending of remittances.
- The informal or irregular status of many migrants is a barrier to universal access to modern energy services. Migrants in informal settlements and displaced people often experience a worsening in their access to modern energy services.
- Migrants require knowledge about modern energy services and markets to ensure equitable access to reliable, affordable energy in high-income countries. They may transfer this energy knowledge to their communities of origin.

1 Introduction

International migration is a factor in social and economic development in every region of the world. It can increase investment and development in countries of origin, and reduce poverty among migrants and their families (Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017). Migration within countries, especially from rural to urban areas, can increase migrants' incomes and benefit those remaining in their places of origin. These social and economic gains are only realised with the use of energy, which enables migrants to earn a living and sustain themselves at their destination, as well as to undertake the migration journey itself.

Energy consumption is a prerequisite for social and economic development. High living standards are associated with high per capita energy consumption, and access to modern energy services – electricity and clean fuels and technologies for cooking – is essential for poverty reduction (Pachauri et al., 2013). The services that energy can provide – lighting, cooking, heating, cooling, communications, mobility and motive power – allow people to meet essential consumption needs and to be productive. It is these energy services that contribute to social and economic development rather than the consumption of energy itself. However, the consumption of energy can have detrimental effects on human development, through pollution and the degradation of natural resources.

SDG 7 is to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. But based on current trends, this universal access target will not be achieved: by 2030, 674 million people are expected to be living without electricity and 2.3 billion without clean fuels and technologies for cooking (IEA et al., 2018). Almost 97% of the world's urban population already has access to electricity, though for many supplies are unreliable or unaffordable, and most of those without access in 2030 will live in the rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

SDG 7 also addresses the climate change impacts of energy consumption, which can be reduced by switching to renewable energy sources and reducing energy demand through greater efficiency. Renewable energy is expected to account for 21% of the global energy mix in 2030, a share that neither meets the SDG target nor the ambition

of the Paris Agreement on climate change (IEA et al., 2018). Similarly, progress on improving energy efficiency is unlikely to be enough to achieve the SDG target.

Migrants need energy services wherever they are.¹ However, it is difficult to quantify the amount of energy required by a migrant to live a dignified life, free of poverty. There are also differences between countries, and between rural and urban areas, in the basic level of energy services needed to eliminate energy poverty. These are related to geographical and cultural factors, and along with a lack of data and variation in how access is measured, hamper international comparisons.²

This briefing focuses on the direct and indirect relationships between migration and energy services in places of origin and destination, and how changes due to migration will affect achievement of the SDGs. The next section discusses the role of energy in migration decisions, followed by an analysis of migration's effects on energy services in countries of origin, transit and destination. Section 3 describes how these relationships will affect achievement of the SDGs, recognising that energy is linked to all the SDGs, and finally we conclude with policy recommendations to enhance migration's contribution to SDG 7.

2 The relationship between migration and energy

Decisions to migrate in pursuit of better livelihoods and well-being are closely related to socioeconomic conditions in places of destination and origin. They are also influenced by migrants' social and familial relationships, and by experiences of migration (UNESCO, 2017; Curran et al., 2016; Cummings et al., 2015). Access to and use of energy services is an integral dimension of people's socioeconomic circumstance and well-being (Castán Broto et al., 2017), but is rarely explicitly recognised as a factor in migration decisions. Nor is it considered in current migration debates (except, perhaps, in relation to humanitarian contexts).³

2.1 Is energy a driver of migration?

The links between energy services and migration are best understood in terms of energy's contribution to living standards generally. Access to energy services – or the lack

1 This briefing focuses on international labour migrants, defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) as people who have moved from one country to another for employment purposes (IOM, 2011). Reference to internal migrants and people displaced forcibly will be stated explicitly.

2 The binary (access/no access) measurement of access to electricity does not capture variation in the quantity and quality of electricity consumed. The Multi-Tier Framework (MTF) has been designed to measure energy access in a way that recognises different energy access service levels (Bhatia and Angelou, 2015). The MTF has six tiers of access, ranging from Tier 0, inadequate access for even a basic living standard, to Tier 5 which represents at least 23 hours a day of grid supply. However, statistics about access at different tiers are unavailable, except for a very small number of countries, and are not disaggregated by migration status.

3 The word 'energy', for instance, appears once in the 364-page 2018 *World Migration Report* (IOM, 2017).


of it – may be considered, what van Hear et al. (2012) call, a ‘predisposing factor’ that can lead to migration.

Access to energy services might indirectly influence a decision to migrate through its impact on:

- other established drivers of migration – such as food insecurity, a lack of access to sufficient resources, other basic infrastructure (e.g. roads, water and sanitation), and social services (e.g. healthcare) (Morales, 2017; Wollensack, 2017)
- the livelihoods of farmers and the self-employed: energy poverty can restrict agricultural processing and limit the time available for productive activities, while modern energy services can enable solar-powered water pumps and access to weather information (Morales, 2017)
- social and economic development opportunities, including jobs: energy access can help improve education and skills as well as the productivity of businesses
- resilience to natural disasters: access to easily deployed renewable energy technologies before and after disasters could, for example, allow communities to recover more swiftly (Wollensack, 2017).

Figure 1 Distribution of migrants by level of electrification

■ Universal access (100%) ■ Low access (50–99%)
 ■ Very low access (under 50%)



Source: UNDESA, 2015; IEA et al., 2018.

There is insufficient evidence to establish causation between energy poverty and migration in general (Morales, 2017). This is partly because energy consumption patterns are highly context specific (e.g. relating to geography and climate) and likely to affect migration in different ways. The relationship between energy and migration also depends on the interpretation of migration.

There appears to be more evidence for a causal relationship between internal, rather than international, migration and access to energy services. Research has found a variety of links between migration and electrification in rural areas and peri-urban slums: out-migration can reduce levels of access to electricity, and electrification in places of origin can reduce migration (Harris et al., 2017; IADB, 2014; Beguy et al., 2010). Improved access to electricity in rural Brazil reversed rural–urban migration in some cases (IADB, 2014).

Although it is difficult to discern a *causal* relationship between energy and migration, they are correlated. Most countries with a high proportion of migrants among the total population have universal access to electricity, while migrants represent a small proportion of the population in countries with a low level of electrification. Figure 1 shows the distribution of international migrants by level of access to electricity in countries of destination and origin, in 2015. The great majority of international migrants (86%) reside in destination countries with universal access to electricity, but only 54% of international migrants are from countries with universal access. Countries of destination and origin with very low levels of access to electricity account for the same small proportion (3%) of international migrants. While this suggests migrants are moving to countries with higher levels of energy access, it does not indicate whether migrants’ access to energy improves.

2.2 Effects of migration on energy services in places of origin

The effects of migration on energy services in countries, or places, of origin can be felt in three ways: through households’ consumption of energy; through remittances; and through the transfer of knowledge about energy technologies and uses.

Household energy consumption

The effect of migration on energy consumption in migrants’ places of origin varies. Where fuel needs to be collected by energy-poor households, the reduced availability of labour in households may negatively affect energy access. Women, who bear a disproportionate responsibility for fuel gathering, will be affected most when migrants from the household are female.

Migration can reduce the demand for household energy in places of origin, which may in turn reduce the burden of fuel collection for women and girls at lower tiers of energy access. When the supply of electricity

is from, for example, community-owned solar systems with limited capacity, migration could improve access to electricity for those who remain behind. But, when electricity is from the grid or a mini-grid, migration could reduce demand and revenue to the service provider.

Remittances

Existing levels of income and access to electricity affect individuals' ability to migrate and remit. In Mexico, municipalities with low levels of poverty and higher baseline rates of electrification were more likely to benefit from the 3x1 Programme for Migrants (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2011).⁴ Evidence from Thailand suggests that electrified households were more likely to have migrants, but were less likely to remit (Garip, 2010). This could be explained by the fact that electrified households are also likely to be higher-income households, can afford electricity access and use, and are less reliant on remittances.

Recipients can use remittances for consumption expenditure or investment for longer-term social and economic benefit (UNDP, 2018). Remittances can affect the level of household energy consumption. For example, analysis in China found a 1% increase in remittances leads to a small (0.09%) reduction in firewood consumption in communities of origin (Gong, 2011). This suggests recipients invested some of their remittances in improved energy services (though the reduction in firewood collection was also influenced by other factors such as income and perception of future poverty status).

Some studies have shown that, at the macroeconomic level, remittances have had a positive impact on human development through increases in household incomes. As energy consumption is closely correlated with income, energy services are likely to have contributed to this (Sanchez-Loor and Zambrano-Monseratte, 2015): in Asia, a long-term causality was established between economic growth, and remittances and electricity consumption (ibid.). However, the effect of remittances on electricity consumption is not necessarily in the same direction, nor is it clear that there is always a direct link between remittances and energy consumption.

In Morocco, Akçay and Demirtaş (2015) found that remittances were used for energy consumption in the short- and long-term, and indirectly influenced economic growth and industrialisation processes. In Tajikistan, remittances are often used to pay for energy services but are at risk – temporarily or permanently – because of difficulties faced by migrants in destination countries (World Bank, 2015). To increase remittance inflows more generally, Akçay and Demirtaş (2015) identify several policies that can help to create a strong enabling environment, which in turn can contribute

to energy access. These include formalising remittance flows into the country and lowering the transfer costs and taxes on such transactions; minimising the risks to remittance transfers and increasing transparency; and the promotion of financial inclusion and literacy, as well as improvements in the business environment.

There are also linkages between energy and remittances through global energy prices. Rising oil prices have a small, but significant, positive impact on remittance flows from oil-producing Middle Eastern countries, which are economically important for migrants' countries of origin (Ratha, 2015). Falling oil prices, and higher taxes in the Middle East, reduce remittances, and the number of migrants from South Asia (Karim Byron, 2016; Rahman, 2018).

Fluctuations in global energy prices have the greatest proportional impact on low-income consumers (Mendelson, 2013), who may already be reliant on remittance flows. Evidence suggests that single mothers without access to remittances are particularly vulnerable to energy price increases (World Bank, 2015).

Along with consumer financing mechanisms (e.g. mobile banking), remittances are starting to contribute to the delivery of renewable energy technologies to the off-grid and under-electrified poor in developing countries (Mendelson, 2013). Remittances can be specifically provided to support investment in energy services in migrants' original households and communities, including investments that improve energy access and energy efficiency.

Several initiatives in Latin America direct remittances towards improving energy access. A clean-energy technology deployment programme is aiming to increase rural energy access in Ecuador, linked to a financial remittance mechanism (IFAD, 2009), and EcoBazar has begun selling solar water heaters, having marketed the opportunity among remittance providers in Spain and recipients in Bolivia (NDF et al., 2015). Meanwhile, Mexico's 3x1 Programme for Migrants is encouraging investment in local development, including electrification projects.

In Haiti, a pilot scheme to target remittances from the Haitian diaspora to finance solar lanterns and solar home systems reached 30,000 beneficiaries in 2013. The scheme targeted the country's marginalised and energy-poor households, enabling them to displace dirtier fuels (e.g. diesel, candles and kerosene) and reduce household air pollution (Mendelson, 2013; Fomin and ArcFinance, 2014; Fomin, 2015).

Knowledge transfer

Technological progress in developing countries is strongly influenced by their ability to access, adapt and diffuse

⁴ Under this programme, the amount received in remittances is trebled by the government at municipal, state and federal government levels (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012).

technological knowledge generated abroad (UNCTAD, 2014). Policies that encourage mobility can also enhance innovation capabilities in developing countries (IRENA, 2013). Migrants' transfer of energy-related knowledge from high-income countries may therefore be important for energy development in countries of origin.

Though research evidence on this link is generally lacking, there are examples of how international mobility has promoted energy-related skills in countries of origin.

Indian expatriates employed in Europe and working in a variety of sectors, including the energy sector, were found to be important mobilisers of knowledge. Of the four channels analysed for their development impact – physical return, financial transfers, social impact and knowledge transfer – the last was found to be the most important. However, physical return of migrants was an important pre-requisite for diaspora knowledge transfer (EPFL et al., 2013).

Knowledge transfer can also occur *before* a migrant has returned to their country of origin. One skilled migrant who was living in the United States transferred solar and wind technology capabilities back to their country of origin, Bangladesh, through a non-profit organisation (Sultana, 2005). The migrant's organisation supported implementing partners in Bangladesh to learn from mature foreign companies and develop local partnerships. Smaller firms developed the capacity to assemble batteries and solar products (excluding the panels themselves), by gaining access to imports and technological know-how (Sultana, 2005).

However, permanent migration of educated people can result in a loss in a country's stock of human capital and reduce its capacity to receive technology transfers (UNCTAD, 2014). Moreover, migrants that develop energy-related skills overseas do not necessarily return to their countries of origin. For example, the European Centre for Nuclear Research Switzerland, found that 55% of fellows take up jobs in a different country to the country in which they obtained their diploma (Nilsen and Anelli, 2015).

2.3 Energy in transit countries

Migrants in transit may be particularly vulnerable to energy poverty, but even less is known about how this group of people access energy services. According to a recent World Bank report:

The literature is silent on the impacts of transit migration on the migrants themselves; the families they leave behind; and the origin, transit, and final destination countries' (KNOMAD, 2018).

Migrants in transit may be especially unlikely to be able to access modern energy services because of challenges in securing good-quality accommodation and legal connections to utility services at each point along their journey.

Access to electricity is essential for migrants in transit to power mobile phones, which allow them to maintain contact with their families and connect to the internet,

Box 1 Energy for displaced people

More than 135 million people currently need humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, 2018), including refugees and displaced people. With most living in informal settlements and rented accommodation (Morales, 2017), they are particularly likely to have a lower level of energy access because of migration. Access to clean energy is especially lacking for displaced people living in camps – 80% have 'absolutely minimal access to energy' (Lahn and Grafham, 2015).

Energy consumption in the humanitarian sector is often inefficient, polluting, unsafe for the users and harmful to the surrounding environment (GIZ, 2017). Camp infrastructure is often run on diesel-fuelled generators, at an estimated cost of \$100 million annually (Bailey et al., 2017). The Moving Energy Initiative has estimated a one-off investment to provide all displaced households with basic access to energy (clean cooking stoves and solar lanterns) at \$355 million – approximately the amount that would be saved annually in fuel costs (Lahn and Grafham, 2015).

The humanitarian sector's slow progress to reduce energy poverty can be explained by: a lack of a formalised or funded mechanisms for international agencies to coordinate energy-related humanitarian assistance (Callaghy and Riddley, 2017); displaced people and refugees being less likely to be a priority for policy-makers (GIZ, 2017); insufficiently long-term funding horizons (Bailey et al., 2017); and a difference in skills and objectives between the development and humanitarian sectors (ibid.).

In Athens, plans to grow the housing stock for refugees and migrants, with the city paying for utilities and basic electrical appliances, provide an example of action being undertaken to address these constraints (WEF, 2017).

Elsewhere, solar powered water pumps have been installed in the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya to replace diesel generators, and a new solar farm is being built to provide power to both the Azraq refugee camp and nearby villages in Jordan (Morales, 2017). The 'Global Plan of Action for Sustainable Energy Solutions in Situations of Displacement' (GPA) aims to improve coordination and support by humanitarian organisations to address the energy needs of displaced people in camps, urban settings, informal settlements as well as local host communities.

to find accommodation and essential amenities, as well as maps for their route (Cummings et al., 2015; IOM, 2017). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found that only 46% of Syrian refugees arriving in Europe received adequate assistance to charge their phone. In the absence of support, such as the solar-powered charging stations provided in some camps and along major transit routes (Kellerhals, 2016; Hartocollis, 2015), payments for charging or improvised and irregular connections to electricity may be necessary.

2.4 Effects of migration on energy services in places of destination

The absence of comprehensive data on where migrants settle and what their lives are like in host countries (UNESCO, 2017; WEF, 2017) means there is limited evidence about how migrants use energy services and how migrants' energy consumption affects their destination. Understanding the impact of migration on international migrants' welfare 'largely depend[s] on the level of human development in their home countries' (Esipova et al., 2011), but data comparing migrants' current and previous energy use are scarce. Where energy supplies are already constrained, migrants' demand for energy services could decrease access for established residents.⁵ On the other hand, migration and its broad range of benefits could lead to more investment in energy services, which in turn benefits host communities.⁶

While migrants settle predominantly in cities (WEF, 2017), and rural-to-urban migrants (both internal and international) form a significant part of the urban poor (ITDG, 1998; IOM, 2017; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016; Singh et al., 2014), it is important to note that some migrants do not, that not all migrants are poor, and that all the 'urban poor' are not migrants. It is therefore difficult to generalise migrants' experiences with energy

(see also Box 2, for example). However, drawing on the evidence that is available – including anecdotal evidence – we can make some links between migration and energy services in destination countries.

The quantity, quality and type of energy consumed

People migrating from rural households that have limited access to modern energy services may consume a smaller quantity of primary energy at their destination, but experience an increase in the quality of energy as well as the efficiency with which they consume it. This shift is attributed to migrants from rural areas reducing the inefficient burning of biomass fuels on open fires in developing countries. In Australia, migration increased migrants' energy efficiency, because the energy infrastructure 'tightly scripted' energy consumption practices (Maller, 2011). International and internal migration in Mexico helped a transition away from the use of wood for cooking, towards gas (Manning and Taylor, 2014). Figure 2 shows that rural-to-urban migrants in China shift away from crop residues and wood towards gas and electricity, and for some migrants towards coal (Ru et al., 2015). The quantity of household energy consumed by migrants (MI in Figure 2) was lower than that of rural households, but higher than that of indigenous urban households (Shen et al., 2017).

Studies of migrants from developing countries living in rich destination countries suggest significant positive changes in migrants' access to modern energy services because of the higher standard of energy infrastructure in the destination country (Kadundu et al., 2016; Maller, 2011). Migrants from Democratic Republic of Congo living in France were impressed, not only by the reliability of access, but also the improved quality – for example, being able to use multiple electric appliances simultaneously


Box 2 Migrants have different energy experiences

In 2015, migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan represented approximately one-third of registered migrants in Russia, but the profile of migrants from each country is markedly different. A majority from the Kyrgyz Republic came from industrialised cities but migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan tended to emigrate from rural households. While migrants from these three countries were most likely to be male, young, and working in construction (UNDP, 2015) – which suggests their current energy consumption patterns may be similar – different conditions in their places of origin mean that the impact of migration on their energy consumption is likely to vary. Moreover, this profile of a migrant contrasts with the global picture, which shows that almost half of the world's migrants are women, and is not even representative for migrants in Russia, where only one-quarter of migrants are employed in the construction sector for their first job (UNDP, 2015).

5 In Ghana, the Mayor of Kumasi blamed migration for putting pressure on the city's housing supply and the resulting creation of slums which had poor access to electricity (IOM, 2017). In Eastern Africa, wood fuel supply near refugee camps is severely depleted for the indigenous population (Morales, 2017).

6 In Davao, Philippines the migrant demand for electricity was cited as a reason for the local government to invest in a new coal-fired power plant (WEF, 2017). Support for energy services in refugee camps may be extended to the indigent population (Morales, 2017).

Figure 2 Energy sources used by urban migrants in China



Source: Ru et al., 2015.

(Kadundu et al., 2016). But migration alone does not always result in better access to modern energy services.

Comparisons between migrants' access to energy and that of the indigenous population show mixed findings. In Spain, migrant women were found to be particularly vulnerable to energy poverty (Gonzalez-Pijuan, 2018). Across Europe, non-EU migrants were found to 'experience systematically higher levels of energy poverty' than intra-EU migrants and EU citizens residing in their home country (Bollino and Botti, 2017). But in China, the share of internal migrants using clean cooking fuels was higher than that of the general urban population (Aunan and Wang, 2014).

Energy access is affected by a range of non-technical factors that must be considered alongside whether a reliable electricity or gas connection is available (Bhatia and Angelou, 2015; Castán Broto et al., 2017). Although relative prices are key, households may continue to use lower quality fuels, because they perceive them to be cheaper, cannot afford large upfront costs for appliances, or prefer to buy fuels in the smaller quantities in which inferior fuels are sold (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016; Phillimore, 2014; Taylor et al., 2011). The need for behavioural change can also constrain a household's transition to improved energy services (ITDG, 1998; Kadundu et al., 2016). Knowledge from other contexts can increase migrants' resilience to energy access barriers or shocks (Maller, 2011).

Migrants' familiarity with how the energy system works in the host context is also important. Research in Australia, France and the UK has shown that migrants are less likely than the general population to be aware of welfare measures to secure energy access, and less likely

to be 'energy literate' – that, to have an understanding of the energy market, tariffs and affordability measures such as energy efficiency drives (ECC, 2016; Barnes et al., 2014; Kadundu et al., 2016; South Seeds, 2016).

The effect of insecurity and informality

The quality of migrants' accommodation at their destination affects the pattern and quantity of their energy usage. In South African cities that have experienced considerable levels of in-migration, poor households living in older, low-quality housing were found to be less likely to have access to reliable electricity and modern cooking fuels (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016). Migrants in Europe face challenges related to poor quality housing (Phillimore, 2014), and low-quality housing and inefficient appliances can lead to energy poverty for both the income and non-income poor (Bollino and Botti, 2017).

Migrants who belong to the category of urban poor are likely to live in informal accommodation or slums, and therefore experience unsafe housing conditions and a lack of basic infrastructure (IOM, 2017). The out-of-city location of peri-urban slums can also increase transport needs, with associated energy impacts (IOM, 2017; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016). A recent study found that 'most rural-urban migrants residing in illegal settlements and urban slum areas are poor and have limited access to affordable, reliable electricity' (Singh et al., 2014). Insecure land tenure and being forced to rent accommodation have been linked to energy poverty in Europe (Bollino and Botti, 2017).

Informality can also prevent modern energy services reaching migrant households, for the Roma population in new EU member states, for example (World Bank, 2015).

In Beijing, millions of undocumented internal migrants live in shanties where piped natural gas or centralised heating are rarely available (Ru et al., 2015; Shen et al., 2017). And attempts to substitute coal with electricity for space heating in Beijing were initially targeted only at officially registered households (Ru et al., 2015). Households that have indirect, sometimes illegal, connections to electricity grids through neighbouring properties often pay more per unit and are also excluded from receiving consumer energy subsidies to which they would otherwise be entitled (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016).

However, poor living conditions are not always an indicator of energy poverty. For example, a report by Human Rights Watch – which lamented the cramped, dirty, and dark living conditions of migrant workers in Qatar – suggested that they did have electricity connections and gas stoves (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Outside cities, information about housing for migrant farm workers in the US suggested access to modern energy services (Hamilton and Dudley, 2010).

Migrants' housing can be temporary as well as informal. In Moscow, 40% of labour migrants were found to be living in 'abandoned factories, basements, and trailers' (Centre for Migration Research, 2014). The inherently insecure accommodation in these situations is unlikely to provide high quality access to modern energy sources.

Support for access to modern energy services is available in some countries for low-income urban households – including migrants. In Thailand, low-cost housing schemes for slum dwellers explicitly included electricity connections, and temporary household registration allowed more households to be connected directly, and legally, to the grid (Shrestha et al., 2008). In brownfield areas of Brussels, Re-Vive are building low-energy and passive housing for these groups (WEF, 2017), while in Glasgow, South Seeds help migrants navigate the energy market and provide them with technical support to improve household energy efficiency (South Seeds, 2016).

However, many municipal governments are unable to respond to the challenges posed by the rate of immigration (IOM, 2017; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016), and government policy may not consider electricity a basic need for the urban poor (Singh et al., 2014; Castán Broto et al., 2017). National policies for migrant inclusion and energy access do not necessarily translate to the integration of migrants and provision of access to modern energy services at city level (IOM, 2017; WEF, 2017; Singh et al., 2014). These policy issues can be especially acute for peri-urban settlements, which can fall beyond the purview of municipal authorities (Castán Broto, et al., 2017).

Environmental impacts

There has been little research on the impact of international migration on energy-related greenhouse gas and particle

emissions. The effect depends on the absolute number of migrants in destination countries, their proportion of the total population, and their energy consumption patterns – factors which vary significantly between countries. Although the US, for example, hosts the largest number of migrants, they comprise a much smaller proportion of the population than in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, where migrants account for 80% to 90% of the resident population (KNOMAD, 2018). In these countries, migrants seem less likely to consume as much energy as the indigenous population. However, urbanisation tends to increase per capita primary energy consumption in higher income countries while decreasing it in lower income countries (Belloumi and Alshehry, 2016).

Although urbanisation has been linked to increased greenhouse gas emissions (Belloumi and Alshehry, 2016), the relationship between migration and emissions, and other air pollutants, remains unclear, involves competing factors and appears to vary by context. For example, if migration leads to an increase in income or a move to a less hospitable climate, migrants may be more likely to consume more energy services, which, other things being equal, would increase emissions. But migration often changes the *types* of energy available and thus changes the types of fuel used to provide the energy services and the resulting pollutants produced. In their place of destination, migrants may have access to different appliances and combustion technologies – potentially increasing the energy efficiency and decreasing the emissions per unit of energy consumed – but actual impacts vary, depending on the migrants themselves.

Research in Viet Nam found that internal migrants from rural areas were likely to produce fewer emissions per capita than migrants from urban areas and indigenous residents (Komatsu et al., 2013). The boundaries of the analysis are also important because although fuels like electricity and natural gas may be 'cleaner' at the household level, the greenhouse gas implications associated with their use must also account for upstream emissions (e.g. those released by coal-fired power stations or during the production and processing of methane).

