Key messages

Adopting feminist foreign policy (FFP) in relation to the climate crisis involves a commitment to pursuing structural transformations to address climate-related issues both effectively and justly. FFP offers an alternative vision that can guide international action, and that can also orient domestic policy through its cascading implications.

As FFP states place a concern with intersectional justice and unequal international power relations, more can be done in international climate decision-making to centre feminist values such as: care, non-violence, participation, and recognition of difference. Doing so speaks to the 3Rs framework – rights, resources, and representation – that many FFP countries have adopted to translate feminist values into practice.

FFP can take action on the climate crisis through: 1) leadership on climate reparations and just transitions; 2) transformation of international law and institutions to remove financial blocks on climate action; 3) diplomatic efforts to help protect Indigenous peoples and environmental defenders from violence; and 4) creation of international intercultural spaces and policy-making structures.
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About this publication

This policy brief forms part of the ODI series: Where next for feminist foreign policy? and was developed from a set of closed-door roundtables with leading experts and feminist actors.

It aims to bridge technical expertise, feminist advocacy and global scholarship, and delves into emerging aspects of feminist foreign policy. This series intends to advance understanding on intersecting agendas to establish potential directions for future research and policy.

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About this policy brief

This brief outlines how states with feminist foreign policy (FFP), and those aspiring to adopt it, can take action to address the climate crisis.

Four key areas of work emerge from existing literature and insights gathered through one of ODI’s closed-door events, part of the series: *Where next for feminist foreign policy?*, hosted online between May and August 2023. ODI’s roundtable ‘How should feminist foreign policy support Indigenous and climate justice?’ convened feminist, Indigenous and environmental scholars, defenders, and practitioners from different global regions to discuss what they would expect to see as part of a FFP agenda.

We encourage policy-makers to read this brief alongside our FFP background note (Michalko, 2023), which outlines some of the key tensions and proposals about FFP implementation (see also Brechenmacher, 2023).
Introduction

‘We are not talking about a dream. We are talking about something that can be real – if we mobilise all our energies to make it happen’
António Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has issued its sternest warning yet on the climate crisis (IPCC, 2023). In the words of United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres, a dangerous future where the global temperature has increased by 2.8°C awaits unless we manage to ‘turn up the tempo, turn plans into action and turn the tide’ (UN, 2023a).

There is thus an urgent need for all countries to adopt bold and innovative policy responses that allow for effective and swift action to meet the goal set by the Paris Climate Accord in 2015: to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. As the climate crisis is not limited by borders, this is, in part, a call for transformative foreign policies.

A feminist foreign policy is a promising alternative approach to addressing the climate crisis, as it places a different set of values and principles at the centre of policy-making and action.

An FFP agenda aims to place intersectional justice at the centre of international relations. Embracing FFP means recognising that while the climate crisis affects all people and countries, it does so differently, due to unequal and intersecting power structures. FFP responds to the differentiated needs and experiences of countries and all people, including women and girls, Indigenous peoples and other marginalised groups.

FFP also focuses on unequal international power relations and encourages action guided by feminist values such as care, non-violence, participation, and recognition of difference (Enloe and Conway, 2023; Alwan and Weldon, 2017; Robinson, 2021). States adopting FFP thus commit to pursuing structural transformations that not only address the climate crisis effectively, but also justly.

In the context of a rapidly closing window of opportunity, and continuing lack of action at the speed and scale needed, FFP can offer an alternative vision that can guide international policy implementation, as well as steer domestic policy due to its cascading implications. States that have adopted FFP, or are considering doing so, have promising avenues before them to meaningfully address the climate crisis.
Context

The climate crisis that we are experiencing all around us – melting icecaps and glaciers, and worsening floods, landslides, droughts, crop failures, wildfires, storms and heat waves worldwide – is undeniably a human-made crisis (IPCC, 2023). The ways in which humans produce and consume is driving escalating pollution – i.e. greenhouse gas emissions – and rising global surface temperatures (ibid).

This is a crisis, however, that has not been equally caused by all nations or peoples. High-income countries have historically used more than their fair share of the global greenhouse gas quota – many with a colonial past that has contributed to their accumulative climate impact. G8 nations (USA, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Russia and Japan), for instance, are responsible for 85% of the emissions accumulated in the atmosphere from 1850 to 2015 (Hickel, 2020). Moreover, responsibility is not equal within these countries, nor limited to national populations. The world’s wealthiest 1%, for example, have been emitting – on average – more than a million times the average of those (in terms of wealth) in the bottom 90% of humanity (Maitland et al., 2022).