Finally, while the impact of greenhouse gases like CO₂ is global, fuel use produces many other local air pollutants (some of which also have climate impacts). In terms of assessing the harm from air pollution, driven by internal and international migration, urbanisation has relocated and concentrated both emissions and populations in cities, particularly in informal settlements where ambient air quality may already be impacted by other emission sources (e.g. transport), therefore yielding greater harm (Shen et al., 2017). Thus, while urbanisation may decrease particulate emissions at the household level, migrants and non-migrants may be subject to higher concentrations of air pollutants because of the general housing density and other pollutant sources in informal and urban settlements that many migrants inhabit.

3 Energy, migration and the SDGs

The enabling role of energy in social and economic development means there are direct and indirect links between SDG 7 and the other 16 SDGs (Nerini et al., 2018; McCollum et al., 2018; ICSU, 2017). Detailed analysis of these links suggests that the positive links outweigh the negative (McCollum et al., 2018), but that change in energy systems will be required to achieve almost two-thirds of the 169 SDG targets (Nerini et al., 2018), including targets related to migration (8.8, 16.2 and 17.18). Table 1 summarises the migration links to the energy targets (SDG 7). Table 2 summarises the energy links to the targets relating to migration.

Migration can contribute to achieving SDG target 7.1, universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services. The level of energy access is often greater at migrants' destinations than at their places of origin. The urban destinations of rural-to-urban migrants have higher levels of access than rural areas. Migrants in countries where average income levels are higher are likely to have improved access to energy services and to consume more energy. This is not to say that migration always contributes to target 7.1: in urban slums, access may be no better than in rural areas, while migrants in countries with the same level of development as their origin country may have similar levels of access. Many people who are forcibly displaced have worse access.

Income levels are likely to be a stronger determinant of access to modern energy services than migrant status.

In terms of numbers, the energy access deficit is primarily a rural experience. The challenge of achieving universal access to affordable and reliable modern energy services (target 7.1) is in rural areas, where people migrate from rather than to. Migration can contribute to improving access in rural areas through remittances, although the extent to which this is occurring is unknown.

The target to increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix (target 7.2) requires switching electricity generation and fuel consumption for transport and industry to renewable energy sources. While many migrants do switch energy sources at their place of destination, the contribution of migration to target 7.2 cannot be determined from the evidence available.

Migrants experiencing improved access to modern energy services are likely to be consuming energy more efficiently, contributing to target 7.3. For example, a switch to kerosene or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking energy is more efficient than using a traditional wood fuel stove. The infrastructure and use of energy-efficient appliances in rich destination countries, can also improve migrants' energy efficiency. However, the greatest gains for achieving target 7.3 are to be had in industry (where migrants may be employed), transport (including during migration) and buildings (where migrants live and work).

Table 1 Migration links to SDG 7 targets

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services	Migration can help improve access to affordable, reliable modern energy services. The general level of access (absolutely and in terms of tiers of access) may be higher in destination countries, and access in towns and cities is higher than in rural areas. Cash and in-kind remittances may be used to enhance access to modern energy services in migrants' places of origin.
7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix	Migration presents an opportunity to switch from fossil fuel energy to renewable energy. Migrants in urban areas are likely to reduce their use of kerosene and use electricity for lighting. However, electricity may be from the grid, with no opportunity for migrants, except in high income countries, to choose the energy source for its generated. Switching to LPG or natural gas for cooking in places of destination may reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but would not increase the share of renewables in the energy mix.
7.3 By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency	Migrants are likely to adopt more efficient energy uses in destination countries and cities (e.g. electricity, clean fuels for cooking).
7.a By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology	International cooperation on energy access, renewable energy and energy efficiency does not explicitly include the needs of migrants. International cooperation on migration does not explicitly consider migrants' energy needs, except in humanitarian contexts. A 'Global Plan of Action for Sustainable Energy Solutions in Situations of Displacement' is being developed.
7.b By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, and small island developing states	Investment in infrastructure and clean energy technologies in least developed countries, small island developing states and other developing countries can benefit migrants in these countries. Remittances from international migrants can support this investment.

Source: UN, 2015b; Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017.

Migration has been directly linked to five SDG targets that are not energy-related (see Table 2; and Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017). Achievement of three of these (8.8, 16.2 and 17.18) requires action within energy systems – to address labour rights and working conditions in the production and supply of energy services, and to support appropriate development of energy systems in developing countries (Nerini et al., 2018). There are also synergies between action to achieve SDG 7 and targets 8.8 and 17.18. For example, employment, innovation and sustainable economic growth are closely linked to the expansion of modern energy services (ICSU, 2017).

Links have been identified between migration and 30 targets, across 13 goals, in addition to the targets that mention migration issues (McCollum et al., 2018; Nerini et al., 2018; ICSU, 2017). Each of these targets has an energy dimension, with a uni-directional or bi-directional link to energy (i.e. SDG 7). These energy and migration links are summarised in the online Annex.

4 Conclusions and recommendations

Progress towards achieving the SDG 7 targets will determine achievement of all the SDGs. This progress will be affected by the international and internal movement of people in pursuit of better livelihoods. As with other development processes, migration is itself enabled by using energy services – to feed and sustain people during their journeys and transport them to their destinations.

The benefits of migration, in terms of higher incomes, improved standards of living and the remittance of resources to home communities are made possible by energy services. Although there are clearly direct and indirect relationships between migration and energy consumption, these links have rarely been explained and there is little empirical evidence about them. However, we can draw some conclusions from the evidence that is available.

Table 2 Energy links to migration targets

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment	Target may require action to be taken on labour rights and working conditions in relation to energy systems (e.g. in fuel supply chains and power plants). Safe and secure working environments can be supported by modern energy services.
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	Access to modern energy services for migrants is necessary to ensure safe and responsible migration. Energy is essential for lighting, cooking and communications during migration, as well as for mobility. Migration policies should consider migrants' needs for energy services in transit.
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%	Energy prices are unlikely to affect the transaction costs of sending remittances. Remittances can be used to improve recipients' access to energy.
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	Target requires action to be taken in relation to forced labour, slavery, trafficking, etc. in energy systems. For instance, this requires the immediate end of child labour in energy systems.
17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts	Target includes capacity-building activities relating to energy systems (e.g. for solar, wind power and efficient cook stoves). The development of sustainable energy systems depends on capacity building efforts; and underpinning data to monitor the energy access/sustainability challenges (e.g. World Bank's Global Tracking Framework).

Source: Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2017; McCollum et al., 2018; Nerini et al., 2017.

Conclusion 1 Regular migration can contribute to improving access to modern energy services

Migrants tend to move to places and countries where the level of access to electricity and clean fuels and technologies for cooking is higher. They live predominantly in urban settlements. However, the great majority of people without any access to modern energy services live in rural areas. Achieving universal access, and thus the eradication of poverty, require investment in energy services for populations in rural areas that have not migrated. Remittances can be used to contribute to improving access to reliable and sustainable energy services in migrants' places of origin.

Recommendations

Governments in countries with significant out-migration should:

- introduce finance mechanisms for the use of remittances to provide access to modern energy services in rural areas, through electrification projects or household electrical products such as solar home systems. Mexico's 3x1 programme is an example.
- adopt appropriate fiscal incentives (e.g. duty-free import and zero-rated value added tax on solar products) that would encourage the wider development of affordable modern energy services.

Relevant SDG targets

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

7.b By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular, least developed countries and small island developing states

Conclusion 2 The informal or irregular status of many migrants is a barrier to universal access to modern energy services

Migrants in informal settlements or with irregular migration status, may be prevented from connecting to services provided by utilities, and receiving support (including subsidies) intended to enable access to modern energy services. When they do have access, they may pay more per unit of energy than registered households.

Recommendations

Governments should regard access to modern energy services (electricity and clean fuels and cooking technology) as an essential basic service. They should:

- develop and implement plans to ensure universal access – including migrants and displaced people – is achieved by 2030, in line with SDG 7
- facilitate registration of temporary migrants and citizenship for long-term migrants, to enable them to secure access to modern energy services.

Relevant SDG targets

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status

Conclusion 3 Migrants to high-income countries gain energy-related skills and knowledge which can be transferred to their places of origin

The transfer of knowledge about solar home systems, electrical appliances, or energy-use behaviour, may occur while migrants remain in their place of destination or, more significantly, when they return. There is some evidence that return migration is the more effective vehicle for the transfer of skills and knowledge.

Recommendations

Developing country governments should consider migration an avenue to gaining energy-related knowledge and skills, to enhance low levels of domestic innovation. They should:

- promote knowledge and skills transfer from migrants through bilateral or regional trade agreements which include, for example, provisions on the movement of people for skills development
- provide incentives for migrants to return to their places of origin to facilitate the transfer of knowledge about energy technologies and uses.

Relevant SDG targets

4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development

10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status

Conclusion 4 Migrants in high-income countries often encounter energy services and energy markets that are very different to those in their place of origin

Migrants from developing countries may need help to use the more sophisticated energy services and markets found in high-income countries (e.g. reliable grid electricity, piped gas distribution, multiple suppliers and tariffs). This would help reduce inequalities in access and inefficient use of energy, and avoid unnecessarily high energy costs for migrants.

Recommendations

Governments of high-income countries should:

- support advisory and information services for migrants from developing countries that increase energy literacy and facilitate migrants' effective use of energy services
- ensure support through subsidies and tariff concessions is available to eligible migrants.

Relevant SDG targets

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status

Conclusion 5 Policies and regulations in countries of both destination and origin shape the relationships between migration, energy and progress towards the SDGs

Policy frameworks can enhance the positive effects of migration on energy access (e.g. by facilitating remittances for this purpose) or constrain them (e.g. by limiting people's mobility and the transfer of knowledge). The wide range of inter-linkages between energy and

the SDG targets, across all SDGs, calls for greater coordination across sectors, while planners and decision-makers in the energy sector need to take migration into account in their decision-making.

Recommendations

Energy sector decision-makers and planners, at national and local level, should:

- include migrants' need for access to affordable and reliable modern energy services when formulating plans and programmes to deliver universal access by 2030
- in high-income countries, focus on equitable access to energy services, by ensuring affordability and providing public information about energy services
- develop plans to deliver universal access to reliable and affordable energy services in developing countries that include unserved populations in both rural and urban areas.

Relevant SDG targets

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries

16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries

16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

Conclusion 6 Knowledge about migrants' use of energy and how this affects their welfare and livelihood is limited

When available, household energy statistics are not usually disaggregated by migration status. Migrants' energy needs may be overlooked in the planning and provision of basic services because of lack of knowledge. This gap is beginning to be addressed in humanitarian contexts, with the launch of a Global Plan of Action, but appears to be rarely explicitly considered for international migrants.

Recommendations

Governments and international organisations should:

- support research to enhance understanding of the way access and use of energy affects the welfare and income opportunities of migrants
- ensure household energy statistics are collected in a way that allows disaggregation by migratory status. This includes data about tiers of access, as defined in the Multi-Tier Framework.

Relevant SDG targets

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services.

11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

We are grateful to the following for comments on a draft of this paper: Helen Dempster (ODI), Jessica Hagen-Zanker (ODI), Nathaniel Mason (ODI), Long Seng To (University of Loughborough), Anne Savery Tchourine (EDA), Reto Thönen (EDA), Guillaume Cassaigneau (EDA) and Simon Büschi (BFE).

References

- Akçay, S. and Demirtaş, G. (2015) 'Remittances and energy consumption: evidence from Morocco' *International Migration* 53(6): 125–144
- Amnesty International (2013) *The dark side of migration: spotlight on Qatar's construction sector ahead of the World Cup*. London: Amnesty International
- Aparicio, F.J. and Meseguer, C. (2012) 'Collective remittances and the state: the 3x1 Program in Mexican municipalities' *World Development* 40(1): 206–222
- Aunan, K., and Wang, S. (2014) 'Internal migration and urbanization in China: impacts on population exposure to household air pollution (2000–2010)' *Science of the Total Environment* 481: 186–195
- Bailey, R., Lahn, G. and Grafham, O. (2017) *Policy, advocacy and host country resilience: supporting national and local development plans*. Background paper for 'Energy for Displaced People: A Global Plan of Action for Sustainable Energy Solutions in Situations of Displacement', Berlin 15–16 January 2018
- Barnes, M., McKnight, A., Kotecha, M., Green, K., Morrell, G., Swales, K., Toomse-Smith, M. and Wood, M. (2014) *Understanding the behaviours of households in fuel poverty. a review of research evidence*. London: UK Department for Energy and Climate Change
- Beguy, D., Bocquier, P. and Zulu, E. (2010) 'Circular migration patterns and determinants in Nairobi slum settlements' *Demographic Research* 23(20): 549–586
- Belloumi, M. and Alshehry, A.S. (2016) 'The Impact of Urbanization on Energy Intensity in Saudi Arabia' *Sustainability* 8: 375
- Bhatia, M. and Angelou, N. (2015) *Beyond Connections: Energy Access Redefined*. Washington DC: ESMAP, World Bank
- Bollino, C.A. and Botti, F. (2017) 'Energy poverty in Europe: a multidimensional approach' *PSL Quarterly Review* 70(283): 473–507
- Callaghy, K. and Riddley, K. (2017) *Planning and coordination – emergency and protracted crises*. Background paper for 'Energy for Displaced People: A Global Plan of Action for Sustainable Energy Solutions in Situations of Displacement', Berlin 15–16 January 2018
- Castán Broto, V., Stevens, L., Ackom, E., Tomei, J., Parikh, P., Bisaga, I., To, L.S., Kirshener, J. and Mulugetta, Y. (2017) 'A research agenda for a people-centred approach to energy access in the urbanizing global south' *Nature Energy* 2: 776–779
- Centre for Migration Research (2014) Защита прав москвичей в условиях массовой миграции, Moscow, cited in UNDP (2015) (www.hse.ru/pubs/lib/data/access/ram/ticket/42/1440070295402d2ca1dc001712b71dba8cb6884c44/Blok.pdf)
- Cummings, C., Pacitto, J., Lauro, D. and Foresti, M. (2015) *Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends of migration to Europe*. ODI Working Paper 430. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Curran, S., Meijer-Irons, J. and Garip, F. (2016) Economic Shock and Migration: Differential economic effects, migrant responses, and migrant cumulative causation in Thailand. *Sociology of Development* 2(2): 119–157
- Dustman, C. and Okatenko, A. (2014) 'Out-migration, wealth constraints, and the quality of local amenities' *Journal of Development Economics* 110: 52–63
- ECC – Ethnic Communities Council of New South Wales (2016) *Experiences of energy consumption for culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities*. ECC
- EPFL – Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne/Cooperation and Development Center, IDSK – Institute of Development Studies Kolkata, JNU – Jawaharlal Nehru University and ILO – International Labour Office (2013) *Migration, scientific diasporas and development: impact of skilled return migration on development in India*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration
- Esipova, N., Ray, J. and Pugliese, A. (2011) 'Gallup World Poll: The many faces of global migration.' Based on research in more than 150 countries. International Organization for Migration in collaboration with Gallup. Geneva: International Organization for Migration
- EU EI – European Union Energy Initiative (2017) *Enlightening the migration debate: the importance of sustainable energy access*. Brussels, 31 January 2017
- Fomin (Multilateral Investment Fund Member of the IDB Group) (2015) 'MIF supports scaled-up program using remittances to fund renewable energy in Haiti.' Press Release, 23 July (www.fomin.org/en-us/HomeOld2015/News/PressReleases/ArtMID/3819/ArticleID/3086/MIF-supports-scaled-up-program-using-remittances-to-fund-renewable-energy-in-Haiti.aspx)

- Fomin and Arc Finance (2014) *Using remittances to finance clean energy: Inspiring the Haitian diaspora to combat climate change*. New York NY: Fomin
- Foresti, M. and Hagen-Zanker, J. (2017) *Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: executive summary*. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Garip, F. (2010) *The impact of migration and remittances on wealth accumulation and distribution in rural Thailand*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University
- GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (2017) Background paper for ‘Energy for Displaced People: A Global Plan of Action for Sustainable Energy Solutions in Situations of Displacement’, Berlin. 15–16 January 2018
- Gong, Y. (2011) ‘Does labour out-migration reduce firewood consumption?’ Presentation to International Seminar on Internal Migration and Urbanization and Their Socioeconomic Impacts in Developing Countries: Challenges and Policy Responses, Fuzhou, China, 10-12 December 2011. Paris: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population <http://archive.iussp.org/members/restricted/publications/Fuzhou11/Gong.pdf>
- Gonzalez Pijuan, I. (2018) *Gender inequality and energy poverty: a forgotten risk factor*. Barcelona: The Catalan Association of Engineering Without Borders
- Hamilton, E. and Dudley, M.J. (2010) *Farmworker housing: policy considerations for New York State*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Farmworker Program and PathStone Corporation
- Harris, T., Collinson, M. and Wittenberg, M. (2017) ‘Aiming for a moving target: the dynamics of household electricity connections in a developing context’ *World Development* 97: 14–26
- Hartocollis, A. (2015) ‘Migrants in Serbia create makeshift charging stations for smartphones’ *New York Times*, 30 August
- Heinrich Böll Stiftung (2016) *Energy poverty and gender in urban South Africa*. Africa’s Energy Future Project. Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa
- Human Rights Watch (2015) *Migrant workers’ rights on Saadiyat Island in the United Arab Emirates: 2015 progress report*. New York: Human Rights Watch
- Husar, J. and Bes, D. (2013) *Energy investments and technology transfer across emerging economies: the case of Brazil and China*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/International Energy Agency
- ICSU – International Council for Science (2017) *A guide to SDG interactions: from science to implementation*. Paris: ICSU
- IEA – International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency, United Nations Statistics Division, The World Bank Group and World Health Organisation (2018) *Tracking SDG 7: the energy progress report 2018*. Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development (2009) *Remittances: sending money home*. Rome: IFAD
- IADB – Inter-American Development Bank (2014) ‘Could universal energy access help slow the growth of our cities?’ IADB blog, 19 June (<https://blogs.iadb.org/ciudadessostenibles/2014/06/19/could-universal-energyaccess-helpslow-growth-of-cities>)
- IOM (2011) *Glossary on migration*. International Migration Law Series No. 25. Geneva: IOM.
- IOM – International Organization for Migration (2017) *World MIGRATION REPORT 2018*. Geneva: IOM
- IRENA – International Renewable Energy Agency (2013) *Renewable energy innovation policy: success criteria and strategies*. Paris: IRENA
- ITDG (1998) *Energy provision to the urban poor*. Contract No: R7182 Issues Paper written for: Department for International Development Knowledge and Research. London: Department for International Development
- Kadundu, P., Karhamikire, Le Roux, D., Douzou, S. and Estibals, O. (2016) ‘Energy demand dynamics beyond borders: An exploratory case study of Congolese (DRC) migrants in France’, Working paper prepared for DEMAND Centre Conference, Lancaster, 13–15 April 2016
- Karim Byron, R. (2016) ‘Remittance inflow from Middle East slows’ *The Daily Star*, 22 July 2016. (www.thedailystar.net/business/remittance-inflow-middle-east-slows-1257415)
- Kellerhals, S. (2016) ‘Why we travelled to Greece to build solar-powered phone charging stations at refugee camps’ *International Business Times*, 15 September 2016
- Komatsu, S., Dinh Ha, H. and Kaneko, S. (2013) ‘The effects of internal migration on residential energy consumption and CO2 emissions: a case study in Hanoi’ *Energy for Sustainable Development* 17: 572–580
- KNOMAD – The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (2018) *Migration and remittances. recent developments and outlook*. Special Topic: Transit Migration. Migration and Development Brief 29. Washington DC: World Bank
- Lahn, G. and Grafham, O. (2015) *Heat, Light and power for refugees saving lives, reducing costs*. London: Chatham House
- Maller, C. (2011) ‘Practices involving energy and water consumption in migrant households’ in Newton, P. (ed.) *Urban consumption*. Collongwood: CSIRO

- Manning, D. and Taylor, J. (2014) 'Migration and fuel use in rural Mexico, *Ecological Economics*' 102: 126–136
- McCollum, D., Echeverri, L., Busch, S., Pachauri, S., Parkinson, S., Rogelj, J., Krey, V., Minx, J., Nilsson, M., Stevance, A.-S. and Riahi, K. (2018) 'Connecting the sustainable development goals by their energy inter-linkages' *Environmental Research Letters* 13: 033006
- Mendelson, S. (2013) 'Sustainable energy access for the poor.' Americas Quarterly Online (www.americasquarterly.org/content/sustainable-energy-access-poor).
- Morales, H. (2017) *The role of sustainable energy access in the migration debate*. European Union Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF). Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
- Nerini, F., Tomei, J., To, L., Bisaga, I., Parikh, P., Black, M., Borrión, A., Spataru, C., Broto, V., Anandarajah, G. and Mulugetta, Y. (2018) 'Mapping synergies and trade-offs between energy and the Sustainable Development Goals' *Nature Energy* 3: 10–15
- Nilsen, V. and Anelli, G. (2015) 'Knowledge transfer at CERN' *Technological Forecasting & Social Change* 112(2016): 113–120
- NDF – Nordic Development Fund, Nordic Climate Facility and NEFCO (2015) *Financing sustainable energy through remittances flows to Bolivia*. NDF and NEFCO, Bolivia
- Pachauri, S., Scott, A., Scott, L. and Shepherd, A. (2013) *Energy for all: harnessing the power of energy access for chronic poverty reduction*. CPAN Policy Guide No. 3. London: Chronic Poverty Advisory Network
- Phillimore, J. (2014) *Local and experiential aspects of migrant integration: an overview*. KING Project, Applied Social Studies Unit Overview Paper. Milan: ISMU Foundation
- Rahman, S. (2018) 'Why remittances from the Middle East matter to India' Fair Observer, 26 February 2018
- Ratha, D. (2015) 'How will falling oil prices affect remittances?' World Economic Forum blog, 31 January (www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/01/how-will-falling-oil-prices-affect-remittances)
- Ru, M., Shu, T., Smith, K., Guofeng, S., Huizhong, S., Ye, H., Han, C., Yilin, C., Xi, C., Junfeng, L., Bengang, L., Xilong, W. and Canfei H. (2015) 'Direct energy consumption associated emissions by rural-to-urban migrants in Beijing' *Environmental Science & Technology* 49(22): 13708–13715
- Sanchez-Loor, D.A. and Zambrano-Monserrate, M.A. (2015) 'Causality analysis between electricity consumption, real gross domestic product, foreign direct investment, human development and remittances in Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico' *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy* 5(3): 746–753
- Shrestha, R. M., Kumar, S., Martin, S. and Dhakal, A. (2008) 'Modern energy use by the urban poor in Thailand: a study of slum households in two cities' *Energy for Sustainable Development* 12(4): 5–13
- Singh, R., Wang, X., Mendoza, J.C. and Ackom, E.K. (2014) 'Electricity (in)accessibility to the urban poor in developing countries' *WIREs Energy and Environment* 4(4): 339–353
- South Seeds (2016) 'Supporting migrants to understand our energy system.' South Seeds News, 28 October (<http://southseeds.org/supporting-migrants-to-understand-our-energy-system>)
- Sultana, M. (2005) *Do migrants transfer tacit knowledge? The case of highly skilled Bangladesh immigrants in the United States*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Shen, H., Tao, S., Chen, Y., Ciais, P., Güneralp, B., Ru, M., Zhong, Q., Yun, X., Zhu, X., Huang, T., Tao, W., Chen, Y., Li, B., Wang, X., Liu, W., Liu J. and Zhao, S. (2017) 'Urbanization-induced population migration has reduced ambient PM2.5 concentrations in China' *Science Advances* 3 (7): e1700300
- Taylor, M., Moran-Taylor, M., Castellanos, E. and Elias, S. (2011) 'Burning for sustainability: biomass energy, international migration and the move to cleaner fuels and cookstoves in Guatemala' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101(4): 918–928
- UNESCO (2017) *Migration as a development challenge: analysis of root causes and policy implications*. UNESCO's intergovernmental science programme on the Management of Social Transformations (MOST)
- UN – United Nations (2014) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants Francois Crepeau. Human Rights Council of the UN General Assembly, Twenty-sixth session, Agenda item 3.
- UN (2015) *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*. New York NY: UN
- UNDESA – United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015) *Trends in international migrant stock: migrants by destination and origin*. POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015. New York NY: UNDESA
- UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014) *Transfer of technology and knowledge sharing for development: science, technology and innovation issues for developing countries*. Geneva: UNCTAD
- UNDP – United Nations Development Programme (2015) *Labour migration, remittances, and human development in Central Asia*. Central Asia Human Development Series. New York NY: UNDP
- UNDP (2016) Remittances (Diaspora financing). New York NY: UNDP (www.undp.org/content/sdfinance/en/home/solutions/remittances.html)

-
- van Hear, N., Bakewell, O. and Long, K.. (2012) *Drivers of Migration*. Working Paper 1. Oxford: Migrating Out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium
- Wollensack, F.D. (2017) 'The role of sustainable energy access in the migration debate'. IISD blog, 14 September (<http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/the-role-of-sustainable-energy-access-in-the-migration-debate>)
- World Bank (2015) *Adapting to higher energy costs: findings from qualitative studies in Europe and Central Asia*. Washington DC: World Bank
- WEF – World Economic Forum (2017) *Migration and its impact on cities*. Geneva: WEF



Malian refugees in Mauritania / Eligible voters are those who had their NINA cards and were registered on the national electoral database, July 2013 © UNHCR/Dalia Al Achi



SDGs covered

- 1:** No poverty
- 3:** Good health and well-being
- 4:** Quality education
- 11:** Sustainable cities and communities
- 16:** Peace, justice and strong institutions

Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Katy Long, Elisa Mosler Vidal, Amelia Kuch and Jessica Hagen-Zanker

Key messages

- Ensuring migrants have access to appropriate and secure legal status can help achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies.
- If granted, permanent residency and/or citizenship can help foster integration. If access is denied, it can lead to tensions between migrants and host communities, further marginalise migrants, and hinder progress towards SDG 16.7.
- Numerous barriers prevent long-term migrants from accessing permanent residency and/or citizenship, including political feasibility, racial, religious and gender bars, stringent language tests, and high costs. These barriers should be removed, or made more flexible.
- Second-generation migrants are particularly affected because they are often excluded from full membership of the communities they have lived in all their lives. States should explore granting full citizenship at birth, or soon after.