Similarly, this is not a crisis that affects everyone equally. Low-income countries are the most vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis, as are vulnerable and/or marginalised populations within high-income countries and emerging economies. Small island states are, for instance, particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and coastal erosion – yet the climate finance available to these states has been historically among the lowest (Akiwumi, 2022; Wilkinson et al., 2023).

Indigenous peoples are also among the most exposed to the climate crisis, as their way of life and their economic and political marginalisation increases their exposure to the impacts of the climate crisis. Yet, Indigenous peoples are also among those that have contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions, as well as being those leading the stewardship of ecosystems worldwide – both through their knowledge and direct political action (Furgal and Seguin, 2006; Etchart, 2017; IPBES, 2019; Leal Filho et al., 2021).

Because of existing inequalities and gender roles, likewise, ‘the climate crisis is not gender neutral’ (UN Women, 2022). Women and girls tend to be more at risk to the effects of the climate crisis - in natural disasters, for example, women are more likely than men to be harmed and/or to die (Neumayer and Plümper, 2008; Erman et al., 2021). This is because of their unequal access to information, economic resources and decision-making power, as well as mobility constraints (Sturridge, et al., 2022; UN Women, 2022). Evidence increasingly shows that the effects of the climate crisis are deepening gender injustices and inequalities too. Extreme weather events, for instance, tend to raise levels of gender-based violence, due to heightened socioeconomic instability and mental stress, as well as deterioration in law enforcement and social services (Daalen et al., 2022; UNFPA, 2023).
Based on the views of leading scholars, environmental defenders, and practitioners, as well as ODI’s own research, this policy brief suggests four areas of action that governments implementing or aspiring to develop FFPs should consider. These areas of work build on the proposal that adopting FFP is a commitment to not only pay attention to gender and other intersecting inequalities, but is more broadly about pursuing structural transformation on the basis of feminist values, such as intersectional justice, care, non-violence and recognition of difference.

All four areas offer guidance on actions at the international level, as well as on domestic policy, through the cascading implications of international commitments and actions. These areas, moreover, speak to, and span across, the so-called 3Rs framework – rights, resources, and representation – that many FFP countries have adopted to translate feminist values into practice (Michalko, 2023).

These four areas of work, however, are only a starting point for what FFP can do in relation to the climate crisis. FFP and FFP-aspiring states are well placed to drive structural transformations by: supporting climate-smart reform of multilateral institutions (Getzel and Prizzon, 2023; Segal, 2023); resisting the militarisation of the climate crisis (Philipson García, 2023); and by leading on policy that recognises the rights of (and guarantees equal access for) women and other marginalised groups to land and natural resources (Shadrack and Chakma, 2023; UN Women, 2023).
1 Demonstrate political will to act on climate reparations, pursue just transitions, and attend to current climate-related inequalities

To limit the rise of average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, in line with the Paris Climate Accord, current and future emissions need to be limited to what remains of the global carbon budget. As high-income countries have historically used more than their fair share of the global greenhouse gas quota, de facto appropriating the atmosphere (Fanning and Hickel, 2023), high-income FFP states can show leadership by embracing climate reparations, recognising their role in using an unfair share of the world’s carbon budget. Reparations especially concern the lowest-income countries, many of which were historically colonised by European powers. These countries have used the lowest share of the carbon budget, but they are in greatest need of financial resources in order to transition to low-carbon societies.

For climate reparations to reach their full potential, countries with FFP, or aspiring to it, should consider three key elements:

1. Reparations should consider and reflect the reality of historical colonial exploitation, as the colonial past of many countries is central to their unfair share of pollution (IPCC, 2023).
2. Reparations should be considered and extended not only to countries harmed by colonialism, but to Indigenous peoples who have been exploited by colonial powers and post-independence states alike.
3. Reparations should better reflect responsibility over offshore emissions and thus be based on calculations that account for consumption, not only production (i.e. where emissions arise) (Krishnan and Maxwell, 2020).