1 Introduction

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls on states to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. This briefing considers how ensuring migrants have fair access to appropriate and secure legal status, through permanent residency and/or citizenship, can help achieve this Goal.

Granting permanent residency and/or citizenship to migrants can help foster integration and promote ‘peaceful and inclusive societies’. If such integration is not fostered, it can lead to tensions between migrant and host communities. We argue that the links between migration and specific Targets should be considered; specifically, 16.3 on the rule of law and access to justice, 16.4 on organised crime, 16.5 on corruption and bribery, 16.7 on responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making, and 16.9 on legal identity. Ignoring these linkages will jeopardise the achievement of these Targets.

This briefing begins by defining key concepts. Section 3 outlines the evidence linking citizenship and integration. Section 4 shows common requirements for, and barriers to, accessing citizenship. Section 5 considers the implications of not giving migrants access to permanent residency and/or citizenship – the potential for tensions and conflict. Section 6 draws out implications for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), specifically the specific Targets included in Goal 16. The final section concludes and draws out specific policy recommendations.

2 Defining key concepts

Citizenship is broadly defined as membership of a self-governing political community, bringing with it rights and obligations for both the citizen and their community (Stanford, 2017). Citizenship, permanent residency and other forms of legal status are usually considered to encompass a formal legal relationship with a state. Yet citizenship also connects to wider ideas about belonging to, and participating in, more local forms of community (see Holston and Appadurai, 1996). Importantly, although citizenship status is primarily acquired through birth, nearly all states also recognise the idea that citizenship rests on consent, so that it is possible for newcomers to become citizens in their host community by mutual agreement.¹

Citizenship is not the only form of secure legal status available to migrants. In many countries, migrants are able to apply for **permanent residency** (sometimes called ‘indefinite leave to remain’) without having to take on all the obligations – or be granted all the rights – associated with citizenship (for example, permanent residents may not be required to complete military service, and are usually not permitted to vote). This is often required as an interim stage before full citizenship, marking an incremental expansion of migrants’ rights over time.

Broader than formal citizenship or other forms of legal status is the concept of **integration**. In this paper, integration is understood as a two-way, long-term incremental process that goes beyond fostering simple tolerance and absence of conflict (between different groups of people in social, economic and political spheres). It involves the active mixing of people who hold different identities, helping to foster shared collective values and practices of ‘belonging’ (Ager and Strang, 2008). Some analysts prefer to use the term ‘inclusion’ to underline that this idea of belonging does not rest upon ‘one-way assimilation’ (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). In this paper, the terms integration and inclusion will be used interchangeably.

Host states do not expect all migrants to integrate (see Ruhs, 2013). Similarly, migrants’ interests in and need to ‘belong’ to the host community vary substantially depending on the purpose of their migration, which itself may change over time. At one end of the spectrum, seasonal workers are generally expected to stay in a fixed location and have minimal engagement with local community. At the other extreme, migrants who arrive through family channels are normally presumed to be settling permanently in their country of arrival.

Most labour and student migrants can be considered a middle group. On the one hand, very few are admitted with permanent rights to stay in a country of destination, and many are only allowed to stay temporarily while they complete a course of study or work for a particular company. On the other hand, many workers and students may find themselves settling in a destination country indefinitely, either by initial design, or because their plans change.

Finally, there are second-generation migrants, who are born in a host country to immigrant parents (or arrive as small children), and may never have lived in their ‘home’ state. While a few states (the United States (US), Canada) still offer unconditional *jus soli* birthright citizenship to those born on their territory, most countries restrict access to citizenship based on the parent’s legal status or length of residency.

1 The idea of mutual consent may also be used to justify the *deprivation* of citizenship by the state. Although the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits deprivation of nationality if it would lead to statelessness, in recent years countries including the United Kingdom (UK) have enacted and used provisions which allow them to denationalise dual nationals (mostly in terror cases) (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 1961: Article 8; Travis, 2017).

3 Links between citizenship and integration

Many argue that citizenship should not be viewed as an end in itself but as a crucial means to secure full inclusion and integration in a community (Massey and Bartley, 2005; Portes et al., 2009). Citizenship is often presented as the end-point of this process, as a reward for successful integration and confirmation of the host community's willingness to accept a new member. Those without such status may be prevented from accessing education and health services, jobs and welfare benefits (Spencer, 2006). These are widely recognised as critical factors for migrants' inclusion (UK Home Office, 2004).

Evidence shows the positive effect naturalisation has on the labour market, with migrants' gaining greater employability and higher wages after naturalisation (Peters and Vink, 2016; Bauböck et al., 2013). This is partly because the new status removes restrictions on public-sector and other jobs, and partly because a naturalised migrant is perceived as less risky to hire. In Germany, a study found that immigrant women experienced higher wages and improved labour-market outcomes after naturalisation, mainly because they were able to switch to jobs with permanent contracts and in larger firms (Gathmann and Keller, 2014). These effects are important for integration prospects; labour-market integration enables greater economic and social inclusion, through improved access to decent accommodation and healthcare (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/European Union (EU), 2015).

While labour-market outcomes are important markers of migrants' integration, they are only one aspect of it. There is also evidence of a positive relationship between naturalisation and political integration. For example, a study across 19 European countries showed that citizenship acquisition increased political participation, especially for migrants who grew up in non-democratic settings (Just and Anderson, 2012). In Switzerland, naturalisation improved political integration as immigrants attained higher levels of political knowledge (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

4 Citizenship requirements and barriers

A migrant may be able to acquire citizenship through registration,² naturalisation³ or investment. There is a general consensus that it is reasonable a migrant should demonstrate a genuine connection with the community

they hope to join when applying for permanent residency and/or citizenship. Most states require applicants to demonstrate a period of residency, basic linguistic and cultural knowledge, and that they are of good character. Many states also charge fees.

Some states run 'citizenship by investment' programmes, which allow for citizenship (or, more often, permanent residency) to be fast-tracked or acquired outright in exchange for a financial investment. Such programmes – especially in less-developed countries like Antigua, the Comoros or the Dominican Republic – are often claimed to have an explicit 'development' objective, bringing income into the state. Yet pursuing development through the sale of citizenship raises difficult questions about the nature of sustainable development, inclusion and belonging.

Traditionally, citizenship was viewed as a unitary status, so that acquiring a new citizenship required the relinquishing of a previous one. However, as the number of international migrants and their descendants has increased, so too have the number of dual nationals, or people formally recognised as holding two or more citizenships. Some states, such as the Netherlands and India, do not recognise dual nationality, and require migrants who naturalise to give up the citizenship of their country of origin. Others have introduced new provisions to allow diaspora members to keep or reclaim citizenship. These policies are explicitly intended to encourage greater economic, cultural and social links between diaspora communities and origin countries by facilitating easier mobility and a sense of continued belonging (Faist and Kivisto, 2007).

The rest of this section discusses barriers to permanent residency and/or citizenship faced by migrants in host communities, and potential policy solutions.

4.1 Political feasibility

Human-rights advocates argue that long-term migrants, once admitted legally, should not be denied the right to secure legal status and citizenship over time. However, in many states, granting citizenship to migrants is politically contentious. This is especially true if there are large numbers of migrants who are eligible to naturalise, as this may stoke fears that social identity and cohesion could be lost. 'Demographic bomb' narratives are the core of a number of political debates, including fears expressed about Palestinian Israelis, Roma in Slovakia and Latinos in the US.

In some cases, such concerns arise because migrants were not originally expected to remain permanently

2 Citizenship by registration can be claimed if a migrant meets criteria that tend to be linked to pre-existing connections between a state and the applicant. It is particularly relevant when dealing with diaspora (re)migration, and migration as a result of marriage.

3 Only a very few states, including Myanmar and Lebanon, have a total or near-total bar on naturalisation. However, in practice many countries make naturalisation difficult for long-term migrants, through a combination of stringent criteria, high fees and arbitrary administrative procedures.

in the host country when they were admitted. It took several decades for Germany, for instance, to recognise that Turkish guest workers and their German-born children were not likely to return home. In the United Kingdom (UK), British citizenship and rights of residency were increasingly restricted after large numbers of migrants from the former British Empire arrived between the 1950s and the 1970s (Weil, 2001).

This problem is compounded where a state understands membership in explicitly ethnic or indigenous terms. In these situations, such as in many Gulf States, collective national identity requires citizenship to be strictly restricted. Some states have taken involved measures to protect this 'national' ideal. For instance, in 2014 Kuwait attempted to buy Comoros passports for stateless Bedouin groups in its territory, in order to avoid having to recognise them as Kuwaiti citizens (Abrahamian, 2015; Mansour-Ille 2016).

Granting citizenship to migrants may also prove politically complex in cases where a migrant group is associated with historic oppression. Latvians' reluctance to recognise Russian-speakers as citizens, for instance, stems from the Soviet Union's long occupation of the country (Weil, 2001). In other cases, granting citizenship to a particular group of migrants may be feared because of divisions within multinational states and concerns

that new citizens may shift political power or encourage separatism. Kenyan reluctance to offer Somali migrants and refugees citizenship can be explained in part by the state's difficult relationship with the Kenyan Somali community (Manby, 2016).

In the case of mass influx of refugees, the politics of granting citizenship is still more complex. Host states did not choose to admit these arrivals, and do so as a humanitarian duty. Offering hundreds of thousands of refugees citizenship *en masse* is usually politically fraught, especially in states like Lebanon where inter-community politics are already extremely fragile and demographic shifts could incite serious violence.

4.2 Legal status

The ability to apply for permanent residency or citizenship is universally premised on having arrived as a legal migrant and remained in the country as such. For millions of migrants who do not hold, or cannot prove, legal status, this can create an insurmountable obstacle.

While this group includes irregular migrants, it is not limited to them. Migrants who have travelled to live and work in countries where there are reciprocal rights of free movement, for instance, may not always have the paperwork to prove their right to residency or citizenship. This has recently become an issue for EU citizens in the UK in the wake of Brexit (Box 3), but has also caused difficulties in the past for citizens moving in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region (Box 1).

4.3 Racial, religious and gender bars

In some cases, constitutional bars prevent migrants who do not belong to a specified racial or religious group from becoming citizens of the country in which they have settled. The Liberian constitution, for instance, specifies that all applicants for citizenship must be 'negro or of negro descent', effectively barring non-black residents from acquiring citizenship. This excludes Liberia's Lebanese population, who have been settled in the state since the 1960s.

In 2003, Israel passed a Citizenship and Entry law that restricted access to citizenship (and residency) for all Palestinians with a West Bank or Gaza identity card, including those with an Israeli spouse. In 2007 the provisions were expanded to apply to non-Jewish citizens of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria marrying Israeli Jews (Amnesty International, 2017). Similarly many Gulf countries make it difficult for non-Muslims to acquire citizenship, and by law Saudi Arabia requires all citizens to be Muslim (US State Department, 2005).

Gender discrimination can intersect with migration to create barriers to citizenship, particularly for the children of mixed citizen-migrant marriages. In 2014, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) launched the #IBelong campaign, advocating

Box 1 Reciprocal rights in ECOWAS

Many regional trade blocs offer citizens of member countries reciprocal rights to live, work and study across a region. Although regional or supranational citizenship is a relatively new concept (most fully developed in the setting of the EU) a number of emerging regional citizenship groups are emerging (Long, 2015).

ECOWAS was founded in 1975. In 1979 the Community adopted a Free Movement Protocol giving all citizens of member states the right to enter, reside and work across the community.

The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol still faces many challenges. Immigration officials in member states are sometimes unaware (or unwilling to recognise) that ECOWAS nationals holding valid documents can enter their country freely. And ECOWAS rights are not equivalent to national membership. For example, in 2002 questions regarding national citizenship (and the refusal to offer this to the descendent of migrants from other West African states) played a role in precipitating civil war in the Cote d'Ivoire.

Nevertheless, ECOWAS offers a possible model for balancing the needs of migrants for reciprocal rights to foster peaceful and inclusive societies, with concerns about protecting national identities (see Manby, 2015).

for the removal of gender discrimination in 27 states where nationality laws currently prevent women married to foreigners from passing on their citizenship to their children. In 2017, Madagascar became the first country on the list to amend its nationality law (UNHCR, 2017).

4.4 Excessive residency requirements

Some states require migrants to prove extremely long-term residency in order to qualify for citizenship. In the Central African Republic, for instance, applicants may be required to show as many as 35 years (Manby, 2016). Bureaucratic delays and quotas can also hamper applications in developed states, sometimes exacerbating ethnic and racial disparities in access.

Laws may explicitly seek to prevent migrants who arrived as refugees from naturalising, particularly in cases of mass influx of refugees. In Uganda, for instance, the government has repeatedly resisted attempts by long-term refugees to naturalise. A 2015 High Court decision determined that refugees could not be barred from applying for naturalisation, but refugee advocate groups complain that in practice, administrators refuse to provide refugees with the necessary forms (International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), 2016). Tanzania, on the other hand, is an example of a country that has given citizenship for long-term refugees on a large scale (Box 2).

4.5 Stringent language and citizenship tests

Many locals feel permanent residents and new citizens should speak some form of lingua franca. However, some states insist that migrants applying for citizenship must pass complex language exams that go beyond the skills needed for everyday communication. For instance, Botswana requires knowledge of Setswana or another language spoken by a 'tribal' community (Manby, 2016).

A number of countries – mostly developed states – also require applicants to pass a citizenship exam. Some of these exams have been deliberately designed to be difficult for immigrants to pass, with questions on trivia that are irrelevant to migrants' everyday inclusion. The Danish citizenship test, for instance, was revised in 2016, as part of a raft of measures intended to cut immigration after a surge of support for anti-immigrant political parties (Delman, 2016). It includes questions such as 'Which Danish restaurant gained a third Michelin star in February 2016?'

4.6 High costs

The monetary cost of applying for citizenship varies considerably. In Japan, although cultural requirements are strictly enforced, the naturalisation process is free. However, Kenya levies a fee of KSHS500,000 (US\$4,800), 3.5 times Kenya's per-capita gross domestic product (GDP). The UK has also been criticised for disproportionately high citizenship fees (Economist

Box 2 Tanzanian citizenship for Burundian refugees

In 1972, Tanzania received tens of thousands of refugees from Burundi and settled them in three rural settlements. Over the years, refugees integrated with the host communities and began to contribute significantly to the local economy. Today, over 85% of the inhabitants in these settlements were born in Tanzania. Nonetheless, the second and third generation of Burundian refugees continue to live with refugee status and no prospects for naturalisation.

In 2007, the government of Tanzania, in partnership with the government of Burundi and UNHCR, designed the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy. This comprised three key elements: voluntary repatriation, application for naturalisation, and final local integration in Tanzania. To date, 151,019 certificates have been distributed to individuals who opted for naturalisation, and over 53,000 refugees have returned to Burundi (UNHCR, 2014).

2017). One consequence of such high costs is that permanent residency and citizenship become unaffordable 'luxuries' for less wealthy migrants; the high cost of US naturalisation (US\$680), for example, is one reason a number of migrants chose not to apply for citizenship even when they can meet other criteria (Gonzales-Barera et al., 2013). Unable to afford naturalisation, poorer migrants remain on temporary visas, without protection against deportation (Taylor et al., 2012).

5 Tensions arising from lack of citizenship

When immigration policy changes, prior acquisition of permanent residency or citizenship (and even migrant parents' and grandparents' citizenship) can become an essential protection against deportation and discrimination. The surge in EU nationals applying for UK citizenship post-2015 (see Box 3) and in naturalisation rates in the US among eligible Green Card holders since the 2016 Presidential election, reflect these concerns (Tolan, 2017).

The inability of long-term migrants, including second-generation 'migrants' born in their host country, to acquire citizenship in their host community can result in exclusion and deprive migrants of fundamental rights, as well as contribute to inter-community tensions and conflict. The case of Turkish migrants and their descendants in Germany, who until the 1990s were unable to become citizens under German law and who as a result struggled to integrate into German communities,

is one well-known example of barriers to citizenship preventing full inclusion.⁴

In the most extreme cases, violence follows government decisions to strip citizenship from the descendants of migrants. In 2013, for example, the Dominican Republic's Constitutional Court revoked citizenship for children born to foreign parents as far back as 1929, as part of a long-running 'anti-Haitianism' political movement in the country inspired by racial, linguistic and socio-economic prejudice (Hindin and Ariza, 2016). This affected a large proportion of the 240,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent in the country⁵ who were left without the right to work, services and more. It provoked huge social and political disquiet, with large-scale protests in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and across the US (Constable, 2015; Semple, 2013).

5.1 Political exclusion

Many migrants have limited political rights in their host country: the ability to vote (especially at the national level) and to run for office is usually limited to citizens alone. One consequence is that migrants – including long-term migrants with permanent residency and their families – have no right of political participation and very little direct political power to influence community decision-making. Policies excluding migrants may prove popular with a non-migrant electorate or avoid close scrutiny, because migrants must rely upon proxy representation (for instance, family who do hold citizenship) in order to influence the outcome of political debate. The relatively progressive nature of the US debate on immigration regularisation – where a majority of those surveyed continue to favour a pathway to citizenship for irregular migrants who meet certain criteria – can be partly attributed to the irregular migrants who have close friends and family with citizenship, and who are an increasingly important political bloc (Branton, 2007).

More serious tensions can arise when governments deny political rights to individuals who have a long-standing claim to that country and/or previously enjoyed these rights. This is the case for the long-established Nepali community in Bhutan (Box 4), and for approximately 300,000 ethnic Russians in Latvia, who, despite having been born or lived in the country for decades, remain non-citizens without political rights. Debate over their status is heated. In 2012, 75% of the

electorate rejected a proposal to recognise Russian as a national language in the constitution, even though a third of Latvia's population speak it as their mother tongue (Cianetti, 2014; Schmid, 2008).

5.2 Access to justice

Non-citizens can struggle to secure access to justice. Although citizens are normally guaranteed legal counsel if they are arrested, this right often does not extend to non-citizens, particularly those whose status is irregular. Australia, for instance, does not guarantee legal counsel for anyone detained under the Migration Act (Congress, 2017).

Tensions around legal access and due process for non-citizens are amplified for low-skilled workers. Given that many migrants are in low-skilled employment, it makes this group particularly vulnerable. This double bar has affected low-skilled migrants in some Middle Eastern and Asian countries, where alleged violations have led to local and national tensions.

Box 3 EU citizens in the UK after Brexit

In June 2016 the UK decided to leave the EU, resulting in uncertainty for millions of EU citizens living in the UK. Key issues at stake include their continued right to work, families potentially being split up, and access to pensions and healthcare (House of Commons, 2017). There are also 1.2 million UK citizens living in EU countries with similar concerns (ibid).

After Brexit, EU citizens rushed to secure their status in the UK; over 90,000 applied for a 'permanent residence' card in 2016 (Ryan, 2017) and capacity to handle these was low. It was estimated it would take 140 years to process applications (Migration Observatory, 2016). At the end of 2016, 29% of claims were rejected (Elgot, 2017). The process was eventually declared 'not fit for purpose' by a parliamentary committee (House of Commons, 2017).

For many EU citizens who have established their lives – legally studying, working, paying taxes and starting families – the continued uncertainty is disruptive. Many have voiced anger at being used for political bargaining in Brexit negotiations, while others have reported anxiety and feeling unwelcome in the UK (House of Commons, 2017; O'Carroll, 2016).

4 This is not to suggest that citizenship is the only factor in fostering integration and inclusion. As a counter-example, despite French citizenship being relative easy for immigrants to acquire, and French identity being understood in non-ethnic terms, France has struggled with the marginalisation and segregation of migrant and second-generation citizens.

5 Their situation was further complicated as they could not resettle in Haiti; foreign-born individuals are only eligible for Haitian citizenship if one parent is a natural-born Haitian citizen.

Box 4 Discriminatory citizenship laws in Bhutan

The experience of ethnic Nepalis in Bhutan shows how regressive and discriminatory citizenship laws can be used as a pretext to deny human rights, and to marginalise and impoverish ethnic minorities, decades after any initial migration.

In 1985, the Bhutanese Citizenship Act created an extremely narrow definition of citizenship that was deliberately used to exclude ethnic Nepalis (some 43% of the population). Authorities went even further than the Act stipulated, requiring Nepalis to prove residency in 1958 to qualify, even when they were already in possession of a citizenship card. Any Nepalis who could not do this were reclassified as ‘illegal immigrants’ and non-nationals.

These revisions led to growing unrest in southern Bhutan. By the mid-1990s, at least 106,000 refugees had fled to camps in Nepal, where they would spend the next 15 years. The ethnic Nepalis who remained in Bhutan were subject to frequent harassment, discrimination and marginalisation (Hutt, 2003).

In 2007, the US government announced its willingness to resettle Bhutanese refugees, with eight other resettlement countries joining them. By late 2015, 100,000 had been resettled (Van Selm, 2013; Shrestha, 2015). There are still 10,000-12,000 refugees in Nepal’s camps hoping for repatriation. While mass resettlement has helped the exiled Bhutanese, it has done so arguably at the expense of their claims to Bhutanese citizenship.

Migrants have also protested against seasonal and temporary workers’ programmes that offer no opportunity to accumulate a more permanent residency status and that can leave workers open to abuse. In 2010, hundreds of Guatemalans gathered to protest against abusive working conditions of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker system (Market Wire, 2010).

5.3 Access to education, healthcare and other services⁶

Decisions by states to limit entitlements to permanent residents and citizens are, in the first instance, relatively uncontroversial. However, second-generation migrants unable to claim citizenship can be particularly affected by limited access to subsidised education or healthcare programmes. This issue has been especially prominent in the US, where 20 states now allow undocumented immigrant students who have graduated from high

school to benefit from in-state tuition rates (National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 2015).

Another group whose exclusion from services can be problematic are refugees, and those who arrived *involuntarily* in a state. In developed regions, recognised refugees (though not asylum-seekers) are usually provided with immediate access to most state services. In contrast, in many developing regions states have pursued deliberately hostile policies aimed at the long-term exclusion of refugees. For instance, Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan face a number of prohibitions that contribute to economic isolation, including no or limited access to the formal labour market (Domat, 2016). Support to refugees in these contexts is mostly provided through humanitarian agencies. Covering vulnerable citizens and non-citizens in parallel systems diminishes any social-cohesion effects to be gained from joint access (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017b).

5.4 Lack of integration prospects

A lack of permanent status and/or citizenship can lead to general unrest in local communities, and the further marginalisation of migrants. In these cases, lack of citizenship is rarely an explicit cause of unrest, but rather a contributor to migrant-local tensions and failed inclusion. Such protests can be migrant-led, such as the violent riots in Paris in 2005 (Schneider, 2008). Most common, however, are anti-migrant and/or anti-multiculturalist protests that are in part motivated by a sense that migrants are living separately from local citizens, such as the xenophobic riots and attacks in South Africa in 2008 (and again in 2015 and 2017) (Mosselson, 2010).

It is ironic that in some cases the expansion of migrants’ rights and/or of host-country citizenship could help address local anger at migrants’ perceived segregation. Partly in response to such concerns, some local authorities have developed local forms of citizenship based on residency (see Box 5).

6 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda

SDG 16 promotes ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’. Migration has played a role in making societies more diverse and inclusive, by creating opportunities for new social and cultural exchanges (Moran, 2011). This in turn can help increase innovation and fuel economic growth (Bove and Elia, 2017). However, a lack of permanent residency and/or citizenship can prevent migrants from becoming full members of society, for instance by limiting access to justice and services, and can create tension and conflict between

6 For more information on migration and access to services, see the other briefings in this series: education (Nicolai et al., 2017); health (Tulloch et al., 2016); and social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a).

Box 5 Local citizenship initiatives

While most migration policies are set at the national level, it is increasingly common for cities at the frontline of migration to develop their own approaches to integrating people, including through processes that draw on the idea of citizenship as *jus domicil*, or ‘citizenship by residency’. In the US, for instance, both San Francisco and New York offer identity cards to all residents, regardless of legal status. Such inclusive practices are closely linked to the ‘sanctuary cities’ movement, in which local authorities limit their cooperation with federal immigration orders (Lee et al., 2017).

In Europe, since 1997 the city of Barcelona has been explicit about its ambition to grant equal citizenship to all persons based on ‘the acquisition of rights instead of the concept of nationality’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1997), granting ‘the same citizen rights and duties to all persons living in Barcelona’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012).

migrant groups and host communities. Thus, if migration is not framed by inclusive citizenship policies, progress towards ‘peaceful and inclusive societies’ can be hindered.

In direct contradiction to SDG 16.3, which calls for equal access to justice for all, non-citizens may struggle to be accorded equal treatment within the justice system, or may be unable to access legal aid to assist with representation. Similarly, long-term and/or second-generation migrants can be barred from political participation, which means decision-making is not fully representative at all levels, directly affecting the implementation of SDG 16.7 on responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making. Again, this can lead to disillusionment, frustration and tension amongst migrants, with implications for Goal 16 more generally.

Permanent residency and naturalisation processes are often opaque, bureaucratic and inefficient, making it harder for migrants to apply. This gives officials, who hold considerable administrative power to approve or deny applications, the opportunity to engage in corrupt behaviour. It can lead to frustration and disillusionment amongst applicants and potential tensions. As such, it affects the implementation of SDG 16.5 on reducing corruption and bribery, and that of SDG 16.6 on developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions, as well as the broader goal of ‘peaceful societies’.

Ensuring universal coverage of birth registration and legal identity in origin and host countries (SDG 16.9) is a vital first step in enabling migrants to access services and apply for citizenship or residency. Yet, globally only two-thirds of births are registered (Mikkelsen et al., 2015). When migrants lack documentation or are unable to

access citizenship, residency or legal status more generally (e.g. a work permit), they may resort to obtaining documents from informal markets (Vasta, 2011). This can jeopardise efforts to tackle organised crime, as set out in SDG 16.4. In fact, when pathways for legal migration become more restrictive, it can deflect migrants towards irregularity (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014), which hinders their integration into the host country, impeding progress towards SDG 16 more generally. Ensuring all migrants have access to legal identity documents issued by origin or host countries is key to combating trafficking by reducing migrants’ vulnerability (SDG 16.2). More broadly, when migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot obtain citizenship or residency status, they are more vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.

Citizenship and residency issues affect the implementation of a number of other SDG Targets. Eligibility to basic services (including health and education) and social protection is often tied to citizenship/residency, with undocumented migrants rarely eligible. This is often an issue for second-generation migrants who, despite being born in the country, are unable to gain citizenship or a more secure status. This means that progress towards the Goals on health, education and social protection (Targets 4.1, 4.3, 3.8, 1.3) is hampered. Furthermore, when migrants are excluded from accessing fundamental services such as health and education, they are prevented from becoming full members of society, hindering their integration.

7 Conclusions and policy recommendations

This briefing illustrates the numerous ways in which migrants’ access to permanent residency and/or citizenship can play a vital role in fostering peaceful and inclusive societies, as called for in SDG 16. Migrants who lack secure permanent legal status may suffer a deprivation of other essential rights including access to justice, basic services and work. Opaque and arbitrary naturalisation processes – sometimes deliberately intended to exclude migrants – may contribute to official corruption and bribery. Migrants’ lack of access to permanent residency and/or citizenship status can cement their political exclusion, resulting in their marginalisation. In the long term, discriminatory policies can foster civil unrest and even contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict, especially when they exclude second and subsequent generations of settled migrants.

In light of these findings, this briefing makes the following recommendations for national and local governments in host and origin countries, international institutions and civil-society organisations in order to make progress towards SDG 16.

Table 1 Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDG target	Link to migration
16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	Migration can contribute to making host countries more diverse and inclusive (Bove and Elia, 2017). Lack of citizenship/residency can prevent migrants from being full members of society, including access to services, and can lead to tensions and conflict.
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	When migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot obtain citizenship or residency status, they are more vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all	Non-citizens may struggle to be accorded equal treatment within the justice system, or may be unable to access legal aid.
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime	When permanent residency and/or citizenship cannot be obtained legally, migrants may resort to obtaining documents on the black market. There are well-recognised links between passport markets and organised crime.
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms	Permanent residency and naturalisation processes are often opaque, bureaucratic and inefficient, providing considerable opportunity for officials to engage in corrupt behaviour.
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	As permanent residency and naturalisation processes can be difficult to navigate (see SDG 16.5), it is harder for migrants to apply and become full members of society.
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	When long-term migrants, and subsequent generations, settle permanently in large numbers and are barred from political participation as non-citizens, decision-making is not fully representative.
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration	Universal birth registration is a vital first step in ensuring that all children, including migrants' children, are able to lay claim to the citizenships to which they are entitled. Proof of legal identity is vital to being able to apply for residency/citizenship.
1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable	Migrants lacking permanent residency and/or citizenship status may not be able to access social protection (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a). Furthermore, they can be prevented from accessing contributions made due to portability constraints (ibid). Tying eligibility for social protection to citizenship/residency hampers progress towards this target.
3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential healthcare services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all	Eligibility for health access is often tied to citizenship/residency status, with only some countries opening up (emergency) healthcare to all, regardless of status (see Tulloch et al., 2016). These eligibility requirements impede progress towards this target and full integration of migrants more generally.
4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes	Education for migrant children is essential to meet SDG 4.1. Yet, eligibility for primary- and secondary-school education can be tied to citizenship/residency status, which means that migrant children can be prevented from accessing education, particularly those who are undocumented (see Nicolai et al., 2017). This often includes second-generation migrants. Access to education is critical, because it plays an important role in social integration and economic mobility (ibid). Participation in education is also key to migrant children becoming fluent in the national language – an important enabling factor to ensure their integration.
4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university	Access to vocational and tertiary education is often linked to citizenship/residency status and fees are sometimes higher for non-nationals. This can be especially critical for second-generation migrants.
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	Planned and well-managed migration must consider pathways to residency and citizenship.

Conclusion 1a Giving migrants access to permanent residency and/or citizenship can foster peacefulness, inclusion and cohesion in host societies.

Conclusion 1b Numerous barriers prevent long-term and second-generation migrants from accessing permanent residency and/or citizenship.

Recommendation: Make pathways to permanent residency available to all long-term migrants.

- Grant, presumptively, permanent residency status to all applicants who meet basic criteria (e.g. length of residency, proof of good conduct) so that long-term migrants are not required to keep renewing short-term visas.
- This should not be contingent on meeting any ethnic, religious or other ascriptive criteria.
- The international community should help countries with the highest ratios of migrants to locals – especially forced migrants and refugees – to find solutions that help address the particular burden these influxes can pose to social cohesion.

Recommendation: Make pathways to citizenship accessible to all long-term migrants who meet certain conditions.

- Host governments, particularly those that require an excessively long period, should reduce the number of years' residency required before an application for citizenship can be lodged.
- Remove all categorical bars on citizenship acquisition, as these can foster tensions and conflict. Furthermore, make language requirements more flexible, particularly for older migrants. Remove citizenship tests for migrants with limited education, or offer them alternative, non-written, means of demonstrating membership (e.g. community engagement).
- Acquiring citizenship should not be contingent on the ability to pay. Host governments should lower fees for citizenship or introduce fee waivers for poor migrants. The US, for instance, extended a fee-waiver programme for naturalisation in 2016 (United States Citizen and Immigration Service (USCIS), 2017).
- Where the costs of processing citizenship applications present a significant burden for a host state (for example, mass refugee integration in a developing country), multilateral funding should be made available, to ensure timely and fair processing.
- Naturalisation policies should include education and development components that also target local populations, to lessen prospective tensions.

Recommendation: State and non-state actors should collaborate in creating programmes to

provide migrants with the skills necessary to qualify both for formal citizenship and everyday practice of membership.

- Such measures can include holding information sessions on adjusting to life in the host country, language lessons, facilitating entry to professional networks, setting up cultural mentorship programmes, and expanding access to microfinance programmes (Vieru, 2017). Portugal's National Plan for the Integration of Migrants, for example, includes a holistic set of measures to help integration across language, employment, vocational training and housing (Juzwiak et al., 2014).

Relevant SDG targets

1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.

3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.

16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.

16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.

16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.

16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

Conclusion 2 Second-generation migrants are particularly affected by citizenship policies, which may exclude them from full membership of the communities in which they have lived all their lives.

Recommendation: Second and subsequent generations of migrants should have automatic access to citizenship in their host communities.

- Second-generation migrants should have an opportunity to register as permanent residents and/or citizens at birth.
- When it is not politically feasible to grant full citizenship at birth, states should provide second-generation migrants with opportunities to register for citizenship at an early date (e.g. as they enter school).

- States should not ask second-generation migrants to complete a naturalisation process, which is often bureaucratic and prohibitively costly.

Recommendation: Host and origin country governments should remove any gender bars on citizenship that prevent women from passing on their citizenship to their children, and allow and facilitate the holding of multiple citizenships.

- Remove barriers that prevent emigrant citizens – particularly women married to non-citizens – from passing on their citizenship to their children.
- Lift legal and policy bars on holding multiple citizenships. This can help integration, as it means migrants do not have to choose one citizenship over others, and can foster business development and trade networks with origin countries.

Recommendation: Host and origin country governments should not deprive naturalised citizens or their descendants of their status arbitrarily, especially in cases where it would render them stateless.

- Host and origin country governments that are not already signatories to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (and the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) should accede to these conventions.

Relevant SDG targets

4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes.

4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university.

16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.

16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.

Conclusion 3 A lack of access to citizenship/residency can limit representative decision-making, both increasing migrant communities' marginalisation and hindering progress towards SDG 16.7.

Recommendation: Support local and regional identities and statuses as alternative and interim means of framing inclusion and providing important legal rights.

- Governments, local authorities and private organisations should consider extending some rights normally reserved for citizens, in order to foster inclusion. With the consent of the local community, such measures could include voting in local or community elections. In particular, migrant parents of children who are permanent residents and/or citizens should be able to participate fully in decisions relating to education.
- Work together to build reciprocal citizenship rights that allow migrants to travel, work and live long-term across broad regional blocs as regional citizens. The international community should seek to support these processes of inclusion and regional integration.
- Cities should work on building local forms of membership (e.g. by providing citywide identity cards) that help strengthen everyday inclusion in communities and provide access to important services (e.g. access to banking facilities) for all residents, without reference to national legal status.

Relevant SDG targets

11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.


References

- Abrahamian, A. A. (2015) *The Cosmopolites: the coming of the global citizen*. Columbia Global Reports.
- Ager, A. and Strang, A. (2008) 'Understanding integration: a conceptual framework' *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21(2): 166–191.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona (1997) *Pla Intercultural [Intercultural Plan]*. Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona (2012) *BCN Pla d'Immigració [BCN Immigration Plan]*. Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Amnesty International (2017) *Israel/OPT: Israel must repeal the discriminatory Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law*. MDE 15/5737/2017. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5737/2017/en/
- Bauböck, R., Honohan, I., Huddleston, T., Hutcheson, D., Shaw, J. and Vink, M. P. (2013) *Access to citizenship and its impact on integration: European summary and standards*. European University Institute.
- Bove, V. and Elia, L. (2017) 'Migration, diversity, and economic growth' *World Development* 89: 227–239.
- Branton, R. (2007) 'Latino attitudes toward various areas of public policy: the importance of acculturation' *Political Research Quarterly* 60(2): 293–303.
- Cianetti, L. (2014) 'Granting local voting rights to non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia: the conundrum of minority representation in two divided democracies' *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 13(1): 86–112.
- Congress, Law Library (2017) *Rights to counsel for detained migrants in selected jurisdictions*. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.loc.gov/law/help/right-to-counsel/right-to-counsel-detained-migrants.pdf
- Constable, P. (2015) 'Plight of Dominican Haitians ignites outrage among diverse immigrants' *The Washington Post*, 23 June 2015. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/plight-of-dominican-haitians-ignites-outrage-among-diverse-immigrants/2015/06/23/7d1c85b4-19b8-11e5-bd7f-4611a60dd8e5_story.html?utm_term=.8a6d7e248a64
- Czaika, M. and Hobolth, M. (2014) *Deflection into irregularity? The (un)intended effects of restrictive asylum and visa policies*. International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper 84. Oxford: IMI.
- Delman, E. (2016) 'How not to welcome refugees'. *The Atlantic*, 27 January 2016. Accessed 31 August 2017 at: www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/denmark-refugees-immigration-law/431520/
- Domat, C. (2016) 'Show me the money! No bank accounts for many Syrians in Lebanon' *Middle East Eye*, 19 December 2016. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/show-me-money-no-bank-accounts-syrians-lebanon-refugees-784158579
- The Economist (2015). 'Payriotism'. *The Economist*, 18 April 2015. Accessed 19 July at: www.economist.com/news/britain/21648699-becoming-british-costly-business-payriotism
- Elgot, J. (2017) 'Rejection of EU citizens seeking UK residency hits 28%'. *The Guardian*, 27 February 2017. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/27/rejections-eu-citizens-seeking-uk-residency>
- Faist, T. and Kivisto, P. (eds.) (2007) *Dual citizenship in global perspective: from unitary to multiple citizenship*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gonzalez-Barrera, A., Lopez M. H., Passel, J. S. and Taylor, P. (2013) *The path not taken*. Pew Hispanic Center. Accessed 21 August 2017 at: www.pewhispanic.org/2013/02/04/the-path-not-taken/
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Mosler Vidal, E. and Sturge, G. (2017a) *Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Ulrichs, M., Holmes, R. and Nimeh, Z. (2017b) *Cash transfers for refugees: the economic and social effects of a programme in Jordan*. London: ODI.
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D. and Pietrantuono, G. (2015) 'Naturalization fosters the long-term political integration of immigrants' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)* 112(41): 12651–12656.
- Hindin, Z. and Ariza, M. (2016) 'When nativism becomes normal'. *The Atlantic*, 23 May 2016. Accessed 21 August 2017 at: www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/dominican-republic-la-sentencia/483998/
- Holston, J. and Appadurai, A. (1996) *Cities and citizenship*. Duke University Press.
- House of Commons (2017) *The government's negotiating objectives: the rights of UK and EU citizens: Second Report of Session 2016–17*. House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee.
- Hutt, M. (2003) *Unbecoming citizens: culture, nationhood, and the flight of refugees from Bhutan*. Oxford University Press.
- IRRI (2016) *The eligibility for refugees to acquire Ugandan citizenship*. IRRI.
- Just, A. and Anderson, J. C. (2012) 'Immigrants, citizenship and political action in Europe' *British Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 481–509.

- Juzwiak, T., McGregor, E. and Siegel, M. (2014) *Migrant and refugee integration in global cities: the role of cities and businesses*. The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.
- Lee, J., Omri, R. and Preston, J. (2017) 'What are sanctuary cities'. *The New York Times*, 6 February 2017. Accessed 29 August 2017 at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html
- Long, K. (2015) *From refugee to migrant? Labor mobility's protection potential*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Manby, B. (2015) *Nationality, migration and statelessness in West Africa: a study for UNHCR and IOM*. Dakar: UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM).
- Manby, B. (2016) *Citizenship law in Africa: a comparative study*. New York: Open Society Foundations.
- Mansour-Ille, D., 'Cast for citizenship: rich Arab countries may pay poor islands to take 'stateless' Bidoons'. London: ODI. Accessed 5 September 2017 at: www.odi.org/comment/10461-cash-citizenship-rich-arab-countries-may-pay-poor-islands-take-stateless-bidoons
- Market Wire (2010) *Migrant workers protest at Canada's embassy in Guatemala*. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.marketwired.com/press-release/migrant-workers-protest-at-canadas-embassy-in-guatemala-1312972.htm
- Massey, D. S. and Bartley, K. (2005) 'The changing legal status distribution of immigrants: a caution' *International Migration Review* 39(2): 469–484.
- The Migration Observatory (2016) *Here today, gone tomorrow? The status of EU citizens already living in the UK*. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). University of Oxford
- Mikkelsen, L., Phillips, D. E., AbouZahr, C., Setel, P. W., De Savigny, D., Lozano, R. and Lopez, A. D. (2015) 'A global assessment of civil registration and vital statistics systems: monitoring data quality and progress' *The Lancet* 386(10001): 1395–1406.
- Moran, A. (2011) 'Multiculturalism as nation-building in Australia: inclusive national identity and the embrace of diversity' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34(12): 2153–2172.
- Mosselson, A. (2010) "'There is no difference between citizens and non-citizens anymore": violent xenophobia, citizenship and the politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa' *Journal of Southern African Studies* 36(3): 641–655.
- NCSL (2015) *Tuition benefits for immigrants*. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/tuition-benefits-for-immigrants.aspx
- Nicolai, S., Wales, J. and Aiuzzi, E. (2017) *Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- O'Carroll, L. (2016) 'EU citizens in Britain post Brexit vote: "I feel betrayed, not at home, sad"'. *The Guardian*, 1 December 2016. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/01/eu-citizens-in-britain-post-brexit-vote-feel-betrayed-not-at-home-sad
- OECD/EU (2015) *Indicators of immigrant integration 2015: settling in*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Peters, F. and Vink, M. (2016) 'Naturalization and the socio-economic integration of immigrants: a life course perspective' in Freeman G.P. and Mirilovic N. (eds) *Handbook on migration and social policy*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Portes, A., Fernández-Kelly, P. and Haller, W. (2009) 'The adaptation of the immigrant second generation in America: a theoretical overview and recent evidence' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(7): 1077–1104.
- Rudiger, A. and Spencer, S. (2003) *Social integration of migrants and ethnic minorities: policies to combat discrimination*. 'The economic and social aspects of migration'. EC and OECD Conference, 21–22 January, Brussels.
- Ruhs, M. (2013) *The price of rights: regulating international labor migration*. Princeton University Press.
- Ryan, L. (2017) *EU citizens in the UK: after the shock comes the strategy to secure status*. London: London School of Economics (LSE).
- Schmid, C. (2008) 'Ethnicity and language tensions in Latvia' *Language Policy* 7(3): 3–19.
- Schneider, L. (2008) 'Police power and race riots in Paris Cathy' *Politics & Society* 36(1): 133–159.
- Simple, K. (2013) 'Dominican court's ruling on citizenship stirs emotions in New York'. *The New York Times*, 17 October 2013. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/nyregion/dominican-courts-ruling-on-citizenship-stirs-emotions-in-new-york.html?mcubz=1
- Shrestha, D. (2015) 'Resettlement of Bhutanese refugees surpasses 100,000 mark'. UNHCR, 19 November 2015. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/11/564dded46/resettlement-bhutanese-refugees-surpasses-100000-mark.html
- Spencer, S. (2006) *Refugees and other new migrants: a review of the evidence on successful approaches to integration*. Oxford: COMPAS.
- Stanford. (2017) 'Citizenship', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 2017. Accessed 21 August 2017 at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/>

-
- Taylor, P., Gonzalez-Barrera, A., Passel, J. and Lopez, M. H. (2012) 'Reasons for not naturalizing, an awakened giant: Hispanic electorate likely to double by 2030'. Pew Research Centre, 14 November 2012. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/14/iv-reasons-for-not-naturalizing/
- Tolan, C. (2017) 'Inspired by Trump, more immigrants rush to become U.S. Citizens'. *The Mercury News*, 5 May 2017. Accessed 29 August 2017 at: www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/05/trump-naturalization-citizenship-ceremony-oakland/
- Travis, A. (2017) 'UK can strip terror suspects of citizenship, European judges rule'. *The Guardian*, 9 March 2017. Accessed 29 August 2017 at: www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/09/terror-suspects-british-citizenship-european-ruling
- Tulloch, O., Machingura, F. and Melamed, C. (2016) *Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development*. London: ODI.
- UK Home Office (2004) Indicators of integration: final report. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.coe.int/t/dg3/migration/archives/documentation/Series_Community_Relations/Measurement_indicators_integration_en.pdf
- UN General Assembly (1961) Convention on the reduction of statelessness. UN Treaty Series, vol. 989, p.175. Accessed 29 August 2017 at: www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39620.html
- UNHCR (2014) Field evaluation of local integration of former refugees in Tanzania. Accessed 23 August 2017 at: www.state.gov/documents/organization/235056.pdf
- UNHCR (2017) 'Madagascar: UNHCR welcomes new law giving men and women equal rights to transfer nationality to children'. UNHCR, 3 February 2017. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: <http://citizenshiprightsafrika.org/madagascar-unhcr-welcomes-new-law-giving-men-and-women-equal-rights-to-transfer-nationality-to-children/>
- USCIS (2017) 'Additional information on filing a fee waiver'. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.uscis.gov/feewaiver
- US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2005) 'International Religious Freedom Report 2005: Saudi Arabia'. Accessed 19 July 2017 at: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51609.htm
- Van Selm, J. (2013) 'Great expectations: a review of the strategic use of resettlement' *Policy Development and Evaluation Service*, PDES/2013/13. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Vasta, E. (2011) 'Immigrants and the paper market: borrowing, renting and buying identities' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34(2): 187–206.
- Vieru, M. (2017) *Integration in host societies and development: adapting policy approaches to the new mobility*. KNOMAD Policy Brief 7 2017. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Weil, P. (2001) 'Access to citizenship: a comparison of twenty-five nationality laws' *Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices* 17(2001): 17–35.





A Syrian refugee shows his home town of Hama on his phone while en route to Canada © IOM/Muse Mohammed 2015

SDGs covered

- 8:** Decent work and economic growth
- 9:** Industrial innovation and infrastructure
- 10:** Reduced inequalities
- 16:** Peace, justice and strong institutions
- 17:** Partnerships for the goals

Technology, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Stephen Gelb and Aarti Krishnan

Key messages

- Highly-skilled migrants contribute substantially to technology innovation and research and development in destination countries – particularly high-income countries.
- Migrants and diaspora groups are an important channel for transferring technology from destination countries back to origin countries. This may be through knowledge they impart directly, remittances they send home, investments they make in origin countries, and support they provide for enterprise development and research institutions.
- Technology – particularly the digital connectivity offered by mobile phones – affects every aspect of migration: it provides access to information pre-migration, during journeys and in destination countries; facilitates remittances; and helps migrants stay connected to families.
- Government management of migration relies heavily on technology, both in keeping people out and in processing migrants after they arrive. Some of these technologies raise concerns about migrants' rights, but others, such as blockchain, may prove to have more positive applications.

1 Introduction

The issues of technology, innovation and productivity are mentioned in 10 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, reflecting the importance of technological change in raising economic growth and living standards, and in reducing poverty. However, none of these terms are mentioned in SDG 10 on inequality, which includes the only target explicitly concerned with migration – target 10.7.

In this briefing, we discuss the technology–migration nexus and show its significance to a range of SDGs and achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We demonstrate that migrants are (and have been) crucial for innovation and technological change processes in both destination and origin countries. And the use of technology and technological innovations is fundamental both to migration processes and to attempts by government authorities to manage migration – or restrict it.

1.1 Definitions

We use the following terms:

- **Technology** is understood here to mean systematised knowledge, often embodied in physical form, as a machine or instrument, used in production or consumption activities, or spelled out in a blueprint or piece of software.
- **Innovation** refers to a change in technology, a new idea or new knowledge used to create a new product or service, a new process of production or distribution of either products or services.
- Technology is evidently essential to all economic activity, but more significantly, innovation and technological change are essential to long-term **productivity** increases and to economic growth.

The technology ‘lifecycle’ distinguishes between:

1. The **production** of technology (innovation) – creating, developing and investing in new ideas and new knowledge results in new products, services or production processes. Innovation undertaken by firms may be disruptive (substantial changes to existing products and processes, or entirely new products/processes) or incremental (minor changes

or improvements, which lower cost and increase competitiveness) (Christensen et al., 2015).

2. The **distribution** and **diffusion** of new technology – its adoption by ‘follower’ producers who wish to produce the new or changed product or service, or to adopt the new production process, to compete better with the innovator.
3. The **use** of new technology by consumers (individuals or organisations) – the use of the product or service in which new technology is embodied.

We consider the interaction between elements of the technology lifecycle and migration – both from origin countries to destination countries and the return of certain migrants and diaspora members.¹ We identify four main migration–technology interactions or pathways:

1. **Migration’s impact on innovation – technology production – in destination countries.** Migrants and diasporas – especially highly-skilled individuals – have significant impact on innovation and research and development (R&D) activity in destination countries.
2. **Migration’s impact on technology distribution and diffusion from destination countries back to origin countries.** Through their links with origin countries, migrants and diasporas may impact on the distribution/diffusion of existing technologies to those countries and on innovation there.
3. **Technology’s impact on migrants’ journeys and migration processes.** Use of technology has a significant impact on the migration experience, impacting on journeys, entry and integration into destination countries, and links with family and communities in origin countries.
4. **Technology’s use in migration management.** Technology is used – for good or ill – in migration administration and management by public authorities, to regulate border crossing, passage and settlement of migrants and refugees.

In the next section, we identify more explicitly how the SDGs address technology and migration. Section 3 then considers pathways one and two – migration’s impact on technology, while section 4 flips the relationship around and considers how technology shapes the migration process (pathways three and four). We conclude by offering recommendations for boosting the potential contribution of migration and diasporas to the SDGs, through their impact on technology production and diffusion.

1 The briefing focuses on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for the purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example refugees, this is stated explicitly. Diasporas refer to migrants’ children and later generation descendants, who identify in some way with their families’ country of origin.

2 Technology, migration and the 2030 Agenda

The centrality of technological improvement for economic growth is underlined in SDG 8. Meanwhile, Goal 9 focuses directly on R&D and technological capabilities, pointing to their concentration globally in high-income countries, for which one reason is inward migration of highly-skilled workers from low- and middle-income countries – the so-called ‘brain drain’. Goal 17, on global partnerships, addresses the unequal distribution of technological capabilities between global ‘North’ and ‘South’. It emphasises the need to rebalance ‘brain drain’ with ‘brain gain’ – the return of highly-skilled migrants to origin countries – and ‘brain circulation’ – the transfer of knowledge and technology to origin countries by migrants and diasporas, partly through temporary return (we discuss both in section 3.2).