Looking to the future, advocating for, and working towards, just transitions to low-carbon societies is central. A just transition is one that respects environmental thresholds and targets, while also reducing inequality and increasing wellbeing: one that pays attention to, and supports, both ecological and human prosperity (Raworth, 2017). A just transition is also one that seizes opportunities to eliminate existing inequalities, such as gendered ones (Dupar and Tan, 2022, 2023), and where attention is paid to the potential injustices and harms that transitioning to low-carbon societies can cause. For example, critical minerals, like cobalt and lithium, are essential to the functioning of renewable energy technologies, but their extraction can be fraught with injustice. Mining operations are often imposed on communities without their consent at the expense of degrading their life sources, such as soil and water (see, for example, Jerez, Garcés and Torres, 2021; Canelas and Carvalho, 2023; Slattery et al., 2023).
Lastly, current injustices, such as the unequal strain of the climate crisis on different countries and its multilayered gendered impacts, must also be at the centre of FFP climate agendas. For instance, it is key that accessible and significant funds are made available to countries that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis (see the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index) and that these are gender-sensitive, applying an intersectional lens.

As concerns with intersectional justice, rights and access to resources are at the core of FFP, countries committed to, or considering, FFP can demonstrate leadership and tackle head on past, future and current climate-related injustices.

Policy recommendations that FFP states can consider:

- **Lead discussions on climate reparations** for low and middle-income countries and Indigenous peoples worldwide, based on an analysis of countries’ use of their fair share of the global carbon budget (considering consumption metrics). Advocate a systemic approach to reparations that focuses on resource redistribution and policy, and the transformation of harmful institutions and policies (Táiwò and Cibralic, 2020; Duncanson, et al., 2023).
- **Pledge and allocate finance to the Loss and Damage Fund**, according to their historical contribution to global greenhouse emissions and on the basis of solidarity and justice. Pursue diplomacy to support the fund’s operation according to principles such as accessibility, autonomy, and accountability, which support its ability to offer high-quality, innovative, and timely funds (Gallagher and Addison, 2022; CANI, 2023).
- **Respect people’s right to be consulted** and have a say in low-carbon transition plans and meaningfully address their concerns (Slattery et al., 2023); minimise as much as possible unfair distributions of the social and environmental costs of low-carbon transitions (ibid.).
- **Lead on gender-transformative decarbonisation plans** and invest in related policy development and capacity-building (Dupar and Tan, 2022; Aguilar Revelo, 2021; Anderson and Fischer, 2022).
- **Advocate for an intersectional focus on gender equality in climate financing** and multilateral climate funds (UNFCCC, 2023; Schalatek et al., 2015).
2 Drive the transformation of international law and institutions to enforce human rights related to natural resources and to remove financial blocks on climate action

International institutions and legal instruments have the capacity to support coordinated global action on the climate crisis. However, in order for them to do so justly, reforms must first be pursued to address power asymmetries and help remove blocks to much needed change.

Today, for example, private sector actors have the right to sue a country in an international forum when they consider its government has violated its obligations towards them. This is a possibility that the private sector has often acquired through bilateral and multilateral trade and/or investment agreements, and the inclusion therein of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. The ISDS mechanism has made countries financially liable to companies for investments and/or profits foregone, if or when they decide to suspend a project (temporarily or permanently) in their territory – even when this is done for the protection of the social and environmental rights of its people.

This mechanism is, thus, at odds with democracy. Companies can demand large sums in compensation, which puts governments under considerable pressure to let projects go ahead, even when this is not in the best interest of their citizens. This can also lead to the repression of any related protest (TNI, 2023). As such, the ISDS mechanism can deter states from taking a stronger stance against projects that negatively impact the climate (see Box 1).
Box 1. ISDS and Colombia

In the region of Tolima (Colombia), the South African mining company AngloGold Ashanti has been seeking, since 2008, to start the open-pit gold mine project ‘La Colosa’. The project would destroy agricultural land and protected areas of the Andean Paramos, deplete the region’s water sources, and release a vast amount of greenhouse gas emissions. Local and national organisations have been opposing the project since 2011. Throughout the last decade, they have achieved - despite being threatened, intimidated, and criminalised - a series of binding local referendums in which over 90% of the populations involved voted against the project.

The company has threatened to sue the Colombian state through the ISDS mechanism and demand compensation for its investments (almost US$1 million by the end of 2017) and potential losses. This puts tremendous pressure on the Colombian state to disregard its obligations and suppress citizen actions that are protecting key areas for carbon sequestration as well as preventing further greenhouse gas emissions. This follows similar action taken by multinational company Glencore (amount unknown) and EcoOro (for over US$700 million) in relation to halted mining projects in the country.