Goal 10 identifies solutions to specific challenges facing migrants: improved migration processes and lower remittance costs. Tackling both challenges depends on migrants’ access to new technologies, especially mobile-phone and related digital technologies. But Goal 10 may also be undermined by governments’ use of technology to close borders and prevent migration.

Several other SDGs are also of relevance: Goals 2 and 3, and 5–7, address the specific issues of: food security and agricultural productivity; environmental impacts on health; gender equality; water quality; and energy poverty, respectively. Developing countries’ access to technological improvements in each of these areas is crucial, underlining the importance of their technological absorptive capacity and the effects of migration on this.

Table 1 lists key SDGs relevant to the technology–migration nexus, identifying the links and key mechanisms.

3 How migration contributes to the production and diffusion of technology

Migrants contribute significantly to R&D and innovation activities in destination countries and to diffusion. These contributions support a number of SDGs as mentioned – in particular, SDGs 8.2 and 9.5, on the centrality of technology and new innovations for economic growth and productivity, as well as SDG 17, on North–South technology partnerships.

The interaction between migration and technology through pathways one and two relates closely to the knowledge dimension of technology. This dimension, even when embodied in a physical good (like a machine), has both explicit and tacit elements. That is, some

of the knowledge can be systematised and written down – or ‘codified’ – (explicit knowledge), while some cannot (tacit knowledge). Instead, the transfer of tacit knowledge – essential for technological change – requires direct interaction and communication between people via joint activities or formal and informal instruction (Polanyi, 1966). This cultural and linguistic dimension of technological change is relevant to how it is affected by migration.

Migrants’ contribution to innovation in destination countries has been substantial. Partly this is because cultural diversity and difference encourages unconventional and out-of-the-box thinking and discourages groupthink, which is valuable for new ideas and knowledge creation. Unlike innovation, diffusion of already-created technology involves the transfer of tacit knowledge (as well as explicit) and thus relies on common language and culture, as well as local knowledge – especially when diffusion occurs in a different context, such as another country. Hence migrants and diasporas may contribute significantly to technology diffusion from destination back to origin countries.

Diffusion is partly determined by absorptive capacities – that is, the ability to assimilate and apply knowledge. This depends on stocks of technically competent managers, of highly-skilled people trained in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields, and of STEM organisations and institutions. Highly-skilled migration flows, both inward and outward, are evidently crucial for countries’ absorptive capacities. This makes migration policy an important tool for technology and industrial development and economic growth.

3.1 Migrant impacts on innovation and knowledge generation in destination countries

The Nobel Prize provides an interesting indicator of migrants’ contribution to innovation in technology. From its inception to 2016, the Nobel Prize was awarded 579 times to 911 people and organisations. Of the total of 350 winners residing in the US at the time of their award, more than 100 were immigrants born elsewhere. In fact, as a distinct category, US immigrant winners are second only to US-born laureates: their number exceeds that of laureates born in any other country (Najam, 2017). In 2016, all six US Nobel laureates were immigrants.²

Numerous studies demonstrate highly-skilled migrants’ role, through their participation in teams along with locals, in disruptive innovation (usually measured by R&D spending or patents). For instance, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2009) found that, in the United States during the 1940–2000 period, there was a strong causal relationship between rising population shares of immigrant college graduates and post-college

2 Three of the prizes – Peace, Literature and Economics – are not directly related to technology.

immigrants, on one hand, and numbers of patents on the other.³ They also showed that a college-graduate immigrant contributed at least twice as much to patenting than their native counterparts. Another study (Bosetti et al., 2015) quantified the contribution of skilled migrants in the European Union (EU) to innovation, showing significant positive effects on knowledge production and application (measured by patent applications and journal articles).

Bosetti et al. (2015) also find that cultural diversity due to migrant involvement and complementarities between locals and immigrants is an important contributing factor in improving productivity, problem-solving and improving the absorptive capacity of all employees within organisations. This is linked to the significance of tacit knowledge, which requires direct human interaction for its transfer, and without mobility remains fixed to specific locations and contexts. Migrant–local networks increase

Table 1 Technology, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Relevant SDGs and targets	Link to migration
Goal 8 Decent work and economic growth	Pathway: 1, 2
8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation	Highly-skilled migrants participate in innovation and R&D in destination countries. Return migrants and diaspora networks support diffusion of new/improved technology into origin countries and R&D there.
Goal 9 Industrial innovation and infrastructure	Pathway: 1, 2
9.5 Enhance scientific research and upgrade technological capabilities in all countries	Highly-skilled migrants and diaspora members engage in R&D and technology production and diffusion in both destination and origin countries, with spillovers to other people and to institutions in both locations.
9.b Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries	
9.c Significantly increase access to information and communications technology (ICT)	
Goal 10 Reduced inequalities	Pathway: 3, 4
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	Digital apps and other mobile telephony technologies facilitate migration journeys and integration and are especially important for lower-skilled migrants and for refugees. Digital technologies may support government migration management but can increase migrants' risks. Technologies are used to close borders.
10.c By 2030, reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances	Financial technology ('fintech') apps can reduce remittances costs and increase security of transactions, and support migrants' financial inclusion, as well as financial development in origin countries.
Goal 16 Peace, justice and strong institutions	Pathway: 3, 4
16.9 Provide legal identity for all, including birth registration	Blockchain technology can expand provision of secure and portable birth certificates and documents.*
Goal 17 Strengthen global partnerships for sustainable development	Pathway: 1, 2, 3
17.6 Enhance regional and international cooperation in science and technology and innovation	Migration and diaspora networks contribute to technological partnerships for 'south' countries.
17.7 Promote environmentally sound technologies for developing countries	
17.8 Enhance capacity building mechanisms and enabling technology, in particular ICT	
17.16 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development	

3 A 0.7 percentage point increase in the population share of immigrant college graduates and a 1.3 percentage point increase in the population share of post-college immigrants each increased patenting per capita by 12%.

the scope of information available and facilitate ‘agility’ (speed and adaptiveness) by enhancing organisations’ capabilities for disruptive innovation and by supporting competitiveness agendas.⁴

Clustering effects⁵ are also important for innovation and technology diffusion, and migration is important for cluster creation. For example, a majority of the population in parts of Silicon Valley, such as Cupertino and Berryessa, are migrants – mainly from China and India (Jiménez, 2018). Silicon Valley also provides considerable evidence for positive spillover effects from migrants to locals (though there are multiple other examples).

Much harder to measure than disruptive innovation is incremental innovation (and thus it is also more difficult to evaluate or attribute migrants’ contribution

Box 1 Migrant pioneers and leaders in disruptive technology

A key component of the so-called ‘fourth industrial revolution’ – characterised, according to the World Economic forum, ‘by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres’ – is sustainable materials for use in new technologies. One recently discovered material, graphene, is considered the world’s first two-dimensional material: ultra-thin and ultra-light, flexible yet immensely tough, it can act as either a conductor or a perfect barrier (Upadhyay et al., 2014). It was discovered at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom by a culturally diverse team of natives and immigrants, led by two Russian immigrant scientists who won the Nobel Physics Prize in 2010.

Graphene’s discovery has spurred several ongoing innovations that are likely to contribute to SDGs 6 and 7, linked to water, waste reduction and clean energy. For instance, research at the University of Manchester led by an Indian immigrant scientist has prototyped graphene filters that separate organic solvent from water and remove water from gas mixtures to provide clean and cheap drinking water, lowering costs of commercial filtration and desalination. At the Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology in South Korea, a US-born immigrant is researching graphene’s use in increasing the life of traditional lithium-ion batteries for quicker, longer-held charging, which is very valuable for electric cars (Dumé, 2018).

to it). However, Lee and Nathan (2010) use survey data to show a positive and significant correlation between London firms’ workforce and ownership diversity and their level of innovation activity, including incremental innovations. They do not claim causality but rather emphasise that diversity complements the main driving factors of innovation: firms’ own R&D spending and collaboration with other firms.

Innovation is facilitated by institutional ‘ecosystems’ that underpin the provision of finance, information and physical facilities (labs, design workshops and factories) along with well-functioning regulatory organisations. Both government (local and national) and multinational corporations are critical for innovation and technology diffusion, the latter of which are important for stimulating and facilitating migration of highly-skilled employees, many of whom contribute to companies’ innovation in destination countries.

But the role of migrants in high-profile innovation goes beyond the R&D lab. The stereotype that migrants have a stronger work ethic is common, but perhaps due to this or to a willingness to take risks, as reflected in their decision to move countries, many immigrants are highly successful entrepreneurs and senior executives. One recent tabulation showed that 15 of the top-25 US ‘tech companies’ (mainly in ICT), which are together worth over \$4 trillion, have first- or second-generation immigrants among their founders. These companies included Apple, Amazon, Google and Facebook, and Ebay, PayPal, Tesla and Yahoo (Molla, 2018). In several of these corporations – Google, Microsoft, Pepsi – their Chief Executive Officers are immigrants. Examples abound outside the US too: Carlos Slim, who controls the major player in Mexico’s telecoms sector (and was the richest man in the world in 2010), is a second-generation Mexican from a Lebanese family.

With their culturally diverse employee base, many of these companies contribute to the SDGs in developing countries through both their primary business activities and multiple corporate social responsibility initiatives. Google and Microsoft have developed long-term digital partnerships with multiple Indian and African civil society organisations and governments, and started open data initiatives, such as openAFRICA and Research Open Data, to improve local governments’ policy-making. Alphabet, Google’s parent company, is working on deploying high-speed internet to rural India through laser technology.⁶

And, in destination countries, young migrant tech entrepreneurs are also spearheading social innovations,

4 While not implying that migrants are either necessary or sufficient for disruptive innovation, it is evident that they are a significant contributory factor.

5 A cluster is a geographic concentration of related companies, organisations, and institutions in a particular sector. Clusters arise because they raise firms’ productivity, due to local assets and the presence of related firms, institutions and infrastructure that lowers production and transaction costs.

6 www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/12/india-will-deploy-two-thousand-google-laser-internet-links-for-highspeed-network-backbone.html

with potential applications for SDG targets in countries of origin and other developing countries. For instance, UK-based company Logically, started by a 21-year-old Indian immigrant, is an artificial intelligence platform that helps citizens access credible information on government performance (SDGs 5.b and 16). Taarifa, developed by a group of young Tanzanian-Americans, is an open source web application that enables public officials to respond to citizen complaints about sanitation services (SDG 6).

Countless similar examples point to migrants' contribution to technology development in destination countries. To enhance innovation, technological progress and productivity growth, destination-country governments should promote highly-skilled inward migration and labour mobility, rather than constrain migrants' options through often-found restrictive quotas for foreign workers and rigid labour market policies and accreditation regulations.⁷ Skilled immigrants are all too commonly forced to 'down-skill' – for example, doctors or engineers driving taxis, unable to practice their profession due to lack of accreditation of origin-country training and certification.⁸

Brain drain or brain gain?

Nonetheless, as SDG 17 underlines, capabilities for technology development are highly unequal among countries, and migration is a major factor in creating and reinforcing that inequality. Recent estimates suggest that highly-skilled (defined as tertiary-educated) migrants comprise about 25% to 30% of the world's 232 million migrants, but that more than 75% of highly-skilled migrants reside in OECD countries.⁹ In fact, the number of highly-skilled migrants increased by 70% in OECD countries between 2000 and 2010, compared with a rise of only 35% in the tertiary-educated native population. The global concentration of highly-skilled migrants is substantial: 66% are in only four countries, all English-speaking – Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. On the other side of the coin, over one-third of countries

– almost all of them low- and middle-income – have had out-migration of more than 10% of their highly-skilled population, and for a sixth of countries, this share is over 20%.

Unsurprisingly, 'brain drain' arguments have dominated policy discussion (UNCTAD, 2007; World Bank, 2006; Kapur and McHale, 2005). Many argue that lower barriers to entry in high-income destination countries would exacerbate outflows of skilled people from poorer countries where they are a scarce resource, leading to suggestions that richer countries unilaterally adopt quotas on highly-skilled recruitment from poor countries (Collier, 2013). Many others propose that origin countries try to restrict out-migration by quotas or taxes. But these views, and indeed the 'brain drain versus brain gain' metaphor itself, are increasingly contested.¹⁰ The role of migrants and diasporas in technology diffusion, to which we turn now, illustrates alternative narratives.

3.2 How migration contributes to diffusion and distribution of technology in origin countries

The 'brain drain' versus 'brain gain' narrative is, however, contested. One argument is that migration aspirations might in fact incentivise a greater demand for education and skills to enhance migration abilities, leading to a net rise in skills in origin countries, as many newly-skilled individuals ultimately remain rather than leave.¹¹ But perhaps a more persuasive set of arguments is that emigrants and diaspora communities enable a return inflow into origin countries of technology and other forms of knowledge, and contribute to a rise in origin countries' 'absorptive capacity', the ability to upgrade technology through diffusion or local innovation, which depends on skill pools and also strong institutions.

Beyond 'brain drain'/'brain gain' binaries, metaphors such as 'brain circulation' and 'brain banks' may more usefully describe migrant and diaspora contributions to technology diffusion¹² (Collier and Vickerman, 2001; Lowell and Gerova, 2004; Agrawal et al. 2011; Clemens, 2011). Of course, a key consideration, as in all

7 For a more detailed discussion on the barriers to migration set by destination and origin countries, see the poverty briefing on the same series (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).

8 The immigrant may still be better off, earning more in a 'down-skilled' activity in the destination country than from a professional activity in the origin country. But this is a sub-optimal social outcome, for both origin and destination countries. On 'behind the border' barriers to migrant entry and integration, see also Clemens (2011) and Collier and Vickerman (2001).

9 All statistics in this paragraph are from Kone and Ozden (2017).

10 For a critique of these arguments, see Clemens and Sandefur, 2014.

11 See Carling and Schewel (2018) for a different view of aspirations and ability in migration and how increased aspirations but a continued low ability to leave could lead to negative development outcomes.

12 'Brain circulation' refers to knowledge flows in both directions between destination and origin countries, while 'brain banks' refer to pools of knowledge built up abroad but available to locals in the country of origin.

discussions of technology transfer and diffusion, is the absorptive capacity (the ability to learn and to integrate new technologies) of the receiving country – here the country of origin. In many cases, this may be very low – for example in low-income or fragile and conflict-affected states.¹³

Three key channels through which migrants and diasporas may support technological development in their origin countries have been identified: (1) direct technological and knowledge transfers; (2) diaspora investment and remittances supporting origin country economic growth and transformation; and (3) supporting entrepreneurialism in origin countries (Docquier and Marfouk, 2004; Clemens and Pritchett, 2016; Gelb, 2016). Many processes and projects will include elements of two or even all three of these channels.

Direct knowledge transfers from the diaspora

As noted, the tacit dimension of knowledge transfer means that language, context and cultural familiarity are crucial. As such, migrants in particular, as well as diasporas, have a vital role in technology diffusion. Quantitative analysis (Kerr, 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Newland and Tanaka, 2010) has shown diaspora networks and return migrants to have a positive and significant effect on growth and export diversity of small and medium enterprises in countries of origin, through technology transfer. Many countries (for example India and Scotland) have established government ministries or agencies to incentivise diaspora networks to support local development through knowledge transfer. In other cases – Chile, Ireland, Nigeria and South Africa – the idea of building diaspora networks arose within the diaspora itself or from civil society in the origin country, with government subsequently taking on some responsibility.

Remittances and diaspora investment

The second channel for diaspora linkages to origin countries is financial flows: remittances and diaspora investment. Remittances are based on an interpersonal connection between sender and recipient (usually a household) and are one-way transactions or transfers, with no corresponding return of economic value to the sender. Diaspora investment is impersonal, received by firms, government agencies or non-government organisations rather than households, and are two-way transactions or exchanges, involving the return of an item of corresponding value by the recipient to the sender(s) (see Gelb, 2016). Both remittances and diaspora investment take various forms, in many of which knowledge and technology flow together with the money itself.

Box 2 Diaspora supporting technology and knowledge transfer to origin countries

- The government of Morocco supports national research and technology initiatives, through programmes such as the International Forum of Moroccan Competencies Abroad. In 2009, the National Centre for Scientific and Technical Research in Rabat signed a memoranda of understanding with several bodies abroad, notably the Association of Moroccan Computer Scientists in France and the Moroccan-German Skills Network in Germany.
- The American Association of Physicians from India, comprised of more than 80,000 practicing physicians in the US, has invested in technological advances across small nursing homes and hospitals in rural India, providing medical accountability and legal training to doctors and improving digital information systems to maintain hospital records.
- Colombia's Red Caldas network, set up with government assistance in 1991, was one of the first diaspora networks that succeeded in promoting collaborative research, training and knowledge exchange between domestic scientists and Colombian researchers abroad (Chaparro et al., 2006).

Remittances sent by poor and well-off migrants represent a significant proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) in many low- and middle-income countries and impact the macroeconomy as well as households and microenterprises (World Bank, 2006; 2016). Lower-skilled migrants' remittances are spent mainly on basic needs of families 'back home', but they also contribute to family investments in housing or education (Gelb, 2016; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017), or in households' productive enterprises (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001). These investments contribute to technology diffusion and upgrading of skill (and absorptive capacities), especially in poor communities. So, too, do remittances to community-based projects. Mexican immigrants in the USA have formed many hometown associations (HTAs) to invest in projects such as school rebuilding in their origin communities. From 2001, the Mexican government provided matching funds via its 'Tres Por Uno' ('three for one') programme, mobilising around \$15 million a year for more than 6,000 projects involving over 1,000 HTAs by 2010.¹⁴

13 Clemens (2014) proposes 'global skills partnerships' where receiving countries finance training in sending countries to build skills pools large enough for both highly-skilled emigration and local skills needs.

14 This is a tiny percentage of total Mexican remittances of about \$24 billion per annum.

Similar examples are found elsewhere. In the spirit of SDG 17, more than 40 France-based Senegalese diaspora organisations support a water fund in partnership with the Government of Senegal to develop water infrastructure to combat climate change, investing in water meters, rain-water harvesting and drainage in the Senegal river valley (Grillo and Riccio, 2004; Scheffran, 2011). Malian diaspora in France partnered with the Comité Immigration Développement Sahel (Sahel Development Immigration Organization) and the Rural Energy Services Company to expand rural electrification systems in several villages using renewable energy sources (SDGs 7.a).

Beyond remittances, **diaspora investment** draws on the savings of other, higher-income migrants and diaspora and takes many different forms, including equity in businesses in the origin country, or loans and bonds issued in the origin country to mobilise funds from destination countries for specific projects (Gelb, 2016).¹⁵ Because diaspora investors want a financial return, they or the business or project promoter will try to improve profitability, often involving technology upgrading. For example, the Senegalese government's *Retours Vers l'Agriculture* ('return to agriculture') programme provides tax exemptions to new business ventures in Senegal, which enables the diaspora to promote hi-tech equipment and modernise agriculture, increase Senegal's exports, growth and sustainable food production, and supports SDGs 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, and 8.2 (Panizzon, 2008).

UK-based Helios and Homestrings are examples of financial platforms that facilitate diaspora investment in SDG-linked sectors in developing countries of origin. Helios, which has over \$3 billion in commitments in Africa, raises finance from the African diaspora and the wider capital market for projects in energy, transport, IT and financial services, as well as retail and consumer products. Homestrings is a web-based crowdfunding platform that allows diaspora members (and other investors) to select investments in origin countries, to finance medium- or large-scale African businesses in agriculture, technology, healthcare and renewable energy sectors, as well as public sector bonds. Both platforms facilitate knowledge flows to the businesses.

Even when they are not themselves sending money, strong diaspora networks may contribute to knowledge flows and technical capabilities in origin countries by acting as reputational intermediaries in their destination countries, encouraging investment into their origin country from non-diaspora businesses, who invariably bring in newer, more advanced technologies than generally available back home (Kuznetsov, 2007). One example is the role that the Indian diaspora in the US have played in the rise of India's IT industry (Box 3). Others include the ChileGlobal Angels and the US-based

Irish Technology Leadership Group, which provide business mentoring and market knowledge and networks to start-ups in their origin countries.

Finally, the financial investment of diaspora and migrants – including remittances – create incentives to upgrade financial institution capabilities and regulation in origin countries. For example, remittance-based housing loans (as in the Philippines or Mexico) or diaspora deposits (common in many countries, but particularly significant in India) require enhanced risk-management capabilities in commercial banks.

Supporting entrepreneurialism in origin countries

The third channel involves diaspora networks fostering entrepreneurialism and business development in origin countries. This can take many forms, including migrants and diaspora returning to their country of origin to start their own businesses, or investing in start-ups with local partners – either as active participants in running the business or as only financial investors. Whatever form it takes, it is likely that knowledge and technology transfer to the country of origin will be part of the link, raising the absorptive capacity of local populations and spurring growth and development (Saxenian, 2005). There is much literature on the importance of inward investment into China by the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong and

Box 3 The role of Silicon Valley-based Indian immigrants in India's IT industry

The IndUS Entrepreneur (TIE) is a venture capital network started in 1992 to promote start-ups in both India and the US, especially in IT. TIE now has over 13,000 members in 61 chapters covering 18 countries and has contributed to creating businesses worth over \$120 billion worldwide, providing mentoring and finance through venture capital, private equity and angel investments. Many TIE members were educated in India before migrating to the US, and many have now returned to India, as have US-born diaspora members. The migration flow in both directions has contributed to the IT clusters in Hyderabad and Bangalore, and their deep links with Silicon Valley. Some argue that major US IT multinationals decided to establish Indian operations during the 1990s, in large part because they had many Indian-born and Indian-origin employees in their US operations who promoted India as an investment destination and themselves moved back – at one point, 71 of 75 foreign investors in Bangalore's software technology park were headed by returned Indians (Kapur, 2007: 398, citing Ghemawat, 2000).

15 For example, the Ethiopian government issued 'Millennium Bonds' to finance hydroelectric energy generation (the Grand Renaissance Dam).

Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s, certainly one of the crucial mechanisms supporting the long-run development of China's industrial capabilities (Saxenian, 2006; Naughton, 2007: 416).

Return migration is a common form of migrant support for enterprise development and technological upgrading, especially in fast-growing developing countries with large diasporas, such as India, China or Korea (Wang, 2015; Kuznetsov et al., 2006). Returning migrants are a source of entrepreneurship, technology, marketing knowledge and business networks, as well as investment capital (Kapur, 2001; Brinkerhoff, 2006a; 2006b). Studies of migrants returning to Egypt have shown, for example, that they tend to have higher skill-linked capabilities than non-migrants and are likely to be more entrepreneurial the longer they work abroad (McCormick and Wahba, 2003; Wahba, 2007). Even some migrants who have 'failed' in destination countries may have acquired skills and networks there that enable them to be competitive when they return to their origin country (where their arrival raises average productivity).

Two examples of return migration's diffusion of new SDG-related technology in origin countries are Digital Green and Escorts Heart and Research Centre in India. Digital Green was founded by a returning immigrant, who had emigrated to the US, and is an app-based company empowering smallholder farmers in India through technology and grassroots-level partnerships. Escorts Heart and Research Centre, set up by another returnee with extensive cardiac surgery experience in the US, uses world-leading surgery techniques including 'beating heart' and robotic surgery (Walden, 2003).

4 How technology use facilitates migration

Individual migrants and refugees use technology in a number of ways to enable and support their migration process. The combination of mobile phones, the internet and social media – together labelled 'digital connectivity' – is crucial, seen by the EU as 'a game changer for migration' (EPSC, 2017). Over the past two decades, the lower cost of handsets and internet access, along with the proliferation of mobile networks and phone apps, have enabled even poor people (migrants and others) to use the technology.

The uptake and use of ICT technology by migrants has substantial impacts on every aspect of the migration journey, especially for poor people, providing:¹⁶

- information on the quality of life and economic opportunities that are available elsewhere, which shapes aspirations, decisions to migrate and migration plans, including destination country preferences
- essential planning and travel information on the journey itself, including on transport options (official and informal such as people smugglers), transport costs, translation, and on safety, including avoiding difficult borders
- access to migrants' own or family financial resources for the journey, while in transit and upon arrival at the destination, via mobile money platforms
- information to facilitate re-settling in the destination country after arrival by accessing migrant networks and local information in the destination country
- continuing linkages with families and networks in their country of origin through messaging, voice call and social network apps available on mobile phones.

For refugees, digital connectivity is often a literal lifeline. Little wonder, then, that refugees are often willing to spend as much as a third of their income on mobile telephony, or to walk miles to access free Wi-Fi or reach a spot in a refugee camp where network connectivity is available (UNHCR, 2018). Mobile telephone access is an absolute necessity in this sense: 'So important were mobile phones that, on arrival [in refugee camps], many refugees asked for Wi-Fi or charging services ahead of food, water, or shelter' (GSMA, 2017).¹⁷ The common experience of confiscation or inspection of refugees' mobile phones by immigration authorities exacerbates the trauma for many.¹⁸

Nonetheless, as with the consumption items mentioned, levels of mobile telephony use among migrants reflect deep income-, gender- and age-related inequalities. Recent analyses identify 'information precarity' as a challenge facing migrants generally, and refugees in particular; these groups may have inconsistent (and costly relative to income) access, lack control over their own data and experience anxiety about phones being used for surveillance of their activities (Wall et al., 2017). To help tackle such problems, the GSM Association launched a Humanitarian Connectivity Charter in March 2015, which has now been

16 See Hamel (2009) for a good overview of the impact of digital connectivity on migrants, notwithstanding that rapid digital innovation makes a decade-old paper already somewhat dated. More recent research includes Gillespie et al. (2016) and Frouws et al. (2016).

17 Surveys have shown similar responses: see Leung (2010).

18 An internet search on 'mobile phone confiscation refugees' yields 577,000 hits, with the first page alone containing news reports on confiscations in six different OECD countries.

signed by 148 mobile network operators operating in 106 countries. The Charter commits signatories to improving access to communication and information for those affected by humanitarian crises, with actions such as local SIM-card provision via the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to new arrivals at refugee camps.

4.1 Facilitating integration

Mobile phones are a very important item for migrants settling into a new country and society, allowing them to access a wide range of essential information and services, including housing, employment or training opportunities, local health and transport, schools and childcare, cultural or religious events (especially within their own diaspora community). Phones also enable migrants to engage with the authorities processing their asylum or residency claims and are a personal security mechanism for vulnerable groups such as women domestic workers. The technology is more and more important to overcoming often overwhelming language barriers: language learning and translation apps are increasingly used both by migrants themselves and by NGOs which provide migrant support services in many countries.¹⁹ And through social media platforms, they enable migrants to connect with migrant networks in the same destination country and further afield.

Apps that support migrant settlement are quintessentially public goods, and this is increasingly recognised by the investment of public or collective resources. Since the upsurge in migrant entry to Europe since 2015, public and private migrant service providers in destination and transit countries have created a proliferation of apps, including *Ankommen* ('arrive') in Germany, *Love Europe* in the Netherlands, *Textfugees* messaging service in France, and the *TikkTalk* platform that connects NGOs and interpreters in Norway (Wasik, 2017). An example outside Europe is the *MySeoul* app, created by the Seoul City government to improve, in particular, women migrants' access to information. There is arguably an 'over-supply' of apps, with many now out of date or redundant and limited inter-connection between them. Migrants thus tend to fall back on Facebook and other social media platforms to access information and build new social networks.

This underlines that mobile phones are not the answer to all migrants' challenges: though they reduce difficulties of accessing information and save time and money, migrants still need to learn the language in their destination country, find a job, secure and pay for housing, and register

children with schools and health services (Iannelli, 2018). Furthermore, widespread use of phones and social media raises serious concerns about privacy and about potential surveillance by governments (Loh, 2016; Jumbert et al., 2018; McGregor, 2018). Many refugees from political conflicts fear country-of-origin surveillance, but it is a concern in destination countries too. In 2017, both Germany (despite opposition from the data protection commissioner) and Denmark expanded the legal powers of immigration officials to digitally search asylum seekers' phones.²⁰ German immigration officials argue that mobile phone data may point to inconsistencies in asylum-seekers' stories, and within six months of the law's enactment, they searched 8,000 phones (Meaker, 2017).

4.2 Staying connected

As recently as 2010, African refugees in Australia reported relying on ordinary postal services to communicate with families back home (Leung, 2010). Mobile phones have changed that by:

- enabling lower cost and faster remittances to provide financial support to families
- continuing emotional support to (and from) family members via messaging and Voice over Internet Protocol ('VoIP') software
- steady flows of news and cultural information from their 'home' country
- the potential for extensive political participation in both country of origin and the diaspora.

Social media is the most common software technology used by migrants and has fundamentally transformed their relationships – allowing them to both retain links with families and communities 'back home' and integrate into diaspora and local communities in the destination country (Benitez, 2012; Oiarzabal, 2012). But there are downsides: emotional 'support' can also be a means to controlling behaviour or increasing financial demands – either to or from the migrant – and this is likely to affect women more negatively. Some argue that continuing strong origin-country links may be considered an obstacle to migrants' integration into their new countries because 'bridge burning', on the other hand, assists integration. However, it seems quite possible for migrants to simultaneously have strong ties with origin countries and be well-integrated into destination countries (Loh, 2016). 'Live', dynamic links between migrants and families and communities at home may have benefits for those

19 They are also used as a communication tool by border police.

20 The German law allows authorities to look at the data on a migrant's phone only if the individual can't or won't provide proof of identity and nationality, such as a valid passport. Only meta data from the phone is accessible, and only by the German Migration Office. Meta data includes information about calls and messages (time, source or destination), as well as email addresses, websites visited, files downloaded and GPS location information (McGregor, 2018).

communities too, in the form of ‘social remittances’ (Levitt, 1998, cited in Hamel, 2009). These are ideas and knowledge flowing back from destination to origin country, which we have discussed extensively in relation to technology and economic knowledge but which also relevant to social and political issues.²¹ The notion of social remittances offers at least some promise of identity porosity and fluidity and a softening of the hard borders of nationalism. Interactions between nationalism and political conflict (including war) are, of course, complex. If newspapers were the technology enabling the nation to come into existence as an ‘imagined political community’,²² then digital connectivity is the technological means for ‘*transnational* imagined communities’²³ in which ‘connected migrants’²⁴ remain active members of their nation of origin. In this sense, mobile phones provide the ‘social glue of migrant transnationalism’ (Vertovec, 2004).

Beyond mobile telephony, the migration process has also been transformed by a range of financial technology (‘fintech’) institutions using phone-based apps rather than the costly physical infrastructure used by conventional financial institutions. Regulatory environments vary between countries – especially for cross-border transactions that are undertaken by migrants and involve exchange rates. But despite this, many fintech providers have been able to customise transaction services products for migrant customers, offering remittance transfers to, and bill payments in, their countries of origin. Some fintech start-ups allow migrants to open local (destination-country) bank accounts from abroad before their arrival.²⁵ The UN World Food Programme has developed technology with Carrefour and Mastercard, combining iris scanning with smart cards issued to each refugee, who can now shop at nearby supermarkets (McKinsey, 2016).

There are also a few examples of technologies that go beyond digital connectivity. Distance education programmes for language learning still depend on ICT, as does tele-medicine, including medical specialist consultations and tele-surgery for refugees in which specialists based abroad

supervise theatre operations using web video links. Quite different, but equally useful, is flat-pack housing, developed by UNHCR with the Ikea Foundation, which uses a steel frame and solar energy panels and is replacing tents that last only 6 months (Robson, 2013).

5 How technology use facilitates migration management

5.1 Border crossing technology

‘Dual use’ technology with military and non-military applications has long been central to governments’ efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of controls. This has accelerated in recent years, with a rapid expansion in both scale and scope of what has been labelled the ‘border industrial complex’, a market expected to reach around \$32.5 billion by 2021 (Dart, 2015; Hoffman, 2016).²⁶ Annual trade fairs such as the ‘Border Security Expo’ in the US or the UK Home Office-sponsored ‘Security and Policing’²⁷ showcase a bewildering array of new hardware to collect information on people and goods as they cross borders, with data processing software returning analysis to border officials fast enough to halt the border crossings before completion.

Hardware includes cameras and radar surveillance equipment mounted on drones, blimps, helicopters or satellites, or on towers and other static platforms, for continuous scanning of long borders. It is claimed that some cameras can identify faces from hundreds of yards away, with sufficient detail to specify age, gender and ethnicity. Also used to detect movement along long borders are underground sensors. And there are greater ambitions: ‘ROBOrder’, under development by a consortium across 15 EU member states, is ‘a border surveillance system with unmanned mobile robots including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground vehicles, capable of functioning both as standalone and in swarms (*sic*).’²⁸

21 On a more prosaic level, the diffusion of mobile phones and ICT in some low-income origin countries may have been encouraged and accelerated by out-migration and the need to ‘keep in touch’.

22 To use Benedict Anderson’s (1983) evocative phrase.

23 Aksoy and Robins, 2002, cited in Hamel 2009 (emphasis added).

24 See Diminescu (2007), cited in Hamel 2009.

25 As do some conventional commercial banks in origin countries, as mentioned above.

26 About half of the US Department of Homeland Security’s 2016 budget.

27 Established over 30 years ago and closed to the public and media, it is promoted as ‘the premier platform for relevant UK suppliers ... to demonstrate the opportunities presented by innovative cutting-edge technology’ (www.securityandpolicing.co.uk/about).

28 Horizon 2020, Project ID: 740593. See <https://roborder.eu>.

Increasingly sophisticated scanning devices are used at official border crossings for people and personal baggage, and vehicles and goods containers. These use x-ray, heat radiation and infra-red technologies as well as automatic licence number registration (ALNR) and Radiofrequency Identification (RFID, or embedded chips). Biometric information – fingerprints, irises, facial images and voice – is collected and stored.

Donald Trump's campaign promise to build a concrete wall between Mexico and the US has led to an active debate among US government agencies and the security industry on the effectiveness and cost efficiency of a 'virtual wall' that relies on multiple technologies versus a physical (concrete) wall (Nixon, 2017).²⁹ Without suggesting that the latter may be more effective or more efficient – let alone more desirable – there are concerns about 'virtual wall' technologies: dysfunctionality due to weather conditions such as winds or storms, or due to extraneous factors such as animals or dense foliage; technical problems with the software, rendering it slow or error-prone; and, most importantly, continued reliance on human interpretation of data, which is error-prone but surprisingly often neglected by border personnel who give it limited credibility. The Secure Border Initiative Network, an earlier project to install camera and radar equipment on towers along the southern US border, was initiated in 2005

under then-President George W. Bush. By 2010, cost and technical problems meant that only 15 towers had been set up covering only 53 miles of the 2,100-mile border at a cost of \$1 billion, and the project was cancelled.

The difficulties facing technological 'solutions' for border-crossing management are also illustrated by the maximum facilitation notion proposed for an invisible UK–EU border after the UK leaves the EU. It is argued that scanning goods and people will minimise – even eliminate – border-crossing time and disruption. However, the UK government has been unable to identify technologies already in operation that permit this, and eventually conceded they do not yet exist.

Notwithstanding its technical limitations, surveillance technology for border crossing control raises major concerns about potential impacts on privacy and human rights, not only of migrants but also of citizens. The physical range of technologies enables surveillance across entire border towns, including of local residents' daily activities, while the technologies can be easily adapted for policing uses by domestic security agencies unconnected with migration or border control.

5.2 Migration management

Looking at the broader migration management process, data processing technology in combination with

Box 4 Blockchain and migration

Blockchain – or distributed ledger technology – is still in early stages of development but it is considered promising for both migrants' rights *and* welfare. One application being explored is in digital identity, to address SDG 16.9 ('legal identity to all... by 2030'),¹ but extending naturally and importantly to migrants outside their country of birth. ID2020 was started in 2017 to create legal identities that are 'personal [unique], portable, persistent [lifelong] and private [access requiring the holder's consent]'. It uses blockchain and biometric data to underpin a decentralised and global 'identity market' based on 'interoperability' – that is, the ability of different IT systems and software to exchange data and use common information. Similar combinations of blockchain and biometrics could be used in asylum applications and migrant integration processes, where proof of legal identity is also crucial (Long et al., 2018). The European Parliament has set up a taskforce to discuss the potential of blockchain for refugee identification and related programmes.

Blockchain's indelibility and decentralised governance means it is central to emerging initiatives to enhance financial inclusion of migrants and refugees, and to manage public expenditures on these groups. The World Food Programme's (WFP's) pilot project, Building Blocks, in the Azraq refugee camp in Jordan, uses blockchain rather than smartcards to provide financial support to refugees. Under the scheme, WFP deposits vouchers directly into camp residents' virtual accounts for use at the camp supermarket, where residents are identified biometrically. WFP then pays the supermarket directly, eliminating banks and smartcards, improving security and efficiency, and saving 98% of bank charges (Kenna, 2017). Because records of all residents' transactions are retained by the system, blockchain (unlike smart cards) could enable migrants and refugees to build a consolidated financial history as they move across borders, operating the same virtual account. This would ultimately support their access to credit in destination countries. Blockchain could also enable safe and private transmission of remittances. Much will depend on the evolution of the broad stance of financial institutions and financial regulators towards blockchain: its potential uses in migration will inevitably follow from more general applications.

1 An estimated 1 billion people globally do not have a legal identity at present.

29 Trump demanded Congress authorise about \$1.6 billion for the concrete wall.

biometrics is increasingly used to lower administrative costs and enhance systems integration and coordination. Developed with Microsoft, UNHCR's proGres Refugee Registration Platform is used to process asylum claims and to provide food and medical assistance in more than 300 refugee camps in 75 countries. The EU's Eurodac database stores fingerprints of asylum-seekers across all member states. Germany's Asyl Online project is an effort to integrate all national databases containing migrant and refugee information.

It is not only in OECD countries that technologies are of interest. Large migrant labour sending countries, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, are increasingly automating their migration management systems. In Malaysia, where migrants comprise 15% of the workforce, a Foreign Workers Centralised Management System (FWCMS) has been developed to link migrant workers' 'compliance, security, health and welfare' across both origin and destination countries. Linking origin-country embassies and destination-country employers into the system allows comprehensive monitoring. In 2017, FWCMS won a digital innovation prize for government and citizen engagement at a UN-linked awards ceremony. Like the mobile phone, FWCMS may assist migrants' integration into destination countries and help them to access employment, insurance, or health services. But, simultaneously, it also enables authorities to track and monitor migrants for 'security' or related reasons.

Other technologies also have costs as well as benefits: marine search and rescue (SAR) missions that rely on radar surveillance and communications technologies are crucial to prevent tragic loss of migrant lives in the Mediterranean. But people traffickers depend on governments' and NGOs' commitment to SAR, which enables them to cut costs, putting migrant lives at risk by providing inadequate boats while supplying passengers with satellite phones to contact coastal patrols. These examples underline the unsurprising conclusion that technologies are instruments with ambiguous impacts and benefits, which generally depend on users' motivations – that is, the social and political context – rather than on the technology itself.

6 Conclusions and policy recommendations

Technology, innovation and productivity are mentioned in 10 of the 17 SDGs yet are absent from SDG 10.7 (on safe, orderly and regular migration) and from SDG 10 (on inequality) more broadly. Migrants contribute significantly to the processes of innovation and technological change, and that the use of technology is crucial for all aspects of migration, though its effects depend in large part on its users' motivations. Our analysis has shown how

important the technology–migration nexus is to the achievement of many SDGs (Table 1). And based on this, we draw several broad conclusions and provide targeted, pragmatic recommendations to policy-makers in destination and origin countries to help them harness the potential of both migration and technology.

Conclusion 1 Highly-skilled migrants make a substantial contribution to technology innovation in destination countries, especially high-income countries, underlining the importance of group diversity in creating new ideas and new knowledge

Highly-skilled migrants are deeply involved in R&D and innovation in destination countries, as members of teams producing technology across many activities and sectors. This group of migrants is also key to supporting ongoing development of domestic technological capabilities in destination countries, as founders, owners and managers of major global corporations. Workplace diversity resulting from immigrant employees contributes positively to creativity within teams and organisations and hence to innovation.

Recommendation: minimise barriers to highly-skilled immigration

- Destination countries should ease restrictive quotas on the numbers of highly-skilled foreign workers allowed to enter, and should reduce costly and lengthy visa application processes.
- Governments of destination and origin countries should explore the potential for entering into 'global skills partnerships' in which potential employers from destination countries financed training of highly-skilled workers in origin countries, only some of whom migrate, contributing to the pool of highly-skilled workers in both countries (Clemens, 2014).
- High-income destination countries, particularly English-speaking countries in which highly-skilled migrants are heavily concentrated, should expand the scale and scope of short-term academic and scientific exchanges and collaborative programmes, enabling cross-border collaboration on innovation and temporary rather than permanent migration of researchers and technicians.

Recommendation: mitigate 'down-skilling' of highly-skilled immigrants, so that they and their destination countries maximise their contribution

- As part of the 'global skills partnership', origin and destination countries should develop joint accreditation of training programmes and competency assessments to ensure that skills are transferable.

- Destination countries should strengthen skill-matching and other placement programmes to improve employment prospects for highly-skilled immigrants.

Relevant SDG targets

8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation

9.5 Enhance scientific research and upgrade technological capabilities in all countries

Conclusion 2 Migrants and diaspora groups are a significant channel for transferring technology back to origin countries, through transfers of direct knowledge, remittances and financial investment, and through support for enterprise development and for research and scientific institutions in origin countries

Diasporas and return migrants, mainly those who are highly-skilled, contribute significantly to the diffusion of technology back to, and strengthening of R&D and business capabilities in, origin countries. They do so through various inter-connected channels – direct knowledge transfers, diaspora inward investment and remittances, and diaspora networks supporting local enterprise development. The simple notion of ‘brain drain’ versus ‘brain gain’ needs to be set aside in favour of ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain banks’, which are potentially available to both origin and destination countries.

Recommendation: origin country governments should more actively promote and invest in diaspora networks and should partner with destination country governments to optimise the benefits for technology development from emigration

- Origin country governments should systematically and actively promote diaspora networks by establishing diaspora ministries or agencies and support diaspora business associations in destination countries, especially high-income countries.
- Together, origin countries and destination countries – especially the four English-speaking countries where most highly-skilled migrants are concentrated – should establish ‘global technology partnerships’ (parallel to global skills partnerships), which draw on the diaspora associations and groups that link the two countries.
 - i. Global technology partnerships should address scarcities in origin countries of technology service providers – which are essential for technology transfer – by helping local firms to source, validate and adapt technologies, and provide legal and financial services

to buyers. Diaspora associations should link service providers in destination countries with business development agencies and STEM and intellectual property institutions in their origin countries.

- ii. Operating within global technology partnerships, diaspora networks – particularly employees of large corporations with global reach – should also broker technology transactions that help to diffuse innovations *from* origin countries, particularly innovations that meet poor peoples’ needs in SDG-linked sectors such as agriculture, water, energy, health and education but which are often unable to realise wider market potential due to lack of finance or business networks.

Relevant SDG targets

8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation

9.5 Enhance scientific research and upgrade technological capabilities in all countries

9.b Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries

17.6 Enhance regional and international cooperation in science and technology and innovation

17.7 Promote environmentally sound technologies for developing countries

17.8 Enhance capacity building mechanisms and enabling technology, in particular ICT

17.16 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development

Conclusion 3 Technology, particularly digital connectivity using mobile phones, affects every aspect of migration

Digital connectivity enables access to information on destination countries before migration, on transport and security during migration journeys, and on integration opportunities and services in new communities and destination countries. Digital connectivity also facilitates ongoing links with, and transfer of remittances to, families back home, and enables migrants to remain deeply connected and engaged with communities in origin countries, so underpinning migrant ‘transnationalism’.

Recommendation: destination, origin and transit country governments should apply to all migrant groups the UNHCR’s connectivity priorities

for refugees: access, affordability and usability (UNHCR, 2016)

- Governments in destination and transit countries should strengthen partnerships with mobile phone operators to address ‘information precarity’ by enhancing access to mobile telephony and lowering its cost for refugees and all other migrants. Access should include free Wi-Fi provision in public spaces in destination countries’ immigrant communities (i.e. community and job centres, libraries, schools and places of worship).
- Governments in destination countries should provide public resources for the creation in multiple languages of ‘integration apps’ like Germany’s Ankommen app, as well as their maintenance to keep their information content updated.
- Governments in destination and origin countries should use public resources to support the development and distribution to migrants of fintech apps that would lower remittance transaction costs to 3% in line with the target in SDG 10.c. This should include support to ensure regulatory compliance of the apps and transactions through them within countries’ financial system regulation.

Relevant SDG targets

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies

10.c By 2030, reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances

Conclusion 4 Migration management by governments relies heavily on information technology, both in keeping people out and in processing migrants after they arrive. This raises concerns about migrants’ rights, but some emerging technologies such as blockchain may have potential for more positive applications for migrants and migration

Migration management technology illustrates clearly the potentially contradictory nature of technology: some technologies enhance well-being and enable realisation

of rights and capabilities; others are a means to restrict and limit well-being and rights. The border-crossing technology market is growing rapidly. Most technologies on offer aim to reinforce control over human and goods traffic but are not generally as effective or as efficient as intended. Migration information management systems rely increasingly on digital and biometric technologies. These facilitate systems integration and may assist migrants but also reinforce migrant and refugee management as control, both at the border and ‘behind the border’. Blockchain and biometric technologies may offer an alternative grounded more firmly on individual rights, enabling migrants more secure and portable identity documentation, which can help them enter and settle in transit and destination countries and enhance financial inclusion.

Recommendation: technological solutions to migration management implemented in destination, origin or transit countries need to be complemented by accountability mechanisms to fully protect migrants’ rights

- Destination country governments need to establish safeguards, including transparent public accountability mechanisms and bodies, to oversee further development and use of technologies for surveillance and border-crossing control, for access to mobile phone data of migrants (and other groups) and for immigration databases, to ensure that migrants’ rights and privacy are fully protected.
- Governments need to prioritise the development of blockchain technology for digital identification and for financial transactions and financial inclusion of migrants (and poor people in general), including for cross-border remittances.

Relevant SDG targets

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies

10.c By 2030, reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances

16.9 Provide legal identity for all, including birth registration

For very helpful and constructive feedback on earlier versions of this paper, thanks to Loren Landau, Iris Lim, Anna Lindley, Dirk Willem te Velde, and colleagues at the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). For great support, advice and feedback throughout the whole process, many thanks to Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Helen Dempster, Sarah Cahoon and Chris Little. And for excellent editing and production work, thanks to Hannah Caddick, Chris Little and Caelin Robinson.

References

- Agrawal, A., Kapur, D., McHale, J., and Oettl, A. (2011) 'Brain drain or brain bank? The impact of skilled emigration on poor-country innovation' *Journal of Urban Economics* 69(1): 43–55
- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined communities*. London: Verso
- Benitez, J.L. (2012) 'Salvadoran transnational families: ICT and communication practices in the network society' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(9): 1439–1449
- Bosetti, V., Cattaneo, C. and Verdolini, E. (2015) 'Migration of skilled workers and innovation: a European perspective' *Journal of International Economics* 96(2): 311–322
- Brinkerhoff, J. (2006) 'Effects of a long-duration, professional development academy on technology skills, computer self-efficacy, and technology integration beliefs and practices' *Journal of Research on Technology in Education* 39(1): 22–43
- Carling, J. and Schewel, K. (2017) 'Revisiting aspiration and ability in international migration' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 6: 945–963
- Christensen, C.M., Raynor, M.E. and McDonald, R. (2015) 'What is disruptive innovation' *Harvard Business Review* 93(12): 44–53
- Clemens, M.A. (2011) 'Economics and emigration: trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?' *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25(3): 83–106
- Clemens, M.A. (2014). *Global Skill Partnerships: a proposal for technical training in a mobile world*. CGD Policy Paper No. 40. Washington DC: Center for Global Development (CGD)
- Clemens, M.A. and Pritchett, L. (2016). *The new economic case for migration restrictions: an assessment*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9730. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- Clemens, M.A. and Sandefur, J. (2014) 'Let the people go: the problem with strict migration limits' *Foreign Affairs* (January–February) (www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2013-12-16/let-people-go?nocache=1)
- Collier, P. (2013) *Exodus: how migration is changing our world*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Collier, W. and Vickerman, R. (2001) *Inter-regional capital and labour flow across an international border: a European case study*. Centre for European, Regional and Transport Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury
- Dart, T. (2015) 'Inside the US “border industrial complex”: spy tech meets immigration crackdown'. *Guardian*, 26 April
- Diminescu D. (2007) *ICT and migrations: research program on the uses of information and communication technologies in migrations*. Paris: Fondation maison des sciences de l'homme
- Docquier, F. and Marfouk, A. (2004) *Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers (1990–2000): release 1.0*. Washington DC: World Bank
- Dumé, B. (2018) 'Folded graphene boosts energy storage in lithium-ion batteries'. *Physicsworld.com*, 31 January (<https://physicsworld.com/a/folded-graphene-boosts-energy-storage-in-lithium-ion-batteries>)
- EPSC – European Political Strategy Centre (2017) *Ten trends shaping migration*. Brussels: European Union
- Filatotchev, I., Liu, X., Buck, T. and Wright, M. (2009) 'The export orientation and export performance of high-technology SMEs in emerging markets: the effects of knowledge transfer by returnee entrepreneurs' *Journal of International Business Studies* 40(6): 1005–1021
- Frouws, B., Phillips, M., Hassan, A. and Twigt, M. (2016) 'Getting to Europe the “WhatsApp” way: the use of ICT in contemporary mixed migration flows to Europe.' RMMS Briefing Paper 2. Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council (www.regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Social_Media_in_Mixed_Migration.pdf)
- Gelb, S. (2016) 'Diaspora investment: making diaspora finance more productive'. London: ODI for Commonwealth Secretariat
- Ghemawat, P. (2000) *The Indian software industry at the millennium*, Harvard Business school, Cambridge MA, N9-700-036
- Gillespie, M., Ampofo, L., Cheesman, M., Faith, B., Iliadou, E., Issa, A., Osseiran, S. and Skleparis, D. (2016) *Mapping refugee media journeys smartphones and social media networks*. Open University and France Médias Monde (www.open.ac.uk/ccig/sites/www.open.ac.uk/ccig/files/Mapping%20Refugee%20Media%20Journeys%2016%20May%20FIN%20MG.pdf)
- Grillo, R. and Riccio, B. (2004) 'Translocal development: Italy–Senegal' *Population, Space and Place* 10(2): 99–111
- GSMA – GSM Association (2017) 'The importance of mobile for refugees: a landscape of new services and approaches'. London
- Hagen-Zanker, J., Postel, H. and Vidal, E.M. (2017) 'Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. In *Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI

- Hamel, J.-Y. (2009) *Information and communication technologies and migration*. Human Development Research Paper 39. New York: United Nations Development Programme
- Hoffman, M. (2016) 'The future of border securing technology is here and it's terrifying', VICE, 21 April (www.vice.com/en_uk/article/zngp34/the-new-frontiers-in-border-security-technology)
- Hunt, J. and Gauthier-Loiselle, M. (2009) 'How much does immigration boost innovation?' *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 2(2): 31–56
- Iannelli, O. (2018) 'The spread of apps to support new migrants: are they really helping?' Migrant Rights, 23 January
- Jiménez, T.R. (2018) 'A two-way street: how immigration shapes everyday life in Silicon Valley'. Migration Policy, 4 April (www.migrationpolicy.org/article/two-way-street-how-immigration-shapes-everyday-life-silicon-valley)
- Jumbert, M., Bellanova, R. and Gellert, R. (2018) 'Smart phones for refugees: tools for survival, or surveillance?'. PRIO Policy Brief No. 4. Oslo: PRIO
- Kapur, D. (2001) 'Diasporas and technology transfer' *Journal of Human Development* 2(2): 265–286
- Kapur, D. (2007) 'The causes and consequences of India's IT boom', in Baldev Raj Nayar (ed.) *Globalisation and politics in India*, Delhi: Oxford University Press
- Kapur, D. and McHale, J. (2005) *Give us your best and brightest: the global hunt for talent and its impact on the developing world*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development
- Kenna, S. (2017) 'How blockchain technology is helping Syrian refugees'. Huffington Post, 28 November
- Kerr, W.R. (2008) 'Ethnic scientific communities and international technology diffusion' *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(3): 518–537
- Kone, Z.L. and Ozden, C. (2017) *Brain drain, gain and circulation*. KNOMAD Working Paper No. 19. Washington DC: Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development: 349–370 (www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/KNOMAD%20WP19_Brain%20Drain%20gain%20and%20circulation.pdf)
- Kuznetsov, Y., Nemirovsky, A. and Yoguel, G. (2006) 'Argentina: burgeoning networks of talent abroad, weak institutions at home', in Y. Kuznetsov (ed.) *Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad*. Washington DC: World Bank 153–170
- Kuznetsov, Y. (2007) *Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad*. Washington DC: World Bank
- Lee, N. and Nathan, M. (2010) 'Knowledge workers, cultural diversity and innovation: evidence from London' *International Journal of Knowledge-Based Development* 1(1/2): 53–78
- Leung L. (2010) *Telecommunications across borders: refugees' technology use during displacement*. Melbourne: Monash University e-Press (<https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/15479>)
- Levitt, P. (1998) 'Social remittances: migration-driven local-level firms of cultural diffusion' *International Migration Review* 32(4): 926–948
- Loh, T. (2016) 'Digitizing refugees: the effect of technology on forced displacement' *Gnovis* 16(2): 49–57
- Long, K., Mosler Vidal, E., Kuch, A. and Hagen-Zanker, J. (2017) 'Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.' In *Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. London: ODI
- Lowell, B.L. and Gerova, S.G. (2004). *Diasporas and economic development: State of knowledge*. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University
- MacGregor, M. (2018) 'Smartphones: lifeline or liability?'. InfoMigrants, 8 March (www.infomigrants.net/en/post/7841/smartphones-lifeline-or-liability)
- McCormick, B. and Wahba, J. (2003) 'Return international migration and geographical inequality: the case of Egypt' *Journal of African Economies* 12(4): 500–532
- McKinsey (2016) *People on the move: global migration's impact and opportunity*. McKinsey Global Institute
- Meaker, M. (2018) 'Europe is using smartphone data as a weapon to deport refugees'. Wired, 2 July
- Molla, R. (2018) 'The top U.S. tech companies founded by immigrants are now worth nearly \$4 trillion. That's up from \$3 trillion earlier this year'. Recode.net, 12 January (www.recode.net/2018/1/12/16883260/trump-immigration-us-america-tech-companies-immigrants)
- Najam, A. (2017) 'America's Nobel success is the story of immigrants'. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, 28 February (<https://dornsife.usc.edu/csii/adilnajamnobelprizeimmigrants>)
- Naughton, B. (2007) *The Chinese economy: transitions and Growth*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press
- Newland, K. and Tanaka, H. (2010) *Mobilizing diaspora entrepreneurship for development*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute
- Nixon, R. (2017) 'On the Mexican border: a case for technology over concrete'. New York Times, 20 June
- Oiarzabal, P. (2012) 'Diaspora Basques and online social networks: an analysis of users of Basque institutional diaspora groups on Facebook' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(9): 1469–1485

- Panizzon, M. (2008) 'Bilateral migration agreements and the GATS: sharing responsibility versus reciprocity' *The Journal of Migration and Refugee Issues* 5(3): 70–130
- Polanyi, M. (1966) *The tacit dimension*. Garden City, NY: Anchor
- Robson, S. (2013) 'The technology aiming to help refugees'. BBC News (Cape Town), 13 December (www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25351763)
- Saxenian, A. (2005) 'From brain drain to brain circulation: transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China' *Studies in Comparative International Development* 40(2): 35–61
- Saxenian, A.-L. (2006) *The new Argonauts: regional advantage in a global economy*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
- Scheffran, J., Marmar, E. and Sow, P. (2012) 'Migration as a contribution to resilience and innovation in climate adaptation: social networks and co-development in Northwest Africa' *Applied Geography* 33: 119–127
- UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007) *Brain drain and brain gain: a survey of issues, outcomes and policies in the least developed countries (LDCs)*. Geneva (http://unctad.org/sections/ldc_dir/docs/ldcr2007_Manning_en.pdf)
- UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016) Connecting refugees: how internet and mobile connectivity can improve refugee well-being and transform humanitarian action. Geneva.
- UNHCR (n.d.) 'Connectivity for refugees' (www.unhcr.org/innovation/connectivity-for-refugees)
- Upadhyay, R.K., Soin, N. and Roy, S.S. (2014) 'Role of graphene/metal oxide composites as photocatalysts, adsorbents and disinfectants in water treatment: a review' *RSC Advances* 4(8): 3823–3851
- Vertovec, S. (2004) 'Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation' *International Migration Review* 38(3): 970–1001
- Wahba, J. (2007) 'Returns to overseas work experience: the case of Egypt' *International Migration, Economic Development and Policy*: 235–258
- Walden, A. (2003) 'Indian heart surgeon took talents home'. New York Times (national edn, print), 18 May (www.nytimes.com/2003/05/18/world/indian-heart-surgeon-took-talents-home.html)
- Wall, M., Otis Campbell, M. and Janbek D. (2017) 'Syrian refugees and information precarity' *New Media and Society* 19(2): 1–15
- Wang, D. (2015) 'Activating cross-border brokerage: interorganizational knowledge transfer through skilled return migration' *Administrative Science Quarterly* 60(1): 133–176
- Wasik, Z. (2017) 'Migrant crisis triggers a wave of tech innovation'. Financial Times, 26 October
- Woodruff, Christopher M. and Zenteno, ReneR. (2001), Remittances and Microenterprises microenterprises in Mexico. Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies Working Paper. San Diego: University of California San Diego (<https://ssrn.com/abstract=282019>)
- World Bank (2006) *Global economic prospects: economic implications of remittances and migration*. Washington DC
- World Bank (2016) *Migration and remittances factbook 2016* (3rd edition). Washington DC



A boy and a woman looking for water struggle with the dusty wind in Wajir, Kenya, 2011. Photo: Jervis Sundays, Kenya Red Cross Society

Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Emily Wilkinson, Lisa Schipper, Catherine Simonet and Zaneta Kubik

Key messages

- Climate change and disasters are, and will continue to be, major drivers of migration and displacement.
- The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. They are likely to live in high-risk areas, have less means to prepare, and lack information to anticipate, and respond to, a disaster. Yet they are also the people who will find it hardest to migrate.
- National adaptation strategies must help those who are forced, or choose, to migrate as result of climate change. They must inform migrants of risk and build their capacity to cope in new locations.
- For those who are forced to move internationally, bilateral agreements and international frameworks must protect their rights.
- Migrants can put additional pressure on infrastructure and services at destination. National policies need to factor in the needs and impact of new climate-induced migrants.

1 Introduction

This briefing looks at the anticipated impacts of climate induced migration on efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on climate change – SDG13. More specifically, this brief describes the SDG targets relating to climate change, and the particular challenges to each in the context of increasing climate-induced migration.

In this Introduction, we offer a definition of climate-induced migration. Section 2 examines the migration trends in climate-vulnerable locations, focusing on least developed countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Although there are few studies on migration trends in response to climate risks, there is an observable increase in external migration flows from countries most vulnerable to climate change. Section 3 explores the main international frameworks for addressing climate-induced migration: the Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Nansen Initiative and Protection Agenda. We conclude that none wholly captures the complex dynamics of climate-induced migration, and the different causes and motivations for leaving or staying. In Section 4, we discuss how the achievement of the SDGs – in particular, SDG13 – might face challenges due to the lack of strategies and plans that directly tackle climate-induced migration. None of the SDGs make the explicit connection between climate change and migration. Yet climate-induced migration must be included in national and international policy to ensure that those who are


forced or choose to leave, and those who stay, are not left behind. Finally, Section 5 offers three sets of conclusions and recommendations to build climate resilience for all, through measures aimed at helping people to adapt and minimise risk, wherever they live.

1.1 What is climate-induced migration?

There is no universally agreed definition of climate-induced migration. In this brief, we use the concept to refer to four broad categories: those displaced by climate-related disasters, who often move temporarily; those forced to migrate more permanently due to recurrent events; those forced to migrate to avoid worsening slow-onset deterioration of the environment; and those who ‘choose’ to move as an adaptation strategy, in response to environmental pressures and other factors.

Disasters have always driven people to leave their homes in search of safety. Between 2008 and 2015, an average of 25.4 million per year were displaced by disasters within and across borders. The large majority (85%) of these were climate-related disasters (extreme weather and related events such as flooding). Some people moved across borders but the vast majority move within their own country (Nansen Initiative, 2015; IDMC, 2016). Those that are forced to move often lose property, crops and other resources in the disaster and during the move (Wilkinson and Peters, 2015). However, this kind of displacement tends to be temporary: for example, major floods in 2010 in Pakistan displaced nine million people but most returned home within a year (Brickle and

Figure 1 Migration flows from economically and environmentally vulnerable groups of countries



Note: the V20 are the 20 countries considered most ‘climate vulnerable’. The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category.

Source: authors’ calculation using WDI and Global Bilateral Migration Database (downloaded on 15/11/2016).

Thomas, 2014). For some, however, the displacement is repeated or for longer periods of time, particularly when flood events become more frequent (IDMC, 2016).

This line is further blurred in the context of slow-onset environmental changes associated with climate change such as changes in rainfall predictability, salt water intrusion, desertification and sea level rise. Migration can be ‘forced’ when the situation is unbearable. Leaving can also be a survival strategy or more ‘voluntary’, where a tipping point is reached in the steadily deteriorating conditions and in response to opportunities elsewhere (Renaud et al., 2011).

Across the world, sea level rise will force people from their homes in order to avoid severe deterioration in habitat and resources and even risk to lives. These people may be unable to return due to the physical loss of land, or may need to alter livelihood practices in order to return. This is likely to be the case in some SIDS where land will be lost along the coasts and coastal livelihoods affected by salinisation and coastal erosion.

Climate change will be a major driver of displacement in the future. An increasing number of people will be forced to move as a result of deteriorating environmental conditions, loss of habitat and livelihoods, and extreme weather events (Milan et al., 2015). While projections of climate-migrants are unreliable and vary between 25 million and 300 million by 2050 (Gemenne, 2011), it is clear that migration and displacement in the future will be heavily influenced by climate change impacts.

To avoid average global temperatures increasing beyond 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, significant climate change mitigation is needed as well as measures to enhance the resilience and adaptive capacity of communities already suffering the negative impacts of climate change. Efforts on both fronts will be affected by the growing numbers of people moving and the changing patterns of migration.

2 Migration trends in climate-vulnerable places

The relationship between climate change and migration is complex and there are few reliable global studies of past and current migration trends in response to climate risks (Gemenne, 2011; Beine and Parsons, 2014; Cattaneo and Peri, 2015). Nonetheless, there is a marked increase in external migration from countries that are highly vulnerable to climate variability and climate extremes over the period 1970-2000 (the period for which we have

data on migration flows). Over this 30 year period, flows of migrants doubled, with the 20 countries considered most ‘climate vulnerable’ (known as the ‘V20’) having the highest outflows (see Figure 1).¹ In these countries, on average 10% of the population migrated in 2000. The trend is also increasing within LDCs. The LDC category of countries is highly exposed to climate hazards because it includes both SIDS, with high exposure to cyclones, storm surge and sea-level rise (Wilkinson et al., 2016a) and landlocked countries, many of which are semi-arid and exposed to desertification and drought (Simonet 2014; Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011; Guillaumont et al., 2015; Istanbul Declaration, 2014).

In SIDS too, migration levels have been high, rising fivefold over the period 1960-2000. This group of countries has seen the highest growth in out-migration per capita (see Figure 2). Future climate change poses a real existential threat in countries like Kiribati and Tuvalu – reportedly 70% of households would consider migrating to another country (UNU-EHS, 2014).

Over the last 50 years, migration has increased in absolute and relative size. However, the migration patterns remain similar: one-third of those moving from developing countries have migrated to the same ten countries (i.e. the destination countries change very little year on year) and most migration is regional and south-south. The migration flows data (Figure 1) represents the number of migrants moving from one country to another each year. The upward trend in migration flows from V20 countries, LDCs and SIDS (1960-2000) is also confirmed by the migrant stock data (the number of migrants in host countries, by place of origin). After 2000, the number of migrants from these countries rose even more sharply (see Figure 3).


The impacts of climate change on migration patterns are better understood within countries, where effects such as lower crop yields can be observed alongside decisions by families to diversify income and reduce risk through migration to other rural areas or often also to cities (see Box 1).

3 Climate-induced migration in the Paris Agreement and Sendai Framework

As work begins to implement the Paris Climate Change Agreement and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in national contexts, it provides an important opportunity to take stock of the implications of

¹ In 2015, the twenty member countries of the Climate Vulnerability Forum launched an official bloc for the climate change negotiations, known as the ‘V20’. The V20 countries define themselves as countries disproportionately affected by the consequences of global warming: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Kiribati, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Vietnam. The V20 group refers to DARA Climate Vulnerability Monitor Data Portal and the CAIT Equity Explorer portal via the World Resources Institute to assess climate change vulnerability. Nonetheless this criteria doesn’t seem to be an eligibility criteria to become member of the group; countries considering themselves as vulnerable to climate change can apply to be member of the group.


Figure 2 Migration flows as a share of total population from economically and environmentally vulnerable groups of countries



Note: the numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category.

Source: authors' calculation using WDI and Global Bilateral Migration Database (downloaded on 15/11/2016).

Figure 3 Migration flows from economically and environmentally vulnerable groups of countries



Note: the numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category.

Source: authors' calculation using United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015).

Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).

Box 1 Climate change and rural-urban migration in Tanzania

Tanzania is a LDC exposed to extreme weather events, such as recurring droughts and flooding, as well as slow-onset changes, such as rising temperatures and decreasing rainfall. Climate projections predict a temperature increase of up to 2.2°C by 2100 (Agrawala et al., 2003), a shortening of the growing season (Hulme et al., 2001), and altered cropping patterns (URT, 2003). Tanzania is highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture: the sector employs 70% of the labour force but accounts for only 23% of GDP (URT, 2016). Climate change is expected to decrease crop yields (Rowhani et al., 2011) and will therefore put additional pressure on the rural population. Given this context, climate change impacts are likely to impede poverty reduction efforts in the country (Ahmed et al., 2011).

To mitigate this impact, emphasis is on agricultural policies, such as increasing the use of fertiliser, irrigation or alternative farming systems (URT, 2007). However, progress has been slow because of a lack of funds at the national level (Norrington-Davies and Thornton, 2011). Opportunities for diversification into non-agricultural activities in rural areas are also hampered by the poor links between farm and off-farm sectors, as well as insufficient access to credit and infrastructure (Lanjouw, Quizon and Sparrow, 2001; Bah et al., 2003; Katega, 2013). For many Tanzanian households affected by weather shocks, migration is therefore seen as a risk management or adaptation strategy to climate change. Migration enables families to spatially diversify income and therefore reduce the risk that the entire household income will be affected by weather events (Liwenga, Kwazi and Affi, 2012; Kubik and Maurel, 2016).

Migration in Tanzania takes place mainly within rural areas. However, climate change can alter mobility patterns and foster migration from rural to urban areas, especially towards big cities such as Dar es Salaam (Liwenga, Kwazi and Affi, 2012; Kubik, 2016), which can offer better opportunities (See: Mbonile, 1996; Beegle, De Weerd and Dercon, 2011). However, many households don't have the funds to make such a move (Kubik and Maurel, 2016). In addition to acting as a push factor, weather shocks also undermine people's ability to move by reducing crop yields and eroding assets (Hirvonen, 2016). Climate change can therefore intensify the poverty trap experienced by rural populations.

Those who are forced into cities by adverse weather shocks may not be easily absorbed by the urban labour market – rural poverty can transform into urban poverty (WB, 2015; Kubik, 2016). It can also put additional pressure on insufficient urban infrastructure, pushing migrants into overpopulated informal settlements and further increasing environmental risks. Evidence of these effects can be seen in Dar es Salaam, where 70% of the population live in unplanned settlements, including those in low-lying areas susceptible to coastal erosion and regular flooding (Casimiri, 2009). The number of people directly exposed to these risks is expected to more than triple by 2050 (Kebede and Nicholls, 2012).

climate-induced migration for achieving goals and targets on climate change adaptation, resilience and disaster risk reduction (DRR).

3.1 The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement includes mention of the vulnerability of migrants (UNFCCC, 2015). Under the text on Loss and Damage (paragraph 50), there is a request to establish 'a task force [...] to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change' (UNFCCC, 2015). However, it does not specify whether movement is in response to extreme events or gradual changes; or if it is within or across national borders. Critically, there is also no mention of the positive effects of migration and therefore no recommendation to Parties on how to harness these.


At the national level, countries have developed Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), making commitments to actions they will take after 2020 (when the Kyoto Protocol ends) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and put CO₂ back into the atmosphere through actions like reforestation. The collective contributions of all

country's INDCs make up the overall global commitment to climate change mitigation from 2020-2030. Post-Paris, these national-level commitments are now being converted into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which include more detail on how the INDCs will be implemented – including the contributions of different sectors like transport and industry. Of the 162 INDCs that were submitted, only 34 referred to human mobility (see Figure 4). No European countries mentioned migration in their INDCs, suggesting that they did not think it would affect their ability to meet their commitments around reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

3.2 The Sendai Framework

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030 (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 2015) focuses on displacement in response to extreme events. It focuses less on those people moving due to/in anticipation of gradual changes in climate. Serving as a global blueprint for efforts to build resilience to natural hazards, SFDRR represents an evolution in the way human mobility is considered within global policy dialogues. Its predecessor, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR,

Figure 4 Inclusion of migration in national climate change commitments



2005) only recognised that forced migration, and efforts to address it, could increase exposure and vulnerability.

In contrast to the HFA, the SFDRR addresses a range of topics, including climate and non-climate-induced displacement after disasters as well as migrants' contribution to resilience at their destinations, all of which is missing from other global dialogues. The complex relationship between disasters and human mobility is well articulated but the SFDRR too fails to highlight the exacerbating effect of climate change and

the likelihood of increased forced migration in the future. Desertification and repetitive drought in the Sahel, glacial retreat in the Andes, water and soil erosion in low-lying coastal areas around the world are just some examples of the types of environmental risks that are not necessarily classified as disasters or extreme events.

As well as being considered in climate action and DRR, climate-induced migration is considered a protection issue and is addressed in this way through the 2015 Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda (See Box 2).

Box 2 The Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displacement

Established in 2016, the Platform on Disaster Displacement addresses the protection needs of people displaced across borders as a result of disasters and climate change. The Platform aims to follow up on work started under the 2015 Nansen Initiative, which revealed a general lack of preparedness leading to ad hoc responses, and implement the recommendations of Protection Agenda.

The Platform is built on three pillars: a Steering Group, an Advisory Committee, and a Coordination Unit, and has four Strategic Priorities:

1. Address knowledge and data gaps.
2. Enhance the use of identified effective practices and strengthen cooperation among relevant actors.
3. Promote policy coherence and mainstreaming of human mobility challenges.
4. Promote policy and normative development in gap areas.

Knowledge and data gaps persist, especially on cross-border movements, human mobility in slow-onset disaster contexts, disaggregated data, solutions and future risks. The Platform aims to address these gaps by mapping and consolidating existing data, and utilising existing data gathering mechanisms.

In most cases, people who are forced to leave due to disasters and climate change will not be considered refugees under current international law. Rather than calling for a new convention, the Platform supports an approach that focuses on the integration of effective practices into existing normative frameworks.

Finally, the enormous challenges that cross-border disaster-displacement generates are diverse. International cooperation as well as regional and national engagement is crucial. To this end, the Platform promotes coherence and enhanced cooperation across relevant global policy dialogues.

4 Climate, migration and the SDGs: SDG13

This section explores SDG13 on climate action (UN, 2015). SDG13 does not mention migration or displacement, or recommend the inclusion of this important phenomenon in climate policies. Other SDGs, specifically SDGs 8, 10 and 17, point to the need for facilitated, planned and well-managed migration policies – but do not make the connection with climate change. Therefore, the ways in which migration may be altered by climate change and the challenges this poses for policy and planning are not directly addressed in the SDGs. Nor are the broader challenges that human mobility presents to meeting goals on mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change.

SDG13 is exclusively focusing on climate change, and requires governments to ‘Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’. The goal is to be achieved through five targets. These focus heavily on the adaptation needed to deal with climate change impacts, and emphasise mainstreaming climate change in policies and plans, requiring capacity building, awareness raising and mobilising funding. SDG13 is supported by Target 1.5 under SDG1, ‘End poverty in all its forms everywhere’, which relates to building resilience of the poor to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.

Migration will affect progress on SDG13. However, given the uncertainty surrounding migration projections and where migrants will go in the future, it is hard to anticipate the precise impact of human mobility on achieving these targets. This section looks at some of the challenges for SDG13 posed by existing patterns of migration as well as those anticipated in the future, including away from coastal areas particularly in SIDS.

Target 13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and ‘natural’ disasters in all countries

DRR and climate change adaptation policies can build the resilience and adaptive capacity of individuals and communities and help them to prepare for and prevent displacement due to climate extremes. Therefore, policies aimed at reducing disaster risk can limit displacement. DRR policies commonly include structural measures to protect people and assets (such as dykes and sea walls) and land-use planning and relocation policies to limit exposure to hazards. People displaced by disaster often end up in hazardous urban areas where housing fails to comply with planning and building regulations, and basic services are lacking or provided irregularly (UN-Habitat, 2015; Wilkinson et al., 2016b). This increases the challenge for DRR. While measures to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity will be confronted with further difficulties in assessing the level of disaster risk (vulnerability or risk assessments usually being the

starting point for identifying suitable policies), and in providing effective early warnings of climate hazards and related health risks.

Pushing up levels of risk

New arrivals are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts for a number of reasons, including the fact that they are less connected to support networks and services than established city dwellers. In addition, the UK Government Foresight Report found that those migrating in ‘illegal, irregular, unsafe, exploited or unplanned ways’ are more likely to find themselves migrating to areas of high environmental risk, such as low-lying areas in mega-deltas or slums in water insecure, expanding cities (Government Office for Science, 2011: 104). They also come from other environmental, social and cultural settings and therefore, may be unfamiliar with how to respond to the unfamiliar climate extremes. For example, new arrivals in Indian cities were less experienced in responding to heatwaves and were among those most affected by the high temperatures of 45-48°C across cities and towns in the region in May 2015 (Burke, 2015).

Similarly, those left behind in places where outgoing migration is high may become even more vulnerable to climate change. In Bangladesh, coastal farming is being increasingly affected by sea-level rise and storm surges introducing saline water. The high levels of migration to urban areas as a result of this, is having a negative economic and social impact on those left behind, particularly women and children who are less able to manage the farming activities and deal with floods and other extreme events (Lazar et al., 2015).

Difficulties understanding risk

Risk assessments form the basis of national-level policies and plans designed to manage disaster risk and adapt to climate change. However, these are usually a snapshot of circumstances at a given time to identify where people are living in relation to hazards and their vulnerability or sensitivity to these – they do not reflect the dynamic nature of vulnerability and exposure.

Risk assessments rarely take into account migration patterns and fluctuation in demographics and any migration will affect the level of risk. There is some evidence that people who cope well with changes in climate are less likely to migrate (Koubi et al., 2016). Yet those who decide to migrate often do so because their livelihoods become unsustainable (Koubi et al., 2016). Farming practices in semi-arid areas, for example, are becoming less and less viable as drought periods lengthen. Understanding why people migrate – in any given context – is key to understanding the level of risk.

It is difficult to untangle the causes of migration because the relationship between vulnerability to climate change and migration is circular. People displaced

by an extreme event will often return home (Oxfam International, 2016), but this may change in the future as climate extremes become more frequent (Field et al., 2012), while this movement and loss of assets will make people more vulnerable to future climate change impacts.