Sources: ABColombia, 2023; OCMAL, 2023; TNI, 2023.

International law could also be strengthened from a human rights perspective to increase the accountability of states and the private sector. This could improve the tools that environmental and/ or Indigenous movements have at their disposal. Companies, for example, could be better held accountable by countries with or aspiring to FFP for causing environmental disasters – such as those provoked by tailing dam failures (in the Philippines in 1993, Canada in 2014, and Brazil in 2015 and 2019) and oil spills (such as those in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and 2023).

International financial institutions can also do more to effectively address the climate crisis. Unsustainable debt levels, high interest rates, limited liquidity and offshore tax havens can hinder the ability of countries to finance their transition to a low-carbon society, especially those with lower GDP levels. Not only do these countries have more limited monetary resources than their wealthy counterparts, but they are often forced to borrow money at much higher interest rates too (Liao, 2023).

This means that low and middle-income countries tend to struggle to access the necessary capital to invest in climate adaptation and resilience. This only causes them to experience harsher climate-related disasters, which pushes them further into debt and decreases their ability to invest in climate-related policies, locking them in an unfair and detrimental cycle (ibid.). To ensure international financial institutions are aligned to the scale and speed needed to address the climate crisis, these can be reformed through proposals such as the Bridgetown Initiative (see Box 2; Keane and Remy, 2023).
Box 2. The Bridgetown Initiative

This initiative, led by the government of Barbados, proposes:

- to provide more immediate liquidity to support climate planning in low- and middle-income countries by rechannelling funds to subsidise lending and fund climate action and policies;
- to restore debt sustainability by supporting its restructuring with long-term low-interest rates and by including disaster clauses that allow for the diversion of debt payments towards disaster relief; and
- to redesign and widen funding eligibility in multilateral development institutions to account for a country’s vulnerability to the climate crisis and provide low-interest and long-term loans to fund climate-related actions and policies.

Sources: Liao, 2023; UN, 2023b.

Because of the concern in FFP with attending to power relations, as well as a focus on strengthening rights and resource access, states pursuing FFP, or inspired by feminist ideas, can lead on efforts to transform international law and institutions. Leadership on this issue can protect people’s rights in relation to natural resources, as well as support long-term national planning and improve access to financing for climate frontline states.

Policy recommendations that FFP states can consider:

- **Take action to limit the ISDS mechanism** and related instruments, particularly in cases when decisions are taken to abide to democratic mandates and/or to protect social and environmental rights. This can be done, for example, by supporting and leading on the use of plurilateral interpretative statements – that is, declarations endorsed by multiple countries that define their interpretation of treaties (or specific clauses within them). This will help to ensure that international tribunals interpret these in a similar spirit (Gertz and St John, 2015; Skovgaard and Gertz, 2021).

- **Champion the Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights** currently being discussed at the UN, and the need for it to include a feminist lens (BHRRRC, 2023a, 2023b). This treaty would strengthen the obligations of transnational corporations to minimise their environmental impact and to assume their climate commitments by taking positive actions to address concerns.

- **Lead conversations on rigorous debt audits** for low and middle-income countries to identify if and which debts should be cancelled because they impede a country’s democratic path to low-carbon prosperity. This would allow countries to redirect their resources to climate-related state action and policies.
• **Back initiatives that unlock finance, such as the Bridgetown Initiative**, and advocate for the transformation of the current financial global architecture in order to increase the ability of low- and middle-income countries to pursue climate-related actions and policies.

• **Support a UN convention on inclusive and effective international tax cooperation.** This would strengthen the obligations of transnational corporations to contribute financially to state resources, reduce tax abuse and the use of tax havens, and increase available funds to finance climate responses (Sokona et al., 2023).
3 Lead on diplomatic efforts and policy-making to help protect Indigenous peoples and environmental defenders from violence

Climate activists – diverse members of civil society active in pressuring/lobbying governments and international bodies to reduce global greenhouse emissions and stop deforestation – have been central to driving our responses to the climate crisis (Fisher, 2019; Tokar and Gilbertson, 2020; Hansen and Pollin, 2022).

Also on the frontlines are Indigenous peoples and environmental defenders protecting their territories – many of whom are women (Jiménez Thomas, 2021). Indigenous struggles continue to contest a lack of rights over ancestral and/or communal land, and over self-determination. Conflicts have also emerged worldwide against environmentally harmful development projects that are sanctioned by states, but which lack the consent of affected Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities alike. Communities leading these struggles have guarded and protected territories worldwide from environmental degradation – preventing, in many cases, greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to carbon sequestration and preserving other fundamental elements of ecological well-being, such as water and biodiversity (Almeida, et al., 2018; EJOLT, 2023).

Indigenous peoples and environmental defenders protecting their territories have invested not only their time, energy, and resources, but have also assumed this urgent work at great risk to themselves: of being intimidated, assaulted, criminalised and/or assassinated. While male defenders tend to face a greater risk of lethal violence, female Indigenous and/or environmental defenders often face gendered violence, expressed in smear campaigns, sexual harassment, and sexual violence (IM–Defensoras, 2013; Global Witness, 2023).

In 2022 alone, 177 defenders – many of them Indigenous – were murdered worldwide, amounting to a total of 1,920 people who have been murdered since 2012 for protecting nature (Global Witness, 2023). Of the 1,005 defenders murdered between the 2015 Paris Climate Accord and 2021, one in three were Indigenous (Lakhani, 2021).

The private sector, with its growing influence, has been a significant source of aggression, as have states. For example, in 2022, Global Witness could link agribusiness to 10 killings, the mining sector to eight cases, and logging companies to four (Global Witness, 2023). While two mechanisms to protect environmental defenders were created in 2018 – the Defenders’ Policy and the
Two core values of FFP are non-violence and an ethics of care. Governments committed to, or considering, FFP can put these values into practice, as well as strengthen people’s right to physical integrity, by improving protections from violence for Indigenous peoples and environmental defenders.

Policy recommendations that FFP states can consider:

- **Leverage influence to hold countries violating the rights of environmental defenders to account** and commit to not using violence against nor criminalising climate, environmental, and/or Indigenous activism and peaceful civil disobedience actions at home.
- **Organise international working groups** with environmental defenders and Indigenous peoples to learn what security means for them, what strategies they are already using and how existing protection mechanisms can be amended, or new mechanisms developed, to best support their strategies and attend to their needs.
- **Withdraw support through trade and diplomatic missions to industries** that are highly rejected in the country in which they operate (or are seeking to operate). Support should be withdrawn, for example, from Global North mining companies wishing to operate in countries like Guatemala and Argentina, where there has been widespread resistance to the industry (EJOLT, 2023), and from deep-sea mining in the Pacific Ocean (Pacific Blue Line, 2023).
- **Develop legal accountability mechanisms for companies working abroad** to be liable in their home countries for human rights and environmental violations. For example, European countries with or aspiring to FFP can work to ensure the European Commission’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive requires companies to adopt and abide by the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, and grants access to European courts to communities abroad affected by European private sector activities (Global Witness, 2023).
- **Support and/or develop direct democracy processes and strengthen state institutions – at home and abroad.** Support the advancement of people’s right to decide on matters with the potential to affect their natural environments, such as large-scale development projects, and strengthen state institutions – at home and abroad – by supporting/funding anti-corruption programmes, transparency mechanisms and judicial systems.
- **Advance diplomacy efforts to recognise the territorial sovereignty of Indigenous peoples** and to support Indigenous governance structures.
4 Support the creation of international intercultural spaces and policy-making structures

To address the climate crisis justly and effectively, it is crucial that representatives from Indigenous groups and other grassroots actors are included in key political decision-making spaces. This widens the range of possible climate solutions and responses, as well as strengthens the global democratic character of climate-related decision-making.

There are, however, significant barriers to the participation of Indigenous peoples, despite the progress made on paper in the last few decades. In 2001, for example, Indigenous peoples were recognised as a formal constituency at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Conference of the Parties (COP), recognising their right to observe the negotiations and lobby representatives. In 2015, the Paris Climate Accord recognised the significant role of Indigenous and local knowledge and actions in addressing the climate crisis (Lakhani, 2021). However, the cost of travel and the bureaucracy associated with attendance are prohibitive for many. For example, due to the existing accreditation processes, only official organisations can apply to participate in COP. Furthermore, many are only given partial access, or do not make it altogether, due to limited funding and unequal visa requirements (Lakhani, 2021; CS – Cultural Surviva, 2022).

Beyond removing the barriers that Indigenous and grassroots actors face in attending key multilateral climate events, it is also necessary to address the barriers that stop them from being able to participate meaningfully once they arrive. Current approaches to inclusion focus solely on increasing participation of Indigenous peoples, but leave unaddressed the fact that the very processes in which they are being included do not recognise and have space for different worldviews and modes of thought (Violeta, 2022; ICA, 2022).

As such, Indigenous peoples are required to engage in conversations on terms that are not their own. This approach tokenises Indigenous and grassroots representatives, allowing for the appropriation of Indigenous and local knowledge while their marginalisation in decision-making remains unaddressed – as repeatedly denounced by Indigenous leaders worldwide (Lakhani, 2021; CS, 2022; IEN, 2022; Violeta, 2022). Addressing both the ability of Indigenous peoples and other grassroots actors to participate in key decision-making spaces, and to do so meaningfully, could be at the centre of FFP agendas. This aligns with their concern with representation – according to the 3Rs framework – as well as speaking to the central role that the recognition of difference has in feminist thought (Fraser, 2007).

To ensure meaningful participation, especially of Indigenous communities, interculturality is crucial. An intercultural perspective recognises other worldviews, cosmovisions, values, principles
and structures, challenging dominant ways of thinking to allow for communication across different patterns of thinking (Tsosie, 2010; Lang, 2022). In other words, it means recognising and respecting Indigenous peoples, cultures, languages, practices, and decision-making structures. It also means understanding and engaging with different value-systems when making decisions on how to act on the climate crisis. Developing appropriate processes for intercultural transformation can be pursued both at the international and national level.

It is important to simultaneously incorporate a youth-centred approach. Young people – Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike – are crucial stakeholders in the climate crisis and already leaders in climate action, and as such it is crucial that they are able to participate in decision-making spaces.

To advance a concern with recognition and representation, FFP and FFP-aspiring states can lead on reforms that support Indigenous peoples and other grassroots actors to meaningfully participate in, and shape, discussions, and decisions on the climate crisis.

Policy recommendations that FFP states can consider:

- **Enable Indigenous peoples, youth, and environmental defenders to attend COP** and other key platforms by offering relevant funding and pursuing diplomatic efforts with host countries in order to facilitate visa application processes.
- **Work with Indigenous peoples to develop youth-friendly intercultural reform proposals for COP and other key platforms** that would allow them to participate in ways that are meaningful to them.
- **Invest in intercultural capacity-building** and policy development. Train government officials and representatives in interculturality and youth-centred approaches. This entails adopting a proactive stance to learn about the worldview, concerns, governance structures and challenges of Indigenous communities.
- **Support the recognition of Indigenous peoples in international forums**, outside of nation states. For example, support the creation of an international Indigenous People’s Forum within the UN framework that is by and for Indigenous peoples and not dominated by member states, and support proposals to give Indigenous peoples a distinct status in UN spaces.
- **Listen to and engage with Indigenous climate proposals**, such as those about leaving fossil fuels in the ground and indigenous-led energy policy (ICA, 2023a, 2023b).
Conclusion

Adopting FFP is a commitment towards building international relations based on equal power, intersectional justice, care, non-violence, participation, and the recognition of difference, as well as signalling an interest in pursuing transformative action. For states with FFP, or aspiring to adopt these policies, the four areas of work discussed in this brief are only a starting point to address the climate crisis. Attending to the 3Rs framework – rights, resources, and representation – on climate policy will require further policy action beyond these areas.

States embracing FFP do not only have the opportunity to individually lead on transformative action to bring about climate justice, but also to coordinate action among like-minded countries and stakeholders and persuade more countries to adopt a feminist vision and agenda to address the climate crisis.

FFP states, or those inspired by feminist ideas, can benefit from remaining attentive and receptive to the ideas of feminist groups, Indigenous peoples, and environmental defenders at home and abroad to expand the scope of potential solutions and ambitions of climate policy. The road ahead is challenging, but FFP and FFP-aspiring states are well-placed to pursue creative and meaningful action because of the principles, values and vision underlying their approach.

Being reflexive is important when pursuing this work: FFP and FFP-aspiring states will benefit from regularly analysing their stance and policies in order to assess their (intended or unintended) impact, as well as engaging with affected communities to understand the relevance and usefulness of their policies as the climate crisis accelerates and new challenges emerge. This can increase both their ability to respond meaningfully and effectively to the realities of the climate crisis, as well as to live up to the aspirations of feminist values.
References