Furthermore, like risk assessments, early warning systems for climate extremes are commonly based on past data of the types of hazards that occur and the population that might be affected. Migration can create new risks with people inhabiting hazard-prone and previously uninhabited areas, without drainage or sanitary services causing secondary health risks when there is heavy rainfall and drains are blocked and floodwater contaminated. The effectiveness of early warning systems for floods and related health risks will be severely affected by changes in population and by the likelihood of migrants not understanding the warnings and/or knowing how to respond.

Recognising migration as an adaptation strategy

Migration is not necessarily a last resort for people confronting environmental change and can be a powerful adaptation strategy (IOM, 2016). Yet facilitating migration when people decide to move voluntarily to seek more resilient livelihoods will require recognition of the challenges posed by migration and better infrastructure planning. Decision-makers will need to consider whether adaptation policy should help people become more resilient in a given location, or help people in leaving. For example, smallholders in fragile environments, for whom agriculture is already a tremendous challenge, will find it even more difficult to have a decent harvest in the future. The question is then whether investments in irrigation, more tolerant crop varieties and alternative crops are required, or whether these investments will only increase vulnerability over the long term. If these new crop varieties fail to produce or sell, people may become worse off and indebted if they have taken out loans to purchase new seeds or technologies. In these cases, support to migrate could be more effective.

Target 13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning

For many years, the international climate change community has been arguing for national development plans to incorporate climate change mitigation and adaptation. Countries can only hope to reduce the impact of climate change on development by considering climate change impacts in policies, strategies and plans. Development plans and investments that do not take into account migration as an impact of climate change are likely to cost more, be less effective, and potentially increase people's vulnerability to climate change. Local development plans, in particular, will need to take into account how

people move in response to climate change – whether this is permanent, temporary or seasonal – and how these patterns might change in the future (see Box 3 and 4).

Adaptation undermined by rural abandonment

Not taking into account rural-to-urban migration patterns in the future could result in incomplete adaptation plans, which fail to protect important economic sectors from climate change impacts. Agricultural policies that incorporate projections of warmer weather in the future, will be ineffective if people end up moving out, resulting in a loss of both resources and skills. An example of this can be seen in Rwanda, where a team of researchers are working with the agricultural ministry to incorporate climate information into existing plans to expand the coffee and tea sectors (CDKN, 2014). The economic development of the country is linked to these exports but both tea and coffee will be heavily affected by climate change in the future. With the increase in temperatures projected over the next few decades, the low-lying areas of current production of tea (around 1700 metres) will become less suitable for optimal production of high quality tea (CDKN, 2014). Adaptation plans consider climate change scenarios and direct impacts on crop yields, but not the indirect impacts of the decisions of farmers if they were to relocate to urban areas. Lack of adequate drinking water during dry periods, flash floods and landslides will affect all communities living in these areas – not just those working in coffee and tea plantations, and many may choose to migrate to cities where there are more stable sources of income. If adaptation plans do not address the multi-dimensional vulnerability of those living in rural areas – not just those of a particular farming activity – investments to adapt these farming practices may be wasted.

Failure to meet targets for GHG emissions

Migration, particularly large flows of migrants driven out of areas affected by disasters and conflict, could have an impact on GHG reduction targets outlined in country NDCs, although how significant this will be remains unclear. Rural-to-urban migration leads to higher incomes and greater CO₂ emissions, as seen in China (Ru et al., 2015). Urban low-carbon development plans will need to include population projections to ensure that GHG reduction targets can be met as the urban population expands. New residents will also put pressure on services, particularly transportation and energy: there may be a growth of vehicles transporting people from city centres to sub-urban areas, as well as greater demands for goods and services, all of which result in increased energy consumption. Planning for low-income settlements should include measures to increase use of LPG gas rather than fuelwood.

Box 3 Taking account of internal climate-induced migration in Tanzania

Tanzanian authorities have not, as yet, recognised migration as an adaptation response to climate change. The only official document that explicitly takes into account migration in the context of climate change is the National Adaptation Program of Action (URT, 2007). Migration is also viewed as a vulnerability, and not a potential adaptation activity. The Program of Action further stipulates relocation of vulnerable communities, in principle from coastal areas subject to sea-level rise, emphasising again the forced and not voluntary dimension of migration.

Tanzanians are already migrating as a response to climate change. Policy-makers need to integrate this reality into official climate strategy to better facilitate the movement of people. Furthermore, climate-related strategic interventions, as exposed in the Climate Change Strategy (URT, 2013) should, where relevant, take into account the migration perspective, including the upgrading of unplanned settlements and peri-urban areas. Employment-related solutions are also needed for integration of migrants into the local labour markets. The current Five Year Development Plan, which is focused on industrialisation, is a good starting point for this integration.

Despite extensive work on planning a climate strategy, the Tanzanian government has been less effective in its implementation (Daly, Yanda and West, 2015). These commitments need to be binding and further international financial assistance will be important to achieving this.

Box 4 Taking account of internal climate-induced migration in Kenya

Unlike other countries facing climate-change related risks, Kenya has recognised migration as a coping strategy. Several official documents, including the National Climate Change Response Strategy (Republic of Kenya, 2010), National Environmental Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2013a) and National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017 (Republic of Kenya, 2013b), refer to rural-urban migration as a response to deterioration of rural livelihoods due to environmental change, emphasising the challenges this might present for those left behind.

Some policies have been put in place to address disaster-related displacement and planned relocation (Republic of Kenya, 2012), including a special Resettlement Policy Framework (Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, 2016). The government considers voluntary and forced climate-induced migration as issues to be addressed in adaptation strategies rather than as separate problems requiring their own set of policies. The government acknowledges the need to understand these coping mechanisms and to identify alternatives to allow people to remain in their communities (Republic of Kenya, 2013b).

Kenya now needs to make these commitments binding. The recently signed Climate Change Act (Republic of Kenya, 2016), the first such legal framework in East Africa, although not referring to migration directly, could be a first step in this direction. Kenya's participation in the EU-funded project 'Migration, Environment, and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP)', is another encouraging sign of commitment to this issue.

Target 13.3 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning

Skills and knowledge, whether traditional or learned, are crucial in helping people adapt to climate change and cope with natural hazard impacts (Agrawal, 1995). However, migrants arriving in a new location may not have appropriate skills or understand their new contexts sufficiently to be able to overcome unfamiliar challenges. Education and awareness-raising must ensure that those new to an area gain the knowledge necessary to thrive. This may mean providing education in additional languages or with different, more culturally appropriate messages. This will include providing information to 'invisible', undocumented people whose children may not

be able to attend school, so that they too are aware of the risks to which they might be exposed, and what they can do to reduce their vulnerability. Spurring cultural change is necessary in some situations. For example, in Pakistan, women often cannot leave the home without a male relative – even in a flood (Drolet et al., 2015). In order to save lives, policy-makers will need to address these cultural barriers directly.

Targets 13a and 13b on means of implementation (finance and institutional capacity)

Financial support for climate-induced migration

The direct implications of climate-induced migration for climate finance are unclear and identifying appropriate measures to be funded by the Green Climate Fund

Box 5 Funding to support climate-induced migration

To-date, programmes financed by climate funds rarely address aspects of voluntary and forced climate-induced migration (IOM, 2016). The V20 Group, which brings together finance ministers to mobilise and stimulate climate funding, has identified migration as critical area of action. This is a promising step for allocating funds to address climate-induced migration in V20 countries. In addition, a number of countries – Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Maldives, Mali, Nepal and Peru – have applied to the IOM Development Fund (2001) to launch pilot projects that integrate migration and responses to climate change.

Migrants themselves offer a source of funding for adaptation activities through remittances. Asian countries have received high levels of remittances and in Nepal, which is particularly vulnerable to climate change, remittances accounted for 29% of GDP between 2013-2014. Around the world, remittances are used for basic needs, such as food, housing and healthcare, and are invested in assets (De Haan 2000; Banerjee, 2016). However, it is unclear to what extent these remittances are invested in measures that build resilience and adaptive capacity (Banerjee, 2016). The Nepalese Government has emphasised the role that governments and local authorities should play in supporting these transfers and in offering options for them to be used in concrete adaptation investment (IOM, 2016).

(GCF)² will be made more difficult by changes in population and energy use. Ideally, UNFCCC-related funds could be used to support climate-induced migration, helping people to move when they choose to do so, to help people adapt in destinations, and to ensure that costs of low-carbon development associated with new arrivals would be covered.

Funding is a crucial trigger for action, but sometimes measures are taken with incomplete knowledge. It is important to consider whether DRR and adaptation investments are actually limiting mobility and promoting activities that prevent resilience to climate change in the future – something that is referred to as ‘maladaptation’.

Capacity challenges in SIDS

In some contexts, capacities to respond to climate change will need to be higher – in particular, in LDCs and SIDS. Many factors make it difficult for people to migrate. However, there are also a large number of people considered to be ‘trapped’ – unable to migrate due to a lack of resources even when they would like to leave (Black and Collyer, 2014). In some SIDS, migration away from coastal areas will be essential and some islands will have to be abandoned entirely due to sea-level rise. This migration needs to be facilitated by governments in places of origin and destination, and will likely involve planned relocation (see Box 6).

Forced migration will require internationally agreed solutions and institutional arrangements to support those needing to move. The Loss and Damage Mechanism, under

the UNFCCC, is expected to do this, potentially including a means to compensate countries for climate change impacts. Yet agreement on how this will work remains in the distant future. Beyond simply ensuring that people are free to move, action needs to be taken before we reach the point of no return: people should be helped before they have depleted all of their capital, health and mental wellbeing.

Box 6 Avoiding the worst impacts of climate change: planned resettlement in the Maldives

After the 2004 tsunami in the Maldives, a government programme was put in place to move communities from smaller islands to larger ones. A total of 20,000 people were evacuated to other islands after the tsunami, and half returned to their homes a few weeks later. Many remained displaced because of the damage to the island. The government designed three types of durable solutions for those affected:

1. Rebuilding houses and facilitating return but in safer locations, where possible
2. Building houses on islands where people were temporarily displaced, and facilitating integration
3. Where returns and resettlement were not possible, building new villages and infrastructure on uninhabited islands.

Source: Duwat and Magnan, 2014.

2 The GCF is one of several funds operated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

5 Conclusions and policy recommendations

Building ‘resilience for all’ is akin to leaving no one behind. It will help to reduce the number of people displaced by disasters or forced to leave as a result of deteriorating environmental conditions and support those that do so in maximising opportunities and limiting the creation of new risks. For national policymakers, this means that adaptation policies should include awareness raising, capacity building and education on climate change to ensure that people understand the risks they face and the impacts that their behaviour might have on the environment, wherever they live.

National governments will need to negotiate durable solutions on resettlement and local integration to address the needs of those permanently forced out due to irreversible environmental change, including from some SIDS (Wilkinson et al., 2016c). International agreement around a Loss and Damage Mechanism is making slow progress, but will most likely focus on forced migration and displacement, where the climate change drivers are clear.

The following conclusions on implementing SDG13 are drawn from the research and evidence presented in this brief. Based on these conclusions, we make further recommendations aimed at national and local governments in climate vulnerable countries for future policy consideration.

Conclusion 1 Forced climate-induced migration and displacement can lead to further risk accumulation in cities.

Investments in building resilience and adaptive capacity could help reduce displacement and forced migration, limiting the impacts of environmental change, where it is not an existential threat. Displaced populations in particular often end up living in hazardous urban areas and their unfamiliarity with climate risks in these places makes them particularly vulnerable. At the same time, migrants often take crucial resources, skills and knowledge with them, leaving communities behind with insufficient capacity to respond to climate change impacts in those places. Investment in DRR and adaptation can help to reduce migration and the associated ‘risks’ by tackling the causes.

Recommendations:

- Diversify livelihoods in places that are likely to be most affected by climate change. People affected by climate change will seek to diversify their livelihoods and rely on remittances from relatives elsewhere to cope with seasonal variation, extreme events and longer-term trends. Adaptation policies can ensure income diversification into less climate vulnerable sectors.

- Promote livelihood options that are less risky. Measures to strengthen resilience need to go beyond helping people adapt within their current livelihood activities. These measures need to enable livelihood options that are less risky. This might include a switch to predominantly off-farm activities, and ensuring that people living in rural areas are better linked up to markets.

Conclusion 2 Climate policies do not take future migration into account because the timing of forced migration and displacement is unpredictable.

In some places, solutions are needed for whole communities forced from their habitats. The most extreme example is in SIDS, where residents of some islands will simply no longer have any land to live on, and will be forced to move. Unplanned, forced migration for which governments and destination locations are not prepared, will create problems for national and local governments that could result in humanitarian crises. With greater foresight and preparedness planning, significant financial and human costs could be avoided.

Recommendations:

- Ensure DRR and adaptation measures are flexible and take into account how movement of people – whether planned or voluntary – could affect these measures. Consider how disaster response measures and provisions can quickly expand in scope and reach to include new arrivals with different cultural backgrounds. Ensure adaptation and DRR strategies can incorporate undocumented migrants – i.e. not just those on an electoral or housing register.
- Policy-makers and planners to consider projections of future climate conditions and migration trends. Projections of migration patterns and population changes can be generated through models by looking at potential climate change impacts with and without adaptation investments. This would provide a more compelling case for investing in adaptation.
- Data gaps still exist, in particular on forced migration related to slow-onset changes in the environment, the role of remittances and the demographic dynamics of migrants. Data collection needs to be enhanced alongside improved understanding of these phenomena, to allow better planning for these changes.

Conclusion 3 Voluntary climate-induced migration can be supported and planned for as an adaption strategy.

For some people, migration is an adaptation strategy, helping families to diversify their incomes and reduce their vulnerability to climate change impacts. In the context of some SIDS, the ability to move is existential

and greater support to facilitate these individuals and families' decision to move is important.

Recommendations:

- Funding should aim to avoid vulnerability traps where climate change impacts deplete people's assets to the extent that they cannot afford to move. Better consideration of migration as a response to climate change – both extreme and slow-onset changes – and better financial planning is required to divert funds from adaptation to addressing a migration crisis.
- Consider whether development investments are making mobility more difficult and potentially leading to maladaptation. Measures specifically designed to keep people in place must also consider the consequences if they fail. For example, facilitating people's access to off-farm labour opportunities now may make them less dependent on failing agriculture in the future.
- Policies and funding is needed to support resettlement and integration of migrants into DRR systems so they are informed about the hazards, and can avoid behaviour that might even introduce new hazards or settling in places that actually increase their exposure.

Relevant SDG targets

13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries

13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning

13.3 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning

13.a Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible

13.b Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities

References

- Agrawal, A. (1995). 'Dismantling the Divide between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge'. *Development and Change*, 26(3): 413–439. Available: <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1995.tb00560.x>
- Agrawala, S. Moehner, A., Hemp, A., van Aalst, M., Hitz, S., Smith, J., Meena, H., Mwakifwamba, S. M., Hyera, T. and Mwaipopo, O.U. (2003). *Development and climate change in Tanzania: Focus on Mount Kilimanjaro*. Paris: OECD.
- Ahmed, S. A., Diffenbaugh, N. S., Hertel, T. W., Lobell, D. B., Ramankutty, N., Rios, A. R. and Rowhani, P. (2011). 'Climate volatility and poverty vulnerability in Tanzania'. *Global Environmental Change* 21: 46–55. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.10.003.
- Bah, M., Cissé, S., Diyamett, B., Diallo, G., Lerise, F., Okali, D. Okpara, E., Olawoye, J. and Tacoli, C. (2003). 'Changing rural-urban linkages in Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania'. *Environment & Urbanization* 15: 13-24.
- Balaz, V. and Williams, A. M. (2011). 'Risk attitudes and migration experience'. *Journal of Risk Research* 14(5): 583–596. doi: 10.1080/13669877.2010.547256
- Banerjee, S. (2016). *Understanding the Effects of Labour Migration on Vulnerability to Extreme Events in Hindu Kush Himalayas: Cases Studies from Upper Assam and Baoshan County*. Doctoral thesis submitted to University of Sussex, June 2016.
- Beegle, K., De Weerd, J. and Dercon, S. (2011). 'Migration and economic mobility in Tanzania: Evidence from a tracking survey'. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 93: 1010–1033. doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00105.
- Beine, M. and Parsons, C. (2014). 'Climatic factors as determinants of International Migration'. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 117(2): 723–767.
- Beine, M., Bertoli, S. and Parsons, C., (2015). 'A practitioner's guide to gravity models of international migration'. *The World Economy* 39(4): 496–512.
- Brickle, L. and Thomas, A. (2014) 'Rising waters, displaced lives'. *Forced Migration Review* 45. February 2014.
- Casmiri, D. (2009). *Vulnerability of Dar es Salaam City to Impacts of Climatic Change* (mimeo).
- Cattaneo, C. and Peri, G. (2015). *The Migration Response to Increasing Temperatures* (No. w21622). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- CDKN (2014). *Mainstreaming climate information into sector development plans: the case of Rwanda's tea and coffee sectors*. Future Climate for Africa Programme, Climate and Development Knowledge Network.
- Daly, M. E., Yanda, P. Z. and West, J. J. (2015). *Climate change policy inventory and analysis for Tanzania*. CICERO Report 2015:05. Oslo: Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research.
- De Haan, A. (2000). *Migrants, livelihoods, and rights: the relevance of migration in development policies*. Working paper 4, p.38, Social Development.
- Drolet, J., Dominelli, L., Alston, M., Ersing, R., Mathbor, G. and Wu, H. (2015). 'Women rebuilding lives post-disaster: innovative community practices for building resilience and promoting sustainable development'. *Gender & Development* 23(3): 433–448. doi: 10.1080/13552074.2015.1096040
- Gemenne, F. (2011). 'Why the numbers don't add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmental changes'. *Global Environmental Change* 21: S41–S49.
- Guillaumont, P. and Simonet, C. (2011). *To what extent are African countries vulnerable to climate change? Lessons from a new indicator of Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change*. FERDI Working Paper.
- Guillaumont, P. and Simonet, C. (2014). *Facing Climate Change in the LDCs: How to Implement the Istanbul Programme of Action*. FERDI Working Paper 94.
- Hirvonen, K. (2016). 'Temperature Changes, Household Consumption, and Internal Migration: Evidence from Tanzania'. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. doi: 10.1093/ajae/aaw042.
- Hulme, M., Doherty, R., Ngara, T., New, M. and Lister, D. (2001). 'African climate change: 1900-2100'. *Climate Research* 17: 145–168. doi: 10.3354/cr017145.
- IDMC (2016) *Global Report on Internal Displacement*. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.
- Katega, I. B. (2013). *Rural Non-Farm Activities and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: A Case of Selected Villages in Chamwino and Bahi Districts in Dodoma Region*. Dar es Salaam: REPOA.
- Kebede, A. S. and Nicholls, R. J. (2012). 'Population and Assets Exposure to Coastal Flooding in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania): Vulnerability to Climate Extremes'. *Regional Environmental Change* 12: 81–94.
- Kiunsi, R. (2013). 'The constraints on climate change adaptation in a city with large development deficit: the case of Dar es Salaam'. *Environment & Urbanization* 25: 1–17. doi: 10.1177/0956247813489617.
- Koubi, V., Stoll, S. and Spilker, G. (2016). 'Perceptions of environmental change and migration decisions.' *Climatic Change* 138(3): 439–451. doi:10.1007/s10584-016-1767-1

- Kubik, Z. and Maurel, M. (2016). 'Weather Shocks, Agricultural Production and Migration: Evidence from Tanzania'. *The Journal of Development Studies* 52: 665–680. doi: 10.1080/00220388.2015.1107049.
- Kubik, Z. (2016). *Weather risk, Internal Migration and Urbanization: Evidence from Tanzania*. Paper prepared for the Population Association of America 2016 Conference.
- Lanjouw, P., Quiwon, J. and Sparrow, R. (2001). 'Non-agricultural earnings in peri-urban areas of Tanzania: evidence from household survey data'. *Food Policy* 26: 385–403. doi: 10.1016/S0306-9192(01)00010-0.
- Lazar, A. N., Nicholls, R. J., Payo, A., Adams, H., Mortreux, C., Suckall, N., Vincent, K., Sugata, H., Amisigo, B. A., Rahman, M., Huque, A., Adger, N. and Hill, C. (2015). *A method to assess migration and adaptation in deltas: A preliminary fast track assessment*. DECMA Working Paper, IDRC.
- Liwenga, E. T., Kwezi, L. and Affi, T. (2012). 'Where the Rain Falls' project. Case study: Tanzania. Results from Same District, Kilimanjaro Region. Report No. 6. Bonn: United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS).
- Mbonile, M. J. (1996). 'Towards Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Labour Migration in Tanzania: a Case of Makete District'. *UTAFITI (New Series)* 3: 91–109.
- Milan, A., Gioli, G. and Affi, T. (2015). 'Migration and global environmental change: methodological lessons from mountain areas of the global south'. *Earth System Dynamics* 6: 375–388.
- Millock, K. (2015). 'Migration and Environment'. *Annual Review of Resource Economics* 7.
- Myers, N. (2002). 'Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century'. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* 357: 609–613.
- Nansen Initiative (2015). *Agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change volume 1*. Geneva: The Nansen Initiative. <https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf>
- Norrington-Davies, E. and Thornton, N. (2011). *Climate Change Financing and Aid Effectiveness. Tanzania Case Study*. Paris: OECD. Available: www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/48458474.pdf .
- Oxfam International (2016). *Building back right*. Oxfam, Joint Agency Briefing Paper. Available: www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-building-back-right-nepal-210416-en.pdf
- Renaud, F. G., Dun, O., Warner, K. and Bogardi, J. (2011). 'A decision framework for environmentally induced migration'. *International Migration* 49(1): 5–29.
- Republic of Kenya (2010). *National Climate Change Response Strategy*. Nairobi: Government of Kenya
- Republic of Kenya (2012). *Land Act*. Laws of Kenya No. 6 of 2012, Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting
- Republic of Kenya (2013a). *National Environmental Policy*. Nairobi: Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources
- Republic of Kenya (2013b). *National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017*. Nairobi: Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources
- Republic of Kenya (2016). *The Climate Change Act*. Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 68 (Acts No. 11), Nairobi 13th May 2016, 179–208.
- Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (2016). *Resettlement Policy Framework*. Climate Smart Agriculture Project (KCSAP). Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries
- Rowhani, P., Lobell, D., Linderman, M. and Ramankutty, N. (2011). 'Climate variability and crop production in Tanzania'. *Agricultural and Forest Meteorology* 151: 449–460. doi: 10.1016/j.agrformet.2010.12.002.
- Ru, M., Tao, S., Smith, K., Shen, G., Shen, H., Huang, Y., Chen, H., Chen, Y., Chen, X., Liu, J., Li, B., Wang, X. and He, C. (2015). 'Direct Energy Consumption Associated Emissions by Rural-to-Urban Migrants in Beijing'. *Environmental Science & Technology* 49(22): 13708–13715. doi: 10.1021/acs.est.5b03374
- Simonet, C. (2012). *Changement Climatique, Chocs Pluviométriques et Sécurité Alimentaire: essais sur l'usage de l'information climatique en économie du développement*. PhD Thesis, Université d'Auvergne-CERDI.
- UNU-EHS (2014). *Climate change and migration in the Pacific: Links, attitudes, and future scenarios in Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati*. Bonn: United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security.
- UN-Habitat (2015b). *Migration and refugees in urban areas*. Habitat III Issue Paper 2. New York: UN-Habitat.
- UNFCCC (2015b). *Draft decision CP.21 on Agenda item 4(b): Adoption of the Paris Agreement*. Proposal by the President. Available: <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf>
- UNISDR (2005). *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*. Available: www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf
- UNISDR (2015). *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030*. Available: www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf

-
- United Republic of Tanzania (URT) (2016). ‘*National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17-2-2-/21*’. Nurturing Industrialization for Economic Transformation and Human Development. Dar es Salaam: URT Ministry of Finance and Planning.
- URT (2007). *National Adaptation Programme of Action*. Dar es Salaam: URT Vice President’s Office Division of Environment.
- URT (2003). *Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*. Dar es Salaam: URT Vice President’s Office.
- Vearey, J. (2011). ‘Challenging urban health: towards an improved local government response to migration, informal settlements, and HIV in Johannesburg, South Africa’. *Global health action* 4.
- Warner, K., Kalin, W., Martin, S. and Nassef, Y. (2015). ‘National Adaptation Plans and human mobility. Disasters and displacement in a changing climate’. *Forced Migration Review* 49: 8–9.
- Wilkinson, E., Lovell, E., Carby, B., Barclay, J. and Robertson, R. E. A. (2016a). ‘The dilemmas of risk-sensitive development on a small volcanic island’. *Resources* 5(2): 1–21.
- Wilkinson, E., Kirbyshire, A., Le Masson, V. and Batra, P. (2016b). *Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience*. London: Rockefeller Foundation and Overseas Development Institute. www.odi.org/publications/10594-climate-induced-migration-and-displacement-closing-policy-gap
- Wilkinson, E. and Peters, K. (eds.) (2015). *Climate Extremes and Resilient Poverty Reduction: Development Designed with Uncertainty in Mind*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- World Bank (2015). *Tanzania Mainland Poverty Assessment*. Washington: World Bank Group. www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Tanzania/Report/tanzania-poverty-assessment-05.2015.pdf.



**Evidence.
Ideas.
Change.**

ODI is an independent, global think tank, working for a sustainable and peaceful world in which every person thrives. We harness the power of evidence and ideas through research and partnership to confront challenges, develop solutions, and create change.

ODI

203 Blackfriars Road
London SE1 8NJ

+44 (0)20 7922 0300
info@odi.org

odi.org
odi.org/facebook
odi.org/twitter



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC